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ABSTRACT 
Arbitration has long been the preferred method of resolving commercial 
disputes as, at its best, it is both cheaper and quicker than litigation. But by 
the 1980s many international commercial arbitration cases were proving so 
slow and expensive that its advantages were being questioned. At this time 
several approaches were tried to make arbitration faster and cheaper. ‘Fast-
track arbitration’ was one of these new approaches. In the last 25 years fast-
track arbitration has become “institutionalized”, as an increasing number of 
institutions have enacted specific sets of expedited rules. Despite this trend, 
there is still uncertainty over whether fast-track procedures can become a 
viable alternative to conventional international arbitration. With more than 25 
years of practical application of FTA to look at, it is time to ask the question 
which forms the title of this thesis: Is there a scope for the wider application of 
fast-track arbitrations in the resolution of international commercial disputes? 
In order to find an answer, this thesis looks at the development of regular 
arbitration and why it changed from a swift and economic method of solving 
disputes into the cumbersome and unpopular method of the 1980s. We will 
then consider the various attempts that were made to improve the situation, 
culminating in the development of international fast-track commercial 
arbitration (IFTCA) that we see today. Having examined the defining features 
of IFTCA, the thesis will be in a position to weigh the evidence on whether 
there is a scope for the wider application of fast-track procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of methods for expediting arbitration has increased in response to 
concerns over the long delays and excessive cost of arbitration in the current 
international business environment.1 Fast-track arbitration (FTA) combines 
many of these methods in order to achieve advanced speed and economy. 
Thus, as we will see in this thesis FTA is arbitration where the parties have 
chosen to adopt an agreement with the specific aims of increasing speed and 
reducing cost, and where it is understood that the fast-track procedures to 
achieve these aims may restrict parties’ options in other areas of international 
commercial arbitration (ICA). 
 
This thesis examines whether FTA can effectively improve the speed and 
economy of international commercial arbitration (ICA) without reducing the 
traditional characteristics of ICA such as finality, flexibility and enforceability. 
Thus, the question is whether there is a scope for the wider application of fast-
track arbitrations in the resolution of international commercial disputes. 
 
Speed and economy are expected to arise from the parties’ elimination and 
limitation of some of the procedural steps, by comparison to regular arbitration 
where all procedural steps are normally permitted.2 In FTA parties insert time 
limits or procedural limitations for the conduct of arbitration, for example 
limited document production, a one-day hearing rather than a full hearing, and 
short deadlines between procedural steps.3 
 
What makes FTA different from methods of expediting arbitral proceedings 
which also promise speed and economy in ICA is that many aspects of the 
FTA process, such as shortened time limits and procedural limitations, are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Queen Mary, U. O. L. S. O. I. A., & White and Case LLP (2012) International Arbitration Survey: 
Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process London (SIA/WC Survey 2012) 
2 Ulmer (2010) pp. 33-45 
3 Kraft (2010) 
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applied wholly during dispute resolution process.4 Whereas, the methods of 
expediting regular ICA, such as identification by the tribunal of the issues to 
be determined as soon as possible after constitution or appointing a sole 
arbitrator, are applied partly depending on the particular circumstances.5  
 
This difference means that FTA is more robust and has a more rigid structure 
for achieving speed.6 But ICA is a flexible process where many procedural 
issues are decided after a dispute has arisen and during the preparation of the 
dispute resolution mechanism.7 Parties can create their own rules about how 
disputes will be resolved and even pick how many decision makers there will 
be and how quickly they will be appointed. This freedom is attractive and may 
even permit international businesses to conduct arbitral proceedings without 
the constraints of municipal procedural law.8 
 
However, adopting an FTA process specifically for promoting speed and 
economy in ICA may also create practical problems. For instance, 
comprehensively expediting ICA will reduce both the autonomy and flexibility 
of international businesses to resolve their disputes in a manner that suits 
them. Thus, in contrast to regular arbitration proceedings, once they have 
imposed shortened time limits they cannot easily extend them.9 
 
Also FTA will not be beneficial if it results in arbitration awards which are not 
final and globally enforceable. The New York Convention (NYC) made 
arbitration awards easily enforceable in most countries throughout the world.10 
International businesses are anxious to conserve litigation costs and focus on 
their core business but it is doubtful whether FTA awards will be as easily 
enforced as regular arbitration awards or whether FTA awards will create a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Glaholt (2008)  
5 See supra p. 22 note 1 SIA/WC Survey of 2012 p.13; infra p. 268 figure 22 
6 Andreeva (2008) 
7 Najar (2008) 
8 Craig (1985) p. 49-81 
9 Barrington (2009) 
10 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – the New York 
Convention- of 10 June 1958 (NYC) 
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streamlined procedure for enforcing parties’ rights in many different countries, 
or whether as a result FTA will achieve significant savings of time and money 
compared to regular arbitration.11 
 
Of course, parties may agree to FTA which has not been derived from the 
jurisdictional imprimatur of national legal systems and is not supported by key 
international conventions. In such an instance, providing the parties manage 
to convince the tribunal that they will voluntarily agree to the tribunal’s 
decisions, arbitrators may disregard the mandatory requirements of the law 
and issue an award despite the risk of it being unenforceable. But even this 
arrangement may lead to argument over whether precedence should be 
giving to the values of national systems or transnational norms or to party 
autonomy.12 
 
With these practical issues in mind, this thesis will discuss the effectiveness of 
fast-track procedures by assessing their benefits and disadvantages. This will 
allow parties to inform themselves about the risk of forsaking the security and 
certainty offered by ICA in favour of the advantages of speed and reduced 
cost which FTA appears to offer.  
 
In other words: 
 
Can FTA bring speed and economy without compromising the fundamental 
values of ICA?  
 
What is reasonable speed and economy in ICA? Although difficult to 
determine, it is not impossible. Thus, in its 2007 report on Techniques for 
Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration,13 the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Commission on Arbitration considers the freedom of parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Davis/Smit/Brown/Affaki/et al. (1994)  
12 Petrochilos (2004) 
13 Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration: Report from the ICC Commission on 
arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce, Paris: ICC Publication No 843, (ICC Techniques 
(2007)) 
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to set out fast-track procedures in the arbitration clause.14 The report draws a 
distinction between the techniques for controlling time and cost and fast-track 
procedures. Thus, FTA is only one of the techniques which may be used to 
achieve speed and economy, depending on the specific nature of the contract 
and disputes that are likely to arise.15 The report clearly recommends the 
parties to tailor their own FTA by picking and mixing among many of the 
techniques and methods for controlling time and cost.  
 
However, parties’ desire for increasing speed and economy needs to be 
balanced against unfairness and injustice, i.e. where it might conflict with due 
process, mandatory laws or institutional requirements.16 Since FTA is more 
likely to encounter problems with regard to the due process of arbitral 
proceedings, it is highly possible that a challenging party may try to convince 
the court or arbitrators that because of these procedures he has been treated 
unfairly.17 Although it is becoming more difficult in today’s arbitration 
environment to claim that fast-track procedure is unfair just because it is 
speedier and cheaper than regular arbitration procedures, such claims may 
still be justified, especially when considering the difficulty of assessing the 
suitability of fast-track procedure in the arbitration clause, which is agreed 
before the dispute has arisen. Thus, it is essential that the quest for speed 
and economy does not compromise procedural fairness if fast-tracking 
international commercial dispute resolutions is to achieve results that are as 
final, binding and enforceable as in regular arbitration.18  
 
In order to consider whether there is a scope for the wider application of FTA 
for the resolution of international commercial disputes, this thesis will examine 
on one hand thoroughness of fast-track procedures in comparison with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid. paras. 6 and 15 
15 Ibid. 
16 Giallard (1998) pp. 28-31 
17  Sattar (2010) pp. 51-73 
18 Rovine (1992) pp. 45-57; Davis (1992) pp. 43-50; Verbist (1993) pp. 543-545; Downie (1991) pp. 
473-488; Imhoos (1992) p. 135; See further at the special sections of 2 Am Rev Int'l Arb. Issue 2 of 
1991, and 3 ICC Bulletin Issue 2 of 1992; Davis/Ezratty (1992) pp. 141-142; Rovine (1995) pp. 286-
288 
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regular methods of expediting arbitration, and, on the other, the fundamental 
principles of international arbitration rules, laws and norms. Given that fast-
tracking international commercial disputes occurs in so many places and is 
subject to so many procedural and substantive norms, it is best to identify all 
relevant rules through case-by-case research, with resort being made to the 
major treatises, Internet resources and national compendia. Thus the thesis 
will refer to examples from leading jurisdictions around the world but does not 
aim to be a reference manual for the FTA rules of all systems or one single 
system. 
 
This thesis is also not aiming to outline the elements of court procedures that 
are ancillary to the FTA process. Such procedures include stay of proceedings 
applications, supportive court-ordered interim relief, court assistance in 
obtaining evidence abroad and procedural challenges to the FTA during 
arbitral tribunal is at his place. While these are important in their own right, 
they are only dealt with where they would impact upon an arbitrator's powers, 
rights and duties.  
 
The thesis structure is as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Speed and Economy During the Development of ICA: Arbitration 
has long been the preferred method of resolving commercial disputes as, at 
its best, it is both cheaper and quicker than litigation. However, when the 
framework for modern international commercial arbitration was established, it 
was not speed and economy that were paramount but rather finality and 
enforceability. 
 
Chapter 2 – Concern for Increasing Cost and Length: By the 1980s many 
international commercial arbitration cases were proving so slow and 
expensive that the advantages of arbitration were being questioned.  
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Chapter 3 – Avoiding Cost and Delay: We examine several of the approaches 
that were tried in the last 30 years to make arbitration faster and cheaper. 
 
Chapter 4 – FTA as a Paradigm: ‘Fast-track arbitration’ was one of these new 
approaches. In this chapter we examine the defining features of FTA in 
international commercial dispute resolution.  
 
Chapter 5 – Is there scope for the wider application of FTA: With more than 30 
years of fast-tracked international commercial disputes to examine, the thesis 
can now consider whether there is scope for IFTCA to be used more widely. 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Having reviewed the evidence this thesis will show 
that there is no reason why FTA should not be applied more widely to 
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 SPEED AND ECONOMY DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 1
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
 Speed and economy as a traditional feature 1.1
For thousands of years traders from all civilizations have used arbitration to 
settle disputes due to its speed and economy.19 In ancient times, village 
councils or tribal elders were petitioned to arbitrate.20 In Ancient Greece, 
under the famous Athenian lawmaker, Solon, disputes were referred to 
magistrates for quick and cost effective resolution.21  
 
At this time, the first step in the arbitral procedure was usually the taking of 
oaths. In arbitration between Sparta and Megalopolis, the arbitrators were 
required to take the following oath in which speed was an important part: 
 
“Every question in the judgement relating to the moneys and boundaries of 
Apollo I will decide as is true to the best of my belief, nor will I in any wise give 
false judgements for the sake of favour or friendship or enmity; and the 
sentence passed in accordance with the judgement I will enforce with the best 
of my power with all possible speed, and I will make just restoration to the 
god…”22 
 
Speed and economy was also the reason for traders of the Roman colonies to 
refer their disputes to the Praetor Peregrinus, a commercial judge based in 
Rome who decided disputes between traders.23  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hunter (1999) p. 2 
20 Born (2011) p. 2   
21 King/LeForestier (1994) p.40  
22 Tod (1913) p. 116 
23 Boardman (1993) pp. 31-32   
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In medieval Europe there were private courts that achieved speed and 
economy, by using a body of private commercial rules and principles, such as 
the Law Merchant, that were distinct from the ordinary law of the land. The 
merchant courts sat in fairs, markets, seaport towns and most other large 
centres of commercial activity.24 Merchant courts chose as judges merchants 
who possessed intimate knowledge of particular commercial practices and 
techniques. As Mitchell, a historian of the Law Merchant writes: 
 
“The summary nature of its jurisdiction . . . characterized the Lex Mercatoria. 
Its justice was prompt . . . and the time within which disputes [had to] be finally 
settled was narrowly limited.”25  
 
Maritime merchants, for example, demanded that disputes be settled “from 
tide to tide according to the ancient law marine and ancient customs of the 
sea … without mixing the law civil with the law maritime.”26 For the most part, 
the law merchant was administered in special quasi-judicial courts. There 
were also the courts set up by the merchants themselves at trade fairs, which 
administered a law that was uniform throughout Europe, regardless of 
differences in national laws and languages.  
 
During this period, international disputes revolved on the particulars of the 
trade and appeared to be settled best by the disputants' peers, merchant-
turned-arbitrators, who performed such services without charge or for only 
token remuneration.27 Sanctions such as ostracism and the boycott of all 
future trade ensured that traders would be held to the resolution dictated by 
the arbiters.28 In this way, disputes which otherwise might have damaged the 
whole industry were settled with a minimum of disruption.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Milgrom/North/Weingast (1990) 
25 Mitchell  (2011) p.12-13 
26 Mitchell (2011) p. 20 
27 Mattli (2001) p. 919-947 
28 Werner (1998) p. 22 
29 Krishnamurthi (1983) pp. 103-142 
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Another reason for using guild courts was that “under severest penalties, the 
guilds forbade members to appeal, in cases where they alone were 
concerned, to any court save that of the guild.”30 
 
With the development of international trade the seaports of England, France, 
Germany and the USA became the venues for many hundreds of arbitrations 
between foreign parties every year. These were procedurally and 
jurisprudentially akin to litigation but much quicker and cheaper. However, 
with the industrial revolution international trade grew rapidly, involving many 
participants outside the guilds which consequently compromised the sanctions 
which merchant-turned arbitrators could impose.31  
 
To resolve these new type of disputes the foremost jurists and members of 
the legislative assemblies of Europe and America came together to update the 
Merchant Law arbitration procedures to fit the needs of modern commerce.32 
In the mid-19th century the British Parliament gave arbitration added power by 
adopting legislation to overturn the English law33 that arbitration agreements 
were revocable by the parties and not enforceable by the courts.34 Over the 
next hundred years other countries took similar steps to advance the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards, motivated by business 
groups who lobbied for improved methods of resolving cross-border 
commercial disputes.35 
 
What was still lacking was a system of commercial arbitration that could cope 
with the practical difficulties of resolving international disputes and be 
acceptable and enforceable to merchants of many different countries.36 
Between the Jay Treaty in 1794 and the Treaty of Washington in 1871 there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mitchell (2011) p. 42 
31 Lalive (1998) p. 483 
32 Gennadios(1904) p.74  
33 English Arbitration Act of 1697 
34 Sayre (1928) pp. 606-607 
35 Born (2009) p. 49 
36 Lalive (1987) p.272  
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were many attempts to provide such an arbitration environment but they were 
mostly unilateral agreements covering only a few nations.37  
 
It was not until 1895 that the development of arbitration law in England 
allowed the foundation in London of the International Arbitration and Peace 
Association, which developed into the current London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), to cover the issues of many nations.38 Its success served 
as a model for the creation of several international arbitration bodies which 
still exist including the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce  (SCC), based in 
Stockholm (established in 1917); International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
based in Paris (established in 1919); and American Arbitration Association  
(AAA), based in New York  (established in 1926). These bodies played a 
crucial role in developing modern mechanisms for international commercial 
arbitration throughout the 20th Century.39  
 
Whilst there are a large number of arbitral institutions that followed the 
footsteps of those major institutions, the most important organisations which 
contributed to the field are: China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), based in Beijing (established in 1956);40 
United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL), based in 
Vienna (established in 1966);41 World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), based in Geneva (established in 1994);42 and Swiss Chambers' 
Arbitration Institution (SCAI), based on the integration of the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry of Basel, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Lugano, 
Neuchâtel and Zurich (joint together in 2004).43 
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 Speed and Economy as an axiom 1.2
During the development of modern international commercial arbitration the 
need for speed and economy was accepted without question.44  Arbitration 
always had been a less formal, quicker, and less expensive way of resolving 
international disputes, and the emerging institutions were committed to 
preserving those traditional virtues.45  
 
LCIA was the first institution to codify speed and economy of modern 
arbitration. The priority given to these advantages was clearly stated in a 
speech to celebrate the opening of LCIA in 1892:  
 
“This Chamber is to have all the values that the law lacks. It is to be expedient 
where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where the law is 
technical.”46  
 
The advantages of speed and economy of arbitration continued to be 
emphasised in the opening ceremonies of ICC in 1922.47 Praised by 
international traders for its effort in promoting arbitration as an efficient way of 
resolving international commercial disputes, ICC urged that an arbitration 
clause should be included in all individual business agreements “to the end 
that expense and delay incident to litigation may be eliminated, and that 
commercial arbitration may be adopted speedily in all international trade.”48  
 
At this time, speed and economy were achieved in a variety of ways.49 Many 
arbitration laws, rules and conventions were introduced to make arbitration a 
predictable and reliable dispute resolution process, which in turn encouraged 
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commercial parties to add arbitration clauses to their contracts.50 Thus, 
enforcing a court judgment in a foreign country requires separate litigation on 
the award, which often enquires afresh into the merits of the dispute and is 
typically more time consuming and costly than enforcing an arbitration 
award.51 Since ICA took place in one forum it could save time and money by 
avoiding the race to the courthouse by parties from two different countries 
which may also have very different laws.52 
 
To facilitate the time and cost management of the dispute, arbitration 
institutions took a more active role and established lists of arbitrators who 
could be relied on to be competent and who could be selected for their 
specialized knowledge in the field in which the dispute had arisen.53 These 
arbitrators conducted the procedure in consultation with the parties rather than 
following the rigid procedures of the courts. In addition, the private nature of 
arbitration ensured confidentiality to parties who might otherwise find 
themselves in the glare of public interest.54   
 
 Speed and Economy are internationally codified 1.3
In 1923, a number of important trading states with the help of ICC negotiated 
the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters.55 This 
was the first step towards creating an effective international legal framework 
for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. Among other 
things, it required contracting states to recognize the enforceability of 
international arbitration agreements,56 to enforce arbitral awards made in their 
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51 Wang (2000) pp. 189-211 
52 Lander (1995) pp. 167-172 
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55 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses Signed at a Meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations Held 
on the September 24, 1923 in Geneva. (The Geneva Protocol of 1923) 
56 Ibid Articles I-IV. 
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own territory,57 and to give the parties the autonomy to craft the procedures 
which would subsequently govern their arbitration.58  
 
In 1925, just two years later, the US adopted the first federal statute governing 
arbitration – the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)59 It was adopted specifically to 
overturn the hostility of the US courts to arbitration.60 The Act was followed 
with the establishment of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in 1926.   
 
In 1927, the Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
supplemented the Geneva Protocol.61 Where the Geneva Protocol required 
the enforcement of arbitral awards in the state where the award was made, 
the new convention required the enforcement of "foreign" arbitral awards 
within any contracting states.62 In addition it prohibited substantive judicial 
review of the merits of such arbitral awards in recognition proceedings with 
the term not open to opposition, appeal, or (other recourse) of any kind in that 
country.63 
 
The Geneva Agreements provided the legal framework for the enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements and awards for the next thirty years but 
practical problems remained.64 Under the Geneva Convention, the winning 
parties to arbitrations were required to obtain a leave for enforcement from the 
courts of the country of origin before they could execute the award overseas 
time-consuming process known as double exequatur.65  
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In the US, although the Geneva Agreements were enacted during the same 
time frame as the FAA, neither the protocol nor the convention was ratified. 
Instead the US continued to rely on the FAA to govern the enforcement of 
both domestic and international arbitration agreements and awards in the US 
courts and continued to rely on bilateral agreements for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards abroad.66 This led to legal disagreements in the USA 
on the validity of foreign arbitration agreements. In a 1927 article in the Yale 
Law Journal, one commentator noted that if an arbitration agreement provided 
for arbitration outside of the US (as was common in maritime transactions), 
the FAA did not authorize the US courts to enforce the arbitration 
agreement.67 The article noted, however, that the courts would have power to 
stay any US Litigation under section 3 of the FAA while the foreign arbitration 
was pending.68 
 
By the 1930s, the primary interest in arbitration was not whether cases were 
cheap and speedy (the Lena Award of 1930, 202 days)69 or costly and lengthy 
(the Radio Corporation of America v. China Award of 1935, 989 days).70 What 
the international business community needed was to be able to settle disputes 
with binding results.71 Only then would they get the kind of justice which would 
inspire confidence in the trading community and enable the smooth progress 
of international transactions.72 
 
In 1953, a landmark case highlighted the problems of enforcing international 
arbitration awards. In Wilko v. Swan73 the US Supreme Court held that an 
arbitration agreement between a securities broker and a buyer was 
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unenforceable under the Securities Act of 1933. For the first time since the 
adoption of the FAA in 1925, the USA courts held that certain categories of 
statutory, public-law claims were incapable of being resolved by arbitration.  
 
As world trade expanded after World War II, the ICC published a report in 
1953 in which it collected observations from many countries that were 
experiencing problems with enforcing international arbitration agreements and 
awards. The report culminated in a request for the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council to convene a meeting on the subject of international 
arbitration.74 It was suggested that ICA was open to frequent attacks and did 
not suitable for satisfactory award in terms of time and cost-effectiveness. The 
best precedent to quote in this respect is SEEE v. Yugoslavia75 where the 
dispute, started around 1950, produced an award in 1956 which was subject 
to so many attacks that—at least until 1990s—the winner did not succeed in 
enforcing it.  
 
In the spring of 1958, the United Nations hosted a three-week conference in 
New York, attended by delegates from 45 countries, to consider a new 
international convention on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. That 
conference resulted in the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - the New York Convention (NYC). 
 
The NYC introduced significant improvements over the Geneva Protocol and 
Convention.76 It addressed the enforcement of both arbitration agreements 
and arbitration awards, broadened the definition of arbitral awards covered, 
shifted the burden from the party seeking enforcement of an arbitral award to 
the party resisting enforcement, recognized the parties' autonomy to 
determine arbitral procedures, the procedural law of the arbitration and the 
law governing the arbitration agreement, and eliminated the requirement of 
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double exequatur which had required the party seeking enforcement of an 
arbitral award to first have the award confirmed in the arbitral seat.77 
 
Despite these benefits and the pressing need for international agreement to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards, only 24 of the 45 delegates originally signed 
the NYC.78 At that time, the legal frameworks of NYC were seen too liberal 
and many countries preferred to remain on the principle of bilateral reciprocity 
agreement for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards.79 
Over the next twelve years only 16 more countries ratified the Convention.  
 
The advantages of NYC, during 1960s, therefore remained potential until the 
necessary legal framework can be internationally secured. This legal 
framework should at the very minimum provide that the commitment to 
arbitrate is enforceable and that the arbitral decision may be executed in 
foreign countries, precluding the possibility that a national court has grounds 
to review the merits of the case.  
 
This was especially true with the countries in transition where the only way 
arbitrators would see their awards enforced was if they gave courts clear 
reasons for why an international award had been made between two foreign 
parties.80 The courts would agree with their logic and thus uphold the award.81 
Accordingly, arbitrators gave extra attention to procedural details to boost the 
confidence in their decisions in various national courts.82 
 
Indeed, during the 1960s only a few per cent of arbitration clauses in 
international contracts specifically contained provisions to save time and cost.   
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In the 70s and 80s successive GATT Trade Rounds (Dillon Round, Kennedy 
Round, Tokyo Round, Uruguay Round)83 resulted in steep increases in cross-
border trade and investment activities throughout the world.84 Emerging 
markets, such as Russia, China, India and Latin America and new financial 
products like derivatives and joint ventures, and new business strategies such 
as franchising and mergers and acquisitions contributed to this rapid increase 
between 1970 and 1990 as did like intellectual property disputes of WIPO in 
90s and the Internet disputes of ICANN in 2000s.85 Inevitably, there was a 
steep increase in the number, size and complexity of the cases submitted to 
international commercial arbitration.86 In the 54 years between 1922 and 1976 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), had roughly 3,000 cases filed; 
it took only 11 years to file the following 3,000.87 Thereafter, rapid growth of 
the number international commercial arbitrations continued. 
Figure 1: ICC Case Numbers between 1977 and 2011
Source: ICC Caseload Statistics (Red bars show each time the total increased by 3000 
cases) 
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Pressed by the international business community, several countries who once 
hesitated to ratify the NYC now reconsidered their decision and became 
signatories to the Convention.88  Thus the US, who abstained from the vote 
approving the Convention, changed its position in 1970 and acceded to the 
Convention. Many other countries followed as of today 149 countries are 
ratified the NYC.89 
 
1.3.1 Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
For the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the NYC contains 
internationally uniform provisions; however, it also leaves a number of matters 
to be determined by national laws.90 The most important role is played by the 
law applicable to the arbitration agreement.91 Article V (l)(a) of the NYC 
specifies that the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is "the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, ... the law 
of the country where the award was made."92 
 
The Convention also provides for conditions that need to be met by an 
arbitration agreement. Article II (3) states that a court must refer the parties to 
arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is "null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed".93 The words "incapable of being performed" 
would seem to apply to those cases where the arbitration cannot be effectively 
set into motion. This may happen either where the arbitration clause is too 
vaguely worded or where other terms of the contract contradict the parties' 
intention to arbitrate.94 However, the possibility of a lack of financial resources 
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to satisfy an award must not be deemed as rendering an arbitration 
agreement incapable of being performed within the meaning of Article II (3). 
 
Furthermore, the conditions concerning the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement are not limited to this phrase.95 Article II (3) also states "an 
agreement within the meaning of this article". This phrase incorporates, as 
conditions for referral to arbitration, three other conditions relating to the 
arbitration agreement mentioned in first two paragraphs of Article II: 96   
• the difference must arise in respect of a defined legal relationship  
• the subject matter of the agreement must be capable of settlement by 
arbitration   
• the arbitration agreement must be in writing  
 
It is obvious that arbitration can take place only if there is a dispute between 
the parties which has arisen in respect of a defined legal relationship. In other 
words, the formulation of an arbitration agreement must be sufficiently broad 
to cover the dispute.97 Whether or not a dispute falls under the agreement 
would appear to be a matter of interpretation.98 The courts, however, have 
resorted o domestic law for resolving the question of whether or not a certain 
claim comes within the purview of an arbitration agreement. 99 
 
In 1972, in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.100 the US Supreme Court 
upheld a forum selection clause providing for litigation in a foreign court. The 
Court's decision demonstrated its acceptance of the realities of globalization 
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and the need for US courts to give effect to dispute resolution provisions in 
cross-border transactions. 
 
In 1974, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver101 a US company initiated litigation in a 
US district court against a German vendor, alleging fraudulent 
misrepresentation over the sale of a business and asserting claims under US 
securities laws. The parties' contract contained an arbitral agreement 
providing for arbitration in Paris under ICC rules and the German company 
petitioned the US court to enforce the provisions of this agreement.102 Scherk 
thus brought into focus the conflict between, on the one hand, the policies 
underlying the Supreme Court’s non-Arbitrability holding in Wilko v. Swan103 of 
1953 and, on the other hand, the treaty obligation of the NYC (and the pro-
arbitration policies of the FAA) as well as the Court's recognition of the needs 
of international business in M/S Bremen.104 
 
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver the Court rejected the precedent of Wilko v. 
Swan,105 which involved solely US parties and a dispute involving US property 
under U.S law and instead placed considerable weight on the fact that the 
transaction in Scherk was truly international.106 Citing its decision in M/S 
Bremen107 the Court reasoned that the enforcement of international arbitration 
agreements was critical for the conduct of international business transactions. 
 
Ten years later, in 1985, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.108 the Court was confronted with a similar case involving claims 
under the US antitrust laws. In Mitsubishi Motors, a US distributor asserted 
claims in a US district court against a Japanese company under the US 
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antitrust laws.109 The Japanese company sought to enforce the parties' 
arbitration agreement, which provided for arbitration in Japan.110 Given that 
the court acknowledged the importance of the antitrust law to US public policy, 
the dissenting opinion would have held that an arbitration clause should not 
normally be construed to cover a statutory remedy that it does not expressly 
identify thus rejecting the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal.111 The majority 
disagreed. As in Scherk, the court decided that enforcing arbitration was vital 
in promoting international commercial transactions.   
 
Article II (1) requires that the arbitration agreement must deal with a subject 
matter which is capable of settlement by arbitration, i.e., the question of 
Arbitrability.112 Although the Convention is silent on the issue as to which law 
should be applied in determining the arbitrability of an agreement, the 
Mitsibushi Motors verdict encouraged a steady trend towards a more liberal 
approach to Arbitrability in most countries.113 Notwithstanding, it must be 
presumed that—for the enforcement of an arbitration agreement—the law of 
the country where the enforcement is sought should govern the question. 
 
Today, most claims are arbitrable, at least in the international commercial 
context.114 For example, in France, a country that has played a large role in 
the development of international commercial arbitration,115 there is a strong 
presumption in favour of enforcing arbitration agreements.116 Although the 
French Civil Code prohibits public entities from entering into arbitration 
agreements “in all matters in which public policy is concerned,”117 the French 
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courts have construed this limitation quite narrowly.118 In practice, the French 
approach is indistinguishable from Mitsubishi Motors.119  Similarly, Germany 
amended its arbitration law to substantially expand the concept of 
Arbitrability.120 Under the 1998 law, which is modelled on the UNCITRAL 
Model Arbitration Law, arbitration agreements can extend generally to any 
claim involving an economic interest.121  
 
A number of other jurisdictions followed suit demonstrating that broad 
categories of disputes were arbitrable.122 Providing there was no express 
legislative exclusion of a particular claim or subject matter from arbitration.123 
This international consensus was a big step in reducing unnecessary cost and 
delay.124  
 
1.3.2 Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The decision whether to enforce an award presents a similar choice.  The 
domestic court can defer to the international tribunal and require the parties to 
comply with the award or ignore the tribunal’s ruling and require the parties to 
litigate in the domestic forum. Contemporary principles favour the international 
regime. The NYC creates a clear presumption in favour of enforcing awards  
and many NYC member countries have endorsed this.125 Thus, any award 
made by an arbitral tribunal in a country that has ratified NYC will, 
theoretically, be enforceable in the courts of all other signatory countries, 
subject only to certain limited exceptions. By contrast, as we have seen 
earlier, there is no similar multi-lateral agreement with respect to the 
recognition and enforcement of court judgments.  
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The underlying provision regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards is 
Article III of the NYC. In Article IV, the Convention specifies the documents to 
be supplied by the party seeking recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award. 
 
This article was set up to facilitate the request for enforcement by requiring a 
minimum of conditions to be fulfilled by the party seeking enforcement. It 
should be emphasized that the conditions mentioned in Article IV are the only 
conditions with which the party seeking enforcement of a Convention award 
has to comply.126 It also supersedes any domestic law with respect to 
conditions.127 However, the failure to submit the documents, mentioned in 
Article IV (1), does not result in the automatic dismissal of the request for 
enforcement and, rather, may be cured during the proceedings.128 
 
The NYC further lays down the grounds under which the court, where the 
enforcement is sought, may refuse to enforce the award.129 The grounds for 
refusal of enforcement are incorporated in Article V and are divided into two 
groups: first, the grounds for refusal of enforcement which are to be proven by 
the respondent;130 and second, those which only concern violations of public 
policy of the law of the forum state (on which the court may refuse 
enforcement on its own motion).131 The grounds for refusal mentioned in 
Article V are exclusive. Enforcement may be refused only if the party against 
whom the award is invoked is able to prove one of the grounds listed in Article 
V (1) or if the court finds that the enforcement of the award would violate 
public policy (Article V (2)). 
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It should be noted that the opening lines of both the first and the second 
paragraphs of Article V employ a permissive rather that mandatory language: 
enforcement "may be" refused. For the first paragraph, this means that even if 
a party against whom the award is invoked proves the existence of one of the 
grounds to refuse enforcement, the court still has a certain amount of 
discretion to overrule the defence and to grant enforcement of the award. For 
the second paragraph, this means that a court may decide that—although the 
award would violate the domestic public policy of the court's own law—the 
violation is not such as to prevent enforcement of the award in international 
relations. 
 
Accordingly, many national laws adopt a pro-arbitration stance.132 For 
example, in countries that have adopted arbitration laws based on the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law,133 and have thus made it a (part of) domestic law, the 
enforcement of foreign awards may be achieved on exactly the same bases 
as under the Convention without any need for reference thereto.134 In France, 
by virtue of the 1981 Decree on International Arbitration, foreign awards are 
more liberally enforced than under the Convention—and again with no need to 
make reference to the NYC thereto.135  A similar effect has been ascribed to 
Article 1044 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.136  The same is also true 
of the other twenty-six states that are parties to the 1961 European 
Convention, all of which at the same time are parties to the NYC. Under the 
arbitration law of many nations, it is possible to reach the same results in 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as the NYC.  
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In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act incorporates Article V’s 
exceptions by reference,137 providing that a domestic “court shall confirm [an] 
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal … specified in the …  
Convention.”138  
 
A further main feature of grounds for refusal is that no review of merits of the 
award is allowed.139 This has been affirmed by the courts.140 In England, for 
instance, the court’s role is narrowly circumscribed: it is limited under Section 
68 to intervention in cases of awards where there has been “serious 
irregularity” of one or more specified kinds which the court considers “has 
caused or will cause substantial injustice” to the party challenging the 
award.141  
 
Although the NYC was never intended to be an overall framework for the 
conduct of arbitral proceedings, it nevertheless allowed a great leap forward in 
the effectiveness and efficiency of ICA. Lord Mustill described the success of 
the NYC as a convention which “perhaps could lay claim to be the most 
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 Harmonisation of ICA 1.4
By the 1990s many national courts were prepared to enforce arbitration 
agreements and the awards made by arbitration tribunals. The arbitration 
community were therefore in a position to push for harmonizing the laws in 
different countries and rules of different arbitral institutions in relation to 
ICA.143  
 
Harmonization provided two major benefits. First, it gave parties a greater 
level of clarity, certainty and comfort in designing the arbitration process.144 
Second, harmonization increased the ability of arbitration bodies to effectively 
handle international arbitrations occurring at different locations throughout the 
world.145 This enabled arbitration bodies to be equally effective in handling 
international disputes irrespective of the nationality of the parties.  
 
In the 1970s there was an increasing need for a neutral set of arbitration rules 
suitable for use in international ad hoc arbitrations to be applicable for small 
and mid-size disputes which cannot afford the expense institutional arbitration. 
At that time, there was no guidance for parties and arbitrators wanting to 
conduct international commercial arbitration outside the institutional arbitration 
context. The response came with the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules of 1976, which covered all 
aspects of the ad hoc arbitral process. This included providing a model 
arbitration clause, setting out rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators 
and to the form of the award.146 
 
The UNCITRAL Rules were intended to be acceptable in both capitalist and 
socialist countries, and in common law and civil law jurisdictions.147 The 
drafters clearly envisioned a potential conflict between different legal traditions 
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in arbitration and attempted to provide a procedural regime that is acceptable 
for everyone and flexible enough to make all parties to the dispute 
comfortable.148  
 
The UNCITRAL Rules achieved international recognition and were widely 
adopted in international arbitration practice. The Iran US Claims Tribunal149 
and many bilateral investment treaties applied a modified version of the 1976 
rules and free trade agreements of many countries allow investors to pursue 
UNCITRAL arbitration against a host State to resolve their disputes.150  
 
In 1983, the International Bar Association adopted ‘Supplementary Rules 
Governing the Presentation and Reception of Evidence in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (commonly known as the ‘IBA Rules of Evidence’). 
These rules dealt particularly with practical problems in relation to the 
evidentiary matters, including the production of documents and the 
presentation of evidence by witness statement. These Rules were designed to 
be used in conjunction with institutional or ad hoc arbitration rules or 
procedures governing international commercial arbitrations.151 They were 
published “as a resource to parties and to arbitrators in order to enable them 
to conduct the evidence phase of international arbitration proceedings in an 
efficient and economical manner.”152 Moreover, they were intended to reflect 
procedures for the taking of evidence in as many different legal systems as 
possible. In that way it was hoped that the rules would enjoy the widest 
possible acceptance and would be particularly useful where the parties come 
from different legal cultures.153  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Sanders (1977) p.172. See also Sanders (2004) pp. 243-268  
149 Holtzmann (1995) pp. 39-50 
150 Rau/Sherman (1995) p. 94 
151 Commentary on the New IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration (2000) p.3 
152 IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration (1999) Preamble para. 1 
153 Kühner (2010) p. 667 
  50 
In 1985, a further historical landmark came with the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Arbitration (the Model Law).154 This gained widespread acceptance by the 
international arbitration community and 66 countries have now adopted the 
Model Law as their arbitration legislation.155 In addition, many other countries 
that have not adopted it outright have based their arbitration laws upon it.156 
For instance, England did not adopt the Model Law but many provisions of the 
1996 English Arbitration Act showed that the legislator has taken it into 
account.157  The importance of the Model Law in ICA is clearly described by 
the authors of Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration:  
 
“If the New York Convention propelled international arbitration onto the world 
stage, the Model Law made it a star, with appearances in States across the 
world.”158    
 
The Model Law is a uniform set of ad hoc rules which represents a sort of 
international consensus on the regulation and conduct of international 
commercial arbitration.159 Prior to UNCITRAL, if parties were not going to use 
an arbitrational institution, they were forced to devise their own rules. This 
requires the full participation of both parties in drafting rules for incorporation 
into the initial contract, or in determining the rules for arbitration after the 
dispute arises. Alternatively, parties could allow the arbitrator to establish 
rules after the process has begun. The Model Law offered a third option which 
essentially replaced the arbitral institution's procedure by providing a 
framework for arbitral proceedings when the parties have failed to specify the 
procedure.160 
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The Model Law achieved this without strict rules regarding procedures such 
as document production, cross-examination, or documentary evidence; rather 
the Model Law endorsed the two core principles: party autonomy in the 
arbitration process and limited court intervention.161   
 
1.4.1 Party Autonomy 
Within the limits of the law, parties can agree to be bound by whatever rules 
they choose regarding the conduct of the arbitration.162 Article 19 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides that subject to the provisions of this Law, the 
parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in conducting the proceedings. The parties are given the freedom to 
determine the language of the proceedings,163 the law governing the 
substance of the dispute,164 the appointment procedure165 and the place of 
arbitration.166  
 
This principle has been enshrined in many national laws and endorsed by 
international arbitral institutions and organisations167 Thus, the parties can 
designate the number of arbitrators, their qualifications and matters relevant to 
the procedure to be followed. They can prescribe time limits and can, for 
example, stipulate that an award must be handed down within a prescribed 
time. Further, the parties may choose to have oral hearings or a documents 
only arbitration,168 and include their own rules regarding the use of experts.169 
After the arbitration agreement has been concluded, and before an arbitration 
has been commenced, the parties are free to modify their agreement in any 
way they deem fit. They can alter the number of arbitrators, the procedure for 
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the appointment of arbitrators and other matters which they may have 
previously agreed upon such as the sequence of pleadings and time limits.170  
 
1.4.2 Limited Court Intervention  
Most significantly, Article 5 of UNCITRAL Model Law provides that “in matters 
governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in 
this Law.”171 This provision is crucial because it operates to prevent national 
courts from relying on any residual bases under local law to intervene in the 
arbitral process, which would seriously compromise party autonomy and 
increase cost and delay of arbitration.172   
 
1.4.3 The growth of Institutions  
The growth in international arbitration would not have been possible without 
the pioneering work of the world's eminent arbitral institutions.173 As Redfern 
and Hunter have noted, “an established and well-organized arbitral institution 
can do much to ensure the smooth progress of an international commercial 
arbitration, even if the parties themselves—or their legal advisers—have little 
or no practical experience in the field.”174  
 
The last 25 years has seen a big increase in the number of institutions 
providing arbitration services.175 In addition to distinguished arbitration 
institutions, many regional organisations have become popular. For instance, 
in 1985 the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) was 
established, followed in 1991 by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC). Both have become widely used in the Asia-Pacific region.  
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In 2008 the ICC set up a branch of its Secretariat in Hong Kong and in 
Singapore. In the same year the LCIA and the Dubai International Financial 
Centre jointly created a centre in Dubai, known as DIFC-LCIA. A year later the 
LCIA also set up a satellite branch in India, known as LCIA India. More 
recently, in 2010, AAA and Bahrain Chamber of Dispute Resolution jointly 
created the AAA’s Bahrain branch in the Gulf. 
 
The proliferation of arbitral institutions throughout the world has created a 
degree of competition and many are striving to be more successful by 
resolving greater numbers of disputes and by promoting quicker and cheaper 
arbitration.176 On one hand, this is beneficial for international parties because 
arbitration becomes more accessible and each regional centre comes with 
arbitration friendly national legislation. 
 
However, this resulted in arbitral centres that are exact copies of one another 
creating unnecessary competition.177 Whenever one of the major arbitration 
centres introduces new rules others follow suit.  When SCIA published its 
expedited rules in 2004, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(HKCIA) and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre re-modelled theirs. 
Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) separate fast-
track arbitration rules were copied by the Arbitration Institute of the Finland 
Chamber of Commerce (FCC), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC). In 2009 the international division of the AAA, the International Centre 
for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), created provisions for parties to request 
emergency relief before the establishment of the main arbitral tribunal.178 
Many institutions followed suit with similar rules like the SIAC Article26 (2010), 
the ICC Article 29 (2012) and the SCIA Article 43 (2012).179  
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Before such global competition between arbitral institutions, each major 
institution had its own arbitration rules and procedures which were 
considerably influenced by the arbitration law and practice of its seat.180 Thus 
the LCIA, located in London, has been particularly influenced by the English 
Arbitration Acts and the Common Law.181 The ICC in Paris enjoys long-
standing favour to ICA it has been provided by French Arbitration Law. And 
WIPO and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), located in Switzerland, 
have developed in response to specific industries such as information 
technology and sport.182  
 
Today there are no such clear divisions and rules ‘cross-pollinate’ between 
organisations. The same transfer occurs between domestic and international 
arbitration institutions. For example, the Drafting Committee for the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), which is intended to be a model for US state 
legislation regarding domestic arbitration, expressly acknowledged that it  
"utilized provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the New York Convention, 
and the 1996 English Arbitration Act as sources of statutory language for the 
RUAA."183 Similarly, the AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules are 
modelled primarily on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.184 
 
International arbitration has also benefitted from domestic arbitration rules.  
Ten years after the Arbitration Bar Associations (ABA) and the AAA devised a 
joint Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, the International 
Bar Association (IBA) adopted its own Rules of Ethics for International 
Arbitrators, reflecting many of the same principles as the AAA/ABA Code.185  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Wetter (1995) pp. 85-106 
181 English Arbitration Act of 1996, Sections 3, 4(3), 44(5) and 44(6); LCIA Rules, Article16 
182 Schultz (2006) 
183 Born (2009) p. 161 
184 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, See also recently revised UNCITRAL Rules 
185 AAA/ABA’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes of 2004 
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1.4.4 Has harmonization gone too far? 
In 1996, there was a discussion in the 7th the International Congress for 
Commercial Arbitrators (ICCA) Congress186 about UNCITRAL’s Draft 
Directives for Preparatory Conferences in Arbitral Proceedings which then 
became the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.187 The 
notes were created to provide guidance on prehearing preparation procedures 
in ICA and were intended to be of great help to practitioners with relatively 
limited experience in international arbitration. However, they were strongly 
criticized by arbitration practitioners during the 1996 Congress. In an article 
entitled De la fureur réglementaire, Holtzman quoted from Lalive when he 
asked:188 
 
“Is it not time to redefine priorities and to react against the public and private 
mania of wanting to regulate down to the very last detail?”189 
 
Fouchard also vigorously criticized the first draft of the UNCITRAL text,190 
especially with respect to the attempt of codification and the limitation of 
flexibility:  
 
“if too many interests or prejudices conflict to make [arbitration] simpler, at 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Holtzmann (1996) pp. 173-194 
187 Ceccon (1997) pp.67-85 
188 Lalive (1994) p. 213-219 
189 Lalive (1994) p. 213 
190 Fouchard (1994) pp. 461-478 
191 Holtzmann (1996) pp. 173-194 
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 Concluding Remarks 1.5
This brief summary of the development of international commercial arbitration 
shows that the priority given to speed and economy has changed over time.  
In the last century making arbitration agreement and awards enforceable 
considered more important than improving the speed and economy of 
arbitration. Today, as a result of the proliferation of arbitration institutions, 
establishment of legal frameworks for international arbitration, and the 
harmonisation of arbitration proceedings, ICA is more readily available. Hence 
they facilitated the growth of ICA. 
 
Indeed, the harmonization of ICA cannot be enough without the increased role 
of the NYC, and arbitration friendly court decisions which correctly interpreted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law and subsequent modern arbitration legislation like 
the English Arbitration Act (1996). The cross-pollination of rules, codes and 
guidelines between institutions resulted in arbitration being applicable to many 
different circumstances. Today, ICA has become the norm in the resolution of 
international commercial arbitration and 90% of all international commercial 
transactions contain arbitration clauses.192 Hence arbitration awards are final, 
binding and widely enforceable in the global scale.  
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 CONCERNS FOR EXCESSIVE COST AND DELAY IN ICA 2
In the past 30 years, ICA has become increasingly effective and popular due 
to the successful establishment of an international arbitration framework.193 
The end result is that, today, there is no doubt about the severability of 
arbitration agreements and the enforceability of international arbitral awards 
for regular arbitration proceedings. Indeed, arbitration, with its flexibility, 
finality and global enforceability has appeared to be the only game in town for 
the resolution of international commercial disputes.194 
 
But while ICA has gained considerable approval from both international 
businesses and arbitration communities, time and cost saving features have 
not merited such admiration.195 The excessive time taken between filing a 
request for arbitration and the award being rendered, along with the attendant 
expense, has increasingly become the major criticism levelled against ICA.196  
 
The 2010 SIA/WC international arbitration survey asked corporate counsel 
from leading corporations around the world to comment on the reasons for 
slowness and expense in ICA.197 The study asked respondents to indicate, 
from a list of factors which may have an impact on the length of arbitral 
proceedings, which they considered the most significant. They identified that 
before the establishment of arbitral tribunal the main factors were: lack of 
skilled arbitration practitioners (either parties’ counsel and arbitrators), dilatory 
tactics, and the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. After the arbitrators were 
selected the main factors which contribute to cost and delay were identified 
as: unsuitable procedural conduct during disclosure of documents, written 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Böckstiegel (2009) pp. 181-187 
194 Landau (2007) pp. 282-297 
195 Horvath (2011) p. 252 
196 School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary, U.O.L.) & PricewaterhouseCoopers, International 
arbitration: corporate attitudes and practices 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers, London,(the SIA/PWC 
Survey 2006) p. 2 ("Expense and the length of time to resolve disputes are the two most commonly 
cited disadvantages of international arbitration"), 6, 7, 19, 20 
197 School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary, UOL) & White Case LLP, International arbitration 
survey 2010: Choices in international arbitration, (the SIA/WC Survey 2010) 
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submissions and the conduct of hearings.198 Notably, the time for the written 
arbitrators' questions contributed very little to the cost and delay of ICA. Other 
smaller contributing factors included late rendering of the award after the final 
hearings and the time required for enforcement.199   
 
Figure 2: Factors contributing to the length of arbitration
Source: SIA/WC International Arbitration Survey 2010  
 
These results suggest that the long delays of arbitral proceedings are not 
inherent to the nature of international commercial arbitration but due to 
proceedings being conducted in a manner which leads to time and delay.200 
 
The delay produced by arbitrators’ written questions was identified as the 
lowest contributing factor. This may indicate that in the eyes of corporate 
counsel arbitrators are conscientious about reducing delay and effectively 
manage procedural questions or it may suggest arbitrators simply ask few 
question during the pre-hearing stage.201 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 SIA/WC Survey (2010) p.32 Chart 30 See also Brubaker/Templeman (2010) 
199 SIA/WC Survey (2010) (The study showed that, this period usually exceeds twelve months, while 
the reasonable required time for this procedural stage should not exceed between three and six 
months.) 
200 Brubaker/Templeman (2010) pp. 1-6 
201 Ibid 
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Figure 3: Proportional share of the participants to the length of the arbitral process
Source: SIA/WC International Arbitration Survey 2010 
 
The survey also revealed that the parties contribute most to delay in the 
proceedings, followed by the tribunal and external counsel.202 The result 
shows that the length of the arbitral process to a large degree is the direct 
result of the behaviour of the parties or their advisers. Given that the service 
providers of arbitration are responsible for a high proportion of delay, a 
mindful corporate counsel will be keen to choose the right external counsel 
and to collect information from arbitral institutions regarding arbitrators’ 
performance and availability and thereby to select more efficient arbitrators 
and arbitral institutions.203 Significantly, many corporate counsel in the 
interview section of the survey believed that “ICA must become more 
streamlined and disciplined to provide an entirely effective form of dispute 
resolution.”204 
 
In the light of these findings this chapter examines why ICA became slow and 
expensive despite the successful legalization, harmonization and global 
expansion of ICA. It also examines to what extent international business 
communities are satisfied with the speed and economy currently offered by 
ICA. 
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 Excessive length of arbitration 2.1
The developing ICA framework reshuffled the fundamental values of ICA. 
Thus, the benefits of finality and enforceability outweighed the value of speedy 
and economic dispute resolution. But, by the end of the 1980s, in an 
environment of economic recession and its attendant cash flow difficulties, 
worries about the disproportionate costs and delays in international arbitration 
started to surface.205    
 
In 1987, Rubino complained “a duration of three years, which is quite frequent 
in large international arbitrations, is unacceptable in and of itself.”206 25 years 
later, the length of arbitration is still a big concern. In 2010, Schroeder, a 
member of the Corporate Counsel of International Arbitration Group (CCIAG), 
claimed that no one he knew who uses arbitration regularly was happy with its 
speed of resolving international commercial disputes.207 That year McIlwrath & 
Savage reported the time taken to reach an award in an international 
commercial arbitration was in the region of one to two years, and often 
longer.208 This figures are similar to the findings of Rubino (1987),209 
McIlwrath & Savage (2009)210 and Born (2010)211 who reported that 
international commercial arbitration took between 18 and 36 months to 
complete. These figures reveal that there has been no significant reduction in 
the length of ICA over the past 25 years. 
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Mary, U.O.L.) & PricewaterhouseCoopers, International arbitration: Corporate attitudes and practices 
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survey recognised that the time and cost of international arbitration were viewed as disadvantages.  
208 McIlwrath/Savage (2010) p.225; Born (2010) p. 6 
209 Rubino-Sammartano, M. (1987) pp. 75-80 p. 75 
210 McIlwrath (2009) 
211 Born (2010) pp.6-7 
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Thus, in the Costs in International Arbitration Survey 2011,212 participants 
were asked to provide information on the duration of the arbitration in order to 
determine whether there was a link between the common costs incurred by 
the parties and the length of the arbitral proceeding. The results from 254 
international arbitrations conducted between 1991 and 2010 showed that the 
average length of commercial arbitration was 19 months from the 
establishment of the arbitral tribunal to the rendering of the award.213 
Construction arbitrations took 1 month longer while other arbitrations such as 
Shipping & Maritime, Oil & Gas, and IP &Technology were 2 months shorter. 
 
Figure 4: Average length of arbitration in months – 1991 to 2010
Source: CIArb Survey 2011 p. 3 and 12. 
 
Even though the CIArb Survey results did not clearly demonstrate a link 
between length of arbitration and the cost incurred, it confirmed that the length 
of arbitration affects some of the common costs.214 Such costs are often 
caused by unnecessarily long and complicated proceedings with unfocused 
requests for time extensions of the procedural deadlines, requiring a 
disclosure of unrelated documents and submitting unnecessary witness 
statements and expert evidence.215 
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In many industries such as mergers and acquisitions, sports, international 
finance and price determination, speed is a major characteristic of the 
business and it is vital that disputes should be settled quickly.216 But on many 
occasions international commercial arbitration has failed to provide those 
industries with the speed they require.217  
 
 Excessive cost of arbitration 2.2
Although it is understandable that rapid arbitral proceedings may endanger 
the fundamental values of flexibility, finality and enforceability, this does not 
justify excessive cost to protect these fundamental features. Nevertheless, the 
average cost of ICA is now £1.5m.218  Unlike litigation, which is subsidized by 
governments through the provision of their courts, in arbitration the parties 
bear the full costs of the process.219  These costs have three main 
components: administrative fees charged by the arbitration institutions; fees 
charged by the arbitrator or arbitrators; and parties cost of paying external 
legal fees for the presentation of their case.220  
 
Figure 5: The costs of arbitration fees under major arbitral institutions (US$).
Source: Fee Scales of AAA, ICC and LCIA. Walker’s cost report for Ad Hoc 
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Figure 5 above shows the costs for using various institutions.221 As an 
example of what a party might pay in arbitral fees, let us assume that the 
dispute is for a sum of US$1 million. It takes a three-members tribunal one 
week to deal with procedural matters and one week for the substantive 
hearing. The arbitral institution involved takes 20 hours of administrative time 
to deal with the case.  
 
For this particular imagined dispute, the ICC or the LCIA are the least costly 
choices in terms of the tribunal fee and the institutional cost of arbitration. But 
as the value of a dispute increases, so do the fees for institutional arbitration, 
as they are decided on an ad valorem basis. The table below shows how ICC 
arbitration fees increase depending on the amount in dispute.222 The LCIA 
and SCC and SCAI also use similar sliding scales to estimate the advance 
cost of arbitration.223  
 
Figure 6: Comparison of ICC arbitration fees according to amount in dispute (US$)
Source: ICC’s Fee Calculator 
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Institutions publish scales of administrative expenses and arbitrators' fees so 
it is easy to see what parties to have their dispute arbitrated by a particular 
institution. However, parties often choose the arbitral forum at the time of 
contract, when they are generally not able to anticipate the value of any 
dispute which may arise.224 They may discover to their cost that the chosen 
institution may be a good choice for low value disputes but not for high value 
disputes, or vice versa.225  
 
To avoid administration fees, parties may opt for ad hoc arbitration but this 
does not always produce an ultimate cost benefit.226 First, the arbitration fees 
are not known in advance under ad hoc arbitrations unless parties name their 
arbitrators and make a fee-arrangement before the dispute.227 In general, 
parties name their arbitrators after the dispute and arrange their fees while 
they are disputes with each other. Second, the arbitral administration provided 
by an institution generally justifies the administrative fees.228 The institution 
will appoint an arbitrator if a party fails or refuses to do so and it will decide 
upon challenges against an arbitrator. The arbitrators’ fees are determined by 
the institution in accordance with its rules which relieves the parties of the 
need to negotiate directly with the arbitrators on this delicate subject. Third, 
the institutions provide support and assistance on dealing with administrative 
matters which will otherwise require the attention of arbitral tribunal. Finally, 
under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, a draft award is subject to scrutiny by the 
ICC, which can require changes in the award’s form and draw the arbitrators’ 
attention to matters of substance.229 This will increase the enforceability of 
awards as compared to ad-hoc arbitral awards which do not pass any control 
prior to the resource to courts for the refusal of enforcement.230 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Zykin (2010) p. 607 
225 Hanessian/Hayden/Muniz (2012) p.10 
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227 Paulsson/Rawding/Reed (2010) pp. 57-79 
228 Hacking/Schneider (1998) 
229 ICC Rules, Article 33 
230 Born (2001) p.11 (stating that more structure and predictability may help reduce risks of breakdown 
between parties and technical defects in award, and credibility increases likelihood that award will be 
accepted and judicially enforced). 
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These benefits should not be underestimated. An ad hoc arbitration may well 
take significantly longer without the administrative support of the arbitral 
institution.231 
 
Figure 7: Cost allocation of arbitration fees in ad hoc
Source: CIArb Survey 2011 p.11 Chart 14 Common Cost Allocation 
 
Even more expensive than the institutional cost and the arbitrators fees are 
the party costs covering external arbitration fees for the presentation of their 
case.232  In a very thoughtful study published in 2007 the ICC Commission on 
Arbitration looked at all cases which went to a final award in 2003 and 2004 
and found on average, the costs in these ICC arbitration cases were spread 
as follows:233  
 
• 82% Costs borne by parties to present their cases: (including, as the 
case may be, lawyers' fees and expenses, expenses related to witness 
and expert evidence, and other costs incurred by the parties for the 
arbitration other than those set forth below)  
• 16% Arbitrators' fees and expenses. 
• 2% Administrative expenses of ICC. 
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In 2011 CIArb survey the cost breakdown borne parties for the presentation of 
their case showed external legal expenses (including the cost of hiring a 
barrister) as a dominant cost factor followed by the cost of witness and expert 
reports, external expenses like the hire of rooms for the hearing, travel and 
accommodation, and other management costs.234  
 
Figure 8: Cost breakdown of external arbitration expenses
Source: CIArb Survey 2011 p.10 Chart 12 What did they spend on it? 
 
It follows from both reports that if the overall costs of the arbitral proceedings 
is to be minimized, special emphasis needs to be placed on steps aimed at 
reducing the costs connected with the parties external cost for the 
presentation of their case. As Morton clarified in 2010 that the length and cost 
of arbitration can directly be correlated with the parties presentation of their 
case:  
“The longer a process takes, the more it is likely to cost. It is a regrettable fact 
of life that if, for example, counsel are given two weeks from the close of the 
hearing to prepare written closing submissions, they will fill (or largely fill) that 
time completing the task. If they had only been given two days, they would in 
most cases be able to produce submissions making substantially the same 
points, even if not with the same level of flair or aplomb.” 235 
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True as it may be that the issues of costs and delay are matters that parties 
and their representatives to the process exercise certain control over, the 
question still naturally arises as to the role which institutions and arbitrators 
have, and should play in this context.236 
 
Thus, 2010 report of a national summit hosted by the College of Commercial 
Arbitrators concluded "organizations providing arbitration services should play 
a major role in bridging the gap between user expectations and experiences 
regarding speed, efficiency and economy in arbitration."237 
 
The same year, Naimark, senior vice president of the AAA's International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), observed, there has been an increasing 
chorus of voices that international arbitration is getting too lengthy and 
expensive, mostly because institutions put less effort to control time and cost 
of international arbitral proceedings.238 Accordingly conducting ICA may 
amount to an unbearable burden for small and mid-size companies.239  
 
The 2011 CIArb Cost Survey shows that on claims for  £1m or less, 
irrespective of the nature of the dispute, in 52% of cases parties spent more 
than £250,000 (approximately $405,000).240 Notably, in 21% of cases, the 
costs of arbitration were between £250k and £500k. And for 7% of cases, the 
cost of arbitration was actually more than the amount in dispute. 
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Figure 9: Cost spent in arbitration when less than £1 million value claimed
Source: CIArb Survey 2011 p.10 Chart 11 How much did they spend? p.27 Appendix 
 
Given that 26% of commercial disputes were £1m or less in 2011 (Figure 10) 
these costs go a long way to explaining the dissatisfaction of arbitration users 
of small and mid-sized disputes. 
 
Figure 10: Nature of commercial disputes by value claimed
Source: CIArb Survey 2011 p.26 Appendix 
 
ICA is particularly poor value for disputes under $1m. Thus, from 1992 to 
2011 the number of ICC cases more than doubled but the percentage of 
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Figure 11: Percentage of ICC Arbitration cases below $1m – 1992 to 2011
Source: ICC Caseload Statistics 
 
The LCIA’s caseload statistics show a similar trend with an average 21% of 
cases submitted between 1992 and 2011 being valued at £1m or less. 
 
Figure 12: Percentage of LCIA Arbitration Cases below $1m – 1992 to 2011Source 1: 
LCIA Caseload Statistics
Source: LCIA Caseload Statistics 
 
Figure 9 shows that when less than 1m was claimed, 21% of arbitrations cost 
close to or more than the value of the dispute.241 This well illustrates the 
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frustration of parties bringing small-sized disputes to ICA since 1992. Any 
company that spends half a million pounds on a claim of 1 million is going to 
be unhappy with the result. While it may be reasonable to pay such high 
arbitration costs for the resolution of larger cross-border disputes, for smaller 
and mid-size disputes the legal cost of applying to international commercial 
arbitration may be higher than the parties can bear and render arbitration an 
inaccessible forum.242 
 
 The reasons for excessive cost and delay in ICA 2.3
There are many reasons for excessive cost and delay in ICA. Some are 
caused by delaying tactics. Others seem inevitable due to the complex nature 
of international commercial disputes. In this section, the thesis will introduce a 
list of problems in relation to the reason for excessive cost and delay but the 
solutions will be provided in the later chapters. Thus, there are many reasons 
for escalating costs and delay in international commercial arbitration:  
 
• Pre-dispute agreements can sometimes fail to provide robust 
conditions which are easy to challenge later. 
• The controls for dilatory tactics are inadequate in ICA. 
• ICA worse at handling parties from different cultural and legal 
backgrounds than international litigation and domestic arbitration. 
Parties often have differing expectations about how the dispute will 
proceed which can cause confusion and conflict; 
• the increasing involvement of large American law firms has brought 
lengthy US-style litigation procedures to international commercial 
arbitration;  
• the increasing use of local lawyers as counsel or arbitrators has 
created practitioners who are insufficiently familiar with international 
arbitration processes;  
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• international commercial disputes often and increasingly involve 
extremely large sums of money which directly affects the cost of 
administration but  such high cost of administration is unreasonable for 
smaller and mid-sized ICA cases;  
• international commercial disputes are frequently either very technical or 
legally complex  in nature. These cases are bound to take longer and 
cost more. Trying to reduce cost and delay of these cases will increase 
complication rather than saving cost and time. 
 
2.3.1 Providing for unknown circumstances 
One of the key obstacles to achieving speed and economy in international 
commercial arbitration is making bad choices in the arbitration agreement that 
fail to anticipate the circumstances of a possible future arbitrations.243  
 
Before the dispute has occurred the parties cannot know the subject matter of 
the case, the amount in dispute, or even whether there will be a dispute at 
all.244 This creates a challenge when it comes to drafting an arbitration clause 
in a business contract. The potential areas for dispute are almost limitless, 
and yet trying to cover every eventuality with a plethora of provisions can 
result in ambiguity which only leads to cost and delay. It might therefore 
appear that guaranteeing quick and economic dispute resolution in the 
absence of the specifics of the dispute is an impossible task. However, 
arbitration literature offers many suggestions for the creation of an appropriate 
arbitration clause.245  
 
The real problem is that when contracts are being agreed and the emphasis is 
on building a new business relationship, parties often feel it is inappropriate to 
sour matters by arguing over a dispute resolution clause.246 Understandably, 
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  72 
the businessmen and lawyers who negotiate deals are far more concerned 
with reaching agreement on the salient commercial  terms,  such  as amounts 
to be paid  or  invested than they are with dispute-resolution clauses. As a 
result, during contractual negotiations, the arbitration agreements are often 
drafted carelessly on a “boiler-plate” or “one size fits all” clauses with 
inadequate modifications to properly regulate all future disputes.247  Whereas, 
in fact, agreeing on a suitable clause when the commercial relationship is 
amicable is far easier than when the parties are in dispute and is almost 
certain to make arbitration easier, quicker and cheaper.248  
 
2.3.2 Delaying Tactics 
Although a party does not know before a dispute arises whether it will be the 
claimant or the respondent, once it is known the party’s attitude changes 
dramatically. Thus, after the dispute, the parties’ interests in a quick and 
economic resolution rapidly become polarised. The former business partners, 
who are now claimant and respondent, will want to achieve very different 
things. This turns arbitration more and more into a hostile forum to argue over 
the failings of their business relationship rather than to agree on effective 
measures to reduce delay and minimise cost.249 It is thus the parties 
themselves who mainly contribute to cost and delay due to their conflicts of 
interests and resulting non-cooperation during the proceedings.250 
 
Claimants will want their award as soon as possible and will naturally give a 
high priority to achieving speed and economy.251 By contrast, the majority of 
respondents will have no interest in quicker or more cost-effective 
proceedings.252  Indeed, respondents may prolong the case for as long as 
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possible in an attempt to drive up its cost and force the claimant to abandon 
the case.253    
 
The respondent will use various types of dilatory tactics before the 
establishment of the arbitral tribunal: claiming that neither the notice nor the 
claim was received; contesting the validity of the arbitration proceeding itself; 
claiming that the matter in dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement; 
contesting the existence of a dispute at all; petitioning interventionist national 
courts to interrupt arbitral proceedings; arguing that the claim is incomplete or 
needs amplification; refusing to contribute to the down payment for the costs 
of the arbitration; failing to appoint an arbitrator; employing an arbitrator who is 
too busy; challenging the other party's arbitrators; disputing the number of 
arbitrators; delaying the appointment of lawyers; appointing additional lawyers 
and demanding additional preparation time. All these dilatory tactics are worse 
in ICA than international litigation or domestic arbitration where particular 
national judicial system can exercise immense power to reduce the dilatory 
effects. 
 
After the tribunal is formed the respondent can be uncooperative in many 
ways: challenging the jurisdiction; not adequately clarifying the matters in 
issue, making indiscriminate requests for document production; producing too 
many documents and failing to select a working core bundle; raising questions 
about language; slowing proceedings by failing to exploit modern 
developments in computer and information technology such as taking all 
evidence orally and recording it by hand.254  
 
Arbitral tribunals now habitually accept elaborate written submissions which 
produce huge numbers of documents. They allow lengthy document 
production requests and admit countless bindings, witness lists and expert 
reports.255 This all favours delaying tactics.256   
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Disagreements about members of the arbitral tribunal can also delay the 
procedure. These most commonly centre on whether or not party-appointed 
arbitrators are impartial,257 and inevitably run up time and cost.258  In some 
cases a party has forced its arbitrator to resign to delay proceedings.259 
Because these challenges to the impartiality of the chairperson or the party-
appointed arbitrator are only designed to delay proceedings, they are often 
unfounded.260  
 
Dilatory tactics can also be employed during the execution and enforcement 
of an award. One of the parties may call for the intervention of a court at 
several of the stages between the request of arbitration and the notification of 
the final award. Issues asserted before the courts include designation of the 
arbitrators, the scope of the arbitration, the arbitration agreement itself, the 
extension of a time limit to render the award, the measures enforcing 
provisional orders, assistance in taking evidence and appointing experts, the 
deposit and notification of an award, and the declarations of enforceability. 
Furthermore, courts will need to intervene if one party has to force the other 
party to comply with the award. 
 
A supreme example of delay and cost in arbitration is Black Clawson 
International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG,261an arbitral 
proceeding which lasted for 15 years, within which time all the original 
members of the tribunal resigned and new ones were appointed. During the 
proceedings the parties were often in conflict over procedural conduct. 
Dilatory tactics, non-party cooperation and several recourses to the courts 
contributed immensely to the cost and duration of this case.  
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2.3.3 Differences in cultural and legal backgrounds 
The most efficient international arbitrations usually occur in arbitration friendly 
countries, where quicker and cheaper arbitral proceedings are permitted 
under the applicable civil law and common law.  However, in today’s business 
environment, most users of international arbitration come countries that are 
not arbitration friendly.262 Thus expanding markets like Russia, China, Latin 
America and the Middle East present new challenges.263 In 2010 the ICC 
oversaw disputes involving 2,145 parties from 140 countries and independent 
territories.264 LCIA arbitrations in 2010 involved parties from Russia (7%), Asia 
Pacific (7%), Africa (4%) and the Middle East (9%). None of these countries 
were listed in 2000.265 This shows a great regional shift from parties of 
arbitration friendly nations to parties of less arbitration friendly nations like 
China, India, the Middle East and other Asia Pacific.  
 
Figure 13: The Nationality of Parties referred to the LCIA between 2000 and 2010 
Source: 2000 and 2010 LCIA Statistics 
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A party's cultural and legal background may influence what it expects to get 
out of arbitration.266 The areas where parties may differ most in their 
expectations are, according to Lew: the evidence gathering process; the 
examination and preparation of witnesses; “inquisitorial” tribunals; the 
provision of written pleadings over oral submissions; the use of expert 
evidence; how foreign law is proved and the determination of costs in 
arbitration.267 
 
In Continental Grain Co. v. China Petroleum Technology268 Chinese parties 
initially enjoyed good progress with the arbitrator, Mr. Bruce Harris. Later, 
however, they applied for his removal on the ground that at the time of his 
appointment they believed, mistakenly, that he was a lawyer. The 
misapprehension stemmed from Mr Harris' curriculum vitae which indicated 
that he had been for a period of ten years “with Richards Butler & Co. (now 
Richards Butler), major City of London solicitors”269. From this, and Mr Harris' 
extensive experience as arbitrator, the Chinese parties assumed that Mr 
Harris was legally qualified. 
 
The claim was not however supported by Mance J., who found that there was 
no ambiguity surrounding Mr Harris' appointment: 
 
“It simply arises from the interpretation which the respondents say that they 
put on that C.V., an interpretation which I, for my part, would say was not 
objectively justified, certainly in the London context in which the C.V. was 
submitted. This type of unilateral mistake can have no relevance in this 
case.”270 
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The cultural and legal background of the arbitrator may also affect the conduct 
of the proceedings.271 Although there are ethical rules for the conduct of 
international commercial arbitration, arbitrators from different backgrounds 
may conduct proceedings differently. For instance, although, document 
production is expected to be very limited in international arbitrations due to the 
significant cost and delay it adds to proceedings,272 an American lawyer 
usually assumes that they will have the opportunity to discover all facts that 
are "reasonably calculated to lead to the document production of admissible 
evidence."273 This contradicts with the assumption of lawyers from Civil Law 
jurisdictions like France, Germany and Switzerland where the compulsory 
disclosure of documents is an exception and always requires the intervention 
of an arbitrator or a judge.274 Thus, an astute respondent may choose an 
arbitrator with a common law background like an American lawyer who is 
likely to grant widespread document production and hence increase delay and 
cost.275 The claimant may conversely seek to appoint an arbitrator from a civil 
law background who they believe will provide a quicker and more cost-
effective dispute resolution.276 
 
Although IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration 
appear to eliminate such cultural barriers and to harmonize the varying 
approaches from different legal backgrounds, they are nevertheless only a 
guidance rather than hard law. Mandatory rules and laws concerning arbitral 
procedures and evidence will still apply, such as only a man can be a witness 
in Islamic Sharia law and this may be conflicted with the modern international 
arbitration practice.277 
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Cultural and legal differences also play a role in whether early settlement of a 
dispute is easy or difficult.278 While voluntary settlement serves both parties by 
keeping costs down, 279 like any contract negotiation, the process of 
negotiating a settlement may work differently in different cultures.280 For 
instance, certain legal cultures such as China and Japan like to "cut to the 
chase" by quickly identifying the key issues to be resolved and then 
negotiating those issues one by one. Other cultures such as USA and UK 
prefer to start with relatively unimportant issues and slowly work their way to 
the key issues.281 Some cultures see no problem with an arbitrator being 
directly involved in facilitating a voluntary settlement others cultures may see 
direct involvement of arbitrators as contradictory to the principle of impartiality 
of decision makers.282 Some nations allow parties to begin negotiations all 
over again just when it looked like all the issues had been resolved others see 
this dilatory attempt to extend the issuance of arbitral awards.  
 
One of the results of globalization is the increasing fluency of the English 
language throughout the world. Since managing arbitration is easier when all 
parties can communicate in the same language, English is often chosen as a 
language of arbitration.283 However, this can cause arbitrators and opposing 
parties to believe that everyone has the same expectations of the arbitration 
when actually cultural and legal differences exist.284 Arbitrators and parties 
may be speaking the same language but the parties may not fully understand 
the meaning of what is being said.285 Such misunderstandings may go 
unnoticed by arbitrators who do not appreciate the relevance that coming from 
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different cultures has in reaching decisions.286 Hence, this is a common 
practical issue in ICA.287 
 
2.3.4 Americanization of International Commercial Arbitration 
The huge increase in the value, number and size of international disputes has 
created an urgent need for more experienced arbitration practitioners. In 
response, many global law firms have come into ICA and become quite 
sophisticated in the arbitration game, whether under civil or common law.288 
Almost all of them established international dispute resolution division which 
resulted in hundreds of new arbitration specialists from different countries. 
 
American lawyers bring with them US-style procedural techniques, court 
standards of minimum contacts between the arbitrators and the parties (and 
their counsel).289 Thus, many American attorneys commented on Dezelay’s 
research in Dealing in Virtue that international arbitration is but one “kind of 
litigation,”290 simply in a “different forum,”291 and behave during arbitration 
hearings “as if a jury was there.”292 Thus, with the arrival of more American 
lawyers, arbitration is turned into a sort of “off-shore litigation”293 at the 
expense of its traditional virtues: speed and economy. 
 
For example, in most foreign and international tribunals, US-style cross-
examination techniques and aggressive litigation tactics are considered 
unprofessional and at worst unethical.294 Nevertheless, excessive document 
production requests, non-stop depositions, challenge of arbitrators’ 
impartiality, simultaneous litigation proceedings in several forums, and tactical 
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manoeuvres have become commonplace. The use of these techniques in ICA 
is a source of concern for global arbitrators and practitioners.295 As Lalive296 
observed in 1995 that, “international arbitration is exposed to lose its well-
known, or alleged, flexibility and its traditional peaceful and conciliatory 
character due to the role and methods of American litigators in international 
arbitrations.”297 
 
In 2010 Seidenberg made a similar observation that the involvement of US 
lawyers as counsel for the parties and as arbitrators leads to more document 
production and more contentiousness, resulting in arbitration proceedings that 
begin to resemble American-style litigation, with many of the ‘abuses’ (like 
extensive document production, declining civility, and excessive 
gamesmanship) that outrage the international business and arbitration 
community.298 
 
2.3.5 Specialists arbitration lawyers could not reduce 
excessive cost and delay in ICA  
ICA has become a specialized field in its own right. Lawyers who once would 
have been involved arbitration once in a blue moon now work only within 
ICA.299 Arbitrators, in-house counsel and arbitration lawyers have become the 
main component of arbitration and litigation is only relevant in order to enforce 
arbitration clauses or awards.300   
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These arbitration specialists are, in effect, a new breed of international 
arbitration lawyers. But their outlook and working methods are different from 
domestic arbitration lawyers who operate within a fixed arbitration rules and 
laws of a particular country. The new breed is required to be more creative, 
beginning with the negotiation of dispute resolution clauses designed to give 
the greatest effect to their clients’ interests. This requires that they take 
account of the arbitration laws and practices of countries considered as 
potential arbitral venues, or as places of contractual performance, or as 
possible jurisdictions for the enforcement of awards. They must also be 
familiar with the rules of the various international, regional and national arbitral 
institutions which now exist in many parts of the globe. Then, when a dispute 
has arisen, creativity is required in order to be conciliatory rather than 
adversarial.  
 
Over time, being an ICA specialist has taken over the territory historically 
reserved for being a litigation specialist in a particular country. In order to 
grapple more effectively with complex business disputes, arbitration 
procedures have become longer and more detailed, and lawyers turned new 
arbitration specialists are using the same approach as their counterparts in 
litigation.  Trial practice, with its heavy emphasis on prehearing motions and 
intensive document production, is reinforced by ethical rules enshrining a 
model of zealous advocacy.301 For lawyers accustomed to full-fledged 
document production, anything less may seem tantamount to inviting claims of 
malpractice. As one American arbitrator observes: 
 
 “Most lawyers are reluctant to go ahead and try the case. Many times I have 
tried to shorten the time [frame] and have the hearing sooner, … [but] in many 
instances the lawyers want more time to get prepared.”302 
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While arbitration rules give parties freedom to set shortened time limits this 
does not always result in the elimination of superfluous proceedings. Once a 
defined course of procedure is begun a zealous arbitration lawyer, eager to 
protect the interests of his client, will stick doggedly to every one of the 
procedural steps.  The first examples of superfluous arbitral proceedings 
arrived in the early 1980s with a number of high-profile international 
arbitrations involving huge costs and delays. International investment, large 
commercial works and construction disputes were prominent as in the cases 
of SEEE v. Yugoslavia303, Dame Krebs304 and MINE.305  
 
In Enel (National Electricity Board) v. Saci306 the dispute was referred to 
arbitration on 17 July 1979 and judgment was entered on the award on 18 
May 1982 (i.e. three years later). The award was attacked before the Court of 
Appeal, Rome and on 14 January 1985, the Court rejected the challenge. The 
appellate judgment was further attacked before the Court of Cassation which 
rejected it on 16 March 1989. In conclusion there were ten years of legal 
battle from the beginning to the end. The amount awarded was only 
US$50,000.307 
 
These cases gave ICA a bad name and brought about the belief that only by 
providing special forms of expedited procedure would dispatch be achieved 
without undue cost and delay.  
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2.3.6 Representation by Inexperienced Lawyers 
The increased size and complexity of international commercial disputes has 
placed a premium on specialist expertise.308  As a result, an increasing 
number of lawyers are putting themselves forward as international arbitration 
specialists. 
 
Lawyers, because of their legal knowledge and skill in presenting their clients' 
cases, can potentially play a valuable role in arbitration proceedings.309 Their 
expertise should ensure that the issues in dispute are properly defined and 
that the evidence and legal arguments are efficiently and clearly presented to 
the arbitrator. But often these benefits are not reaped in ICA practice, because 
many lawyers representing the parties are insufficiently familiar with the 
dispute resolution practices of the industry they are representing in the 
international context.310 This lack of experience can have a significant impact 
on increasing cost and delay. 
 
A 1983 editorial in the Engineering News Record (ENR) offered a perspective 
from the international construction industry: 
 
“As most people know, the beauty of arbitration is that arbitrators are experts 
in industry matters and can use informal hearings to cut right to the heart of a 
dispute without the years of delay and resultant expense likely to be 
encountered in the judicial system. But, say those ENR talked to, attorneys 
without construction experience are increasingly finding their way onto panels, 
where they often turn hearings into pseudo-court proceedings complete with 
delays caused by anachronistic judicial rules of evidence, document 
production, and methods of proof. This development, coupled with parties' 
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increasing use of attorneys to represent them in such hearings, is starting to 
slow the system down.”311 
 
Multiple problems can compound to make things even slower. External 
lawyers may want to adopt regular arbitral proceedings rather than unfamiliar 
time and cost saving techniques.312 Counsel from different backgrounds may 
adopt different procedures causing delays while conflicting approaches are 
reconciled.313 And inexperienced counsel may require more guidance from the 
arbitral tribunal to help move the proceedings forward. Any or all of these will 
lead to proceedings that are longer and more expensive than they need to be. 
 
2.3.7 E-document production 
Storing information electronically and using new information technologies, like 
video conferencing and interactive briefings, opens new horizons for efficient 
management of disputes but these developments also create new challenges 
and risks.314 As one practitioner observes: 
 
“If the law of e-document production were allowed to develop on an ad hoc 
basis [in ICA], one decision at a time, companies with their complex 
information technology systems would be eaten alive by process costs. It is 
essential to develop best practices that work in a real world”315 
 
A major problem with electronic documents is the ease with which they may 
be modified and the difficulty in detecting such changes.316 This means it can 
be very difficult to identify exactly which version of a document was 
communicated between the parties and, of course, this may be crucial in 
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determining a factual or legal situation.317 Consequently, consultation with 
technical experts may be required by the parties and arbitrator to assess the 
authenticity of documents and this will obviously bring additional time and cost 
to the arbitral proceedings. 
 
Other problems with e-document production include the essential scope of 
and limits on document production, the weighing of burdens and benefits;318 
the handling of the costs of retrieval and review for privilege;319 the duty to 
preserve electronic information.320 
 
 Slowness and expense may be acceptable to parties in 2.4
some type of international commercial disputes 
International commercial disputes involve multi-judicial proceedings in 
different national judicial systems, each with its own laws and procedural 
standards.321 Because it is difficult to stay court proceedings in one jurisdiction 
on the basis of litigation proceeding in another country, cross-border litigants 
may find themselves simultaneously pursuing multiple avenues of relief, or 
defending multiple proceedings in the home country, the opponent’s home 
state, and in the place where assets are located.322 Each of these avenues 
brings with it a potentially unknown system of law and procedure, and the 
potential of corruption, bias, or influence.323 
 
Even when such complicated and protracted international disputes are 
decided, a court victory can be essentially worthless if the loser’s assets are 
located outside the jurisdiction covered by the resulting court order, since 
international recognition of court judgments is quite rare and hedged in with 
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conditions and limitations.324 The NYC overcomes some of the difficulties of 
enforcing awards in international commercial disputes, but there can still be 
problems in countries which, despite being signatories to the NYC, are less 
arbitration friendly.325 Because of these uncertainties, parties and arbitrators in 
arbitral proceedings feel obliged to do all they can to increase the likelihood of 
an award being enforced. Consequently, arbitral proceedings can become 
subject to those same stringent duties of disclosure and document production 
requests which are normally expected to arise in litigation under common law. 
Such procedures can involve substantial costs and delays, particularly while 
the mechanisms for dealing with international commercial disputes remain to 
be fully developed. 
 
According to the ICC, 77% of the cases initiated under its rules in 2011 were 
worth more than US $1 million.326 International contracts for infrastructure, 
energy and manufacturing attract financing of tens, hundreds, or even 
thousands of millions of dollars.327 Since ICA increasingly involve disputes 
over extremely large sums of money, many parties do not want to risk 
enforceability in order to save time and cost.328  The ICC’s statistics clearly 
show that parties raise fewer complaints about high costs and long delays 
when the dispute is complex and high value.329   
 
ICA also frequently involves technical and legally complex disputes.330 Large-
scale construction or energy-related projects are often carried out in less-
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developed countries but involve the funds and expertise of fully industrialized 
states.331 The increase in the complexity of such transactions requires 
specialist expertise and elaborate proceedings to resolve disputes.332 Thus, 
ICSID cases involving large amounted disputes are often reported to cost 
more and take longer than small amounted disputes.333  
 
But for many larger organizations what it costs or how long it takes to resolve 
a particular dispute is unimportant. What counts, is the guarantee of 
procedural fairness, enforceability and confidentiality.334   
 What makes ICA slow and expensive? 2.5
The research of numerous practitioners and scholars cite costs and delay as 
a common problem.335 Clearly, parties, their in-house counsel and the 
external lawyers who represent them all have a responsibility for reducing 
excessive cost and delay.336 All participants are expected to refrain from any 
act that excessively increase costs and delay of arbitration.337 However, these 
expectations cannot reduce dilatory tactics. As Profaizer, international 
arbitration and litigation counsel, commented: “if arbitration is to commit 
suicide, it will do so of its own choosing, because the parties have chosen to 
make it more expensive, time-consuming and more like litigation.”338   
 
The arbitral tribunal is also required to avoid poor management of the arbitral 
proceedings.339 For example, adequate identification and delimitation of the 
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issues in dispute can have a considerable impact on the costs and length of 
the arbitration. It is their duty to render an award in due time without excessive 
delay. As one author put it: "the secret of speed in arbitration is timely 
planning and due monitoring of the timing."340 Once the arbitrator has 
accepted to act in an expedited procedure, he is bound and cannot step down 
for lack of time.341 In some countries like Brazil and Argentine, where parties 
have determined a time limit for the award to be made, the courts will hold the 
arbitrator personally liable towards the parties if he does not respect the time 
limits.342  
 
While it is the task of arbitrators to prevent non-cooperation and dilatory 
tactics by parties,343 many arbitrators believe their primary role is to render an 
enforceable award.344 In most instances, seeking to decide disputes fairly 
between the parties and maintain due process, arbitrators allow their 
arbitration to lag behind the speed achieved in the courts or in domestic 
arbitrations.345  
 
Many corporate counsels claim arbitrators lack management skills.346 In 
particular, they are dissatisfied that arbitrators often fail to assert their 
authority and do not adequately limit or control the litigious instincts of the 
parties' lawyers.347 A number of prominent corporate general counsels cited 
the failure of arbitrators to control the process as the primary reason for 
lengthy hearings, elaborate document production and tardiness in coming to a 
decision.348  
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A number of arbitrators refuted these accusations, stating that the problem 
lies in parties’ failure to rein in their corporate counsel, and the obfuscation 
and delaying tactics of outside lawyers.349  
 
The Law firm attorneys, on the other hand, blamed not only their clients, for 
wanting them to prolong the process and attack the opponent’s case at all 
cost after the dispute, but also the arbitrators, for failing to make the tough 
decisions that would control the other side.350 
 
So each group blames the other for long delays and excessive costs.351  That 
such finger-pointing can be found in the notes of a 2009 roundtable discussion 
in London involving a number of well-known in-house lawyers for multinational 
companies, international arbitration counsel and arbitrators.352 While all the 
stakeholders identified the lack of combined efforts as the main reason for 
cost and delay, each believed that another constituency was better placed to 
implement solutions to the problems.353  
 
In the past 20 years a number of conferences354 and ICCA congresses have 
looked closely at the causes of cost and delay and ways of avoiding this.355 
The most important observation is that these issues cannot be adequately 
addressed unless and until the international arbitration community establishes 
ways to achieve the concerted effort of each participant.356 The lack of joint 
action to overcome difficulties should not be the norm because it negatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 (Interview) Hunter, M. (2010), (“And one of the challenges there is that the expectations and wishes 
of the ultimate  parties  are not always the same as those of the attorneys, who are very often more 
interested in playing litigation games and making money”) 
350 Najar (2008) see also Lord Hacking (2006) p.26 
351 GAR Roundtable I: The Time and Cost Conundrum (2009, May 13); GAR Roundtable II : The Time 
and Cost Conundrum (2009, July 15) 
352 GAR Roundtable I: The Time and Cost Conundrum (2009, May 13) 
353 Ibid 
354 Gurry (1997); Horvath (2010); VIAC-INCITRAL 2010 Conference. (2010); Samaras (2011); 28th 
AAA/ICC/ICSID Joint Colloquium (2011, November 18); and more recently, 27th Annual Colloquium of 
Arbitrators (2012, March 26) 
355 ICCA Congress Series Nos. 5, 7 and 9.  
356 McIlwrath/Schroeder (2008) pp.13-11 (Frustration with the length and expense of the arbitral 
process is increasingly cited as the rationale for favouring court resolution or at least no longer 
favouring arbitration) 
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affects both the users and the providers of international commercial 
arbitration. Arbitration users suffer financial loss and valuable business 
time;357 arbitration providers risk seeing users take their business 
elsewhere.358  
 
 Concluding Remarks 2.6
ICA is faced with three problematic areas in relation to cost and delay. The 
first concerns the goals of arbitral proceedings and whether ICA should be 
faster than adjudication in the court system or domestic arbitration. Slowness 
and expense may also be reasonable in small and mid-size disputes rather 
than risking the enforceability of arbitral awards. However, this does not mean 
that slow and expensive arbitrations are acceptable in every case. 359   
 
The second problem area is procedural. There are many examples when 
parties want ICA to be fast and economic but poor procedural choices by 
contract drafters and their legal representatives result in excessive cost and 
delay. Some examples are: submission clauses which are found to be invalid 
or of insufficient scope to cover the dispute; the unavailability of prescribed or 
familiar methods of obtaining evidence; the lateness of order, timing, and 
manner of pleading; the lengthy presentation of both lay and expert witness 
testimony; inappropriate methods of proving a case, including unnecessary 
documents, depositions, briefs, and testimony; problems caused by the 
location and language of the arbitration proceedings; difficulty in agreeing the 
applicable law; and the inability to prevent delaying tactics.  
 
The third area of concern for the slowness and expense in ICA is substantive. 
This includes: the choice of incompetent arbitrators - a decision crucial to the 
whole proceeding and potentially determinative of applicable substantive and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Whiteman (2006) 
358 Drazhozal/Wittrock (2009) p. 71. See also Eisenberg/Miller (2007) p.75 
359 Ulmer (2010) p.233; Rivkin (2008) pp. 375-386 
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procedural law; whether the form of an award should be reasoned, 
unreasoned or partly reasoned in the applicable arbitration law; and the 
vulnerability of an award to review and attack by national courts that will easily 
refuse enforcement.360 Too often an arbitration proceeding results in an 
unsatisfactory award and the litigation that the parties originally wished to 
avoid is commenced.  
 
The chronicles of arbitration are full of arbitral proceedings in which long 
delays and expense have occurred and commercial parties are increasingly 
expressing their disappointment about the lack of requisite speed and 
economy in ICA.361 The need to resolve a multitude of intermediate 
disagreements before considering the primary dispute often sacrifices one of 
the main benefits of arbitration—its speed and economy.  
 
According to Stipanowich, arbitration has become the "new litigation.”362 Its 
benefits, in Phillips’ report, have been undermined by "judicialization”, 
"creeping legalism" and “incremental formalism.”363 
 
Mcllwrath and Schroeder, from a corporate counsel view, reported that 
“frustration with the length and expense in the arbitration process is increasing 
as the rationale for favouring court resolution, or at least for no longer 
favouring arbitration”364 As a consequence of this dissatisfaction there are 
reports of businesses removing arbitration clauses from their contracts and 
even company-wide bans on arbitration clauses.365 
 
Corporate counsel, as shown by the 2010 SIA/WC Survey, expect arbitrators 
to be more pro-active in controlling time and cost and for more arbitration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Japaridze (2008) p. 1423 
361 See supra pp. 81 footnotes. 303-305 
362 Stipanowich (2009) pp. 1-48 
363 Phillips (2003) p. 37 
364 McIlwrath/Schroeder (2008) p. 6 
365 Drazhozal/Wittrock (2009) p.73 "anecdotal evidence suggests that business communities are either 
abandoning arbitration altogether or using more 'carve-out' provisions (exempting specific categories of 
disputes from the arbitration clause)." 
  92 
institutions to offer speed and economy rather than over zealous use of 
procedural formalities to increase fairness of the proceedings.366 As one 
corporate counsel observed: 
 
“When businesses pay for private adjudication, they rightly expect speed and 
efficiency from the process, just as they expect these qualities from other 
service providers … Realistically, however, it is difficult to comfortably predict 
an arbitration of any commercial complexity ending in fewer than two or three 
years … a time frame … which is simply too long, particularly for a private 
process … in which any right to appeal is largely given up … While business 
leaders also expect a fair resolution, taking excessive time can often be just 
as damaging as a wrong decision”367 
 
In 2007, Herbert Smith’s survey of global corporate counsel showed a 
movement away from arbitration368 in favour of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)369 mechanisms such as mediation,370 expert determination and early 
neutral evaluation and adjudication.371 Staying away from ICA is very much in 
line with a survey conducted by the School of International Arbitration at 
Queen Mary, University of London, which showed that while in 2006 only 11 
per cent of in-house counsel preferred litigation to settle international disputes, 
by 2008 the figure had risen to 41 per cent.372  
 
After reviewing the attitudes of 21 of the largest global companies towards 
ADR, Herbert Smith’s Survey in 2007 observed: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366Bühring-Uhle (1996) pp. 136-143 (one of the “two most significant advantages and presumably the 
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guaranteeing the international enforcement of awards”); Naimark/Keer (2005) p. 95 
367 McIlwrath/Schroeder (2008) p.6 
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“One theme which arose repeatedly was a growing frustration with 
international arbitration as a dispute resolution process. Whilst it was 
recognised as a valuable process where the domestic courts of a particular 
jurisdiction were not considered to be an acceptable forum, the trend for 
arbitration proceedings to become more like litigation, slower, more expensive 
and lacking in robust procedural controls were all highlighted as pointing 
towards an uptake in mediation.”373 
 
As an alternative to arbitration, ADR may be cheaper and quicker but it does 
not offer final and binding solutions.374 ADR depends on a consensual 
resolution rather than confrontation.375 Therefore, it cannot be a replacement 
for arbitration.  
 
Yet with speed and economy, the traditional benefits of arbitration, having 
been eroded over the last 25 years, clients are increasingly disenchanted with 
the system.376 In many instances the ultimate cost and time involved in 
resolving a dispute through arbitration are disproportionate to its value. The 
desire shown by international business communities for improved speed and 
economy forces the following question: Can the excessive costs and delay of 
international arbitration be avoided?377  
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per cent in 2005). The survey concluded that “the overall trend among the survey respondents seems 
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375 ICCA Congress Series No 5 (1990) 
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 AVOIDING COST AND DELAY 3
Numerous attempts have been made by both arbitration users and providers 
to reduce the excessive cost and delay of ICA. This chapter considers 
methods for expediting ‘regular’ or ‘ordinary’ arbitration.378 The following 
chapter will address FTA specifically and the differences between expedited 
regular arbitration and FTA will be discussed. 
 
 Party Autonomy enables speed and economy 3.1
Arbitration is a consensual process. Rather than impose on the parties how 
their dispute should be resolved, the principle of party autonomy allows 
parties to choose how they govern their arbitration.379  
 
As Lew puts it: 
 
“Party autonomy is the primary source of the arbitration and the procedure. 
The arbitration will be governed by what the parties have agreed in the 
arbitration agreement subject to the limits provided by mandatory rules. The 
agreement may either directly design the rules and procedures to follow or do 
so indirectly by selecting the applicable arbitration rules.”380 
 
Accordingly, parties enjoy complete freedom to choose provisions for time and 
cost saving.381 They can specify a sole arbitrator rather than three to save 
cost, and specify an expedited selection and appointment process of the 
arbitral tribunal to ensure speed.382 They can select those procedural rules 
which are conducive to the business in question. For instance, speed and 
economy of maritime and commodity arbitrations in England are supported by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 In this thesis the terms regular, ordinary or normal arbitration deliberately refer to non-expedited 
arbitration as apposed to fast-track. 
379 Lau/Horlach (2010) p.121 
380 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) pp. 28 ¶2-44. 
381 Kaufmann-Kohler/Stucki (2004) p. 59 
382 Fulmer/Rodriguez/Berry (2009) pp.149-170 
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many courts decisions in England. Fast-track notions of sports arbitration in 
Switzerland have proved to be upheld by law and thus enable arbitrators to 
freely provide immense time and costs saving.383 
 
Parties can save money and time by choosing to have the seat of arbitration 
in the country most convenient for the parties, witnesses, experts and 
arbitrators.384  
 
The parties can also ensure that the desire for timely and economic conduct 
of the arbitration is reflected in the arbitration clause.385 They can do this by 
choosing specific sets of institutional rules or by creating entirely new rules or 
by modifying the provisions of existing rules to make them more adaptable to 
their circumstances.386 In order to achieve the maximum savings in speed and 
economy they can even decide to leave the entire procedural matter of the 
applicable law, rules and seat for the arbitrators to determine, either as 
“amiable compositeurs” or “ex aequo et bono.”387 
 
Thus, if the parties desire FTA to be completed within two months they can 
make it a condition of the arbitration agreement.388 If they desire a documents-
only arbitration, because they do not want to incur significant expense in 
having their dispute resolved, they can agree to that too.389 They can 
dispense with the disclosure of documents or the evidence of witnesses, and 
even a hearing if they wish. 390 Conversely, if parties think that a dispute is 
likely to be technical and require full disclosure they might stipulate that.391 
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Popular choices for expediting arbitration are:  
 
‘Documents only arbitrations’392 – The arbitrator decides the issues of the 
dispute based only on written submissions from both parties without any 
pleadings or, sometimes, any hearing.  
 
‘Limitations on document production of documents’393 – Unlimited document 
production can bury both parties in mountains of paper, only part of which has 
any relevance to the issues.  
 
'Look and sniff' arbitrations’394 – The issue is a physical thing that can be 
inspected, like the quality of commodity product or a construction material, 
and the arbitrator looks at the disputed issues in question and makes a 
binding determination within days of the dispute arising. 
 
'Baseball arbitration’ – After an exchange of written pleadings the arbitrators  
choose between two final offers submitted by the parties.395 
 
'Sealed offers' – One party submits a written offer to the other in the hope of 
settling the dispute quickly. Thought not recognized as standard practice in 
international arbitration it is known in common law practice. It encourages 
settlement because a party that refuses an offer but goes on to lose the 
arbitration will be liable for all costs of the arbitration accumulated after the 
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These rules may be selected from existing versions drafted by arbitration 
institutions or they may be created by the parties specifically for the 
agreement in question.397 The choice of a designated arbitral body is not 
mandatorily required.398 Under modern arbitration practice, parties either opt 
for ad hoc arbitration so that arbitrators can exercise more control over the 
arbitral procedure or parties can mix and match rules and institutions to their 
liking.399 In either case, because the parties are free to design their agreement 
in whatever way they choose, the arbitration agreement is the most 
fundamental opportunity for including binding measures aimed at reducing 
cost and time.400 
 
 Arbitrators are uniquely placed to change the pace of 3.2
an Arbitration 
After party autonomy, the focus of efforts to improve international arbitral 
procedure has generally been on the tribunal. As Greenwood observes, the 
inherent flexibility of arbitral procedure places the tribunal in a unique position 
to change the pace of arbitration.401 According to her, the obligation of 
arbitrators is not only to observe due process and to issue a binding, 
enforceable award; it is also to conduct time and cost effective arbitral 
proceedings.402 Accordingly it is commonly accepted that arbitration is only as 
good as its arbitrators.403  
 
In the 2010 SIA/WC Survey, corporate counsel suggested that a strong 
tribunal can make all the difference to the conduct of arbitration by imposing a 
robust timetable and case-management. However detailed the arbitration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Lau/Horlach (2010) pp. 121-30 
398 Tweeddale/Tweeddale (2007) p.89 Aside from the tailor-made rules, the choice of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules by the parties is widely accepted as an adoption of the ad hoc arbitration) 
399 Redfern/Hunter (2004) ¶3-44. 
400 Tackaberry (1987) p. 219 
401 Greenwood (2010) p. 566 
402 Ibid 
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procedures are, they can only accelerate arbitration if the tribunal manages to 
implement them.404 
 
There are many examples of arbitral tribunals which have started with early 
case-management and active procedural controls, imposing short deadlines, 
with the intention of allowing time extensions only if parties can show that 
there is a clear, overriding reason for not meeting the deadlines, but then have 
deviated from this approach.405  
 
In a 2006 article Marriott discussed streamlining the arbitral procedure in 
which he stressed the importance of arbitrators taking the initiative:  
 
“Judges and arbitrators must manage cases efficiently, be prepared to impose 
time limits and stick to them, refuse to accept evidence and submissions 
which are irrelevant or only of secondary or tertiary importance and, above all, 
be active and not passive.”406 
 
The ICC report on the Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in 
Arbitration echoed these sentiments when it highlighted the need for proactive 
arbitrators with strong case management skills.407 The report emphasised the 
utility of a tribunal holding an early case management conference, recognising 
that:  
 
“The more information the arbitral tribunal has about the issues in the case 
prior to the case management conference, the better able it will be to assist 
the parties to devise a procedure that will deal with the dispute as efficiently 
as possible.”408  
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The more the arbitral tribunal reduces irrelevant issues arising during the 
procedure, the cheaper and quicker the procedure will become. Ideally, only 
those witnesses that the arbitrator approves should be heard. Furthermore, 
the tribunal alone should ask the experts questions or make sure that any 
questions at the witness conference are confined to issues relevant to the 
dispute. The pleadings and written witness statement should be taken as 
evidence in chief, which allows the other party to directly commence with its 
cross-examination.409 
 
In many cases it is possible for the arbitral tribunal to agree with the parties on 
the total duration of the hearing. Moreover, the tribunal has the power to 
overrule the parties if it considers that the amount of time required by the 
parties is unreasonable.410 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 1981-4 
was probably the place where this method was first introduced on a large 
scale.411 These tribunals used their discretion to apply many different 
techniques for controlling the time and cost of the arbitral proceedings.412  
 
As chairman of a 1996 ICC tribunal413 and a 1999 ICSID tribunal,414 
Böckstiegel also used his discretion to inform the parties that each would be 
given a finite amount of time during the hearings.415  Böckstiegel asked the 
parties to allocate the time 50/50 between them and to determine what they 
considered to be the best use of their time.416 This approach later became 
characterized as the ‘chess clock’ or ‘stop clock’ system.417 Even the ICC418 
encourages the use of these methods and it seems to be very efficient in 
complex cases in order to avoid lengthy hearings. In a large domestic 
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arbitration case in Australia, stop clock arbitration made possible the hearing 
of 241 witnesses (including experts) in 54 days.419   
 
However, Rau & Sherman suggested in 1995 that unless arbitrators work full-
time, resulting in more experienced, more professional and more confident 
arbitrators, the skills required to manage arbitration to tight deadlines might 
not be found.  
 
“Assigning substantial case-management functions to arbitrators would 
considerably affect the present system of selecting persons who have other 
careers and are willing to set aside a discrete block of time for an arbitration 
hearing, but are not prepared to be on call, as is a full-time judge, to rule on a 
multitude of prehearing matters and motions. Greater case management 
duties for arbitrators (or at least the chairman) seem inevitable, but that may 
require rethinking some of the basic premises of the traditional model.”420 
 
 Statutory Provisions for Time and Cost Control 3.3
There is an inevitable conflict in every arbitration between, on the one hand, 
the desire of the parties and especially their counsel, to have unlimited time to 
put forward their case, and to leave no stone unturned when it comes to 
reviewing evidence and, on the other hand, the duty of the arbitrator to 
proceed within as short a time as possible.421  
 
The 1996 English Arbitration Act, while acknowledging the principle of party 
autonomy422 and judicial minimalism,423 brought in a new statutory principle 
that the object of arbitration is to obtain “the firm resolution of disputes by an 
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impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense.”424 This aim is 
followed up in section 40425, which imposes on the parties a duty to “do all 
things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitral 
proceedings.”426 If a party fails to do what is necessary for the proper and 
expeditious conduct of the arbitration, arbitrators are given statutory power to 
enforce time limits.427  
 
In particular, section 33(1)(b) contains a mandatory duty of the tribunal to: 
“adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case 
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense so as to provide a fair means for the 
resolution of the matters falling to be determined.”428  
 
In this context it is interesting to note the evolution which has taken place in 
arbitral laws and rules. The UNCITRAL Rules (Article 15)429, which date back 
to 1976, or the UNCITRAL Model Law (Article 18)430, which was adopted in 
1985, envisaged that each party should be given a “full opportunity” of 
presenting its case. New rules and laws only provide for “reasonable 
opportunity.”431 This obligation to avoid unnecessary cost and delay, while still 
granting the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case, should 
now guide arbitrators when deciding on the most appropriate procedure. As 
Briner suggested:  
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“Arbitrators should be encouraged to insist that time limits requested by the 
parties are reasonable and not excessive and, especially, to be reluctant to 
allow extensions which are not really justified.”432 
 
 Institutional Adaptation to speed and economy 3.4
Arbitral institutions have built on the foundations laid in the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law433 but they have remained aware that proclaiming general 
principles is not enough to control time and cost. As is often the case, 
arbitration institutions have been more proactive than national parliaments 
and over the last 25 years have developed rules to clarify the extent to which 
parties are obliged to conduct arbitrations in a timely and economic manner, 
and the circumstances in which arbitral tribunals may be empowered to force 
parties to seek a more conciliatory approach.434  
 
In 2007 the ICC produced a report called Techniques for Controlling Time and 
Costs in Arbitration,435 aimed at parties and their counsel. The report contains 
a useful summary of case management techniques such as bifurcation, 
limiting document requests, and limiting the length and scope of written 
submissions and witness evidence. It also emphasizes that: 
 
“Appropriate control of time and cost is important in all cases. In cases of low 
complexity and low value, it is particularly important to ensure that time and 
costs are proportionate to what is at stake in the dispute.”436 
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In 2008, Rivkin showed that many arbitral institutions have improved their 
regular arbitration rules in such areas as securing faster appointment of the 
arbitral tribunal, requiring a case management conference as early as 
possible after the tribunal, coping with e-document production, ensuring 
parties remain cooperative and encouraging pro-active arbitrators.437  
 
Institutions have also begun to require prospective arbitrators to confirm their 
availability. In Article 11(5) of the ICC Rules, arbitrators agree that:  
 
“By accepting to serve, arbitrators undertake to carry out their responsibilities 
in accordance with the Rules.”438  
 
Before August 2009, a prospective ICC arbitrator had to provide a declaration 
of acceptance, including a declaration of availability, which stated: 
 
“(…) I confirm that I (…) am able and available to serve as an arbitrator in 
accordance with all the requirements of those Rules (…).”439  
 
Practice showed that arbitrators did not always give sufficient attention to their 
availability when accepting to serve as an arbitrator. This frequently resulted 
in tribunals that were too busy to manage their cases in reasonable time.440  
 
The ICC International Court of Arbitration responded in 2009 with a revised 
“Statement of Acceptance, Availability and Independence”, in which a 
separate section invites prospective arbitrators to specifically confirm their 
ability to devote the necessary time to the arbitration. The new form states: 
 
"I confirm, on the basis of the information presently available to me, that I can 
devote the time necessary to conduct this arbitration diligently, efficiently and 
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in accordance with the time limits in the Rules. I understand that it is important 
to complete the arbitration as promptly as reasonably practicable and that the 
ICC Court will consider the duration and conduct of the proceedings when 
fixing my fees (Article 2(2) of Appendix III to the Rules). My current 
professional engagements are as below for the information of the ICC Court 
and the parties.” 441 
 
Thus, a prospective arbitrator is now required to declare the cases in which 
they are involved as sole arbitrator, tribunal chair, co-arbitrator or counsel as 
well as any foreseeable conflicting demands in the following eighteen 
months.442 Upon its introduction on 17 August 2009, it was clearly stressed 
that  “genuine concerns about availability” may cause the ICC Court not to 
confirm or appoint an arbitrator.443 The statement reminds prospective 
arbitrators of the seriousness of their agreement, and this is reflected in the 
consequences for an arbitrator who slows the pace of proceedings, as the 
ICC can impose financial penalties upon recalcitrant arbitrators and, as a last 
resort, can even require the removal of such arbitrators.444   
 
Since the introduction of the new form, the ICC Court has three times 
exercised its right not to confirm prospective arbitrators who in the Court’s eye 
appear not to be sufficiently available.445 In one case the prospective arbitrator 
stated that he was involved in over 20 cases.446   
 
In another case, the prospective chairman disclosed that he would shortly be 
on a sabbatical for a period of 4 months.447 In this case the co-arbitrators 
accepted the availability limitations and none of the parties raised any 
objections to the confirmation of the prospective chairman within the time limit 
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granted. The ICC Court, however, decided not to confirm the nominee, 
considering that the possibility that one of the parties will require interventions 
or actions during the sabbatical stage, and that the arbitral tribunal would not 
be able to deal with such cases.448  
 
In one FTA case the ICA Court of the ICC, was aware of the availability 
problems of proposed arbitrator who had submitted the Statement of 
Acceptance, Availability and Independence.449 The ICC required him to pull 
back from the position and thus resolved the problem without having to refuse 
the appointment. In fact, the ICC Court had the power under Article 11(4) of 
the ICC Rules not to confirm the said person as sole arbitrator or chairman.450 
 
With respect to lengthy document disclosure requests, the International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) showed its commitment to expeditious 
arbitration in 2008 by issuing The ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning 
Exchanges of Information.451 
 
The most recent step in the evolution time and cost effectiveness of ICA was 
the publication of the revised ICC Rules on September 12, 2011, which came 
into effect in January 2012. Article 22(1) of the new ICC Rules states: 
 
“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the 
arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the 
complexity and value of the dispute.”452 
 
Article 22(1) thus contains an explicit contractual obligation on the parties to 
conduct their arbitration in a ‘proportionate’ manner. More often than not, 
however, when large sums of money are at stake and experienced counsel 
are engaged on both sides, at least one of the parties has an incentive to 
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behave as though they were litigating, with all its attendant cost and delay. 
Once a dispute has arisen, it is unrealistic to expect either party to act 
contrary to its self-interest in pursuit of the ‘higher ideal’ of arbitral efficiency. 
In such situations, time and costs are best kept in check by empowering 
tribunals to make case management decisions on the basis of ‘proportionality’, 
which means an appropriate speed for an appropriate case. The existence of 
such a power is common to most modern sets of rules453 and is contained in 
Article 22(2) of the new ICC Rules:  
 
“In order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after 
consulting the parties, may adopt such procedural measures as it considers 
appropriate, provided that they are not contrary to any agreement of the 
parties.”454 
 
The innovation with regard to case management in the new Rules is Article 
24, which makes it mandatory for the tribunal to convene an initial “case 
management conference to consult the parties on procedural measures”455 
which may be held “in person, by video conference, telephone or similar 
means of communication.”456 Article 24 also suggests that the tribunal may 
adopt one or more of the case management techniques described in 
Appendix IV.457  
 
 
Although the case management techniques set out in Appendix IV and the 
above-mentioned improvements will be familiar to all experienced arbitration 
practitioners, Friedland458 observes that the codification of time and cost-
effectiveness in ICA fulfils at least two important functions. First, it can 
reasonably be expected that the explicit encouragement to use such 
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techniques will increase their use by less experienced arbitrators.459 Second, 
the explicit enunciation of case management techniques serves further to 
legitimize their use and hence to prevent awards being challenged on due 
process grounds.460   
 
Notwithstanding all these improvements, quite recently in 2012, a new task 
force was created within the ICC Commission on Arbitration, co-chaired by 
Bernard Hanotiau and Julian Lew, to analyse why delays and costs still arise, 
and to provide the arbitral community with new recommendations.461  
 
While arbitral institutions have been making great strides in limiting cost and 
delay it would be an exaggeration to give them all the credit for the recent 
development of expedited procedures.462 The UNCITRAL has also brought 
about changes in arbitral culture. In 2010, after years of deliberation, the 
UNCITRAL Working Group II submitted a revised text of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. While remaining faithful to the structure and drafting style of 
the first version, the revisions seek to enhance the time and cost effectiveness 
of UNCITRAL arbitration and to reflect the use of modern technology.463  
 
Several articles of the 2010 UNCITRAL rules acknowledge developments in 
communication which allow faster processing. Article 1 eliminates the 
requirement that the parties must agree in writing that the UNCITRAL rules 
will apply to the arbitration464. Agreements can be now be made by phone, 
email, or any other medium, providing proof of the agreement is available.465 
According to article 2 electronic transmissions is acceptable for all arbitral 
communication. Any communication transmitted electronically is deemed to 
have been received on the day it is sent, except in the particular case of the 
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notice of arbitration, which is deemed to have been received on the day when 
it reaches the addressee’s electronic address.466 Article 3 provides that the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal shall not be hindered by any controversy 
with respect to the sufficiency of the notice of arbitration, which shall be finally 
resolved by the arbitral tribunal.467  
 
The new UNCITRAL Rules, like the LCIA and ICC Rules, give arbitrators and 
parties a mandatory duty to reduce delay. Article 17 makes clear that the 
tribunal shall conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay and 
expense and shall establish a provisional timetable as soon as possible.468  
Additionally, it prescribes that the arbitral tribunal, as soon as practicable after 
its constitution and after inviting the parties to express their views, shall 
establish the provisional timetable of the arbitration. 
 
Some of the new UNCITRAL Rules offer arbitrators the means to take control 
of time and cost.469 Article 28(4) states that the tribunal may direct that 
witnesses, including expert witnesses, may be examined through means of 
telecommunication (such as videoconference) that do not require their 
physical presence at the hearing.470  
 
The International Bar Association (IBA) is another organisation concerned 
with the time and cost of arbitral proceedings. In 1999 a working group of the 
IBA, comprising both common law and civil law experts published revised 
version of the IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial 
Arbitration.471 The revision gained popularity because critically, according to 
Gaillard, the committee who made the revisions had sufficient first-hand 
experience to understand what was needed to create speedy time and cost 
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effective arbitral proceedings.472 This encouraged the IBA to introduce new 
updates in 2010 to cover evidentiary representation in arbitration,473 in 
particular the new challenges and opportunities presented by the disclosure 
and production of electronic documents as evidence.474  It also for the first 
time suggested “proportionality” as a consideration for arbitrators to reduce 
cost and delay in ICA.475  
 
There have also been joint efforts between arbitrators, counsel and parties 
such as the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), which in 2009 
issued the CEDR Rules for the Facilitation of Settlement in International 
Arbitration. In the United States, the College of Commercial Arbitrators (CCA) 
introduced Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration.476 
In England, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, (CIArb) published Protocol 
for E-Disclosure in Arbitration (2008) and Guidelines on the Interviewing of 
Prospective Arbitrators. CIArb’s Cost in International Arbitration Survey 
revealed significant facts about time and cost-effectiveness of ICA. Valuable 
observations about the experiences of practitioners’ counsel and arbitrators 
since 2006 were reported in the School of International Arbitration’s bi-annual 
surveys on ICA.   
 
To avoid unnecessary costs, discussing the conduct or progress of the 
arbitration can be done by telephone or video conferences instead of forcing 
parties to physically meet.477 The contribution of information technology is 
essential to saving time and money as, for example, witnesses and experts 
are heard by use of videoconferences.478 Olympic arbitrations since 2004 
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Olympics have often made use of such technology and almost all arbitral 
institutions in today’s word make good use of IT. 479 
 
The ICC began to operate electronic case management system as early as 
1989.480 This immediately provided a solution to the one of the major 
problems of international arbitration, namely the excess of documents and 
evidences which cause significant cost and delays.481 Case management 
techniques to reduce time and costs are continually being considered.482 For 
example, the WIPO introduced an Electronic Case Facility which enables 
secure filing, storing and retrieval of case-related submissions and remote 
electronic case management.483 In November 2005, the ICC launched its Net 
case facility to enable arbitrations to be conducted in a secure online 
environment.484 The increasing use of electronic communication can have a 
major impact on putting limits on the disclosure of documents.485 
 
 Guidelines on Counsel Conduct  3.5
Because ICA is a service, parties have every right to expect a cost-effective 
procedure. What really costs in arbitration is not air tickets, hotels, 
restaurants, or court reporters, it is the time spent on the case by lawyers and 
corporate management.  It is quite simply unethical for lawyers or arbitrators 
to sit on cases so that they can charge more hours. 
 
Some major international law firms publish declarations to their clients and 
practitioners confirming they will make every attempt to reduce the time and 
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cost of arbitration.486 Rivkin, co-chair of the International Dispute Resolution 
(IDR) Group, explains the purpose of the protocol: 
 
“We have always focused on conducting our arbitrations in the most efficient 
manner possible. We believe that this approach is strongly in our clients’ 
interests, and we hope that, … this public commitment … will encourage 
others to work with us in improving the international arbitration process.”487 
 
Clients are increasingly unwilling to use outsourced legal research and 
instead expect customized attention from its legal counsel, be it in house or 
external.488 Many law firms now offer fixed fees structures for different dispute 
resolution methods.489 Many include specialists in ADR to resolve matters as 
early as possible.490 Other law firms are revising their fee structure to be able 
to offer cost saving options such as 491 sliding scales492 or contingency fees493 
instead of the hourly charge-out rate. 
 
In 2008, a significant step came from the IBA's Arbitration Committee, which 
formed a task force to investigate the different ethical and cultural standards 
and disciplinary rules that apply to counsel in international arbitrations. The 
mandate is to create a code of conduct in international arbitration, including 
the issues of excessive costs and long delay in arbitration. In August 2010, 
the IBA’s tasks force conducted a survey seeking views on the impact of 
ethical constraints on arbitral proceedings, including views on specific cases. 
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The survey has received considerable attention. Proponents maintain that a 
code of conduct for counsel in international arbitrations would bring greater 
integrity and certainty to the practice of international arbitration and level the 
playing field for practitioners from different jurisdictions and legal traditions.494 
Detractors remain sceptical about the need for any such code of conduct, 
believing it would only lead to confusion.495  
 
A code of conduct for counsel in international arbitration certainly raises 
numerous issues.496 As Born asks:497 What would be the character of such a 
code? Would the code purport to be binding and, if so, by what legal 
mechanism? Alternatively, would the code be non-binding, but instead 
suggest best practices which would provide guidance but no more? Similarly, 
what mechanisms would need to exist to enforce a code of conduct for 
counsel in international arbitrations? And who would enforce it – national 
courts, national bar associations, or international arbitral tribunals?  
 
Questions will also arise, according to Rogers, as to the relationship between 
any international code of conduct and national rules of professional 
responsibility.498 In many jurisdictions, counsel’s conduct in an international 
arbitration is subject to obligations imposed by his or her local bar. What 
should be the relationship between these national rules of professional 
responsibility and an international code of conduct designed specifically for 
international arbitral proceedings? 
 
These questions have recently been answered in the IBA Guidelines on Party 
Representation in International Arbitration of 25 May 2013.499 These 
guidelines are inspired by the principle that party representatives should act 
with integrity and honesty and should not engage in activities designed to 
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produce unnecessary delay or expense, including tactics aimed at obstructing 
the arbitration proceedings.500 It is unlikely that these guidelines will provide a 
widespread solution to the issue of dilatory tactics in ICA. However, at the 
very least, such guidelines may be the impetus for parties and tribunals to 
agree a common standard for addressing speed and economy early on, rather 
than leaving it until just before the hearing, or, as is often the case, not 
addressing the point at all and employing dilatory tactics. 
 Concluding Remarks 3.6
Many time and cost saving techniques are available for ICA but they provide 
speed and economy within the narrow concept of reducing unnecessary cost 
and delay. This does not allow the promotion of more speed or more economy 
that some international commercial disputes currently demand. Methods for 
expediting regular arbitration proceedings are being kept to a reasonable 
minimum in order not to overload the rules of a given institution and not to 
adversely affect the flexibility of arbitral proceedings. Arbitral proceedings can 
in many cases restrict the number of written briefs, document production and 
long witness statements and impose time limits for the filings of such briefs 
and witness lists. But using any one of those technics is not enough for 
providing the speed and economy that many international commercial 
disputes demand. Thus FTA was suggested as a cure to those international 
commercial disputes in which increased speed and economy is more openly 
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 FAST-TRACK ARBITRATION AS A PARADIGM 4
The emergence of fast-track arbitration (FTA) is a fundamental development 
in both international and domestic arbitration and clearly reflects the increased 
cost-consciousness of disputants and their desire to resolve disputes even 
more quickly than methods of expediting regular arbitration proceedings.501 
 
 Definition of Fast-track Arbitration 4.1
While many attempts have been made over the years to increase the speed 
and economy of international commercial arbitration, before 1990 there was 
no uniform understanding of FTA in the arbitration literature.502 Practitioners 
used many methods for improving speed in arbitration without labelling it as 
FTA until Davis created a definition in 1993.503  
 
Davis defined three types of procedures for increasing speed in arbitration (i) 
fast-track arbitration; (ii) expedited arbitration; and (iii) accelerated 
arbitration.504 He differentiated the procedures according to when and how the 
parties agree to expedited rules. Thus, “Fast-track arbitration” (according to 
Davis) is established in the arbitration clause within the main commercial 
contract regardless of whether any dispute may eventually exist.505 
“Accelerated arbitration” is established in the submission agreement after the 
dispute but before establishing the arbitral tribunal.506 “Expedited arbitration” 
uses ready-made institutional rules, and parties may opt into these rules either 
before the dispute by way of their arbitration clause which refers to the 
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specific set of institutional expedited rules, or after the dispute has arisen by 
way of the submission agreement to the arbitral institution.507  
 
In 1998, Freyer508 accepted Davis’ definition of expedited arbitration as 
arbitration which uses ready-made institutional FTA rules. But instead of 
making two further divisions he combined Davis’s definitions of fast-track 
arbitration and accelerated arbitration and suggested the term “modified 
arbitration” for all fast-track procedures, whenever agreed by the parties. 
  
These two authors drew a distinction between different fast-track methods in 
order to see which worked best. However, their categorizations did not gain 
wide approval from the arbitration community because they complicated the 
simple concept of “fast-tracking” international commercial arbitration which 
covered all measures aimed at increasing speed and reducing cost. A more 
recent definition is given by McIlwrath & Savage in 2010. FTA is:  
 
“an arbitration where the parties have agreed, either in their contract or when 
a dispute arises, to a form of accelerated or ‘fast-track’ procedure, the goal of 
which is to have the dispute resolved by an award rendered in a period of 
months, weeks, or even days.”509  
 
This thesis defines FTA as arbitration where the parties have chosen to adopt 
an agreement with the specific aims of increasing speed and reducing cost, 
and where it is understood that the fast-track procedures to achieve these 
aims may restrict parties’ options in other areas. Any arbitration that falls 
outside this definition of FTA is defined as “regular arbitration” according to 
this thesis. Furthermore, any attempt to increase speed and economy in only 
one area or procedural stage is, under this thesis, a method for expediting 
regular arbitration.510  
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 The development of institutional FTA rules 4.2
 
4.2.1 Early suggestions for improving the speed of arbitration 
Before 1990, arbitration authorities made several suggestions for improving 
the speed and reducing the cost of regular arbitration but they did not call it 
FTA. 
 
In 1987, Rubino suggested using a sole arbitral tribunal instead of three 
arbitrators, a limited option of appeal and a time frame with a maximum of two 
years.511 In this system, except in special cases, the arbitration clause should 
provide one arbitrator with a mandate to complete the dispute within one year. 
This arrangement could be supplemented with an appeal arbitration panel. He 
proposed a three-member appeal panel with the power to transfer the 
appealed award to the winner, in whole or in part, if the first instance award 
was confirmed. Alternatively, the appealed award could be returned to the 
loser if the award decision was reversed within one year.512 Rubino also 
proposed that the placing of a security deposit would be a condition of making 
an appeal, in order to eliminate spurious dilatory appeals by the losing 
party.513 
 
Unfortunately the appeal procedures which Rubino advocated often led in 
practice to additional disputes, for instance regarding alleged procedural 
errors or whether the appellate tribunal had the authority to review some of 
the issues.514 Moreover, in cases where one party does not accept an award 
in the first instance, it almost certainly would refuse to pay the deposit 
proposed by Rubino and decline to follow an appeal procedure. Instead, it 
would probably choose litigation to obstruct enforcement based on the 
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reasons listed in Article 5 of the NYC. So whether Rubino’s proposition 
represents time and cost saving is questionable.515 
 
Schneider, in 1989, introduced the term “lean arbitration”516 which describes a 
situation where arbitrators are active in promoting speed and economy rather 
than waiting for the parties to request expedition.  Schneider suggests that 
“lean arbitration” would work best when issues relating to procedure are 
clearly identified at the outset, rather than leaving them to be determined 
during the arbitral process.517  
 
Schneider also proposed that the objectives of speed and economy are best 
served if, as early as possible, arbitrators itemise the cost of each procedural 
step. The intention was to encourage economy by clearly showing the savings 
to be made from conducting, say, a main hearing in one day rather than 
seven, or the savings that could be made by documents only witness 
statements and limited cross-examination in the hearing.518 However, this 
approach has not received acceptance as in the majority of cases arbitral 
proceedings are determined as the case unfolds and the cost of arbitration is 
calculated last, after the closure of proceedings.519  
 
Redfern and Hunter, in 1991, also suggested methods for improving speed, 
called “streamlined proceedings” which, they suggested, should be codified in 
the procedural rules of arbitral institutions.520 According to them, institutions 
are best placed to offer streamlining techniques because at the start of 
arbitration the arbitral tribunal has insufficient knowledge of the parties’ 
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position regarding the most appropriate arbitral proceedings in a particular 
dispute. Instead, arbitral institutions could adopt various procedural rules to 
increase speed and offer them as a separate or semi-separate system so that 
parties may pick and choose which measures to employ rather than accepting 
regular procedural rules. This would require that the parties agree beforehand 
which system to use. Alternatively, institutional rules could be drafted in such 
a way that arbitrators are granted the authority to determine which system to 
use.521 Redfern and Hunter made many suggestions for institutional rules 
which might streamline arbitral procedures, some of these are:522 
 
• only a sole arbitrator should be appointed; 
• exact and unyielding time limits should be strictly imposed; 
• the arbitrator should, first and foremost, identify the most significant 
points at issue, determine the extent of direct witness testimony and 
allocate the total time available for witness statements and 
responses between the parties before the hearing; 
• the arbitrator’s award should not contain extensive reasoning. 
 
Uff, in 1993, addressed the question of whether and by what means 
arbitration can be made economically viable.523 He suggested that arbitrators 
have wide powers and that if arbitration procedures are to be radically 
improved, the initiative must come from the arbitrators. 
 
He suggested that arbitrators should: 
 
• become sufficiently acquainted with the issues at an early stage  
• not regard themselves as bound by any of the rules or procedures 
of the local court 
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• consider requesting a written or oral presentation from each side 
aimed at defining the principal issues to be addressed in the 
arbitration.  
• consider from the earliest possible date how the arbitration is to 
proceed.  
• consider whether, and to what extent, oral hearings are necessary 
or appropriate 
• have regard to the sums of money in issue, the complexity of 
particular issues in order to determine the appropriate speed for the 
case. 
 
Uff’s suggestions have been widely used and most current FTA rules give 
arbitrators broad authority expedite arbitral proceedings. 
 
4.2.2 The modern concept of FTA 
FTA as a separate system, rather than as a method for expediting regular 
arbitration was first seriously considered in 1991 when an ICC tribunal used 
its regular arbitration rules to administer two related cases under a "fast track 
procedure”. The value in dispute was several $100 million and the two 
arbitrations were completed in only 60 and 80 days.524  
 
The two cases were unrelated but both concerned the redetermination of the 
purchase price for a gas supply agreement.525 These cases combined the 
classic characteristics of complex international arbitral proceedings with the 
added pressure of an extremely tight deadline.526 The arbitral tribunal had to 
deal with difficult procedural issues including the challenge of an arbitrator, the 
drawing up of terms of reference, questions as to the extent of its jurisdiction 
and the merits of the dispute, exchange of memorials, hearing the witnesses 
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and parties, and the approval of the award by the ICC. Despite these 
complications the tribunal managed to conduct the FTA with remarkable 
speed and the notification of the final award was given to the parties on the 
day of approval.527 
 
Surprisingly, some of the lawyers involved in drafting the FTA clause did not 
believe it would be possible to successfully conclude an international 
commercial arbitration within the time limit of 60 days which was part of the 
arbitration agreement. The main purpose of the FTA clause was that, in case 
of a dispute, the parties should reach a voluntary settlement as opposed to an 
award being made.528 In the end fast-track proceedings succeeded because 
of the will of the parties, the sophistication of the tribunal and the efforts of the 
ICC Court and its Secretariat.529   
 
The following year saw an arbitration that was fast-track in every sense of the 
word. In 1992, immediately before a Grand Prix race, a dispute developed 
between the host of the Formula 1 championship and a racing team regarding 
the proper varnishing of two race cars.530 A prompt decision was required and 
the ICC Arbitration Court delivered. The award was rendered just 38 days 
after arbitration proceedings were begun, allowing the racing team to 
participate in the Grand Prix.531  
 
In order to foster fast-track dispute resolution, in 1992, Rovine suggested that 
arbitral institutions should establish ready-made FTA rules with the specific 
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aims of increasing speed, economy and fairness, and balancing the 
requirements of all three.532 Such rules could:  allow the institution to propose 
a sole arbitrator in the absence of agreement by the parties; set time limits for 
filing answers and reduce challenges; allow fewer submissions than normal 
from parties - perhaps one from each side - and these should be submitted 
simultaneously; give arbitrators the discretion to rule on whether witnesses 
are needed at the hearing and whether any document production should be 
permitted. The ICC refused to take up Rovine’s suggestion of creating a 
separate set of FTA Rules, preferring to conduct FTA under the auspices of its 
regular arbitration rules.  
 
In 1993 four international commercial arbitration cases with a significant value 
were initiated under the ICC,533 two of which were governed by pre-dispute 
FTA arbitration clauses and two were to be settled by fast-track procedures 
agreed through the ICC’s after the dispute had arisen.534  This shows the 
growing popularity of fast-track proceedings and the ICC’s eagerness to allow 
parties to agree on fast-track, before or after the dispute had arisen, according 
its regular arbitration rules. 
 
In the 1990s international commercial arbitration was being heavily criticised 
by many arbitration users for its excessive cost and delay.535 There had been 
many calls for better procedures to be developed, but few constructive 
proposals. As a result the previous FTA cases gained prominence among the 
wider arbitration community and served as a model for a variant form of 
arbitration.536  
 
In 1994, the WIPO, in accordance with Rovine’s suggestion, introduced a 
separate set of FTA rules which applied time limits to various stages of the 
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arbitral proceedings and condensed proceedings before a sole arbitrator.537 A 
year later the SCC also introduced a separate set of FTA rules.  
 
The ICC responded to Rovine’s demands with the administrative function of 
its secretariat but no specific FTA rules were implemented until 1998.538 
Thereafter, Article 32 of the 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules specifically gave 
parties the right to shorten time limits and deadlines under its regular 
arbitration rules.539  The ICC also published Notes on ICC Expedited 
Arbitration to illustrate the suitability of the ICC’s regular arbitrations to support 
FTA.540 Similarly, the LCIA adopted Articles 9 and 14 in its 1998 Rules which 
enabled parties and the arbitral tribunal to conduct a fast-rack procedure by 
the effective use of regular arbitration rules.541  
 
In 2004, the Swiss Chambers introduced the automatic application of 
expedited arbitration rules for all arbitrations referred to them below 1 million 
Swiss francs.542 They were largely based on rules that existed in the 
arbitration rules of the Chambers of Commerce of Basel (Article 41 Basel 
Rules), Geneva (Article 31 CCIG) and Lugano (Article 48 Lugano Rules). All 
of these chambers later joined under the Swiss Chambers Arbitration 
Institutions (SCAI) in 2004.543 In the same year the FCC introduced separate 
FTA rules.  Many arbitration institutions, especially in Asia and the Pacific, 
then adopted this approach. CIETAC and JCAA, for instance, were among the 
first institutions to adopt separate sets of expedited arbitration rules.  Today 
almost all arbitration institutions offer specific set of rules to support FTA.544 
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In the new millennium, there are three main approaches to fast-tracking 
international commercial arbitration.545  
 
In the first, according to the ICC and LCIA, FTA does not require special rules, 
but can be performed by merely adapting regular arbitration rules. This 
approach was formalised by the ICC and the LCIA in their 1998 Arbitration 
Rules and followed by the ICDR and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Under 
this approach the time limits of regular arbitration proceedings are reduced in 
the arbitration agreement, or by a fast-track procedure is created in 
consultation with the tribunal. The latter occurs in the terms of reference if it is 
an ICC arbitration or before commencing the process if it is an LCIA 
arbitration. 
 
The second approach to fast-tracking is based on a set of special FTA rules 
which supplement the common procedure rules. Many international 
institutions have created special FTA rules, such as the Expedited Arbitration 
Rules of the SCAI, the Summary Arbitration Procedures of the CIETAC and, 
more recently, the 2007 Fast Track Arbitration Rules of the Institute of 
Arbitrators and Mediators of Australia (IAMA) The advantage of this approach 
to business users is that FTA procedures can be automatically applied to 
cases below a certain monetary threshold and that ready made fast-track 
procedures provide guidance to both parties and arbitrators. 
 
The third approach is to create FTA rules which stand completely apart from 
regular arbitration rules. This approach, pioneered by the SCC and the WIPO, 
has been followed by the ACICA in 2011 and more recently by the KLRCA in 
2012.  These rules offer the most detailed fast-track procedures. Interestingly, 
however, the regular arbitration rules of these institutions do not contain any 
provision in relation to FTA at all. This may be a downside as it is sometimes 
difficult to clearly divide arbitral proceedings.546 
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 Due Process and Fast-track Procedures 4.3
FTA Rules are now readily available for parties to international commercial 
contracts who prefer to use fast-track arbitral proceedings rather than regular 
arbitral proceedings. But achieving speed and economy is useless unless 
fast-track procedures respect the fundamental principle of due process rights. 
Most nations recognise the importance due process and the laws of many 
require arbitration proceedings to meet with minimum standards of due 
process before the state will lend its support to the enforcement of an award.  
 
Due process is often explicitly required by the lex arbitri. For example, Article 
18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates that the "parties must be treated 
with equality and each party must be given a reasonable opportunity of 
presenting the party's case".547  
 
The requirement for due process is also given express recognition in the NYC, 
which states in Article V.1 (b):  
 
“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused… if… the party 
against whom the award was made was … unable to present his case.”548  
 
The requirement of due process is common across many jurisdictions, 
whether directly stipulated as a procedural requirement under national 
arbitration legislation, or as a general requirement of public policy and legal 
tradition.549 In either case, it will generally be mandated by the lex arbitri, 
although specific standards may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 550 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 18; UNCITRAL Rules, Article 17 
548 NYC Article V(1)(b) 
549 Mantilla-Serrano (2004) p. 341 
550 See e.g. Article 33(1) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 and Article 14(1) of the LCIA Rules 
(fairness, impartiality and that each party has ‘a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing 
with that of its opponent’); Article 16 of the AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules (equality and that 
each party has “the right to be heard” and “a fair opportunity to present its case”. 
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The authority of parties and the tribunal to conduct fast-track procedures is 
therefore subject to the right of due process which is commonly also 
enshrined in the FTA rules.551 Article 5(1) of the KLRCA Fast-track Rules of 
2012 states:  
 
“Subject to these Rules, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the powers permitted 
by  law  and  under  the  Act  to  ensure  the  just,  expeditious,  economical 
and  final  determination  of  the  dispute(s)  in  the  reference. In this regard, 
the Arbitral Tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such manner as the 
Arbitral Tribunal  considers  appropriate,  save  that  at  all  times  the  Arbitral  
Tribunal  shall  ensure that  the  parties  are  treated  equally  and  are  given  
reasonable  opportunity  to  present  their  case.” 
 
Similarly Article 19(2) of the SCC Rules for Expedited Arbitrations of 2010 
states:  
 
“In all cases, the Arbitrator shall conduct the arbitration in an impartial, 
practical and expeditious manner, giving each party an equal and reasonable 
opportunity to present its case.”552 
 
In some cases the requirements of due process may restrict parties’ freedom 
to determine the speed of their arbitral proceedings or the arbitrators’ authority 
to accelerate the process.553 For example, a provision in an FTA agreement 
that the arbitral tribunal should hear only one party might well be treated as 
contrary to public policy under the law of the country of enforcement even if 
both parties had agreed to it.554 In such a case, the arbitrator will refuse the 
parties’ request in order to comply with the requirement of due process.555  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Magnusson (2001) 
552 SCC FTA Rules, Article 19(2) 
553 Müller (1998) p.6 
554 Ibid p.6 
555 Société BKMI et Siemens v. Société Dutco, Cour de Cassation, 7 January 1992, reported in (1993) 
XVIII YBCA 140–142. 
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Similarly, while Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law ensures that the 
parties are free to agree on procedure, the parties are also bound by Article 
18 (due process), which in practice could be regarded as "a limitation" of 
Article 19. As the UNCITRAL Secretariat in its report leading to the Model Law 
noted:  
 
“It will be one of the more delicate and complex problems of the preparation of 
a Model Law to strike a balance between the interests of the parties to freely 
determine the procedure to be followed and the interests of the legal system 
expressed to give recognition and effect thereto.”556  
 
From an international FTA perspective, the most essential expression of the 
principle of due process is the appointment of an impartial and independent 
arbitrator who treats the parties fairly and equally.557  
 
4.3.1 Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators  
Impartiality558 and independence 559 are indispensable elements of FTA. The 
FTA Arbitrator has to achieve the right balance between making a valid 
decision in the shortest time practical and compliance with due process.  
  
Whatever procedures the arbitrator conducts,560 they may not unduly favour 
one of the parties over another.561 This requires him to be free from any bias 
resulting from a privileged relationship with the matter to be decided. This also 
prohibits certain relationships, particularly of a financial nature, between the 
arbitrator and one of the parties or any other participant in the arbitral 
proceedings. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 Holtzmann (1984) 
557 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 10; ECHR Article 6 (1). 
558 Poudret/Basson/Berti/Ponti (2007) p.348 
559 Mustill/Boyd (2001) p.96 
560 O’Reilly v Mackman [1982] 3 All ER 1124 (HL) at 1126j-1127a 
561 Mustill (1989) p. 291 
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Arbitration awards have been deemed invalid by English courts due to a 
violation of the principles of due process because the arbitrator did not act 
impartially or had infringed the right of a party to be heard at all.562 Although it 
is possible for a party to assert that they need more time to make their case 
and that their being compelled to strictly comply with FTA provisions casts 
doubt on the arbitrator’s independence, the courts are often supportive to 
arbitrators unless there is a real danger of bias.563  For instance, English 
courts tend to uphold the decision of the arbitrator and accept certain 
breaches of the rules of due process564 as a necessary evil resulting from the 
parties' intention to receive a quick decision and arbitrator’s duty to achieve 
that aim.565 
 
Courts have on many occasions rejected claims of partiality related to FTA 
and decided that the danger of bias did not exist under expedited 
procedures.566 Thus, an arbitrator’s decision to impose procedural limitations 
or refuse to extend shorter time limits is not in itself sufficient to support the 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Hanotiau/Caprasse (2010); Herrmann (2001) p.71-79 
563 R. v. Gough, [1993] A.C. 646 Lord Goff of Chieveley 
564 Lembcke (2007) p.96 
565 Jenkins/Stebbings (2006) p.108 
566 A.v.B.[2011] EWHC 2345 (Comm); Argonaut Insurance Co v Republic Insurance Co [2003] EWHC 
547 (Comm); Rustal Trading Ltd v Gill & Duffus SA [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14 applied. See also Morison 
J in ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm); [2006] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 122 p. 39 (2) 
567 Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 62; [2008] 1 WLR 2416 at 1 to 3 
of his speech 
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4.3.2 Right to be heard 
In international arbitration the right to be heard is expressed as ‘the right of 
each party to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.’568 This includes 
the right to know the allegations made and proof provided by the other party, 
and to have a real opportunity to respond.569 The judgement delivered by Lord 
Denning in this regard in the case of Kanda v. Government of Malaya states 
that:  
 
“If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must 
carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made 
against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what 
statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair 
opportunity to correct or contradict them.”570 
 
Similarly US Court decisions have pointed out that the right to be heard 
implies “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.”571   
 
The right to be heard encompasses the following requirements: a) to receive 
proper notice—whether it be of the initiation of the proceeding, of the 
appointment process for the arbitral tribunal or of the pleadings, allegations, 
and evidence;572 b) to be given a reasonable time and opportunity to respond, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article18, (‘a full opportunity of presenting his case’); English Arbitration Act 
of 1996, Section 33(1); LCIA Rules, Article 14(1) (‘a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and 
dealing with that of its opponent’); UNCITRAL Rules, Article 17(1) and ICC Rules, Article 22(4) (‘a 
reasonable  opportunity  to  present  its  case’).  
569 Gaillard/Savage (1999) pp. 946-952 Sections 1638-1649 (Breach of Due Process) 
570 Kanda v. Government of Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 (Privy Council) p.337; See also 
Hannaco Ltd. v. Lee, [1997] A.J. No. 81 (30 January 1997) para. 18. 
571 Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (7th Cir. 1997); (1998) XXIII 
YBCA 1076; Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Federation, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2000); (2001) XXVI 
YBCA 1091; Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Economic Enterprise v. Tradeway, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 10278 
(RPP) (S.D.N.ABYEI. Mar. 11, 1996); [1996] WL 107285; (1997) XXII YBCA 958 
572 Seabridge Shipping AB v AC Orssleff's Eftf's A/S [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 415; Atlanska Plovidba v 
Consignaciones Asturianas SA (The Lapad) [2004] EWHC 1273 (Admlty), [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 109; 
Bulk & Metal Transport (UK) LLP v Voc Bulk Ultra Handymax Pool LLC (The Voc Gallant) [2009] 
EWHC 288 (Comm), [2009] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 377; and Finmoon Ltd v Baltic Reefers [2012] EWHC 
920 (Comm). 
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respecting the right to an adversarial proceeding;573 and c) in general, not to 
be unreasonably deprived of an opportunity to present the case.574   
 
Nevertheless, in most FTA proceedings previous court decisions have shown 
that it is reasonable to refuse multiple days of hearings, numerous witnesses, 
or lengthy arguments in the interest of saving time and cost. Furthermore, 
modern FTA rules commonly provide for the accelerated written exchange of 
allegations and proof without a substantial hearing, so that the substantive 
content of the right to be heard might be satisfied before the hearing is 
reached, particularly where there was little or  no  factual  dispute  between  
the  witnesses  presented  by the  parties.575 If the right to be heard does not 
necessarily require an oral hearing, it follows that nor is any particular element 
of an oral hearing ipso facto indispensable to the right to be heard. 
Accordingly, the right to be heard does not necessarily mean that a party has 
the right to present all its evidence or arguments at a hearing, or to demand 
direct examination of its own witnesses or cross-examination of opposing 
witnesses at the hearing.576 
 
Similarly, observing the right to be heard does not mean that arbitrators are 
obliged to grant every single party’s request related to the establishment of 
the facts of the case.577  
 
“The arbitral tribunal will only be obliged to accept the belated submission of 
documents or evidence where the party submitting them has a valid excuse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 Broda Agro Trade (Cyprus) Ltd v Alfred C Toepfer International GmbH [2009] EWHC 3318 
(Comm); L Brown & Sons Ltd v Crosby Homes (North West) Ltd [2008] EWHC 817 (TCC); Kalmneft 
JSC v Glencore International AG [2002] 1 All ER 76 
574 Apis AS v Fantazia Kereskedelmi KFT (No.1) [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 348; Irvani v Irvani [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 412; Aquator Shipping Ltd v Kleimar NV (The Capricorn 1), [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 379 
575 Margulead Ltd. v Exide Technologies [2005] 1 Lloyds Rep 324; [2004] EWHC 1019 (Comm); 
Blackaby/Partasides/Redfern/Hunter (2009) ¶6-231 
576 British Insurance Co. of Cayman v. Water Street Insurance Co. Ltd., 93 F.Supp.2d 506,( Dist. Cir. 
2000); Griffin Industries, Inc. and Ocean Logistics Corporation v. Petrojam, Ltd, 58 F. Supp. 2d. 212, 
Dist. Cir 1999); InterCarbon Bermuda, Ltd., v. Caltex Trading and Transport Corporation, 146 F.R.D. 
64, (Dist. Cir.1993); Audiencia Provincial de Madrid, Sección 10ª, Sentencia de 6 de julio de 2002, rec. 
316/2001; 
577 Hanotiau/Caprasse (2004) 
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for its delay. In the absence of a legitimate reason, the tribunal can take a firm 
position and simply reject the memorials or evidence submitted late... The 
requirements of due process are in fact satisfied if the initial deadline was 
sufficient to enable the party in question to present its arguments and 
evidence.”578  
 
In the US, the courts have stated that although the arbitration hearing must be 
fair and comply with the basic notions of due process, the parties should not 
expect the same procedures as they would find in a court.579 For example in 
Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc580 the US Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that where the terms of reference had given the 
arbitrator discretion to determine what evidence to admit, a refusal to allow a 
cross-examination on a point which the tribunal considered to be irrelevant, 
was not an infringement of due process.581 
 
The same principle would apply in a time limited or single hearing: where a 
tribunal has set a sufficient period of time for a party to, for example, question 
witnesses, the tribunal is not obliged to give extra time where counsel for that 
party has failed to comply with the prescribed time-limit. The right to be heard 
can be satisfied even if there are procedural limitations.582 Further, if the 
tribunal believes the questioning or submissions of counsel are irrelevant and 
repetitive it can direct counsel to continue in another manner or move to a 
relevant topic in order to reduce cost and delay.583   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Gaillard/Savage (1999) p. 694 Section 1270 
579 Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, (7th Cir. 1997); 
580 Ibid 125 F3d 1123  1129-1130 
581 Ibid 125 F3d 1123 pp.1120-1130 
582 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 27 July 1978 in (1979) IV YBCA 266 - 268 
583 See Article 8(1) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration; 
Turner/Mohtashami (2009); Mohtashami (1999) p.129-130 
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4.3.3 Equal Treatment 
Equality requires that there must be a just balance between the parties, so 
that each has a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case in 
circumstances that do not place it at a clear disadvantage in relation to the 
other party.584 It is therefore, intimately related to the right to be heard.585  
 
To ensure equal treatment, parties' pleadings should be made available to 
their opponents early enough to give them the opportunity to respond; any 
orders of the arbitrator regarding future procedures or the extension of 
deadlines in favour of one party should also be communicated without delay; 
and the parties should have an equal opportunity to comment on proffered 
evidence.586 Furthermore, where applicable, sufficient time should be allowed 
to prepare the translation of any document produced in a foreign language. Of 
course, the determination of what constitutes “sufficient time” in a fast track 
arbitration must reflect the parties' choice of an accelerated dispute resolution 
mechanism. Thus, the time frame granted in fast track arbitration may be 
considerably shorter than in regular arbitration.587 
 
Because parties are not identical and nor are their circumstances, the right to 
equality requires substantially equal opportunities for each to make its case, 
rather than a formal or mechanistic equality in all procedural matters. 
Certainly, equality would be infringed if, for example, a party was not 
permitted to call its only witness to the existence of an oral contract when a 
witness has testified for the other party on this issue. But equality would not 
be denied where a witness is not heard under identical conditions as the 
witness for the other party,588 or when one party is permitted to file an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Dombo Beheer BV v. The Netherlands, ECHR 27 October 1993 
585 Caron/Pellonpää/Caplan (2006) p. 29 
586 Trappe (1998) p.99 
587 Müller (1998) p.7 
588 Compare Ankerl v. Switzerland ECHR, (23 October 1996), and Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The 
Netherlands, ECHR (27 October 1993). 
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extensive Memorial with additional exhibits but the other party is not permitted 
to reply that extensively.589 
 
Thus, many national laws provide ex parte proceedings where if one party 
does not take part in the proceedings the case must be heard with the other 
party alone. While these provisions do not allow a decision to be made by 
default, an arbitrator is entitled to proceed with the arbitration with one party 
alone if the other side, despite having been given notice of the proceedings 
and the hearing, chooses not to exercise its right to present its case.590  
 
Similarly, equal treatment of the parties is not violated if a witness does not 
appear before a tribunal after having been summoned even if arbitral tribunal 
does not procure the appearance of the witness through the state courts ex 
officio. The arbitral tribunal will also be typically entitled to limit the scope of 
the evidence taken, for example hearing only four of ten witnesses offered by 
a party, without violating the equal treatment of the parties. 
 
The discretion of the arbitral tribunal is key in achieving equality. In 
Walkinshaw v Diniz591, arbitral rules required a single hearing and a 3 months 
time limit for the issuance of final award but the respondent continuously 
contested the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and sabotaged the arbitral 
proceedings. Notwithstanding the Rules and the dilatory tactics of the 
Respondent, the tribunal made a partial award within the 3 months deadline in 
which it decided that, as a matter of fairness, they would adjourn the matter to 
allow the Respondent to attend and make submissions as to whether they had 
jurisdiction to decide the issue, and they gave further direction for the hearing 
at that point: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 Caron/Pellonpää/Caplan (2006) p. 28. 
590 Hierro (2012) p.37 
591 Walkinshaw v Diniz (Stay of Proceedings). (1999, May 19). Queen's bench division (commercial 
court). [1999] WL 33105608; [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 237 
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“As a matter of fairness to TWR/Arrows [Respondent in Arbitration], given the 
sum of money apparently turning indirectly on the answer to this issue [a 
reference to whether the contract had been terminated under clause 9.2(b) or 
clause 9.5] we think it is wrong to proceed in TWR/Arrows' absence without 
giving it another opportunity to attend a further CRB meeting [arbitration 
hearing] where it could present evidence and argument in support of its case, 
provided that no irreparable prejudice from such a delay is thereby inflicted 
upon the Driver or Sauber [Claimants in Arbitration].”592 
 
These examples support Rowley’s view that a properly operating FTA tribunal 
can make concerns about due process melt away.593  
 Establishing a Fast-track Arbitration 4.4
A number of factors have caused FTA to be frequently preferred over regular 
arbitration in the resolution of international commercial disputes.594 But FTA 
can have its pitfalls too, and parties should be aware of them, both when 
negotiating their contracts and deciding how to proceed when a dispute 
occurs.595 This section describes the principal matters that should be 
considered by parties in selecting appropriate FTA methods and in drafting 
the FTA clause. Selecting between different FTA alternatives available will 
then be considered.596 
 
There are three types of FTA agreements: The Pre-dispute FTA Clause, 
which is drafted to anticipate future disputes; The Post-dispute Submission 
Agreement, which deals with an existing dispute but before arbitration 
commences; and The Post-tribunal Supplementary Agreement which deals 
with the acceleration of an existing arbitration. In all cases, it is the parties’ 
agreement that is the dominant factor in creating fast-track procedures. 
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593 Rowley/ Levy/Baker (2009) 
594 Newman (1994) p. 165; Rovine (1992) pp.45-57. 
595 Franck (2006) p. 499 
596 Arias (2010) 
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4.4.1 Pre-dispute FTA clauses and Fast-track Methods 
Pre-dispute clauses present the most realistic opportunity for implementing 
fast-track procedures as once a dispute has arisen the parties are unlikely to 
agree on anything – FTA included. At that stage, one party’s desire for fast-
track proceedings is typically thwarted by its opponent’s interest in making 
proceedings as slow as possible.   
 
There are four common methods used to achieve FTA in the pre-dispute 
arbitration clause. The first imposes one overall time limit for the entire 
proceedings, i.e. from the commencement of arbitration to the issuance of the 
award.597 The second imposes various time limits for the abbreviated 
arbitration phases.598 The third introduces procedural shortcuts in addition to 
specific time limits and deadlines.599 The last common method is the 
segmentation of disputes so that parties apply fast-track procedures only to 
specific defined areas of dispute and apply regular arbitration procedures to 
the rest. 
 
4.4.1.1 Overall Time Limits 
An overall time limit is a method for fast-tracking the procedure in which 
parties agree that the arbitral award shall be rendered within a specified time 
period starting from a given event, such as from the date the request for 
arbitration is received by the institution or by the respondent; or the 
appointment or confirmation of the arbitrators; or the date the file is 
transmitted to the tribunal. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 Davis (1992) pp. 43-45 
598 Coe (2002) p.61 
599 Newman (1994) p. 165; Rovine (1992 ) pp.45-57 
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Although parties are free to set any overall time limit, care should be taken 
that enough time is allowed for all the proceedings to be carried out.600 Also, 
when determining the overall time for rendering the award in the FTA clause, 
special attention must be paid to the clarification of the beginning and of the 
end of the award term, and whether it can be interrupted by certain procedural 
events601 as such lack of clarity has sometimes generated issues.602 For 
example, the time limit should not be triggered simply by notice of an issue 
leading to a dispute, but rather, by a request for arbitration in relation to that 
issue. Bermann603 and Freyer604 suggests that the overall time limit should run 
after the preliminary stages of the arbitration have been completed, (e.g., after 
the appointment of arbitrators or after the expiration of time-limits for 
challenges to arbitrators and after the payment of security deposits) and not 
from the date of the initiation of the arbitration with the notice of arbitration. 
Freyer observes that an FTA clause’s requirement that the award be rendered 
in an ICC arbitration within a certain time period from the date of the “notice” 
of arbitration seems pathological given that the ICC Rules refer to the request 
for – and not notice of – arbitration.605  
 
The duration of an overall time limit will normally be extendable rather than 
fixed. However, some parties utilize non-extendable time limits such as 60 
days for the conduct of the entire fast-track procedure, as occurred in the first 
FTA cases of 1991.   
 
In order to determine what is a reasonable non-extendable time limit for 
arbitration the drafters of the FTA clause need to possess the skill and 
imagination to adapt the fast-track rules to the specifics of their business and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 UNCITRAL Model Law Article 24(2); German Arbitration Law of 1998, Article 1047(2); Jordanian 
Arbitration Law No 31 of 2001, Article 32(2); Syrian Arbitration Law No. 4 of 2008, Article 23(2); Chilean 
Law No. 19.971 on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 24(2) 
601 Grandjean (1995) p. 47 
602 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p. 81 
603 Bermann (1994) p. 212 
604 Freyer (1998) p.107 
605 Ibid p.107 
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to ensure that the absolute time limit will adequately accommodate all after-
dispute situations.606 
 
There will always be uncertainties, such as who will be claimant or 
respondent, what will be the size and complexity of the claim, the number of 
witnesses and their locations, or whether there will be a need for expert 
witness or document production. For this reason, general FTA clause with a 
fixed, absolute time limit can be pathological and very dangerous.607  Without 
knowing what kind of disputes may arise, an inflexible time limit may turn out 
to be completely unrealistic.608  
 
In Petro­Canada v. Alberta Gas Ethylene Co.609, a Canadian case, an 
arbitration agreement provided for delivery of the tribunal's decision within 
thirty days after the hearing and for either party to have a new tribunal chosen 
if the award was not communicated within sixty days after the hearing. When 
the award was delivered outside both time limits (sixty days after the hearing), 
the applicant elected to have a new tribunal appointed. It was held that the 
mandate of the arbitral tribunal was terminated and the court enjoined the 
arbitral tribunal from issuing the award. The Court of Appeal affirmed the 
decision of the court of Queen's Bench. The court agreed with the principles 
enunciated in the following excerpt from Redfern and Hunter:610 
 
“A limit may be imposed as to the time within which the arbitral tribunal must 
make its award. When this limit is reached the authority or mandate of the 
arbitral tribunal is at an end and it no longer has jurisdiction to make a valid 
award. This means that where a time limit exists, care must be taken to see 
either (a) that the time limit is observed or (b) that the time limit is extended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606  Conference: The arbitration agreement, its multifold critical aspects : A collection of reports and 
materials delivered at the ASA conference held in Basel on 17 June 1994. In Zürich: ASO p. 32 
607 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p.78 
608 Derains/Schwartz (2005) p.375 
609 Petro­Canada et al v. Alberta Gas Ethylene Co. Ltd. et al 127 A.R. and 20 W.A.C. 128, 121 A.R. 
1992 at p. 212-213, (Alberta Court of Queens Bench, 12 July 1991) aff’d, 127 A.R. 128 
(Alberta Court of Appeal, 28 January 1992); Harradence/Stratton/Fraser 
610 Redfern/Hunter (1986) pp.295-296 
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before it expires. The purpose of time limits is to ensure that the case is dealt 
with speedily; such limits may be imposed on the arbitral tribunal by the rules 
of an arbitral institution, by the relevant law, or by the agreement of the 
parties.”611 
 
To avoid the spectre of lost jurisdiction, the arbitration system selected should 
include a provision to extend overall time limits if it becomes necessary to do 
so. The following clause sets a non-absolute overall time limit on the duration 
of arbitration: 
 
“The award shall be rendered in […] months of the commencement of 
arbitration, unless the arbitral tribunal determines that the interest of justice 
requires that such limit be extended”612 
 
Where the parties set their own time limits in the FTA clause a clear starting 
point which is not open to argument should be chosen, e.g. the nomination of 
the arbitrator, the acceptance of the nomination by the arbitrator, or the time of 
the delivery of the request for arbitration to the respondent, or the signing of 
the terms of reference.613 An example of a pre-dispute FTA with a clear 
starting point and non-absolute time limits can be found in the 2010 IBA 
Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses which adopts a very 
cautious approach to setting time limits: 
 
“The award shall be rendered within [...] months of the appointment of [the 
sole arbitrator] [the chairperson], unless the arbitral tribunal determines, in a 
reasoned decision, that the interest of justice or the complexity of the case 
requires that such limit be extended.”614 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 Petro­Canada et al v. Alberta Gas Ethylene Co. Ltd. et al 127 A.R. 128 (Alberta Court of Appeal, 28 
January 1992) 
612 Born (2010) pp. 37-116 
613 McIlwrath/Savage (2010) p.274 
614 IBA Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses of 2010, para. 80 
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Even if there is provision for extending time limits, creating unreasonably short 
deadlines for action by arbitrators is pathological. Particularly, if such a 
deadline means that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal expires before it can 
complete the arbitration.615 In one case, a time period of three months was 
specified for the arbitrators to issue an award, with a provision that this period 
could be extended four times. However one party refused to extend the 
period, and the arbitrators ruled that their mandate had expired.616  
 
For this reason the arbitration clause should also include a security for its 
enforceability in addition to clear start and end dates, and a provision for 
extending time limits. Thus, if the parties agree to give the arbitrators more 
power to manage time limits, the FTA clause can be: 
  
“The Parties mutually desire and intend that, barring exceptional and 
unforeseen circumstances, any arbitration under this Article [...] shall be made 
[...] days from the appointment of the [sole arbitrator] [presiding arbitrator]. 
The Parties may extend this time limit by written agreement. The arbitral 
tribunal may extend this time limit in its discretion if it considers that the 
interest of justice so requires. The arbitral tribunal shall use its best efforts to 
issue the final award within such time period. The arbitral tribunal's failure to 
make a final award within this time limit shall not be a basis for refusing to 
comply with or for challenging or resisting enforcement of any such award.”617 
 
Additionally, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is usually required not to end 
automatically after the expiration of time limits unless the arbitral institution or 
the local courts at the place of arbitration compel it to expire.618  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 9.01 at 158. (Defective arbitration clauses were first denominated as 
"pathological" in 1974 by Frederick Eisemann, who served at that time as the Secretary General of the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration.) 
616 Belgian Enterprise v. Iranian Factory, (1983) VII YBCA 119, 120-21, 124  
617 Born (2010) p. 95 
618 Zuberbühler/Muller/Habegger (2005) pp.351-362 
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This will prevent attempts to sabotage fast-track procedures by making time 
limits expire. In one case the court decided that the arbitrator did not exceed 
its powers by where the award was made two weeks after the deadline 
expired the respondent requested numerous time extensions to delays and 
extensions throughout proceedings, and the tribunal rendered its decision 
within six weeks of conclusion of lengthy post-hearing briefing period.619 
 
Instead of the parties drawing up their own FTA clause, it may be chosen by 
reference to institutional FTA rules.620 Once the appropriate institutional FTA 
Rules are stipulated, the said institution may expressly prohibit the arbitrator 
from extending the time-limit of arbitration in the absence of agreement of all 
the parties. However, in such an instance the supervising arbitration institution 
should be empowered to extend the time if the arbitrator fails to render an 
award within the time prescribed. In this manner, the arbitrator will be 
encouraged to observe the stipulated time limit in which to make his award 
but, in the event he fails to do so, with the approval of the supervisory 
institution, the arbitration can continue.621  
 
4.4.1.1.1 Institutional Time Limits 
 
Arbitral institutions provide clear rules in relation to the beginning, ending  and 
duration of time-limits. The ICC, for instance, recommends the term to start 
from the moment the Term of Reference is signed by the arbitral tribunal.622 
The KLRCA FTA Rules deem both the arbitration and the time limit to 
commence when the party initiating the arbitration delivers to the other party a 
notice in writing stating its intention to commence arbitration.623   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Donelson 473 F.3d 684 C.A.6 (Mich.) (2007) 
620 Bond/Paralika/Secomb (2010) p. 386 
621 ICC Rules (1998), Article 24(1); ICC Rules, Article 30 See Derains/Schwartz (2005) p. 305,(This 
time limit is routinely extended). 
622 ICC Rules, Article 30 (The six-month time limit commences on the date of the last signature of the 
arbitral tribunal or the Terms of Reference (if they are signed by all parties and arbitrators) or on the 
date of notification to the arbitral tribunal that the Terms of Reference have been approved by the ICC 
Court pursuant to Article 23(3)) 
623 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 3 
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Under the AAA Commercial Rules the arbitrator is required to schedule the 
date, time, and place of the hearing, so that it takes place within 30 days of 
confirmation of the arbitrator’s appointment.624 Hearings shall not exceed 1 
day.625 An award must be made within 14 days of the oral hearing or 
submission of final documents.626 Thus, the expedited procedures envisions 
the possibility of an award being made as soon as 50 days after the 
submission of the request for arbitration or, if the AAA loses no time in 
responding to the request and setting up the arbitral tribunal, even sooner. 
However, the procedures do not specify an overall time limit.627 
 
As long as no extensions are permitted, WIPO FTA Rules can result in an 
arbitration which completes within as few as 53 days, or more quickly if the 
parties agree to shorter time limits for the submission of an answer or for the 
expert report. In any case, Article 56 dictates that the arbitration must be 
closed within 3 months after either the delivery of the Statement of Defence or 
the establishment of the Tribunal, whichever event occurs later. The final 
award should, be made within one month thereafter.628  
 
The International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR) 
approaches FTA slightly differently. Most of its time limits contained under its 
rules are discretionary, it also sets maximum allowable period for the whole 
arbitration. Under CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration 
an award must be made “in as short a period as possible” but no later than six 
months from the selection of the tribunal.629 
 
The stand-alone FTA Rules of SCC and FCC aim to complete an arbitration 
within three months of the date that the claim was transmitted to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 AAA Rules, Article E7 
625 AAA Rules, Article E8 
626 AAA Rules, Article E9 
627 Ibid 
628 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 56(a) 
629 CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article1.5.2 
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arbitrator.630 Under the ACICA FTA Rules, the final award should be made 
within 4 months of the appointment of the Arbitrator but if there is a 
counterclaim then within 5 months.631  
 
The DIS in its Supplementary Rules for Expedited Proceedings (SREP) 
deviate from the widely used principle that time limits only begin to run after 
the establishment of the arbitral tribunal.  Section 1(2) of the DIS SREP Rules 
provides that the duration of arbitral proceedings should be no longer than six 
months (in the case of a sole arbitrator) or nine months (in the case of a three-
member tribunal) after the filing of the statement of claim.632 
 
The KLRCA also stipulates a time limit of 90 days from the commencement of 
arbitration in a documents only arbitration. Notably, arbitration commence with 
the notice of the request for arbitration rather than with the establishment of 
arbitral tribunal.  With regard to arbitration with a substantive oral hearing, the 
Arbitral Tribunal shall publish the final award expeditiously and no later than 
160 days from the commencement of the arbitration.633  
 
The CIETAC Summary Procedures stipulate a three-month period for 
rendering the award. This period commences when the case has been 
submitted to the arbitrator.634 If it becomes difficult or perhaps impossible for 
the arbitrator to comply with this time limit, the Secretary General of CIETAC 
may, at the request of the arbitrator, extend the period.635  The HKIAC and the 
SIAC Expedited Procedures also provide a time limit for the rendering of an 
award but their expedited time limit equals the standard procedures of 
CIETAC, which is six months from the formation of arbitral tribunal.636  The 
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) also links the time for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 SCC FTA Rules, Article 36; FCC FTA Rules, Article 33 
631 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 27 
632 DIS SREP, Article 1(2)  
633 KLRCA FTA Rules, Articles 12(4) and 12(5) 
634 CIETAC Rules, Articles 60 
635 CIETAC Rules, Article 46 
636 SIAC Rules, Articles 5(2)(d); HKIAC Rules, Article 38(d) 
  142 
rendering the award to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal and requires 
the award to be rendered within three months thereof.637 
 
Additionally, despite not being separate fast-track procedures, the regular 
arbitration rules of the WIPO, the LCIA and the SIAC set multi-stage 
procedural deadlines.638 ICC and LCIA rules, in contrast, provide only for 
discretionary shortening of time limits, as is always available to parties in 
regular arbitration. Neither institution specifies a limit on the total time an 
expedited arbitration should last, although the time limit for an ordinary ICC 
arbitration is six months from the formation of the arbitral tribunal.639 
 
4.4.1.1.2 Authority to Modify Time Limits under institutional 
FTA Rules 
 
Additionally almost all FTA Rules authorize parties institutions or the tribunal 
to shorten the time limits they prescribe.640   
 
For example, under Articles 4(f) and 4(g) of WIPO FTA Rules, it is possible to 
shorten the 20-day time limit for the Answer,641the 15-day time limit for the 
constitution of the Tribunal,642 the 20-day time limits for the Statements of 
Claim and Defence,643and the 30-day time limit for holding a hearing after the 
end of written submissions.644  
 
Rather than itemise which rules are subject to modification by the parties, 
some FTA Rules give the parties general authority to modify all time periods 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 JCAA Rules, Article 65 
638 WIPO Rules, Articles 11, 15(b), 16(b), 17(b), 17(c), 18(b), 19(b)(iii), 41(a), 42(a) 67(d), 68(e) and 
70(e); LCIA Rules, Article 15 (sets out the procedural timetable for the submission of Written 
Statements (pleadings) and key documentary evidence.) SIAC Rules, Article 17 
639 IBA Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses of 2010 para. 31 
640 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 1(2); SCC FTA Rules, Article 7; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 4(g) and (4(f) 
641 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 11 
642 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 14(b) 
643 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 37(a) 
644 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 47(b) 
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referenced by the Rules.645  Under Some Institutional Rules the institution may 
even shorten or extend any time limits.646 Thus, Article 1.2 of KLRCA FTA 
Rules clearly incorporates the KLRCA Board’s authority to modify time periods 
within the Rules before the commencement of arbitration. In a similar vein, 
Article 9 of the LCIA Rules allows the LCIA Court, where necessary, to 
shorten radically the time normally taken to appoint the arbitral tribunal. A 
similar approach is taken by many opt-out FTA Rules like those of the SCAI, 
the SIAC and the HKAIC.647 
 
By contrast, Article 4 (g) of the WIPO Rules, only authorizes the Centre to 
extend, but not to reduce, the periods for the Answer and the constitution of 
the Tribunal, the deadlines for the Statements of Claim and Defence, and the 
time-limit for holding the Hearing after the establishment of the Arbitral 
Tribunal. A potential problem with the WIPO’s approach is that the parties 
and/or the institutions may be deemed not to have the authority to modify any 
of the time limits not listed in WIPO FTA Rules.  In appropriate circumstances, 
it would seem preferable that the parties or the institution could extend or 
reduce the 7 day time limit for the challenge of an arbitrator,648 the 3 month 
time limit for the closure of hearings after the statement of claim and defence 
and the 1 month time limit for the issuance of the final award after the 
hearing,649 and the 30 day time limit for the correction of the award.650 
 
Article 7 of the SCC FTA Rules authorizes the Board, on application by either 
party or on its own volition, to extend any time period which has been set for a 
party to comply with a particular direction.651 The list is not inclusive and does 
not preclude the parties and the Board’s authority from extending the time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 2(1); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 12 (5); 
646 SIAC Rules, Article 5(2)(a); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 1(2); LCIA Rules Article 4(5) and 4(7); 
HKIAC Rules, Art 38(2)(a) 
647 SCAI Rules, Article 2(3); SIAC Rules, Article 5(2); HKIAC Rules, Article 38(2)(a) 
648 WIPO FTA Rules, Articles 20 and 21 
649 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 56(a) 
650 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 59(a) 
651 SCC FTA Rules, Article 7 
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periods prescribed for challenges to arbitrators,652 hearings,653 expert 
reports,654 the closure of the proceedings or the final award655 or the 
correction of the award.656 But the problem of the SCC Rules, like the WIPO 
rules, is that the institutions are not authorized to shorten those time periods 
where appropriate but can only extend.657  
 
Some Arbitration Institutions do have the authority to extend the time periods 
for the Answer, the parties' joint nomination of the sole arbitrator, the parties' 
payment of administrative fees,658 and the parties' payment of deposits.659 
Additionally, they are able to reduce the time periods prescribed in their Rules 
like the LCIA and KLRCA. This authority is appropriate prior to the constitution 
of the Tribunal. Once the Tribunal has been established, which may occur 
prior to prescribing a deadline for the Answer, the institution should at least 
consult, and probably defer to, the Tribunal before reducing or extending the 
deadline for the procedural conduct of the FTA. Thus, SCC FTA Rules Article 
18 sets an example by stating that “When the Arbitrator has been appointed 
and the Advance on Costs has been paid, the Secretariat shall refer the case 
to the Arbitrator.”660 
 
Many FTA Rules, like those drafted by the WIPO, the SCC and the KLRCA 
and the FCC do not specifically deal with the Tribunal's authority to reduce or 
extend time limits. In fact, the only authority expressly granted to the Tribunal 
to modify any of the prescribed time periods is found in the general power of 
tribunals which authorizes them to extend, but not to reduce, periods of time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 WIPO FTA Rules, Articles 25 and 26 
653  WIPO FTA Rules, Article 53 
654  WIPO FTA Rules, Article 55 
655  WIPO FTA Rules, Article 63 
656  WIPO FTA Rules, Article 66 
657 SCC FTA Rules, Article 7 (The board may extent but not shorten the time limits) Similarly, ICC 
Rules, Article 5(2) 
658 WIPO FTA RulesArts. 67(d) and 68(e) 
659 WIPO FTA RulesArts. 70(e) 
660 SCC FTA Rules, Article 18 
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fixed by the Rules, and only "in exceptional cases",661 “when exceptional 
circumstances exist”662 or “for special reasons”.663   
 
The Tribunal’s general power to extend time limits is, of course, important to 
allow it to ensure the parties are afforded an adequate opportunity to be 
heard.664 It may also be appropriate to authorize the Tribunal to shorten 
certain time limits, such as the deadlines for the Statements of Claim and 
Defence, whenever necessary to expedite the proceedings. 
 
With regard to this, Article 4.7 of the LCIA Rules expressly authorises the 
tribunal, once constituted, to abridge other time limits specified in the Rules.665 
The Tribunal may reduce the time periods fixed for the Answer,666 challenges 
of arbitrators,667 and expert reports.668 The power given by Article 4.7, among 
other things, extending time limits for the service of a communication by one 
party on another party. This may be done retrospectively, after the time period 
has expired. Taken together with Article 22(1) (b), this power can also 
arguably be used by the Tribunal to extend the time limits for the correction of 
an award set out in Article 27. In short, the Tribunal under the LCIA is afforded 
the flexibility to tailor each time limit as speed and justice require.669 Similarly 
the UNCITRAL Rules authorize the arbitral tribunal, at any time once it has 
invited the parties to express their views, to extend or to abridge any period of 
time prescribed.670 
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665 LCIA Rules, Article 4(7) 
666 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 11 
667 WIPO FTA Rules, Articles 25 and 26 
668 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 55 Participants in the ICC FTA Cases No 7385 and 7402 recommended 
granting this power to shorten time limits to the Tribunal. See Smit (1991) p. 141; Ballem (1991) p.153 
669 LCIA Rules, Articles 4(5) and 4(7); ACICA FTA Rules, Article 22 (2); 
670 UNCITRAL Rules, Article 17(2) 
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4.4.1.2 Multi-stage Time Limits 
Rather than setting one overall time limit, the second fast-track method uses 
the pre-dispute FTA clause to set time limits for specified phases of the 
arbitration.671 Limits might be applied to the time taken to appoint the 
arbitrators; or the time allowed to draft the award; or the time between the 
close of the hearing and the rendering of the award; or that the statement of 
claim and the statement of defence should be made within a prescribed time 
following the request of arbitration; or that the chosen arbitral institution shall 
appoint arbitrators if the parties fail to agree on the names of arbitrators within 
the specified time period from the request of arbitration.672  
 
However, there is a danger that defining multi-stage time limits in the FTA 
clause will be pathological, given the difficulty of predicting how long each 
different phase will take to complete. In an ICC Arbitration, for example, while 
parties might direct the arbitrators to submit the award to the ICC within a 
fixed time period after the close of the main hearing, they have less control 
over the length of time the Court will take in approving the award. The same 
uncertainty applies with respect to the ICC Court’s confirmation of arbitrators. 
 
As with overall time limits, it is particularly important that the triggering events 
for multi-stage time limits are unambiguous. Ancillary disputes over the 
precise period of the limit can end up consuming more time than the parties 
have provided for the resolution of their substantive dispute.673 To illustrate 
the confusion which can arise, an arbitration clause providing for the use of 
ICC Rules and requiring that a decision be reached "within one hundred and 
twenty days of the arbitrator's designation" is pathological.674 According to 
Davis, Lagace, & Volkovitsch, the term "designation", which does not appear 
in the ICC Rules, could mean any of five different procedural phases of 
arbitration as set out in the following: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671 Note on Expedited ICC Arbitration Procedure of 2002 p. 32 
672 Ibid 
673 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p. 81 
674 Freyer (1998) p.107 
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(i) the original nomination of the arbitrator by the parties or the relevant 
National Committee;   
(ii) the arbitrators’ acceptance of the nomination and submission of an 
unqualified  statement of independence to the Court; 
(iii) the expiration of the time limits provided for a challenge;  
(iv) the confirmation of the arbitrator by the Court; 
(v) the transmission of the file to the arbitrator after confirmation and 
payment of the advance costs.675   
 
Despite these potential difficulties, with clear agreements the ICC and other 
arbitral institutions are capable of successfully meeting multi-stage time limits. 
In one case, the ICC appointed three arbitrators within 10 days of the request 
of arbitration. In the same case, the tribunal managed to hold a case-
management conference, create the procedural timetable and sign the terms 
of reference within 7 days of their appointment. Additionally, they issued a 
decision on the provisional and conservatory measures within the same 7 day 
period.676 
  
 A typical FTA agreement with multi stage time limits is: 
 
“All disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be finally 
settled by arbitration under the [designated] Rules of the designated institution 
by a sole arbitrator. Any answers shall be filed within [15] days of the receipt 
of the Request for Arbitration. The [designated office of the designated 
institution] shall appoint the sole arbitrator within [30] days following 
submission of the Request for Arbitration. The arbitrator shall endeavour to 
render a final award within [90] days of submission of the Request for 
Arbitration.”677 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p. 81 
676 Freyer (1998) p.108 
677 Friedland (2007) pp.88-89 and p.295 Appendix 43 
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4.4.1.3 Procedural Shortcuts 
 
In addition to overall and multi-stage time limits, parties may also consider 
including procedural shortcuts in the arbitration clause which limit or eliminate 
some steps (like document production) and accordingly increase the speed of 
arbitration.678 The drafter may, for example, provide that the arbitral tribunal 
deliver the award “as promptly as practicable” and, “if possible, without 
document production or oral hearing after their appointment.” 679 
 
To prevent claims that due process is being violated, the clause should permit 
the tribunal to extend any deadlines and to introduce additional procedures as 
a matter of discretion.680  
 
Born used the following wording to set procedural shortcuts in addition to time 
limits as a fast-track procedure: 
 
“The arbitrators shall conclude the arbitration no later than [...] days from the 
date that the claimant's statement of claim is received by the arbitrators. 
Unless the parties otherwise agree, a single hearing (lasting no more than [...] 
days) shall be conducted commencing no later than [...] days from the date 
that the claimant's statement of claim is received by the arbitrators. If the 
arbitrators determine that the interests of justice so require they may extend 
the dates for the hearing and/or for conclusion of the arbitration by up to a 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter (2001) pp. 173-210 
679 Zuberbühler/Muller/Habegger (2005) pp. 351 et seq. 
680 Magnusson (2001) 
681 Born (2010) p. 95 
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4.4.1.4 Segmentation of Disputes  
 
The broadest type of FTA arbitration clause covers any controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to the contract or the breach thereof. Thus FTA may 
be prescribed for disputes which include not only issues of breach of contract, 
but also disputes concerning the very existence and validity of the contract.  
 
If parties decide not to insert a FTA clause for all possible disputes, they can 
still adopt a ‘segmented’ approach by defining a subset of potential disputes 
and specifying that if a dispute arises from that subset, the dispute will be 
resolved by fast-track procedures. Thus the arbitration clause may prescribe 
fast-track only for certain types of claims, such as those involving certain 
dollar amounts; particular parties; types of relief; or subject matter e.g. 
whether the terms of an express warranty have been breached by the supplier 
of the product.  
 
Another approach to segmentation is to exclude certain issues. For example, 
a company holding a US patent may not wish the validity of the patent to be 
adjudicated in arbitration and would insist that these issues be excluded.  
 
Segmentation can be a solution to the criticism that not all commercial 
disputes are suitable for expedited treatment. However, segmentation of 
disputes subject to FTA may be pathological when: 
 
1) the subset of claims to be addressed in the fast-track proceeding are 
not identified clearly (e.g. the clause provides for FTA of "financial or 
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2) the type of claims subject to FTA is incapable of segmentation (e.g. 
the clause provides for FTA of “non-injunctive relief” claims – even 
though it is not unusual for claims for both damages and injunctive 
relief to be joined in a single dispute; and  
 
3) the segmentation criteria are subject to manipulation  (e.g. the 
arbitration clause provides for FTA of disputes over or below a fixed 
dollar amount where the claimed amount is difficult to asses at the 
beginning of the proceedings) 
 
4.4.2 General drafting considerations for FTA Clauses 
 
4.4.2.1 Did the parties agree to FTA? 
Consent to arbitral proceedings is a classical foundation of arbitration.682  
 
However, if the FTA agreement derives from a standard contract provided by 
the arbitral institution or an arbitrator, to which the parties only refer in their 
main agreement, or if the agreement is in a document that the parties accept 
without objection, one might question whether the parties have actually 
consented to submit disputes to FTA.683 
 
Thus a problem could arise where a party is unaware of the FTA clause and is 
thus unable to raise any objections to it, but will nevertheless be bound its 
conditions. This is a particular danger in the areas of sport,684 industry-specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 Walkinshaw v. Diniz, May 19, 1999, Arb. Int’l 2001, at 193; See also Thomas J in Walkinshaw & 
Ors v. Diniz, Commercial Court, 19 May 1999, 1999 Folio No. 522. 
683 Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer (2006) pp. 85-87 
684 Netzle (1998) pp.  53-54. Paulsson (1993) p. 359; Blackhawk/Siekmann/Soek (2006) pp. 40-49 
(The consent in sports disputes is typically that expressed by an applicant for a licence to participate in 
a sports activity, who accepts sports arbitration – henceforth under the new Appeals Arbitration Division 
– as a condition of the licence.) 
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institutions,685 and Internet disputes686 where arbitral organization rather then 
parties creates the arbitration agreement, namely the claimant, to sue the 
respondent in accordance with certain pre-defined fast-track procedures. 
 
For instance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), by virtue of its Internet monopoly, makes it mandatory for each of 
their accredited domain name registrars to incorporate ICANN’s Uniform 
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) into each individual domain 
name registration agreement.687  In effect, the UDRP binds registrants by 
virtue of their contracts with registrars, to submit to mandatory administrative 
proceedings initiated by third-party complainants.688 The applicants for 
domain names are left with the option to either give their consent to the 
procedures or lose out on the opportunity to register their domain name. 
Paulsson observed that it is necessary to draw a line between ICA voluntarily 
agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and ICA which 
is forced upon consumers through the use of a standard form of contract as in 
the case of ICANN and other commercial organisations.689 
 
The parties having signed contracts with compulsory FTA clauses cannot 
realistically be considered to have given their consent its FTA procedures.690 
As Paulsson puts it, speaking of consent when parties are not aware of what 
type of procedures they have agreed to, would be an abuse of language.691 If 
there is no consent to FTA, there must be consent to regular arbitration 
proceedings.692  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Brafford (1996) 331-362 
686 Chatterjee (2006) pp. 728-736 
687 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy of 1999 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm UDRP. See also, Rules for UDRP of 2010 at 
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/rules 
688 Thornburg (2002) p.191 
689 Speidel (2002) p. 167 
690 Schultz (2006) p. 21 
691 Paulsson (1993) p.361 
692 Rigozzi (2005) pp.131 and 566. Along the same lines in the context of sports, Kaufman (1995) 
p.545 
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However, in practice, fast-track procedures are vital for some businesses and 
one may have to admit that successful international arbitrations occur without 
informed consent.693 Non-consensual arbitration may even result from multi-
million dollar international transactions where ‘consent’ is based on treaties 
and national statutes.694 
 
4.4.2.2 Avoiding Pathological Clauses 
Pathological clauses are those drafted in such a way that they result in the 
failure of fast-track, either because their ambiguity leads to a lengthy and 
costly interpretation battles or, in the worst case, results in the unenforceability 
of an award.695  
 
For example, problems may arise if the clause does not clearly define when 
the case will transform from non-binding dispute resolution methods to binding 
arbitration. In one case the defective clause provided, "In the event of any 
unresolved dispute, the matter will be referred to the International Chamber of 
Commerce," but it failed to say whether the dispute would be settled by 
arbitration.696 In another case, the arbitration clause read simply: "Arbitration – 
all disputes will be settled amicably."697 
 
Clauses have proved pathological where parties have named a specific 
person as a sole arbitrator who refused to act or was deceased by the time of 
the dispute. The court in Marcus v. Meyerson ruled that they had no authority 
to name a substitute for a resigning arbitrator who was specifically named in 
the parties' contract.698 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 Kaufmann-Kohler (2001) 
694 Parra (1997) p. 287-364 (In Investment arbitrations consent is based on treaties or national statutes 
which can be construed as an offer to arbitrate and the initiation of the arbitration as an acceptance.) 
695 Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 9.01 at 158. 
696 Redfern/Hunter (1991) p.178 
697 Drewitt/Wingate-Saul (1996) p. 42 
698 Marcus v. Meyerson, 170 N.Y.S.2d 924, 925-26 (1958) 
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Clauses may be void because the institution named to administer the 
arbitration proceeding or to appoint the arbitrators never existed or was not 
named correctly. The Hamm Court of Appeals in Germany, for instance, 
decided an arbitration clause was fatally ambiguous because it read, "The 
parties shall proceed to litigate before the Arbitration Court of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris with the seat in Zurich."699 The court ruled it 
could not determine if the parties intended to submit to the ICC in Paris or to 
the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, both of which maintained permanent 
arbitral tribunals.700 
 
Sometimes parties are too specific with respect to the arbitrators' 
qualifications and thus make it impossible to appoint a suitable arbitrator. As 
Park observes "It would be tempting the devil to require that the arbitrator be 
an English-speaking Italian, with a French law degree and a familiarity with 
Mid-East construction contracts."701 
 
Finally, any arbitration clause can be pathological if it stipulates conflicting or 
unclear procedures.702 One reported arbitral clause reads: "Disputes 
hereunder shall be referred to arbitration, to be carried out by arbitrators 
named by the International Chamber of Commerce in Geneva in accordance 
with the arbitration procedure set forth in the Civil Code of Venezuela and in 
the Civil Code of France, with due regard for the law of the place of 
arbitration."703  
 
This kind of pathological pre-dispute arbitration clauses is virtually guaranteed 
to lead to delays and costly disputes, and may well lead to the 
unenforceability of an award. In Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees Fed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 Hochbaum, J. (1996) pp. 20-23 citing from Hamm Court of Appeals (Nov. 15 1994), Recht der 
Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) Vol. 40, p. 681 (1995) = Recht und Praxis der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
(RPS), Supplement no. 14 (1995) to the Betriebsberater, p. 21 
700 Bond (1990) p. 15 
701 Park (2007) p.160 See also Bernardini (1992) p. 56 
702 Davis (1991) p. 387 
703 Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 9.04 at 163. 
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Credit Union704, the arbitration clause was unconscionable because of time 
limits for filing claims, limits on discovery, and asymmetrical right to arbitrate. 
In another case the German court invalidated the arbitration clause which 
provided only three days to notify seller of defects and requiring non-legally 
qualified arbitrators. Accordingly, in the best scenario pathological arbitration 
clauses provides a party who is interested in delay with opportunities to 
forestall or even completely derail the fast-track proceedings. 
 
4.4.2.3 Essential Clauses 
Without making the FTA clause unduly complex, there are some fundamental 
issues that should be addressed.705  
 
The parties to the contract should be clearly identified and they should 
expressly agree that to be bound by the FTA clause. 
 
The FTA clause should also expressly state that the parties intend to resolve 
their disputes by FTA. While this seems obvious, parties have occasionally 
stipulated that controversies would be referred to an institution that 
administers FTA proceedings, but without mentioning FTA as the method for 
deciding their issues.706 Even though there have been a number of successful 
cases using the automatic application for FTA offered by institutions such as 
the SIAC and the SCAI, if the parties want their disputes decided by FTA they 
should say so explicitly.  
 
The parties should specify the applicable arbitration law.707 There are 
obviously situations when the parties cannot agree on the applicable law and 
the agreement will, therefore, be silent on this issue. However, when the 
choice of law is not specified in the clause, parties frequently become 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)  
705 Franck (2004) p. 19-32 
706 Holtzmann (1996) p. 173-194 
707 Burr/Lomnbardi (2005) p. 118 
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entangled in lengthy argument over which law is applicable, leading to 
inevitable delay and additional cost.708 
 
The place of arbitration should be specified.709 So should the number and 
manner of selection of the arbitrators. Choosing the arbitrators is particularly 
important in multi-party disputes, although the new ICC, LCIA and AAA Rules 
each assist by providing a method of selecting arbitrators in multi-party 
disputes failing an agreement by the parties. 
 
If the FTA is to take place in the USA, it is prudent for the clause to provide 
that the arbitration tribunal has the power to determine its jurisdiction, 
including the scope of arbitrable issues.710 This is because there is a 
difference in between different courts in the US like whether “all disputes 
arising out of, connected with, or relating in any way to this agreement," is a 
broad or narrow arbitration clause.711  Therefore, it may be useful to include all 
such phrases in series or to state outright that the clause is intended to be a 
broad-form clause which will encompass all possible claims between the 
parties. To insure the breadth of the clause, some parties state the disputes 
covered include any relating to “the contract, its negotiation, performance, 
non-performance, interpretation, termination, or the relationship between the 
parties established by the contract.”712  
 
FTA clauses should also provide that any arbitration award rendered will be 
final and binding. Final means the substance of the award will not be reviewed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
708 Davis/Nickles/Smit/Watkiss (1992) p. 4; Smit (1991) p. 138 
709 Downie (1991) pp. 473-488 
710 Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1983) In re 
Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.1961) (the use of the phrase "arising under" results in a narrow 
arbitration clause, has been limited to its precise facts.) 
711 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967). The courts holds that as 
a matter of federal law, where the parties insert abroad arbitration clause, an arbitrator rather than a 
federal court decides if the principal contract has been fraudulently induced, and this rule, one of 
national substantive law, governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. See also Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 
246 F.3d 219 (2d Cir.2001); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006); 
712 See Ethiopian Oilseeds & Pulses Export Corp. v. Rio Del Mar Foods, Inc., [1990] 1 Q.B. 86, 97 
(“arising out of” should be given a wide interpretation); Ashville Investments, Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors, 
Ltd., 1989 Q.B. 488, 508; Redfern/Hunter (1991) pp.152-53.######## 
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by the courts. Binding means the parties intend that the award will resolve the 
dispute and be enforceable by national courts against the losing party;713 it will 
not result merely in an advisory opinion that the parties are free to 
disregard.714  
 
By including the terms, final and binding, or an equivalent phrase – “any 
disputes shall be finally settled by binding arbitration” – parties express their 
intent for courts to enforce the award without reviewing the evidentiary 
foundations of the award. Even if the parties do not say explicitly that the 
award will be final and binding, they may accomplish the same result by 
adopting ICC, AAA or LCIA Rules. If drafters are not using institutional rules 
they should consider including in the FTA clause a waiver of recourse to 
courts of the place of arbitration (exclusion agreement) on points of law that 
arise in the course of FTA or after an FTA award is made.715  
 
In England, the incorporation of an institution's arbitral rules, which provide for 
the waiver of recourse from an arbitral award, is sufficient to prevent judicial 
review of the award,716 while in other countries such as Switzerland there 
must be an express exclusion agreement.717 The reason for this difference is 
that English courts have broad powers to review an arbitral award for errors of 
English law, when that law is applicable,718 while in Switzerland and other 
countries, review of an award is limited to the few defences provided in the 
NYC.719 The scope of the review conducted in Switzerland is thus much more 
limited than that available in England. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 US courts have held that the phrase “final and binding” means “that the issues joined and resolved 
in the arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court.” M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr, GmbH & Co., 87 
F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992). 
714 Bond (1990) p. 15 
715 Bernardini (1992) p. 59 
716 Arab-African Energy Corp. v. Olieprodukten Nederland, N.V., [1983] 2 Lloyd's L. R. 419 (Q.B. Com. 
Ct.); Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, Ltd., [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 27. 
717 See Swiss Federal Private International Law Act of 1989, Article 192(1). See also Clear Star Ltd. v. 
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cited in Bernardini, P. (1992) p. 59. 
718 English Arbitration Act of 1996, Section 69. 
719 Swiss Federal Private International Law Act of 1989, Article 190. 
  157 
4.4.2.4 Exhaustion of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
procedures before the initiation of FTA 
Occasionally, parties provide that non-binding ADR procedures, such as 
mandatory negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arb-med provisions, will occur 
prior to the initiation of final and binding FTA.720 However, a number of 
uncertainties may arise in such circumstances.721 
 
The promise to negotiate, mediate or conciliate may be seen as an 
opportunity for an uncooperative party to offer insufficient time for the required 
processes or to merely restate their position, or make unreasonable proposals 
or to withhold or misrepresent key information in order to delay the 
commencement of FTA.722 Problems may also arise if it is not clearly stated in 
what circumstances when ADR may be considered exhausted and FTA may 
be commenced. If ADR involves settlement negotiations or mediation, it is 
generally helpful to state a time period so it is clear when ADR is 
exhausted.723 In extreme circumstances the recipient may argue that 
insufficient notice by the claimant has taken away its right to truly seek an 
ADR procedure.724 If the ADR procedures are too short, the respondent may 
argue that it has not been given its full substantive right to utilize an ADR 
option. If it is too long, the claimant may argue that the goal of FTA has been 
undermined by the time exhausted during the ADR period. 725  
 
As a corollary, parties should be careful about imposing deadlines after which 
FTA proceeding may not be filed. In a case before a court in Geneva, the 
parties' clause provided that arbitration proceeding could be filed within 30 
days after the failure of negotiations. An arbitration proceeding was filed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 Berger (2006) p.6 
721 Franck (2004) p.22 
722 Farnsworth (2004) 
723 Stipanowich/Kaskell (2001) in Commercial Arbitration at Its Best: Successful Strategies for Business 
Users – A Report of the CPR Commission on the Future of Arbitration. (2001) CPR Institute for Dispute 
Resolution : American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Section of Dispute Resolution 
724 Stippl/Pickl (2009) p.213 
725 Stipanowich/Kaskell (2001) pp. 1-31 
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May but the opposing party claimed it was untimely as negotiations failed in 
January. The claimant argued they failed in April and that the arbitration was 
filed within 30 days after the April date. The Geneva court held the 
negotiations failed in January; therefore, the arbitration was not filed in time, 
and the arbitration failed. 
 
Another problem may occur if parties provide for ADR to take place prior to 
arbitration but are unclear whether it is a condition to initiating a proceeding or 
merely a preferred option.726 In Belmont Contractors, Inc. v. Lyondell 
Petrochemical Co.727 the alternative dispute resolution clause read: "If the 
parties cannot agree within 10 days on a different method of resolving the 
matter, the matter shall be submitted by the parties to and be decided by 
binding arbitration."728 The court held that failure to agree to another method 
of resolving the dispute was a condition precedent to binding arbitration, and 
since the parties agreed to mediation, the arbitration provision was not binding 
on them even though the mediation failed to settle the dispute.  
 
Finally, some legal systems may see negotiation and mediation provisions as 
unenforceable.729 Thus, an adjudicator may hold that poorly drafted non-
binding steps may be ignored simply because they make fast-track 
procedures unworkable.730  
 
Thought should therefore be given to separating non-binding ADR phases 
from the FTA agreement in case they compromise the latter. If parties desire 
expeditious dispute resolution, they must ensure that the triggers from the 
non-binding ADR phases to FTA are clear and that the time limit for each 
phase is suitably short.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726 NL Indus., Inc. v. PaineWebber Inc., 720 F. Supp. 293, 302-305 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (timely filing of 
written protest was a condition precedent to arbitration) 
727 896 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. App. – Houston 1st Dist. 1995, no writ) 
728 Ibid 
729 Ginkel (2004) p.4 (The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld an obligation to undertake 
genuine and good faith negotiations in United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New 
South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 (3 July 2009) 
730Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p.157 ¶7-79 
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4.4.3 FTA Submission Agreement (Post Dispute, Pre-Tribunal) 
While the pre-dispute FTA clause provides for the arbitration of a dispute 
which has not yet occurred, the FTA submission agreement is a contract 
which the parties make after the dispute has arisen.731 
 
Since the submission agreement is drafted when all the issues of the dispute 
are known it is likely to be very detailed.732 It often contains very specific 
provisions in relation to fast-tracking techniques, such as the expedited 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the fast-track evidentiary issues to be 
decided and specific provisions in relation to the procedural and substantive 
law as well as detailed description of each fast-track procedural steps.733  
 
Drafting an agreement after the dispute allows parties to understand each 
other’s position and to appoint appropriate arbitrators and to select the most 
suitable institutional body to administer the case.734 A fast-track submission 
agreement therefore allows parties to cooperate on the fast-track 
proceedings. In such an environment numerous FTA techniques and methods 
are available to expedite the arbitration. The parties can select the arbitral 
tribunal quickly because they know the best arbitrators for the dispute in 
question the known nature of the dispute means time limits can be set more 
appropriately. The agreement can also provide for an expeditious exchange of 
documents, limited document production requests to reduce the amount of 
material presented to the arbitrators, and to present only the material 
evidence. Parties can also select an experienced arbitrator who understands 
their need for timely resolution of the dispute and is available to work 
expeditiously on the matter.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Born (2011) p.327 
732 Baetrns/Yotova (2011) p.433 
733 Blackaby/Partasides/Redfern/Hunter (2009) p.16 
734 Karrer (1994) p. 74 
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Though not an international commercial dispute, the Abyei Arbitration contains 
an excellent example of a fast-track submission agreement.735 In this case, 
the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) provided a fast-track dispute 
resolution process for the border determination problems in relation to the 
Abyei area.736 Prompted by the on-going conflict and ethnic tensions, the 
parties established probably the fastest public arbitration process in modern 
history.737  
 
The fast-track submission agreement was deposited just four days after its 
signature by the parties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on 11 
July 2008.738 The Tribunal was tasked with completing the entire arbitration 
within six months of its commencement, subject to the possibility of an 
extension for three months, if necessary.739 To facilitate this, the agreement 
imposed specific deadlines for the appointment of arbitrators, not only on both 
Parties, but also on the Appointing Authority and the Party-appointed 
arbitrators, with no previewed possibility for their extension.740 The first two 
arbitrators were appointed by the Government of Sudan on 14 August 
followed, on the very next day, by the two appointments chosen by the 
SPLM/A.741 The five-member tribunal was completed on 27 October 2008 with 
the appointment of the presiding Arbitrator by the Secretary-General of the 
PCA, pursuant to Article 5(12) of the Arbitration Agreement.742 The Tribunal 
started work as soon as it was constituted in accordance with Article 4(2) of 
the Agreement, i.e. on 30 October 2008, when the presiding Arbitrator signed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 The Abyei Arbitration provided for the adoption of fast-track procedures by choosing the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only 
One is a State between the Government of Sudan / The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(Abyei Arbitration) available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 
736  The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two 
Parties of Which Only One is a State (1993) is modified according to parties needs. 
737 Baetrns/Yotova (2011) p.432 
738 Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, 7 July 2008 (Abyei Submission Agreement) 
739 Abyei Submission Agreement , Article 4(3) 
740 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 5 
741 Baetrns/Yotova (2011) p.432 
742 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 5(12) 
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his declaration of independence and communicated it to the Parties.743 The 
entire process took only 95 days, incredibly fast for a public international 
arbitration considering that 5 arbitrators were appointed. 
 
The conduct of the proceedings themselves was specifically defined as fast 
track, in accordance with Article 8(3) of the Agreement744 and so on 24 
November 2008 in its case-management conference the tribunal, in 
consultation with the parties, set the following procedural schedule: 
• December 18, 2008: Filing of Memorials 
• February 13, 2009: Filing of Counter-Memorials 
• February 28, 2009: Filing of Rejoinders 
• April 18-23, 2009: Oral Pleadings in The Hague 
 
Thus, the two phases of the written pleadings consisted of simultaneous 
exchanges of memorials and counter-memorials within two six-week periods, 
followed only 30 days later by the oral pleadings.745 The written submissions 
exceeded 20,000 pages and the hearings went on for six days.746 In the 
definition of the timelines for the proceedings, in contrast to those regarding 
the appointment of arbitrators, the Tribunal was given the discretion of 
extension 'for good cause' up to a maximum of 30 days for each party.747 This 
provision was used by the Tribunal in the course of the proceedings to grant a 
14-day extension to the Government of Sudan at its request.748  
 
The Abyei submission agreement also benefited from the incorporation of 
multiple safeguards to prevent any possible obstruction or delay of the fast-
track proceedings by either the parties or the arbitrators.749 These were set 
out in Article 4(8), providing for the continuation of the proceedings if either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 4(2) 
744 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 8(3) 
745 Born (2011) p.92 
746 Baetrns/Yotova (2011) p.433 
747 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 8 
748 See Supra p.159 fn.735 the Abyei Arbitration. See Government of Sudan Counter-Memorial and 
Rejoinder: Errata letter dated March 16, 2009 
749 Baetrns/Yotova (2011) p.434 
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party defaulted in submitting written pleadings or in appearing at the oral 
stage.750  Article 5(5) safeguarded against a default of any of the parties in 
appointing their respective arbitrators by empowering the appointing authority 
to act on their behalf.751 In addition, in the event of a truncated tribunal, it 
provided that at least three arbitrators remained and Article 5(14) gave them 
discretion to continue the proceedings and to issue an award.752 The 
arbitrators were able to successfully comply with the terms of the Arbitration 
Agreement and the Registry and the ambitious fast-track procedure was 
completed within a year of its commencement with the issuing of a 269-page 
award on 22 July 2008, accompanied by a 67-page dissenting opinion. The 
limit of 90 days from closure of submissions to making the award was also 
met as the hearings were closed on 23 April and the award followed exactly 
on the 90th day.  
 
Because it was intelligently planned after the dispute and because parties 
gave well-thought consideration to the nature and duration of each fast-track 
procedural steps, the timing and scope of the pre-hearing motion, and the 
length of the hearing and post-hearing motion, it successfully applied in 
practice. 
 
Not all submission agreements, however, are drafted so well.753 However, 
parties may be helped by using ready-made submission agreement clauses 
provided by arbitral institutions. WIPO recommends the following FTA 
submission agreement for existing disputes: 
 
“We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree that the following dispute shall be 
referred to and finally determined by arbitration in accordance with WIPO 
Expedited Arbitration Rules: 
[Brief description of the dispute] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 Abyei Submission Agreement ,Article 4(8) 
751 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 5(4) 
752 Abyei Submission Agreement, Article 5(14) 
753 Born (2011) p.100 
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“The place of arbitration shall be … The language to be used in the arbitral 
proceedings shall be … The dispute shall be decided in accordance with the 
law of …”754 
 
4.4.4 Supplementary (Post-Tribunal) Agreement 
Fast-track procedures are most commonly established before arbitration 
begins.755 However, it is perfectly possible to fast-track an existing regular 
arbitration by means of a supplementary FTA agreement.756 
 
One of the advantages of international commercial arbitration is the flexibility 
that can allow fast-track procedures to be adopted even without any previous 
agreement.  Despite not giving a strict time limit or procedural shortcuts in the 
FTA clause or in the submission agreement, it is still possible to prescribe 
fast-track rules by amending the arbitration agreement during the first 
procedural conference.757  
 
Once the arbitral tribunal is appointed a party may, if it desires, propose a 
variety of FTA techniques and methods. These include: assessing the case 
early, holding a preliminary conference promptly, authorizing the chairman of 
the three-members tribunal to make procedural decisions on his own; 
prohibiting document production altogether; limiting the deadline for 
submission or the number and/or size of the submissions; excluding or limiting 
the number of witnesses or experts to be used by the parties;758 requiring 
simultaneous submissions, utilizing witness statements in place of direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
754 WIPO Expedited Arbitration clause for existing disputes available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/clauses/#5 
755 Berger (2008) p.598 
756 ICC Techniques (2007) 
757 Holt (2003) 
758 Note on Expedited ICC Arbitration Procedure of 2002, p.34 
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testimony, presenting direct testimony simultaneously, limiting the number of 
hearing days, and dispensing with a reasoned award.759  
 
However, parties need to consult both the tribunal and the arbitral institution if 
they want to apply fast-track procedures to expedite regular arbitration and 
there is a considerable risk that the request will be rejected.760  
 
An arbitrator is not obliged to adopt fast-track procedures if, when he 
accepted to act as an arbitrator, he agreed to deal with a conventional but not 
a fast-track procedure.761 The availability and workload that an arbitrator 
accepted when appointed to a regular arbitration case, may be insufficient 
when the arbitrator is suddenly faced with shortened time limits, an 
accelerated timetables and requests for strict time and cost controls.762 The 
arbitral tribunal must therefore have a veto right or, as ultima ratio, the right to 
withdraw if the parties insist on conducting the arbitration on the basis of the 
later agreed fast-track procedures.763  
 
Similarly, it is important for a supplementary FTA agreement to scrutinize the 
timetables and arbitration procedures of the arbitration institution selected.764 
For example, under ICC Rules, certain procedures like the drafting of terms of 
reference and confirmation of the arbitrators by the ICC cannot be set aside. 
Any inconsistences between the provisions of the supplementary FTA 
agreement and those non-waivable requirements of mandatory institutional 
rules may result in pathologies which at best could prolong, rather than fast-
track the dispute resolution process.  Neither the institution nor the arbitrators 
will approve supplementary FTA agreements, which breach fundamental 
principles of applicable arbitration institution or lex arbitri. 
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762 Fellas (2007) p.80 
763 Rutherford (1992) p.82 
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Where parties insist that an ordinary arbitration is fast-tracked, but the but 
arbitrators and institutions refuse because of mandatory rules, the parties’ 
request may at least communicate their desire for speed and encourage the 
tribunal and institution to move the process more quickly.765  
 
4.4.5 Choice between Ad-hoc and Institutional FTA 
Once the parties have decided that their disputes shall be resolved through 
fast-track arbitration, they have a choice between designating an institution, 
such as the SCC, SCAI or ICC to administer the fast-track procedure or using 
ad hoc arbitration proceedings created outside an institutional framework.766 
 
In drafting an ad-hoc agreement parties may make use of a set of arbitral 
rules drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNICTRAL) which are not connected to any administering institution.767 In 
recent years, as international arbitration practice has expanded and more 
parties and lawyers have gained arbitration experience there has been 
increased interest in adopting UNCITRAL Rules for use in ad hoc FTA. 
Furthermore, ad-hoc FTA is well supported in the arbitration laws of many 
countries where the fast-track proceeding may be held. In the view of many 
experts in connection with Merger and Acquisitions (MAC) clauses the 
number of ad hoc FTA is expected increase in the future.768  
 
One advantage of ad hoc FTA is that the parties avoid the administrative fees 
charged by arbitral institutions, which can be substantial in some cases. Ad 
hoc FTA is also preferable in some industries such as finance, where disputes 
over defaults on loans, securities and broker transactions must not only be 
resolved very quickly but also require skills which are more likely to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 Berger (2008) p.602 
766 Tweeddale/Tweeddale (2007) p. 61 et seq. 
767 Chen (2009) p. 172 
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MAC disputes; 
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possessed by industry specialists rather than arbitrators on the lists of 
arbitration institutions. 769  Ad hoc FTA is particularly popular choice for MAC 
cases because in some MAC transactions even the three to six months 
duration of institutional FTA may still be considered too slow.770 
 
In addition, in some industries such as Merger and Acquisitions, the parties 
are able to stipulate in the arbitration clause the name of arbitrators to be 
appointed from the industry and, at the same time, agree the arbitrators' fees 
with the respective arbitrators.771 This means, as Sachs observes, that the 
administration of an arbitration institution is not needed in Merger and 
Acquisitions. 
 
However, apart from these exceptional circumstances, recourse to ad hoc 
procedures for international FTA can be hazardous.772 National courts are 
more likely to refused enforcement when there is no administering institution 
and no party cooperation.773 Also, in the absence of an administrator, parties 
may have to apply to the courts to resolve procedural problems on which they 
cannot agree.774   
 
Ad hoc FTA also requires that the parties assume the administrative and 
planning responsibilities generally undertaken by arbitral institutions. They 
must agree on the fast-track procedures themselves and appoint the 
arbitrators for the commencement of arbitration.775 This may not be easy. One 
Austrian example of ad hoc FTA concerned claims based on alleged delays in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 Ibid 
770 DIS SREP, Section 1(2): six months (in the case of a sole arbitrator) or nine months (in the case of 
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from the date the case was referred to the arbitrator; SCAI Rules, Article 42 (d): six months from the 
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771 Sachs (2010) p. 1051 
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774 Franck (2004) p.19 
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construction work and involved complex substantive issues.776 The arbitration 
agreement provided that the decision of the tribunal must be made within 
three months of the chairman being appointed. Owing to its strict 
management of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal was able to successfully 
make its decision within this rigid time frame. However, the overall 
proceedings took far longer than the anticipated three months because the 
process of selecting the tribunal took almost a year.777  
 
Moreover, with ad hoc FTA, there is no quality control review by an institution 
like the ICC and the arbitrators will be expected to administer the arbitral 
proceedings and ensure a healthy award is rendered. However, if problems 
arise, for example in setting the fast-track arbitration in motion or in 
constituting the arbitral tribunal, the parties may still require the assistance of 
a court or an arbitral institution, in this example to act as an appointing 
authority for arbitrators or to consider challenges of arbitrators.778 There is 
also evidence that ad hoc awards do not receive the same deference as 
institutional awards when they are presented to courts for enforcement.779  
 
Cost is the primary advantage of ad hoc procedures compared to institutional 
arbitration.780 However, when an institution is not involved, the tribunal's 
administrative tasks will be correspondingly greater, which will presumably 
cause the arbitrator's fees and expenses to increase.781 Also, if cost is critical, 
the role of the arbitration institution can be limited to that of an appointing 
authority without administrative support services.782  The institutions are very 
flexible on their administrative role.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 Fiebinger/Gregorich (2008) p. 237 
777 Rowley/Levy/Baker (2009) 
778 Park (1989) p. 647 
779 Ulmer (1986) p.1335 
780 Asken (1999) pp. 8-9 
781 Ibid 
782 Spencer (1999) p.42 
  168 
More important, in ad hoc FTA arbitration, the arbitrators generally determine 
the amount of their own fees, whereas in an institutional setting it is usually 
the institution that makes, or assists in, this determination. This is a very 
important feature of institutional arbitration that should not be lightly 
disregarded. Given that the views of parties and arbitrators as to the 
appropriate level of the arbitrators' remuneration can diverge quite 
significantly, parties may be placed in an uncomfortable position if required to 
negotiate such matters directly with those who are to decide their case.783  
 
4.4.6 Institutional FTA Procedures - variety of approaches  
If the parties decide on institutional FTA there are myriad of competing arbitral 
institutions which differ in expertise, structure, the services they offer, the 
provisions of their fast-track arbitration rules, and their costs.784 
 
Some will use their regular arbitration rules to administer FTA, but only if they 
receive a specific request from the parties to do so.785 Other arbitral 
institutions have considered it more useful to create separate FTA rules, 
which may be requested.786 Importantly, some institutions may apply FTA 
rules automatically if the amount in dispute does not exceed a certain 
threshold.787 Most, if not all, arbitral institutions have their own recommended 
model FTA clauses. 
  
However, agreement to use a particular arbitral institution should only be 
made after full consideration of what the institution has to offer: the time limits 
and procedural constraints prescribed by its fast-track arbitration rules, the 
quality and expertise of arbitrators on its list; its language translation 
capabilities; its administrative support; its facilities; its charges and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 G.A. Res. 31/98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976). 
784 Fiebinger/Gregorich (2008) p. 238 
785 Krause (2008) 
786 Time And Cost In Arbitration - A Finnish Perspective in Arbitration News Vol. 16 No 2 September 
2011. 
787 Scherer (2005) p.229-239 
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international reputation for fairness and efficiency. It is beyond the scope of 
this document to discuss all of the functions of arbitral institutions but it will be 
useful to review some differences in institutional fast-track commercial 
arbitration rules offered by different institutions. 
 
4.4.6.1 Fast-track procedures using regular arbitration rules 
The question of how best to provide for FTA was considered by the Working 
Group, which drafted the 1998 ICC Rules.788 Believing that no two cases are 
identical and that it is very difficult to prescribe uniform rules suited to the 
needs of all parties and arbitrators, the Working Group did not attempt to 
develop a special set of expedited rules and instead created a provision 
contained in Article 32[1] which allows the parties to “agree to shorten the 
various time limits set out in these Rules."789 Additionally, in Article 32(2) of 
the ICC Rules, they provided that "the ICC Court on its own initiative, may 
extend any time limit which has been modified if it decides that it is necessary 
to do so in order that the Arbitral Tribunal or the Court may fulfil their 
responsibilities in accordance with these Rules.”790  
 
In 2002, the ICC published a Note on ICC FTA Arbitrations explaining the 
concept of Article 32 as understood by the ICC.791 The ICC clearly warned 
parties not to set unrealistically short time limits in the FTA clause.792 The note 
also explains the mandatory character of Article 32(2) which means parties 
cannot prevent the ICC from extending the time limits if it deems it is 
necessary to do so. The drafters of the 2012 ICC Rules took the same 
approach and Article 32 was accepted without change, other than renaming it 
Article 38 in the 2012 Rules.793 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 Rubino-Sammartano (2000) p. 803 
789 ICC Rules (1998), Article 32 
790 Ibid 
791 Note on Expedited ICC Arbitration Procedure of 2002, p.30 
792 Bond/Paralika/Secomb (2010) p. 386 
793 ICC Rules, Article 38  
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Despite not introducing a special set of expedited rules, the ICC has seen a 
number of FTA cases, often of a complex nature, which were decided within 
one or two months after the file had been transferred to the arbitrators and the 
advance on cost had been paid. These exemplary ICC cases showed that 
parties can increase the success of fast-track arbitration by:794 
 
• Choosing one arbitrator, not three;795 
• Not allowing the arbitrator to be dilatory challenged once 
appointed;796  
• Allowing only one round of pleadings, not two;797  
• Not allowing post-hearing briefs to be filed;798  
• Allocating each side with a fixed number of hours to expend as it 
desires at the hearing, subject to the tribunal's power to limit 
irrelevant or redundant submissions;799  
• Stipulating that the arbitrator must render a reasoned award within 
10 days from the close of hearings and that the award's allocations 
of costs must reflect not only who succeeded but also penalise any 
deleterious or wasteful conduct by a party.800 
 
In the LCIA rules, Article 9 grants the LCIA Court the authority to curtail the 
time limits for the formation of the arbitral tribunal which consequently 
provides for an "Expedited Formation" of the Tribunal, but it does not give 
authority - at least not expressly - for an expedited procedure once the Arbitral 
Tribunal has been constituted.801 However, depending on the circumstances, 
an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the "Expedited Formation" procedure 
could conduct accelerated proceedings in the light of Article 14.1(ii) of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 Philippe (2002) et seq. 
795 Welser/Klausegger (2009) p. 259 
796 Daly/Scheller (2010) p. 67 
797 Smit (1998) p. 345 
798 Thomson/Finn (2005) p. 74 
799 Burr/Karrer (2010) p.53 et seq. 
800 Coe (2002) p.61 
801 LCIA Rules, Article 9 
  171 
LCIA Rules as it allows the tribunal and the parties to employ fast-track 
procedures by tailoring the LCIA rules for fast-track arbitration.802  
 
The NAI has introduced a summary proceedings mechanism803 modelled after 
the summary proceedings of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure.804 In 
addition to applying shorter time limits for both submissions and the issuance 
of an award, parties can agree to dispense with written memorials and/or 
witness examinations. This mechanism offers a variety of practical 
advantages, including the availability of a broad range of reliefs, an extremely 
expedited process (normally between a few days and few weeks) and 
reduced legal costs. Further, pursuant to Article 1051(3), Netherlands CCP 
decisions rendered in the context of summary proceedings are classified as 
awards in the context of the New York Convention.805 
 
The summary proceedings can be implemented either through an ancillary 
procedure of Article 37 where an arbitration on the merits has been 
commenced and the tribunal has been constituted,806 or as a stand-alone 
procedure governed by807 Section 42a of the NAI Rules where no arbitration 
on the merits has been filed or where such arbitration has been filed but the 
tribunal has not yet been constituted.808  In the latter case the procedure is 
started by the parties filing a formal request for fast-track arbitration, 
accompanied by any exhibits that support the claims made with the NAI 
Secretariat.809  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 LCIA Rules, Article 14 
803 NAI  Arbitration Rules of 2010, Articles 37 and 42 
804 The Netherlands Arbitration Act of 2004, Article 1051 
805 The Netherlands Arbitration Act of 2004, Article 1051(3) 
806 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p.549 ¶21-90 
807 NAI  Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article37 
808 Ibid, Article42 
809 Ibid, Articles 37 and 42(a), 42b(1) and (2), 
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The NAI summary proceedings are automatically available to parties that have 
agreed on the application of the NAI Rules and where the place of arbitration 
is in the Netherlands.810  
4.4.6.2 Specific FTA Rules – “Opt-in” 
While institutions like ICC, LCIA and NIA consider that their regular arbitration 
rules are flexible enough to be adapted for fast-track procedures, others have 
followed a different path.  
 
The 1994 Expedited Arbitration Rules of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) were one of the first examples of a set of arbitration 
rules created specifically to achieve fast-track arbitration.811 The rules were 
developed to settle disputes in the domain of intellectual property, such as 
disagreements over trademarks, but other types of disputes are not excluded. 
Under WIPO Expedited Rules the arbitration can end in approximately fifty 
days, or even faster if the parties agree to shorten the 20-day time limit for 
submission of the answer to the statement of claim and defence, or permit no 
extensions.  
 
Other sets of rules specific to FTA followed WIPO’s lead.812 Prominent 
examples are: 
• The 2010 Rules for Expedited Arbitrations of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC)813 
• The 2011 Expedited Rules of Arbitration of the Australian Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA)814 
• The 2011 Fast Track Rules of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for 
Arbitration (KLRCA)815 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 Bend/Leijten/Ynzonides (2009) p.190 
811 WIPO FTA Rules 
812 See Appendix 2 
813 SCC FTA Rules 
814 ACICA FTA Rules 
815 KLRCA FTA Rules 
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All of these rules are separate from the institutions’ regular arbitration Rules. 
To use them requires explicit agreement to FTA either in the arbitration clause 
or in the submission agreement - hence their common name of ‘opt-in’ rules. 
These detailed rules govern the entire fast-track process, from the initiation of 
the claim right through to the final award. 
 
As almost all of these arbitration institutions also provide separate sets of 
regular arbitration rules, parties can create an arbitration clause which 
combines fast-track and regular track procedures by specifying in what 
circumstances which sets of rules will apply. In the following wording from the 
SCC, parties select FTA Rules as their first choice but let the SCC determine 
whether or not regular arbitration rules shall apply: 
 
“The Rules for Expedited Arbitrations shall apply, unless the SCC in its 
discretion determines, taking into account the complexity of the case, the 
amount in dispute and other circumstances, that the Arbitration Rules shall 
apply. In the latter case, the SCC shall also decide whether the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be composed of one or three arbitrators.”816 
 
4.4.6.3 Specific FTA Rules – “Opt-out” 
Some institutions have a separate set of FTA rules which, as above, can be 
requested in the normal way. However, for disputes valued below a certain 
threshold FTA rules will be applied automatically and require a request not to 
apply them. Thus they are commonly called opt-out rules. Prominent 
institutions that operate this approach include: 
 
• The Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution (SCAI) in Article 42 of their 
Expedited Procedures (2004)817  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 SCC’s Model FTA Clauses are available at http://www.sccinstitute.com 
817 SCAI Rules  
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• The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC) – in their Summary Procedures (1994) 818  
• The Council of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) 
in Article 38 of their Administered Arbitration Rules (2008) 819 
• The Court of Arbitration of Madrid Official Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Madrid  (CAMARA) in Article 50 of their Rules of Arbitration 
(2009) 820   
 
The ‘opt out’ approach was pioneered by institutions sited in Geneva, Basel 
and Lugano who joined to form the SCAI in 2004.821 Parties can submit 
disputes to the SCAI Expedited Procedure, either in the arbitration agreement 
or, after the dispute arises, within the ordinary arbitration rules framework.822 
However, if the amount in dispute is below CHF 1,000,000823 arbitration is 
conducted under fast-track procedure by a sole arbitrator, even if this has not 
been requested by the parties.824 
 
Provided that the amount in dispute exceeds CHF 1,000,000 parties enjoy 
complete freedom to opt in to of fast-track procedure and later revert to 
regular arbitration. However, if the amount in dispute does not exceed CHF 
1,000,000 parties are restricted to using only FTA.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 CIETAC Arbitration Rules of 1994, Articles 64-74; The rules are recently revised in 2012.  See 
CIETAC Rules Articles 54-62 in which the RAM 500,000 Yuan threshold for automatic application of 
fast-track procedures increased to RAM 2,000,000 Yuan (approximately USD 320,000 equivalent). 
Considering the CIETAC dealt with 560 international arbitration cases in 2009, 418 in 2010 and 470 in 
2011, and majority of disputes are below USD 500,000 threshold. Fast Track Arbitrations are expected 
to boost in the next years. 
819 HKIAC Rules 
820 CAMARA Arbitration Rules of 2009 
821 CCIG Rules of 1992, Article 31 CCIG joined to SCAI in 2004 as one of the seven Swiss Chambers 
Arbitral institutions. Article 42 of the SCAI Rules of 2012 currently applies for FTA. There are two other 
Swiss Chambers with expedited arbitration rules which also joined to SCAI in 2004: Article 41 of the 
BCC Rules of 1995 and Article 48 of the TCC Rules of 1997  
822 SCAI Rules, Articles 1(3) and 42(1)  
823 CHF 1,000,000 is about USD 1,095,290 at the exchange rates prevailing when these lines were 
written on 15 January 2013  (1 USD = about 0.913 CHF). 
824 SCAI Rules, Article 42 
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The opt-out approach of the SCIA’s Expedited Rules has become a model for 
many other institutions. CIETAC incorporated very similar rules in 1994825 but 
with a much lower monetary threshold of CNY 500,000826 for the automatic 
application of fast-track procedures. Although under the revised 2012 Rules827 
the threshold is increased to CNY 2,000,000828 it is still much lower than the 
monetary threshold of CHF 1,000,000 set out in the Article 42 of the SCAI 
Rules.829  In the case of CIETAC, the institution has similar authority to 
determine whether or not to apply the fast-track procedure after a full 
consideration of relevant factors, but where no monetary claim is specified or 
the amount is in dispute, the authority is not clear.830  Unlike the SCAI Rules, 
the CIETAC Rules are not silent on what should happen if the claimed 
amounts exceed or fall short of the monetary threshold. Under CIETAC Rules 
arbitral procedures, whether started on fast-track or regular track, will not be 
affected with counterclaims or withdrawals or with later increases or 
decreases in the amount in dispute, unless the parties agree or the arbitral 
tribunal decides that a change is necessary.831 A similar approach is adopted 
by CAMARA where the decision to conduct an arbitration case using fast track 
procedure is final. This aims to minimize the effects of later changes in the 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825 CIETAC Arbitration Rules of 1994, Articles 64-74 Chapter III Summary Procedures Art 64 states 
“this Summary Procedure shall apply to any case in dispute where the amount of the claim totals not 
more than RAM 500,000.00 Yuan” 
826 RAM 500,000 is about USD 80,428 at the exchange rates dated 15 January 2013 when these lines 
were written. (1 USD = about 6.216 CNY). 
827 SIAC Rules, Article 5 
828 RAM 2,000,000 is about USD 321,713 at the exchange rates dated 15 January 2013 when these 
lines were written. (1 USD = about 6.216 CNY). 
829 SCAI Rules, Article 42(2) 
830 CIETAC Rules Article 54(2) 
831 CIETAC Rules Article 61 
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Figure 14: Monetary threshold beneath which FTA is automatically applied, by 
institution. 
Source: Institutional FTA Rules 
 
By contrast, under KCAB rules, fast-track procedures are automatically 
altered if at any time during the dispute resolution process the claimed amount 
exceeds the threshold through counterclaims or in other ways.832  
 
The SCC provides a clause to apply Regular Arbitration or FTA rules 
depending on the value of the claim: 
 
“The Rules for Expedited Arbitrations shall apply where the amount in dispute 
does not exceed EUR 100,000. Where the amount in dispute exceeds EUR 
100,000 the Arbitration Rules shall apply. The Arbitral Tribunal shall be 
composed of a sole arbitrator where the amount in dispute exceeds EUR 
100,000 but not EUR 1,000,000. Where the amount in dispute exceeds EUR 
1,000,000, the Arbitral Tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators. The 
amount in dispute includes the claims made in the Request for Arbitration and 
any counterclaims made in the Answer to the Request for Arbitration.”833 
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833 SCC’s Model FTA Clauses are available at http://www.sccinstitute.com 
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Not every case needs speed and parties' unwillingness to accept fast-track 
procedure automatically could be one of the circumstances that institutions 
with an opt-out approach take into account when deciding whether to make an 
exception to the automatic application of fast-track procedures.834 It would 
certainly not be in the interest of the arbitral institutions to impose upon the 
parties a product that neither wants.835 
 
However, in many instances it would not be practicable to alter the format of 
the arbitration once it is under way.836 Attempting to transform pending regular 
proceedings, in which the Tribunal has been constituted, into an expedited 
arbitration would likely complicate matters instead of simplifying them and 
thus foster delay instead of speed.837 In particular, it would be very difficult to 
accelerate a regular arbitration once the timetable has been finalised. 
However, if the parties and the arbitrator agree they can of course at any 
stage revisit the timetable, for instance if a main claim has been withdrawn 
and a hearing can be cancelled. 
 
Although it would be easier to shift from an accelerated arbitration to a regular 
format, an increase in the amount in dispute does not necessarily mean that 
there has been an increase in the complexity of the issues to be resolved.838 
Thus, in itself, an increase in the amount disputed offers no compelling reason 
to modify the timetable of the arbitration.839 The same would not be true where 
an increase of the amount in dispute is coupled with additional complexities of 
the case.840  
 
According to Spada, to change from FTA to regular arbitration, or vice versa, it 
should be sufficient to have a unilateral request by one of the parties.841  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834 SCAI Rules, Article 42(2) 
835 Geisinger, E. (2004) p.79 (Can you make others happy despite them?) 
836 Ibid 
837 Zuberbühler (2006) 
838 Rubino-Sammartano (1998) p. 148 
839 Ibid 
840 Lowenfeld (1997) p. 649 et seq. 
841 Spada, F. (2005) p.28 
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Scherer, by contrast, states that bilateral requests from both parties should be 
required.842  
 
Unilateral FTA clauses provide a solution to this problem by allowing a 
request from one of the parties, without the agreement of the other, to 
determine whether the matter will be brought to fast-track arbitration or to 
ordinary arbitration after the dispute.843 Party autonomy would suggest that 
this is acceptable, although it might be seen to offend against procedural 
equality.844   Article 42.2 of the SCAI Rules is a clear example of this approach 
in which the Chambers decide whether fast-track procedures apply in the first 
place. By applying mutatis mutandis to Article 42.2 of SCAI, Geisinger845 
considers that the decision to modify the format of the proceedings would 
have to be taken by the Chambers in view of all relevant circumstances.846  
The decision would be made upon the request of either party or of the Arbitral 
Tribunal. If all parties and the Tribunal make a joint request, there would be 
little point for the Chambers to deny it. In any event, it is obvious that the 
Chambers cannot modify the procedure without first consulting with the 
parties and the Tribunal. 
 
The Swiss Rules of Arbitration allow automatic application of FTA proceedings 
even in cases where the claimed amount in dispute is well-above the 
monetary threshold.847 Though consultation with the parties is required, the 
decision to use FTA can be made even over the objections of one or more 
parties after taking all ‘relevant and applicable’ circumstances into account.848  
 
The application of FTA by the authority of institutions rather than parties is 
also possible under Article 5.1 of the Rules of the SIAC which grants its 
chairman the authority to decide the appropriateness of FTA procedures in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842 Scherer (2005) p. 232 
843 Carter, J. H. (2011) 
844 Richard (2004) 
845 Geisinger, E. (2004) p.80 
846 Spada, F. (2005) p.29 
847 SCAI Rules, Article 42(2) 
848 Ibid 
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cases of exceptional urgency.849 Thus the institution may decide on FTA even 
though the parties may oppose the decision by arguing that there is no 
exceptional urgency.  
 
Furthermore, the SIAC grants its chairman the authority to decide the 
appropriateness of FTA procedure where the amount in dispute is no more 
than SGD 5 million (about USD 4 million) and one of the parties makes an 
application for FTA.850 The statistics show the chairman rarely rejects FTA 
applications. In the first 6 months of the SIAC Expedited Rules there were 19 
FTA applications, 13 were accepted and 1 was rejected by the chairman while 
4 settled or were taken back by the party making the FTA request. In 2011, 
about 20 FTA applications were made, 15 of those were accepted and 2 were 
rejected by the chairman while the remaining 3 were again settled or pulled 
back.  In 2012, a record 35 FTA applications were made, 31 of these were 
accepted, 3 were rejected by the chairman and only one was settled or pulled 
back. Thus out of 74 FTA applications made in the past 2.5 years, 59 were 
successful. Only 6 cases (less than 10%)were rejected.851  
 
Figure 15: SIAC Expedited Arbitration Procedures in Practice 
Source: SIAC Annual Statistics Arbitration Cases 
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850 SGD 5,000,000 is about USD 4,081,432 at the exchange rates prevailing when these lines were 
written on 15 January 2013  (1 USD = about 1.225 SGD). 
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The breadth of these provisions under many institutional arbitration rules 
suggests that fast-track procedure could be applied automatically without 
express parties’ consent but by the decision of arbitral institutions in 
accordance with the implicit consent of parties by agreeing into particular 
institutional arbitration rules. 
 
4.4.7 The seat of Fast-track Arbitration 
Consistent with the principle of party autonomy, the parties to an international 
arbitration are generally free to choose where their arbitration takes place.  
The place of the arbitration (or the “seat” or the “forum” or the “locus arbitri”) is 
highly relevant both to the conduct of the fast-track arbitration and to the 
enforceability of the fast-track award.852 Parties should consider the following 
factors related to the legal system of the seat: 
 
1) It is especially important to select a seat whose arbitral awards will be 
enforceable in other countries (e.g., a country that has ratified the New 
York or Panama Conventions recognizing arbitral awards).853 
 
2) The seat's law should recognize the agreement to fast-track arbitration 
as valid.854 Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention prescribes that 
the validity of an arbitration agreement may be determined by the law 
of the country where the award was made, so compliance with local 
laws is important.855 
 
3) Because the arbitral seat is usually the country whose courts will hear 
an action to set aside an award, it is important to consider the scope of 
review of awards available in that country.856 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 Capper (2009) 
853 Koch (2009) pp. 267-292 
854 Lalive (1984) 
855 Chalbury McCouat International Ltd v PG Foils Ltd [2010] EWHC 2050 (TCC) 
856 Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 2 Int'l Arb. Rep., No. 1, at 17 (Cass. Civ. 
1re 1987) (French court's reversal of ICC arbitral award rendered in Paris). 
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4) The national courts of the seat should not unnecessarily interfere in 
fast-track arbitral proceedings, thereby creating an incentive for dilatory 
tactics and expensive procedural disputes.857 
 
5) The seat's courts should, however, assist the fast-track proceedings 
when necessary (e.g., by compelling arbitration or by enforcing 
document disclosure orders made by the tribunal).858 
 
6) The host country should allow non-nationals to appear as counsel in 
international arbitration proceedings. This is not always the case. For 
example, Japan and Singapore have at times required that the parties' 
representatives be lawyers admitted to practice, and who reside, in the 
seat’s state.859 Other countries require that representatives be lawyers 
(e.g., Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Spain),860 while others 
require representatives to present a power of attorney to the arbitral 
panel (e.g., Argentina, Greece, Austria).861 
 
7) The seat should not unduly restrict the choice of arbitrators. In Saudi 
Arabia, arbitrators must be Muslim and male.862 In Venezuela, 
arbitrators must be lawyers licensed to practice law in Venezuela if 
Venezuelan law applies.863 Certain other countries have also required 
that arbitrators be nationals of their country.864 
 
8) The seat of the arbitration may also determine the lex arbitri:865 the 
language of the arbitration if the parties have not specified the 
language; time-limits for commencing an arbitration; interim measures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
857 Shashoua & Ors v Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm) (07 May 2009); C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 
1282; C v D [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm) (28 June 2007). 
858 Baker/Romman (2010) pp. 9-14 
859 Rivkin (1990) pp. 11-15 
860 Ibid 12 
861 Ibid 14 
862 Bond (1990) p. 18 
863 Rodner (1997) p. 99 
864 Bernardini (1992) p. 54 
865 Hochbaum (1996) p. 20 
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of protection; other matters including rules concerning the disclosure of 
documents, the evidence of witnesses and the powers of the 
arbitrator.866 
 
If parties fail to agree to the seat of the arbitration, the rules of some 
institutions allow the arbitrators to decide the seat, based on the 
circumstances of the parties and the case;867 other institutions’ rules authorize 
the institution itself to select the seat.868 
 
It should be noted that choosing a seat does not mean that all arbitral 
proceedings have to take place there; the arbitrators generally have discretion 
under the arbitral rules to conduct some proceedings at other venues.869 It 
may often be convenient for the parties or the arbitral tribunal or the witnesses 
(who may all be from different countries) to hold meetings or even hearings in 
a country other than the designated seat.870  The legal place of the fast-track 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866 Wilske/Fox (2009) p.383 
867 AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, Article 13 (administrator may initially determine 
the place of arbitration, subject to the power of the arbitrators to determine the seat); UNCITRAL Rules, 
Article 18 
868 ICC Rules, Article 18 (ICC International Court of Arbitration shall fix the place of arbitration if not 
agreed by the parties); LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 16.1 (seat shall be London unless and until the 
LCIA Court determines that another seat is more appropriate) 
869 ICC Rules, Article 18 (2)(arbitrators may conduct hearings or deliberate at any location they deem 
appropriate); AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, Article 13 (arbitrators may hold 
conferences, hear witnesses or inspect property at any place they deem appropriate); LCIA Arbitration 
Rules, Article 16.1 (arbitrators may hold hearings and deliberations at any convenient location) 
870 However the choice of a seat of arbitration does not preclude the tribunal from conducting hearings  
during  the  proceedings  in  another  location  for  convenience:  Union  of  India  v McDonnell Douglas 
Corp [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 48. In such a case the procedural law of the seat continues to govern the 
arbitration.  
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4.4.7.1 The law governing FTA proceedings (lex arbitri) 
Generally, parties do not specify in an arbitral clause the procedural law to be 
applied to the arbitration proceeding.871 In the absence of a choice, arbitrators 
typically apply the procedural law of the seat of the arbitration (i.e. the lex 
arbitri).872  Selecting a seat in a particular country therefore generally brings 
with it the law of that country unless the agreement provides otherwise.873  
 
The lex arbitri is important because it determines all matters relating to the 
form and validity of FTA agreements, conduct of fast-track procedures and 
enforceability of FTA awards. For example, questions regarding how 
arbitrators are appointed, how they can be challenged, what their powers are 
with regard to the admission of fast-track evidence, time limits and other 
related issues, are all referable to the lex arbitri.874  
 
In light of the traditional theory and practice of ICA, there is close linkage 
between the law governing the proceedings and the seat of arbitration.875 It is 
said that "the lex arbitri is the lex loci arbitri"876 This is called "the seat theory" 
and originates from jurisdictional theory. It argues that the contractual root of 
an international arbitral tribunal is a façade which conceals the legally crucial, 
adjudicatory character of the tribunal. The reason to apply the lex loci arbitri to 
the proceedings of arbitration is that the law of the situs imposes itself 
because the parties have set up, after all, a tribunal. Since the parties create a 
private jurisdiction - the arbitral tribunal - and this jurisdiction is situated inside 
the territory of certain country, the local sovereign must have the competence 
to regulate all activities taking place within the realm, including the creation 
and exercise of such jurisdiction.877 From another perspective, it is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 Ulmer (1986) pp. 1342-1343. 
872 India Company v. Pakistani Bank, Award in ICC Case No. 1512 of 1971, in Collection of ICC 
Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 at 3 (Kluwer 1990); Italian Claimant v. Belgian Respondent, Award in ICC 
Case No. 2272 of 1975, in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 at 11-12 (Kluwer 1990). 
873 See supra p. 179 fn. 852  
874 Tweeddale/Tweeddale (2007)  ¶7-39 et seq. 
875 James Miller & Partners Ltd. v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd.[1970] 1 Lloyds Rep. 269 
876 Petrochilos [2004] p. 22; Park (1983) p. 23 
877 Petrochilos (2004) p. 23 
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believed that every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably 
conferred or deprived by a system of municipal law, and there is no exception 
regarding the arbitration agreement and the arbitral proceedings.878 The lex 
loci arbitri is the source of rights and obligations and therefore all arbitral 
proceedings should be subject to it.879 
 
The seat theory has been widely-adopted in conventions and national laws, 
such as Article 5.1(d) of the NYC, Articles 19, 34(2)(a)(iv), 36(l)(a)(iv) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law880, and Article 6(2) of the KLRCA Fast-track Rules. 
Those provisions emphasize the link between the place of arbitration and the 
law governing the arbitral procedure, whether the lex loci arbitri is given 
equivalent weight to the agreement made by parties (dualism of 
application),881 or whether the agreement of the parties is followed in principle 
and only when such agreement fails is the lex loci arbitri applied, or merely by 
applying the mandatory constraints of the lex loci arbitri.882 
 
However, the seat theory is not totally without flaw. One vital criticism is that it 
overestimates the connection between the place of arbitration and the law 
governing arbitral procedure. First, as transportation and communication 
networks develop, arbitral proceedings often happen at more than one place. 
For example, whether for the sake of convenience or necessity, the taking of 
evidence and the deliberation of the arbitral tribunal, may well be conducted 
outside the place of arbitration. In other words, the "seat of arbitration" is 
merely defined as "the judicial seat of arbitration" by parties or arbitrators.883 It 
is not so much a particular geographic site, but rather a conceptual notion of 
law.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
878 Park (1983) p. 21-52  
879 Petrochilos (2004) p. 23 p. 22 It is even more radical to develop the view that "international 
arbitration" is a misnomer because every arbitration is “subject to a specific system of national law” 
880 UNCITRAL Model Law, Articles 19, 40 and 50 
881 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.83 ¶2-14 
882 Park (1983) p. 30 et seq. 
883 Petrochilos (2004) p. 24 
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Furthermore, in many situations, the place of arbitration is chosen merely as a 
place of neutrality which has nothing to do with the law governing substantive 
issues, nationality of parties or factual elements of business.884 It is 
undeniable that the choice of place of arbitration may be important as it can 
affect the language of the arbitration, whether the legal counsel are admitted 
to practice law at the place of arbitration, whether the location of site is easily 
accessible to both sides with good international travel service, the internal and 
external arbitration expenses, its convenience to witnesses or for viewing 
physical evidence, whether appropriate conference rooms exist for hearings, 
and if the country of seat of arbitration is a signatory state of the NYC.885 
However, the choice of place of arbitration may not relate to the substantive 
facts of the case.886 
 
Since a large number of ICA cases can bring in considerable benefits for the 
country of the seat of arbitration,887 countries seek to attract more international 
arbitrations by competing for the best place of arbitration.888 One way 
governments can increase their market share is to reform their national 
arbitration laws to offer more simplicity and flexibility. By contrast, too much 
intervention from domestic courts will deter international arbitrations.889  
 
Therefore, with the supposition that less constraint draws more preference, 
over-emphasizing the relationship between the selection of place of arbitration 
and lex loci arbitri and assuming as a rule that the seat of arbitration is the one 
and the only important connecting factor of lex arbitri seem to lump together 
all and sundry.890 It not only ignores the diversity of cases but also unduly 
simplifies this issue.891 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Craig (1995) p. 2 
885 Carter (2007) p. 117-124 
886 Craig/Park/Paulsson  (1990) p. 463 
887 For instance, work for lawyers at place of arbitration, incentives to stimulate the hotel and hospitality 
industry, building prestige as spin-off to hosting international arbitrations for future development. 
888 Wilske/Fox (2009) pp. 383-418 
889 Wilske, S. (2009) p.187 
890 Hochbaum, J. (1996) 
891 Capper (2009) 
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In the 1960's the seat theory started to face challenges and the "de-
nationalization/localization theory"892 emerged. It contended that international 
arbitration should not be bound by municipal arbitration law, especially not the 
law of the country where the award is made.893 According to the principle of 
party autonomy (l'autonomie de la volonte), the law governing arbitral 
procedure and the procedural rules of arbitration should both be determined 
by the parties, or failing such agreement, by the arbitral tribunal in the manner 
it considers appropriate.894 According to localization theory, International 
commercial arbitration is sufficiently regulated by the rules decided by either 
parties or tribunal and there is no need for lex loci arbitri to interfere in the 
proceedings. In addition, the control of arbitral proceedings should only come 
from the law of the place of enforcement of the award, not the law of the place 
of arbitration.895 Notably, de-nationalization theory is not only applied to 
procedural matters, but also substantive matters and rules of conflict of laws 
to be agreed by parties, such as international law or lex mercatoria served as 
a basis to resolve disputes.896 
 
However, the de-nationalization theory does raise several queries. In addition 
to the issue of whether ICA can exist in a legal vacuum detached from the 
control of national laws,897 in reality there may be a practical need to use the 
lex loci arbitri.898 The arbitral tribunal as an alternative dispute resolution 
method is after all different from the role of the court. Without the power of 
enforceability, it depends on the court to address interim measures and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
892 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.89-91 ¶2-25; Petrochilos (2004) p. 35-41 
893 Hanotiau (2011) p. 90 
894 This thesis suggests that under the de-nationalization theory there is no need to distinguish 
between the law governing arbitral procedure and procedural rules of arbitration. The reason is that if a 
particular national law is chosen to be the law governing all arbitral proceedings, the application of the 
law itself is not based on the power from the sovereignty of such country, but rather the contractual 
characteristic of the agreement made by parties based on the principle of party autonomy. The parties 
can also adjust any content of such law to be more suitable for special needs of their case, which has 
already departed from the notion of the jurisdictional theory. Therefore, the chosen law can be 
conceptually perceived as "one kind of selected procedural rules of arbitration", with more similarity with 
institutional arbitration rules which comparatively have a well-structured framework to be applied to FTA 
directly. 
895 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.90 ¶2-26 
896 Petrochilos (2004) p. 35-37 
897 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.92 ¶2-29 
898 Domenico/Martin (2001) p. 22; Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.76-77  ¶2-02 
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taking of evidence. Hence, the notion that international arbitration can be 
perfectly regulated by its own rules might be a little unrealistic. Besides, many 
aspects in arbitral proceedings require court intervention to fill gaps and 
render opportunities of recourse against awards, such as the appointment of 
arbitrators,899 setting aside  arbitral awards900 etc. If the lex loci arbitri is totally 
abandoned, the domestic court will have nothing to apply or be forced to apply 
unfamiliar foreign laws, which may also cause problems. The application of 
lex loci arbitri is not really defending the interests of the state of the seat, but 
the rights of the arbitrating parties to ensure the fairness, effectiveness and 
practicality of arbitration.901 More crucially, the lex loci arbitri confers its 
nationality on the award of the arbitral tribunal, so that it may benefit from any 
international treaties, such as the NYC, to which its country of origin is a 
party.902 
 
Both the seat theory and the de-nationalization theory have their pros and 
cons. As transnational business prospers, the lex loci arbitri can be a major 
obstacle to fast-track arbitral proceedings, and may even affect the 
enforcement of awards. Undoubtedly, the de-nationalization theory attempts 
to address these issues but many problems still remain. If states are not 
willing to loosen their control over international arbitration conducted inside 
their territory by allowing parties to choose their preferred lex arbitri, the 
"invisible hand" of local courts will eventually dominate arbitral procedure.903 
At present, arbitral proceedings are constrained by the lex loci arbitri and 
parties (especially their legal counsellors) or the arbitral tribunal must pay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 11(3) 
900 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 34(2)(a)(iv) 
901 Petrochilos (2004) p. 25-26 
902 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.91 ¶2-28 
903 Another idea is to expect the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law of states to help promote the 
uniformity and globalization of arbitration. But in practice, it is almost illusory to build  such "level playing 
field" because as the Model Law itself is not binding to members of the U.N., states of different culture 
and historical background are unlikely to adopt the Model Law without  any modification. Hence the 
problem still remains. Ibid at 89-90 ¶2-25  ¶2-26 
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attention to the selection of the seat of arbitration to avoid undue intervention 
from local courts and to maximise the benefits for both parties.904 
 
4.4.7.2 Choice of a foreign procedural law 
The law governing arbitral procedure and procedural rules of arbitration are 
both important but the nature and scope of them are quite different.  
 
Occasionally parties may agree to a seat with an undesirable procedural 
law.905  In that case, the parties may specify different procedural rules from 
the law governing the place of arbitration.906 If there is a contradiction between 
them, the mandatory provisions of lex arbitri prevail.907 The procedural rules 
and lex arbitri are independent but also affected by each other. It is impossible 
to totally cut one out from the other. 
 
The diagram below shows the relationship between lex arbitri, lex loci arbitri 
and procedural rules. The range between lex arbitri and lex loci arbitri 
represents conditions under seat theory where the lex arbitri is definitely the 
lex loci arbitri. The second range between lex loci arbitri and rules of 
procedure represents the possibility that lex loci arbitri and rules of procedure 
are the same and the risk of contradiction between them is avoided and 
impediment to enforcement is also reduced.  The third range between rules of 
procedure and lex arbitri represents conditions under de-nationalization theory 
where parties are allowed to choose their preferred procedural rules and lex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
904 About introduction and comments on arbitration laws and other relevant factors of different 
countries, see generally Wilske/Fox (2009) pp. 383-418 
905 On how to make a choice-of- forum and choice-of-law decision in arbitration, see Born (2010);  
Marriott, A. L. (2006) pp.411-429; Nygh, P. E. (1997); Park, W. W. (1995) pp. 99-112 
906 In one case, a clause read: “Disputes hereunder shall be referred to arbitration, to be carried out by 
arbitrators named by the International Chamber of Commerce in Geneva in accordance with the 
arbitration procedure set forth in the Civil Code of Venezuela and in the Civil Code of France, with due 
regard for the law of the place of arbitration.” Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 9.04 at 163. In that clause, 
the procedural law to be followed was unclear, confused and potentially conflicting, which could lead to 
challenges to the award.  
907 English Arbitration Act of 1996, Articles 1(b) and 34(1); New French NCPC of 2011, Article 1509(1); 
Swiss Private International Law Act of 1989, Article 182(1) 
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arbitri without the constraint of lex loci arbitri. In this case the lex arbitri chosen 
is the same as the procedural rules.  
 
Finally, the centre area in the middle covered by all three circles represents 
the conditions where both the procedural rules and lex arbitri are decided by 
parties or the tribunal, and the arbitral proceedings are simultaneously 
governed by the lex loci arbitri. This represents the compromised reality for 




Choosing a lex arbitri that is different from the procedural law at the seat 
complicates matters by forcing the parties and arbitrators to observe another 
set of rules of law in addition to the law of the seat of the arbitration.908 
Regardless of the procedural law designated by the parties, the arbitrators will 
still be obliged to apply the mandatory rules of law of the place of the 
arbitration,909 which may result in conflicts with the designated procedural law, 
litigation over the resulting issues and enforceability problems.910 It is also 
possible, when a different procedural law is specified, that the countries of the 
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909 Lionnet (1991) pp. 7-8 
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seat and of the procedural law may both assert jurisdiction over the case.911 
Such a conflict would be difficult for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to 
reconcile and would add delay and cost to the fast-track procedure. 
 
Naviera Amazonia Peruana SA v Compania Internacional de Seguros de 
Peru912 was an arbitration held in Peru but, by agreement between the parties, 
was said to be subject to the procedural law of England. During the course of 
the arbitration it became necessary to have recourse to the courts but 
problems arose in determining which national court has jurisdiction. The 
English Court of Appeal noted that although a choice of foreign procedural law 
was theoretically possible, there were practical difficulties:  
 
“There is equally no reason in theory which precludes parties to agree that an 
arbitration shall be held at a place or in country X but subject to the procedural 
laws of Y. The limits and implications of any such Agreement has been much 
discussed in the literature, but apart from the decision in the instant case 
there appears to be no reported case where this has happened. This is not 
surprising when one considers the complexities and inconveniences which 
such an agreement would involve.  Thus, at any rate under the principles of 
English law, which rest upon the territorially limited jurisdiction of our courts, 
an agreement to arbitrate in X subject to English procedural law would not 
empower our courts to exercise jurisdiction over the arbitration in X.”913 
 
Applying a procedural law different than the seat as lex arbitri may also lead to 
complications over the place where proceedings to set aside the award may 
be instituted.914 For example, may an action to annul an award be brought in 
the country whose procedural law is applied (even though it was not the seat 
of the arbitration) or in the country of the seat (even though its procedural law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911 Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas, (1993) 2 L.R. 48; National Thermal Power Corp. v. Singer 
Corp., (1992) 3 S.C.C. 551 (India), (1993) XVIII YBCA 403, 413  
912 Naviera Amazonia Peruana SA v Compania Internacional de Seguros de Peru [1988] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 116 CA 
913 Ibid 
914 Shengehang/Lijun (2006) p.155-183 
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does not apply) or both?915 It is essential that each party understands the full 
implications of agreeing to be bound by the procedural law of another nation. 
This may require a review of the other country's law with the help of a local 
lawyer.916 Considering the importance of speed in FTA, choosing applicable 
procedural law that supports fast-track procedures will help to reduce any 
possible confusion.  
 
The options for the drafter in handling the procedural law may be listed as 
follows:917  
1) ignore the issue, which is the most common approach, in which case 
the arbitrators will decide which procedural rules to apply;  
2) designate the procedural law of the place of the arbitration;  
3) specify the procedural law of a country other than that of the seat;  
4) adopt a procedural law other than that of a country, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration;  
5) exclude a procedural law and create the procedural rules in the 
arbitration clause itself.  
 
If parties fail to reach an agreement on procedure, the arbitral tribunal is 
usually given the authority to determine the procedural rules in the manner it 
considers appropriate according to the circumstances of the case and the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Industrial y Comercial, 
745 F. Supp. 172, 176-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
916 Born, G. (2010) p.94; Zuberbühler/Muller/Habegger (2005) pp.351-362; Friedland (2007) 
917 See Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 8.02 p. 133-134. 
918 Rau/Sherman (1995) p.97 
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 Procedural Elements of FTA  4.5
Although the FTA rules of the major international arbitration institutions all 
provide specific sets of rules for advanced speed and economy in the 
organisation of fast-track procedures, it should not be assumed that the rules 
are all alike.919 There are, in fact, a number of differences, such as the time 
limits and procedural shortcuts applied, that can have a great deal of 
significance for a particular cases.920  
   
Compared with the SCC Expedited Rules, for example, the ICC rules are less 
specific. The SCC expedited rules provide that during the initial stages the 
parties must file statements in support of their claims. The ICC rules provide 
for the preparation and agreement of the parties on the terms of reference. 
Unlike the SCC Expedited Rules, the ICC must approve any award by the 
arbitrators, including fast-track arbitral awards.   
 
4.5.1 Commencing Fast-track Arbitration 
Valid commencement of FTA proceedings has significant legal consequences, 
the most important of which is to record the beginning of time limits. Thus, 
FTA rules,921 regular arbitration rules922 as well as some national arbitration 
laws,923 provide certain requirements that a request for arbitration needs to 
fulfil in order to qualify as a trigger for the commencement of arbitral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919 Bredow, J. (2010) 
920 Craig (1985) p.64 “These procedures are characterized not only generally by flexibility but more 
particularly by the combining of the civil law practice of exchanging documents and written arguments 
and the common law practice of permitting examination and cross‐examination of witnesses.” 
921 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 5; CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, 
Article 4; FCC FTA Rules, Article 4; KLRCA FTA Rules Article 3; SCC FTA Rules Article 4; WIPO FTA 
Rules, Articles 6-13 
922 ICC Rules, Articles 4-10; LCIA Rules, Article 1; AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, 
Article 2; SCAI Rules, Article 3; DIS SREP, Section 6; CIETAC Rules, Article 11; SIAC Arbitration Rules 
of 2012, Article 3; UNCITRAL Rules, Article 3 
923 English Arbitration Act of 1996, Section 14; Belgian Arbitration Act of 1998, Section 1683; German 
Arbitration Law of 1998, Section 1044; which, although based on the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 21, 
stipulates further specific requirements the request for arbitration must comply with. See 
Rützel/Wegen/Wilske (2005) p.131 
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proceedings.924  Though almost all arbitration rules and national laws require 
some kind of filing to initiate proceedings, only fast-track procedures are 
expedited even at this early stage. 
 
4.5.1.1 Mode of Commencement 
Depending on the specific requirements of the FTA agreement and the 
applicable laws, the arbitral proceedings may be commenced by:  
• Issuing a notice to the opposing party;925 
• Issuing a notice to the arbitral institution to submit the dispute to 
FTA;926  
• commencing the procedure for appointment of the arbitral tribunal as 
provided in the arbitration agreement by, for example, writing to the 
appointing authority to make the appointment of the arbitral tribunal; 927  
• lodging the claim with the arbitral tribunal if it is designated in the 
arbitration agreement.928 
 
4.5.1.2 Request for FTA 
An FTA commences with a filing of the demand to the respondent929 or, in the 
case of institutional arbitration, the receipt for the filing of FTA by the 
institution.930  Such filings might be referred to as a “notice,” “request” or 
“statement of claim.” The term “request for FTA” refers to the document 
intended to first initiate the fast-track proceedings in whatever form. Prior to 
that, in most cases some sort of attempt at negotiating a settlement will have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 Lefèvre (2005) 
925 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 3(2)(e) 
926 SCC Expedited Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article 4; ACICA FTA Rules, Article 5 
927 CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article 4; UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 3(4)(a) 
928 Sachs (2010) p. 1055 
929 UNCITRAL Rules, Article 3(2) 
930 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 5; FCC FTA Rules, Article 4; SCC FTA Rules, Article 4; WIPO FTA 
Rules, Articles 6-13; ICC Rules Article 4(2); LCIA Rules Article 1(2); AAA/ICDR International Arbitration 
Rules (2009), Article 2(2) 
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taken place or the plaintiff will have done the necessary research into the 
matter and will have prepared his request but it is with the submission of 
request for FTA that fast-track procedures officially commence.931  
 
Under most FTA rules,932 the request for FTA has to contain information about 
the parties, the arbitration agreement, any procedural arrangements already 
made between the parties or proposed by the claimant, the registration fee (in 
case of institutional arbitration), the relief sought, and an initial statement of 
the claim which is usually rather cursory. FCC FTA Rules only require “a 
preliminary statement of the claimant’s claim” at this stage.933 The arbitrator 
will request the claimant to submit a full statement of claim within a specified 
time.934  
 
Similarly, under the FTA Rules of the SCC, ACICA and KLRCA, only “a brief 
summary of the dispute is required” in the request for FTA but a detailed 
statement of claim can optionally be submitted in the request for arbitration 
without the need to wait for an order from the arbitral tribunal.935 A similar 
system is established by the LCIA Rules in Art. 1.1 (c) and Art. 15.2.  
 
In the 2012 version of ICC Rules the claimant may submit such other 
documents or information with the Request as it considers appropriate or as 
may contribute to the efficient resolution of the dispute.936 Despite being a 
specific set of FTA Rules, the 2004 FCC FTA rules do not permit the 
submission of a full statement of claim with the request for FTA.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
931 Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer (2006) p.72 
932 ACICA FTA Rules, Articles 5; CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009 
Article 4; FCC FTA Rules, Article 4; KLRCA FTA Rules Article 3; SCC FTA Rules, Article 4; WIPO FTA 
Rules, Articles 6-13 
933 FCC FTA Rules, Article 1 
934 FCC FTA Rules, Article 17  
935 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 5(3)(g); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 3(2)(g); SCC FTA Rules, Article 4 
936 ICC Rules, Article 4(3) 
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4.5.1.3 Answer to the Request for Arbitration 
Almost all opt-in FTA Rules impose a short deadline for the Respondent’s 
Answer after the receipt of the Request, or the commencement of arbitration, 
whichever is later.937 The WIPO FTA Rules require respondents to submit an 
answer and statement of defence within 20 days of the receipt of the arbitral 
request, instead of the usual 30 days required by Regular Arbitration. Under 
ACICA and KLRCA FTA rules an answer is required within 7 days but 28 days 
is allowed for the submission of the statement of defence. 
 
Under opt-out FTA Rules respondents have the same amount of time to file a 
response to a request for arbitration as they do under regular Arbitration 
Rules: 15 days under the AAA and the SIAC (with one seven day extension 
being possible under the AAA), 30 days under the SCAI and the HKIAC. But 
all these institutions have the power to shorten this period.938 Only CIETAC 
among opt-out FTA rules imposes a shorter time limit of 20 day to provide an 
answer compared to 45 days stipulated in its regular arbitration rules.  
Notably, however, CIETAC lacks the power to shorten any time limits in the 
rules.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937 WIPO FTA Rules, Article11; 20 days rather than 30 days in WIPO Arbitration Rules, Article 11; 
KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 4; (7 days rather than 30 days in KLRCA Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article 
4) 
938 AAA Rules, Articles E1 and R4 See also AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, Article 3 
(The ICDR International Arbitration Rules provide for 30 days for a statement of defence.) 
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Figure 16: Time Limits for Answer to the Request of Arbitration
Source: Institutional Arbitration Rules 
 
Since the time-limits imposed on the respondent tend to be rather short, 
extensions are frequently granted by arbitral institutions, particularly, if the 
answer is not expected to be a brief statement of the case. 
 
4.5.1.4 Limitation period for the commencement of FTA 
Under most institutional FTA Rules there is no time limit after a dispute has 
arisen for the valid commencement of FTA. Exceptions are the industry 
specific institutional rules of the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) 
and the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) where 
commodity disputes are often resolved within very short periods.939 
 
If no institutional rules have been agreed it may be necessary to look at the 
law of the contract as well as the law of the place of the arbitration to see 
whether there is any limitation period for commencing FTA. As expected, 
different national laws have different time limits.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939 GAFTA and FOSFA prescribe different time limits commencing arbitration in respect of disputes 
arising out of “Rye Terms”, CIF, CIFFO, C&F and FOB contracts. The most common time limit is that, 
in the case of CIF, FOB, CIFFO and C&F contracts, the arbitration must be initiated not later than one 
year after the expiry of the contract period of shipping under GAFTA Rule 125 while this is 120 days 
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4.5.1.5 Communication and Calculation of Time 
Almost all arbitration rules clearly prescribe the form and means of delivery of 
any notice or other communication referred to in the Arbitration Rules. This 
both ensures expeditious delivery of the notices and provides a record of their 
delivery. Such rules also remove a possibly problematic discrepancy between 
the date arbitration proceedings would be regarded as having commenced 
under the applicable law, and the date such proceedings would be regarded 
as having commenced under the arbitration agreement. 
 
Delivery by ordinary mail often not a permissible means of delivery under fast-
track procedures. Most FTA Rules allow notice of the initiation of the 
arbitration to be served by fax, email or any other means of electronic 
transmission.  KLRCA FTA Rules, for instance, allow the claimant to directly 
submit the Notice of Arbitration to the respondent rather than requiring the 
centre to send it.940 Arbitration is thus commenced on the date when the party 
initiating the arbitration delivers to the other party a notice in writing stating its 
intention to commence a fast-track arbitration941 Article 4 of the FCC FTA 
Rules similarly accepts a party’s notice to the other party as the date for the 
commencement of arbitration providing a copy of the notice of arbitration has 
been sent to the institution. Any expedited means of communication is 
acceptable as long as it can provide a record of the attempted delivery. The 
AAA Rules offer perhaps the most unorthodox time-saving approach by 
permitting the notice of the initiation of the arbitration to be served by 
telephone, so long as it is followed by written notice.942  
 
Although using a postal or courier service is not normally preferable in FTA, a 
notice is deemed received on the day it is "delivered," i.e., when it arrives at 
its destination.943 The reference to delivery rather than receipt is useful 
because it covers the situation in which the notice is delivered but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 2 
941 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 3(1) 
942 AAA Rules, Article E3 
943 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 4(c); ACICA FTA Rules, Article 4(1); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 2(3)  
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addressee party is not there to receive it.944 If the notice is communicated 
electronically it is deemed to have been received on the day it was 
transmitted.945 Of course, parties may seek to use this provision to their 
advantage by timing electronic transmissions to take advantage of the 
differences in time zones which are frequently a feature of international 
arbitration.946 
 
Almost all FTA Rules, like those of UNCITRAL, ICC and LCIA, stipulate that 
periods of time begin to run on the day following receipt of notice, regardless 
of whether the day of receipt or the following day is a holiday at the place 
where notice is received.947 Thus mean-spirited parties will undoubtedly be 
tempted to time their submissions to fall on holidays. All other major arbitration 
institution rules, extend any deadline that falls on an official holiday or non-
business day until the first business day which follows.948 Rules differ, 
however, as to whether the holiday must be at the residence or place of 
business of the addressee or at the place the notice is received.  Rules opt for 
the residence or place of business of the addressee.949 Opting for the place 
where the notice is received might be preferable in the event that the 
addressee does not reside where the notice is deemed effective. Because the 
dates for public holidays change significantly from one country to another 
article 4(3) of the ACICA FTA Rules states: “Unless the parties agree 
otherwise in writing any reference to time shall be deemed to be a reference 
to the time at the seat of the arbitration.”950 Like all arbitration rules, FTA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944 Another way to cover the situation is simply to provide that the notice is effective on the day it is 
received or deemed received. See, e.g., SCC FTA Rules, Article 8(3) (A notice or communication sent 
in accordance with paragraph (2) shall be deemed to have been received by the addressee on the 
date it would normally have been received given the chosen means of communication.); Also ICC 
Rules, Article 3(3)  
945 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 2(4); WIPO FTA Rules, Article 4(c); 
946 Wegen/Wilske (2004) p.205-209 
947 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 4(d); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 2(3); ACICA FTA Rules, Article 4(2) 
948 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 4(e); KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 5(2); ACICA FTA Rules, Article 4(2) 
949 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 4(3); CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009 
Article3.2 
950 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 4(2); CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, 
Article 3.1 
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Rules, provide that official holidays or non-business days occurring during the 
prescribed periods of time are included in calculating the period.951 
 
4.5.1.6 The Role of Arbitral Institutions in assisting parties 
Increasingly, parties look to their chosen arbitral institution not just to apply its 
FTA rules, but also to provide guidance and assistance in connection with the 
drafting of arbitration agreements, advice on the requirements of local 
arbitration legislation or jurisprudence and assistance in resolving difficulties 
between the parties in setting the fast-track arbitration procedure in motion.952  
In an attempt to speed up the arbitral proceedings, arbitral institutions may 
therefore get involved in administering the fast-track case long before the 
Request for Arbitration is received and arbitration officially commences.953 
 
The preliminary steps taken by the parties and the arbitral institution at the 
outset of the FTA proceedings may include some or all of the following:  
 
(a) a preliminary meeting between the parties and the arbitral institution to 
discuss the organization of the FTA proceedings;  
(b) a determination of any preliminary issues, such as cost, advance fees, 
correspondent between parties,  and expeditious appointment of 
arbitral tribunal;954 
(c) a discussion of the effectiveness of different expedited remedies, such 
as pre‐arbitral referee procedures, interim measures and ‘fast‐track’ 
arbitrations.955 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951 ICC Rules, Article 3(4); LCIA Rules, Article 4(6); AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, 
Article18 (2) 
952 Schwartz (1995) p.155 
953 SCC FTA Rules, Article 4; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 7; ACICA FTA Rules, Article 5(2); HKIAC 
Rules, Article 4(2); FCC FTA Rules, Article 4; SCAI Rules, Article 3(2) 
954 Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator (1996) ICC Bulletin, 7(1) p. 27 
955 Jenkins/Stebbings (2006) p. 167 
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 As a general rule, neither the institution’s rules nor national laws grant the 
arbitral institution any specific powers in respect of these preliminary steps.956 
However, the arbitral institutions have a duty to conduct the proceedings 
diligently and expeditiously before the arbitral tribunal, and such preliminary 
steps are a key means of preparing parties for a fast-track arbitration.957  
 
4.5.2 Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal 
The appointment of arbitrators is one of the most important considerations in 
the conduct of FTA.958 Indeed, a leading principle in any arbitration is that the 
arbitration is no better than the arbitrator.959  
 
FTA Rules generally include a number of specific provisions in relation to the 
expedited appointment of the arbitral tribunal.960 Ideally, the parties are 
expected to appoint the arbitral tribunal within short time limits after the 
request of arbitration. Where the arbitration agreement calls for the 
nomination of party-appointed arbitrators, the claimant is usually required to 
present his nomination together with the request for arbitration.961  There is 
also a time limit for parties to jointly appoint sole or third arbitrators.962 
However, if the parties fail to agree on the name of arbitrator within the 
prescribed time there will be no time extension and instead the institution will 
make the appointment. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 Overcash (2011) 
957 Webster (2003) p. 119 
958 Park (2009) p. 644 
959 Lord Hacking (2000) p. 32-37 
960 SCC FTA Rules, Article 13; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 14; ACICA FTA Rules, Article 8; HKIAC 
Rules, Article 7; FCC FTA Rules, Article 11; SCAI Rules, Article 7 
961 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 3(2)(e); ICC Rules, Article12(4); LCIA Rules, Article, 1(1) (e); UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 3(4)(c) this is optional. 
962 See supra fn. 960 
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4.5.2.1 Sole Arbitrator 
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the default position under all fast-track 
rules is that a sole arbitrator will decide the arbitration.963 This contrasts with 
the three arbitrators normally appointed under the regular arbitration rules of 
the CIETAC964, the KLRCA965, the DIS966 and the UNCITRAL.967 
 
Obviously, there are fewer scheduling problems to overcome with a single 
arbitrator.968 According to Smit the use of a sole arbitrator will avoid at least 
three types of delay inherent in using three-member tribunals:969  
 
1) delays in the constitution of a three-member tribunal, in which each 
party is allocated time to designate an arbitrator and the two party-
appointed arbitrators then have additional time to designate the chair;  
 
2) delays entailed by the need to coordinate the schedules of three 
arbitrators often located in different parts of the world;  
 
3) delays entailed by debate among the members of the tribunal as to 
procedural and substantive issues. Thus, with no other members of the 
tribunal to consult, a sole arbitrator is in a position to start drafting his or 
her award shortly after the closing of the proceedings.970  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
963 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 4; SCC FTA Rules, Article 1 and WIPO FTA Rules, Article 14; ACICA 
FTA Rules, Article 8 
964 CIETAC Rules, Article 23 (1)  
965 KLRCA Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article 7; KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 4. any arbitration  conducted  
under  these  Rules  shall  be  conducted by a sole arbitrator See ACICA Arbitration Rules of 2011, 
Article 8;  ACICA FTA Rules, Article 8 (There shall be one arbitrator.) 
966 DIS SREP, Section 3 
967 UNCITRAL Rules, Article7 
968 Cook/Garcia (2010) p.216 
969 Smit (1998) p.36 
970 Cook/Garcia (2010) p.217 
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The problem of choosing a sole arbitrator is that each party must be confident 
that the arbitrator they agree to will not favour the other.971 This may lead to a 
time consuming search for a sole arbitrator with superb credentials who 
demonstrates not only efficiency but also scrupulous fairness and level 
playing field.972 This means talking to other users of international arbitration to 
find out about their experiences and to other international arbitrators to find 
out whether a proposed sole arbitrator has a reputation for managing the 
process expeditiously and fairly.973   
 
However, it is easier to vet one arbitrator’s reputation, professional 
background, case management style and expertise than it is to engage in this 
process three times over.974 
 
The qualifications of the sole arbitrator may be designated in the FTA 
Agreement.975 For example, it may be provided that the sole arbitrator should 
be an engineer or a lawyer of “not less than five years standing” or a 
“commercial man”.976  However, this may cause delay in ascertaining whether 
or not a particular arbitrator possesses the relevant qualifications during the 
selection process. In any event, it is easier to define the type of arbitrator and 
qualifications required for a sole arbitrator compared to a three-members 
tribunal.977 
 
If parties and counsel trust a sole arbitral tribunal to be fair and able, then it 
makes sense to use him and forgo the three-member panel.978 By this simple 
act, parties not only speed their dispute but they can also reduce their 
arbitrator costs by two-thirds.979 However, according to Paulsson, this cost 
benefit may be elusive: the fees payable to the sole arbitrator in FTA may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
971 Tawil/Montashami/Sheppard (2009) 
972 Reed (2010) 
973 Lord Hacking (1998) 
974 Welser/Klausegger (2009) 
975 Werner (1998) p. 22 
976 Ibid 
977 Megens/Cubitt (2010) 
978 Carter (2011) p. 4-9 
979 Holt (2003) 
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no less than those payable in ordinary arbitration.980 Indeed, it may be that 
FTA proceedings are so intensive that the arbitrators’ ordinary work schedule 
is disrupted and this may justify fixing the sole arbitrator's fee at a higher level 
within the ad valorem range.981 Therefore, using one arbitrator rather than 
three may not always lower costs.982 
 
The role of a sole arbitrator is certainly more demanding and involves more 
responsibility on his part because he must do the work of the chairperson and 
the co-arbitrators of a three-members tribunal.983 One of his main tasks is to 
carefully plan the FTA proceedings in order to secure the speed and economy 
of the process.984 As a general rule, he needs to possess experience, 
preferably in the form of having previously served as a sole arbitrator or 
chairman of arbitral tribunals. The importance of being able to smoothly 
handle and administer hearings, the exchange of written submissions 
between the parties and observing the obedience of shorter deadlines should 
not be underestimated. 985 
 
But should the court-appointed three-member arbitral tribunal be precluded in 
all cases, even in circumstances where a sole arbitrator might be 
inappropriate? The question arose in Villa Denizcilik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v. 
Longen SA.986 The respondent argued that the nature and complexity of the 
dispute warranted a three-member tribunal and relied on the overriding 
principle, section 1 of the Act, that arbitration should be fair and free of 
unnecessary delay or expense.   
 
Mance J., held that only a sole arbitrator could be appointed. Moreover, if it 
had jurisdiction to decide the number of arbitrators, the court considered itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
980 Paulsson (1994) p. 716 n.6. 
981 Ibid 
982 Expedited Arbitration Rules: Stockholm and WIPO, 13 Arb Int’l Vol. 13(2) (1997) pp. 193 
983 Herrmann (2001) p. 71-79 
984 Rivkin (2008) p. 380 
985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 10(2); Austrian Arbitration Act of 2006, Art 586(1); German 
Arbitration Act of 1998, Article1034(1) 
986 (“The Villa ”) [1998 ] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 195.[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 159 p. 162 
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bound by the parties' “implicit provision”987 of a sole arbitrator which arose 
from the default provisions of the English Arbitration Act.988  
 
In similar vein, the English Court of Appeal recently decided, obiter dicta, that 
the failure of parties to specify the number of arbitrators in an arbitration 
agreement will lead to the appointment of a sole arbitrator, even if the 
arbitration agreement contemplates more than one arbitrator.989   
 
4.5.2.2 Three Members Tribunal 
In FTA, the default rule is to appoint a sole arbitrator. However, it is not 
unusual in international commercial arbitrations for the fast-track disputes to 
be referred to a three-members arbitral tribunal by the parties’ agreement.990 
Where the arbitral tribunal consists of three arbitrators, each of the parties will 
usually have the right to nominate one arbitrator, leaving the third arbitrator to 
be chosen in some other manner.991 The 2012 SIA/WC Survey reported that a 
significant majority of respondents (76%) prefer selection of the two co-










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
987 Ibid p.167 
988 English Arbitration Act of 1996 Sections 15 and 18 
989 Itochu Corp v Johann MK Blumenthal GmbH & Co KG. [2012] EWCA Civ 996. Burnton LJ; Gross 
LJ; Maurice Kay LJ. 24 July 2012 
990 Bridgeman (2010) p. 631 
991 SIA/WC Survey (2012) p. 2 
992 Ibid 
  205 
Figure 17: By what method do you favour selection of two co-arbitrators in a three-
member arbitral tribunal
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey p.5 
 
Allowing each party to nominate one of the arbitrators in a three-member 
panel gives the parties confidence in the arbitral tribunal.993  Each party will 
have at least one person of choice to listen to their case. This may be 
important in an international arbitration where there may be differences of 
language, tradition and culture between the parties and, indeed, between the 
members of the arbitral tribunal themselves.994 An arbitrator nominated by a 
party may be perceived as being in a position to help in ensuring that his 
appointer’s case is better understood by the arbitral tribunal.995 Choosing a 
sole arbitrator may increase speed but parties lose the important contribution 
of co-arbitrators in presenting their side of the argument.996  
 
Moreover, having a panel of three arbitrators brings more experience, 
judgment and skill.997 Having three heads may be considered better than one, 
and prevents a “rogue” arbitrator from running off in the wrong direction.998 A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
993 Secomb/Krause/Nacimiento/Ray/Turrini/Goldberg (2011) 
994 Paulsson (2010) 
995 Landau (2007) pp. 282-297 
996 Webster (2003) p. 132 
997 Swanton (2007) 
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panel also may do a better job of assessing credibility, which can be 
discussed during deliberations. 
 
A three-member tribunal also helps to assuage the doubt regarding the legal 
security of fast-track procedures999 and the ultimate award is more likely to be 
acceptable to the parties. As Carter observes: 
 
“While some think three-arbitrator tribunals are more likely to compromise 
than sole arbitrators, in our view a panel of active arbitrators is, in general and 
all other things being equal, more likely to get it right than a single arbitrator - 
three minds are better than one. Given the virtual absence of appeals on the 
merits, this is an important safeguard.”1000 
 
Since there are many advantages of selecting a three-member arbitral 
tribunal, FTA rules do not entirely eliminate this possibility.1001 There is no 
prohibition against appointing a three-member arbitral tribunal in FTA if this is 
stated in the arbitration agreement.1002 Thus, Article 4(3) of the KLRCA FTA 
Rules is devoted to matters if the Arbitral Tribunal is to consist of three 
arbitrators. Similarly, according to the DIS SREP Rules, parties may agree to 
a three-member arbitral tribunal prior to the filing of the statement of claim.1003 
If a three-member arbitral tribunal is appointed it is important to keep any 
delays in constituting the tribunal to a minimum. This might be achieved by 
maintaining a deadline for the parties to appoint the co-arbitrators and also a 
deadline for selection of on the chairman. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
999 Paulsson (1994) pp. 715-16 (noting the "marginal reduction in legal security for greater speed at 
lower costs" associated with expedited arbitration by a sole arbitrator). 
1000 Carter (2011) p. 9 
1001 The CCIG Expedited Procedure of 1991 and IAMA Fast-track Arbitration Rules of 2007 do not 
require a sole arbitrator as a default rule. See also Downie (1991) pp. 482-84 (recommending the use 
of three arbitrators, unless the parties agree otherwise, to conduct fast-track arbitration). Furthermore, 
ICC FTA Cases No 7385 and 7402 was conducted by a tribunal of three arbitrators. See Smit (1991) p. 
138 
1002 See i.e. restrictive language used in the FCC FTA Rules, Article 11 “If the parties have agreed on 
arbitration under these rules, the dispute shall be resolved by one arbitrator appointed by the Arbitration 
Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce.” 
1003 DIS SREP, Art 3(1)(parties may decide on three arbitrators rather than a sole arbitrator prior to the 
filling of the statement of claim) 
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4.5.2.3 Method of Appointing the Tribunal 
The 2012 SIA/WC survey shows that the majority of respondents prefer the 
selection of the sole arbitrator or the chair in a three-member tribunal to be by 
agreement of the parties.1004 The next favoured method is appointment by an 
arbitral institution or appointing authority. A few respondents prefer selection 
by the parties from an exclusive list of arbitrators which is a method often 
used by the AAA.1005 
 
Figure 18: Preferred method for selecting a sole arbitrator or the chair in a three-
member tribunal
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey p.6 
 
4.5.2.3.1 Appointment of the tribunal by the parties  
 
The process of constituting the arbitral tribunal may take a considerable 
amount of time in regular arbitral proceedings, especially if the parties cannot 
agree on the number of arbitrators and the length of time required for their 
appointment.1006 To increase speed, the parties often specify in the FTA 
agreement the number of arbitrators to be used and the method for their 
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appointment.1007 In the absence of such a provision, most FTA rules prescribe 
a specific time period for parties to name the sole arbitrator or the chair in a 
three-member arbitral tribunal.1008  
 
However, there is no fixed rule or practice as to how the parties should 
proceed to reach such an agreement expeditiously without the need for 
institutions to step in after shortened time limits.1009  It is not uncommon for 
the parties to consult each other and perhaps for each party to exchange lists 
of a few possible arbitrators with a description of the experience and 
qualifications of each of them.1010  It sometimes happens that the same 
person is on both lists. The persons so proposed and ultimately the person so 
chosen must consent to the appointment.1011 A written confirmation of that 
person’s consent should be obtained. In some jurisdictions, it is a statutory 
requirement that the acceptance of the appointment should be in writing.1012 
 
Since the parties will be anxious to have a prompt award, a very busy 
arbitrator should not be selected.1013 Even if the arbitrator is not a “celebrity” 
arbitrator with a full calendar, the parties should expect delays because of the 
arbitrator's schedule.1014 Thus, parties should be ready to nominate their 
arbitrator within a few days but it might be that the most suitable candidate for 
a sole arbitrator position is not available until 3 months later. Should parties 
wait for him or try a new face? An arbitration clause that urges the arbitral 
tribunal to issue the award “within three months after appointment of the 
chairman” or “within six months from the constitution of the arbitral tribunal” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1007 Germany 106. Oberlandesgericht Court of Appeal, Celle, 14 December 2006, no. 8 Sch 14/05 in 
Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2007 - Volume XXXII, Volume XXXII 
(Kluwer Law International 2007) pp. 379 – 381 (The claimant has supplied a fax from its insurer, dated 
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1008 See supra p. 199 fn. 960 
1009 Lord Hacking (2000) p. 36 
1010 Ibid 
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1012 Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, Art 1029(1). 
1013 Ulmer (2010) p. 230 
1014 Waincymer (2010) p. 25 
  209 
certainly does not have its full intended effect if the appointment of the 
chairman or the constitution of the arbitral tribunal takes one year or more.1015  
 
Therefore, selection of the arbitrators in the “pre-arbitral phase” should be duly 
considered.1016 Counsel should always ask what sort of arbitrator would suit 
the client's case. Often the best choice is a legal professional who also has 
expertise in the subject matter of the dispute. Such a person should be able to 
quickly understand any difficult legal and factual issues as well as ensuring 
fast-track procedures.1017  
 
4.5.2.3.2 Appointment of the tribunal by an arbitral 
institution or an appointing authority  
 
Institutions can help the parties by providing a list of qualified arbitrators.1018 In 
order to ensure that arbitrators on their panel are competent, many institutions 
seek feedback from the parties that use them.1019 Institutions will also provide 
arbitrator training.1020 The AAA has a training requirement for arbitrator 
candidates that wish to remain on its panel.  
 
In order to speed up FTA, arbitral institutions, like the SCC, the KLRCA and 
the ACICA, impose deadlines for the appointment of a sole arbitrator.1021 
KLRCA Fast-track Rules stipulate a time limit of 7 days from the 
commencement of the arbitration in which parties must appoint a sole 
arbitrator.1022 If they fail, the director appoints the sole arbitrator, with the 
notice of either party, within 14 days. Under WIPO FTA Rules the time limit for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1015 Sachs (2006) p. 107 
1016 Sachs (2010) p. 1055 
1017 Berger (2009) p.218 
1018 Lord Hacking (2000) p. 37 
1019 Stipanowich & College of Commercial Arbitrators (2010) 
1020 Ibid 
1021  ACICA FTA Rules, Article 8.2 (Within 14 days from the commencement of the arbitration) FCC 
FTA Rules, Article 11 
1022 2012 KLRCA Fast-track Rules Article 4 
  210 
parties to appoint a sole arbitrator is 15 days and under SCC FTA Rules 10 
days.1023  
 
However, if one of the parties is unwilling to agree on the appointment of the 
arbitrators, or it is otherwise certain that the parties will not be able to agree, it 
is unclear whether a party may request the arbitral institution to appoint the 
arbitrators forthwith, without waiting for the time limit to expire.1024 It would 
appear preferable, particularly in an FTA context, not to require that the time 
period expire before the institution will appoint an arbitrator.1025  To reduce 
such confusion ACICA Fast-track Rules stipulate a time limit of 14 days from 
the commencement of the arbitration for the institutional appointment.1026 
Within this time-limit the institution consults parties for their mutual 
appointment otherwise it makes the appointment.1027 FCC FTA Rules also 
direct the institution to make the appointment as soon as possible after the 
commencement of arbitration without giving parties a specific time limit for 
their own appointment.1028 
 
Under the CPR Expedited Rules, parties may agree to a time limit for the 
appointment of a sole arbitrator in the arbitration clause. If they are unable to 
come to an agreement within that time the CPR appoints the sole arbitrator; if 
no time limit is included in the arbitration clause, the CPR establishes a time 
period for parties to make an appointment. On the request of any party, the 
CPR shall appoint the sole arbitrator and otherwise make an appointment 
upon the expiry of the time limit.1029 
 
Under CIETAC rules, there is no separate fast-track arbitrator appointment 
mechanism as the task is adequately covered by the general provisions. 
Parties are allowed 15 days from the date of the Respondent’s receipt of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1023 SCC FTA Rules, Article 13; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 14 
1024 Smit (1998) p. 32 
1025 Note on Expedited ICC Arbitration Procedure of 2002 
1026 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 8 
1027 Magnusson (2001) 
1028 FCC FTA Rules, Article 11 
1029 CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article 6 
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Notice of Arbitration to jointly nominate the sole arbitrator, or entrust the 
Chairman of CIETAC to make an appointment from the list of arbitrators.1030 
Under these rules there is no time limit for the Chairman of CIETAC to appoint 
the sole arbitrator.1031 It is presumed that the chairman will act expeditiously 
once parties fail to appoint their arbitrators.  
 
Most opt-out FTA Rules refer to their general provisions for the formation of 
the arbitral tribunal but this is not as expeditious as using specific FTA rules. 
Under the HKIAC parties are given 30 days to jointly appoint the sole 
arbitrator but article 38(2)(1) states that the HKIAC Secretariat “may shorten 
the time limits for the appointment of arbitrators.”1032 Similarly, the SIAC 
Expedited Rules in Article 5 empowers the Register to shorten any time limits 
under its rules. Normally, if the parties are unable to agree the nomination 
within 21 days after the receipt of the Notice of Arbitration the Chairman will 
appoint a sole arbitrator as soon as practicable.1033  
 
While many arbitral institutions use their own discretion to quickly appoint 
arbitrators, some arbitral institutions provide parties with a short list from 
which they can cross out the arbitrators until one is left.1034 Under the AAA, for 
instance, when FTA is initiated the institution prepares a list of five arbitrators 
from its commercial arbitrator list. Parties may agree to an arbitrator from this 
list or, if they cannot agree, strike out two names and submit their shortened 
lists to the AAA, which will make the final selection.1035   
 
However, in international commercial cases it is still increasingly common for 
the selection and appointment of arbitrators to take four months or more to 
complete.1036  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1030 CIETAC Rules, Article 25 
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1034 Stipanowich/Kaskell (2001) p. 89 
1035 AAA Rules E-5 
1036 Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer (2006) p.108 
  212 
Where the parties have adopted UNCITRAL Rules, Articles 6 and 7 provide 
that the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague may designate an authority to appoint the arbitrator if no appointing 
authority has been agreed upon by the parties but the process may takes up 
to 90 days to conclude.  
 
Similarly, ICC Rules provide that if parties fail to nominate a sole arbitrator 
within 30 days from the date on which the Claimant’s Request for Arbitration 
was received by the other party, the ICC Court will appoint the sole arbitrator. 
 
The ICC Court does not make the selection itself but delegates this task to a 
national ICC committee.1037 The arbitrator so selected must then be confirmed 
by the ICC Court. This method has been criticized for its inherent delays. 
Sources of delay in this process can be the parties who ask for extensions for 
the nominations of a party-appointed arbitrator,1038 the national committees 
which may exceed the time-limit set by the ICC, and the ICC Court itself which 
may reject the national committee's proposal.1039 The average time for the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal is estimated at 3-6 months but can on 
occasions be significantly longer.1040 One of the attorneys interviewed 
recounted an ICC arbitration where the constitution of the tribunal took over a 
year.  
 
In order to speed things up, Art. 32 of 1998 ICC Rules authorizes the parties 
to agree to shorten the various time limits set out in the Rules. However, since 
Art. 32 requires parties to modify the time limits in the arbitration clause before 
the dispute has arisen, in practice not much acceleration has been achieved 
under this rule as parties rarely change the model ICC Arbitration clause.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1037 ICC Rules, Article 9(3) 
1038 Ulmer (1991) pp. 41-42  
1039 Where the ICC Court rejects the proposal or where the national committee fails to honor the time 
limit, the ICC Rules provide that the ICC Court may repeat the request or solicit the proposal of another 
national committee, ICC Rules, Article 9(3) 
1040 Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer (2006) p.73 
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The 2012 ICC Rules have recently resolved the problem by giving the ICC 
Court the right to make direct appointments in the following cases: 
• one or more of the parties is a state or state entity;  
• the Court considers that it would be appropriate to appoint an arbitrator 
from a country or territory where there is no National Committee or 
Group;  
• the president of the Court certifies to the Court that circumstances exist 
which, in the president’s opinion, make a direct appointment necessary 
and appropriate for arbitrations.1041  
 
The latter bullet appears to include fast-track arbitrations in consideration with 
article 38 of the 2012 ICC Rules which permits parties “to shorten the various 
time limits” set out under the general arbitration rules.1042 
 
4.5.2.3.3 By the Court 
 
If the agreed mechanism for appointing an arbitrator breaks down, as for 
example, if the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator or have not 
agreed to the appointment being made by an appointing authority, reliance 
may have to be placed on the on the lex arbitri and application made to the 
relevant national court for that court to make the appointment.1043 However, 
depending on the jurisdiction where the application is made, this procedure 
can entail significant delays.1044 
 
Where the place of arbitration has been specified in the arbitration agreement, 
the national courts of that place should have jurisdiction.1045 However, if the 
place of arbitration has not been specified in the arbitration agreement or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041 ICC Rules, Article 13(4) 
1042 ICC Rules, Article 38  
1043 UNCITRAL Model Law Article 11; German Arbitration Law of 1998, Article 1035 (3); Austrian 
Arbitration Act of 2006, Article 587; Australian International Arbitration Act of 2011, Section 16; English 
Arbitration Act of 1996, Section 16 
1044 Okekeifere (1998) pp. 129-144 
1045 See supra pp.179-190 section 4.4.7. 
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otherwise agreed upon by the parties, and the parties have not expressly 
agreed on which country’s laws should govern the arbitration, problems could 
arise.1046 There could be difficulty in identifying the national court that has, or 
is willing to assume, jurisdiction over the making of the appointment.1047 If, in 
those circumstances, there is no court with jurisdiction to make the 
appointment, the arbitration agreement may be regarded as inoperable.1048 
 
The national court having prima facie jurisdiction must also have the powers 
under its national laws to make the appointment.1049 In jurisdictions with 
developed arbitration laws, this should not pose a problem. For example, in 
the countries that have adopted the Model Law as part of their national laws, 
the national courts (or some other competent authority designated by that 
country’s laws) would be empowered to make the appointment.1050  
 
4.5.2.4 Challenging the appointment of Arbitrators 
Once the appointment process has been completed, the parties are expected 
to be in the hands of the arbitrator. However, an arbitrator may sometimes be 
challenged on a number of different grounds:  
• where circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence;1051 
• he does not possess the qualifications required of him as required by 
the arbitration agreement;1052  
• he is physically or mentally incapable of conducting the 
proceedings;1053  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046 Ibid 
1047 Shashoua v. Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm) 
1048 Nomihold Securities Inc v. Mobile Telesystems Finance SA [2012] EWHC 130 (Comm). (2012) 
1049 Itochu Corporation v. Johann M K Blumenthal GmbH & Co KG and anor [2012] EWCA Civ 996 
1050 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 11 to be read in conjunction with Article 6 
1051 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 9; SCC FTA Rules, Article 14 
1052 SCC FTA Rules, Article 15; SCAI Rules, Article 10 
1053 Welser/Klausegger (2009) p. 270; FCC FTA Rules, Article 12 
  215 
• he has refused or failed to properly conduct the proceedings or to use 
all reasonable dispatch in conducting the proceedings or making an 
award.1054 
 
The bases on which a challenge may be mounted may lie in the arbitration 
agreement1055 or in the in the laws governing the arbitration.1056 For example, 
Section 24 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 contains a number of 
comprehensive grounds, including:  
 
“…(d) that he has refused or failed - (i) properly to conduct the proceedings, 
or (ii) to use all reasonable dispatch in conducting the proceedings or making 
an award, and that substantial injustice has been or will be caused to the 
applicant.”1057 
 
4.5.2.5 The procedure for Challenge  
The procedure for challenge would usually be set out either in the arbitration 
rules that the parties have agreed on or in the law of the place of the 
arbitration.1058 
 
Parties in FTA are generally limited in the time during which they can object to 
a proposed arbitrator. Under the most FTA Rules, a challenge must be 
notified to the other party and to the members of the arbitral tribunal, including 
the challenged arbitrator within a short time limit.1059 KLRCA FTA Rules direct 
parties to raise any challenge within seven days (rather than the 15 days 
specified in the KLRCA Regular arbitration rules)1060 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1054 Okekeifere (1998) pp. 129-144 
1055 UNCITRAL Model Law, Articles 12 and 14 
1056 UNCITRAL Rules, Article 10 
1057 English Arbitration Act of 1996, Article 24 
1058 Lord Hacking (2006) p. 26-30 
1059 SCC FTA Rules, Article 15; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 19; ACICA FTA Rules, Article 9; HKIAC 
Rules, Article 11; FCC FTA Rules, Article 14; SCAI Rules, Articles 9-11 
1060 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 15 
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Similarly, Article 10 of the ACICA FTA Rules states that a party who intends to 
challenge the Arbitrator shall send notice of its challenge within 7 days after 
being notified of his or her appointment or within 7 days after becoming aware 
of the circumstances rather than 15 days under Article 14 of its regular 
arbitration rules. 
 
Under SCC Expedited Rules the time limit is the same as under regular 
arbitration rules, both stating that a challenge to the appointment of an 
arbitrator must be made immediately after the alleged disqualifying 
circumstances have become known to the party, and in any event no later 
than 15 days thereafter.1061  
 
Under the opt-out FTA rules of the SIAC and the HKIAC a challenge to the 
appointment of an arbitrator must be made immediately after the alleged 
disqualifying circumstances have become known to the party, and in any 
event no later than 14 days or 15 days respectively. However, these 
institutions’ FTA rules empower them to shorten those limits. 1062 
 
If the opposing party does not agree to the challenge and the challenged 
arbitrator does not withdraw, a decision will then be made on the challenge by 
the appointing authority.1063 FTA Rules lay out an expedited mechanism for 
the replacement of sole arbitrators and the procedure to determine whether 
any hearings will have to be repeated after the replacement of the 
arbitrator.1064 With these safeguards in place, little can be done to delay the 
fast-track process by manipulating the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1061 SCC FTA Rules, Article 15; WIPO Rules, Article 25; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 20; KLRCA 
Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article13; KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 15; ACICA Arbitration Rules of 2011, 
Article 14; ACICA FTA Rules, Article10; AAA Rules, Articles R11-17 and E4(c) 
1062 SIAC Rules, Articles 11 and 12; HKIAC Rules, Article 11 
1063 Panjabi (1995) p. 173 
1064 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 10; SCC FTA Rules, Article 15 
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4.5.2.6 Waiver 
If a party makes a challenge late, that is, after a prescribed time limit has 
expired, his right to object may be regarded as waived so that he may not be 
able to subsequently challenge the award.1065  
 
Article 26 of the ACICA FTA Rules states: 
 
 “A party that knows that any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules 
has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without 
promptly stating its objection to such non-compliance, shall be deemed to 
have waived its right to object.”1066 
4.5.3 Organising the Fast-track Proceedings 
It is always useful in an international arbitration to convene a preliminary 
hearing or case management conference once the arbitral tribunal has been 
constituted.1067  At that stage, control of the arbitral procedure passes, in 
practical terms, from the parties to the tribunal. If the arbitrator wants to 
ensure that the parties get a swift and cost-effective resolution of their dispute, 
he should quickly get involved with case management tasks to make sure that 
the agreed fast-track procedures are implemented and, where appropriate, to 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1065 Carbonneau (1996) p.1945 
1066 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 26 See also SCC FTA Rules, Article 31; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 52; 
FCC FTA Rules, Article 25; KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 15; SCAI Rules, Article 30 
1067 Böckstiegel (2005) p. 115 
1068 Thomson/Finn (2005) p.74 
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4.5.3.1 Preliminary meetings 
It is desirable to have a preliminary meeting between the parties after the 
commencement of arbitration but before the case management 
conference.1069 This provides a useful opportunity for representatives of the 
parties to meet each other before actually meeting the arbitral tribunal. In 
institutional FTA, the arbitral institution will direct parties to hold such a 
meeting in an effort to find a common ground acceptable for both parties.1070 
In ad-hoc FTA, such meetings help parties to reach a position on various 
matters, including the question of the amount of the arbitrators’ fees and 
expenses and an agreed time-table for certain interlocutory steps, such as the 
exchange of pleadings and submissions.1071 
 
4.5.3.2 The Case Management Conference (Preliminary 
Hearing) 
The main opportunity for an arbitrator to employ case management is at the 
case management conference (also known as the preliminary hearing).1072 
This is a particularly important procedural step if the parties and their 
representatives come from different cultural and legal backgrounds.1073 
 
The main purpose of the case management conference is to provide an 
opportunity for all the participants to get to know each other, to exchange 
preliminary views and to work towards a consensus on the exact fast-track 
procedure to be followed such as time limits and procedural constraints.1074  
 
The case management conference serves two additional functions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1069 Khanna (2010) p. 238 
1070 SCC FTA Rules, Article 6; SCAI Rules, Article 2(3) 
1071 Welser/Berti (2010) p. 79  
1072 Blankenship (2010) p. 119 
1073 Tiessen (2006) 
1074 Ball (1998) p. 33 
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First, it is an opportunity for the arbitrator to begin to impose his authority on 
the fast-track proceedings and the parties.1075 Prior to his appointment, the 
parties are in control. After his appointment, the arbitrator gradually assumes 
greater control relative to the parties, until, by the conclusion of the hearing, 
he is in a position to impose a solution when he delivers an enforceable 
award.1076 Second, it enables the arbitrator and the parties or their 
representatives to review the fast-track procedure provided for in the FTA 
agreement, and to seek means of adapting it to meet the needs of the 
particular dispute.1077 The arbitrator's suggestions regarding fast-track 
procedure have a greater chance of being accepted if he projects himself at 
the case management conference in such a way that he is able to gain the 
confidence of the parties.1078 
 
For both these purposes, it is of crucial importance that the case management 
conference should be attended by both parties and not merely by their legal 
representatives.1079 In this way, the experienced arbitrator is able to assess 
the present state of the relationship between the parties and the effect it could 
have on the conduct of the fast-track proceedings.1080 More importantly, it will 
assist the arbitrator to take control of the fast-track procedure to be used and 
mitigate the danger of it being hijacked by parties' legal representatives, who 
may have little understanding of the differences between fast-track arbitration 
and regular arbitration.1081  
  
However, if for reasons of convenience or expedition, it is not practical to 
convene a meeting for the various parties to meet in person, a case 
management conference can be conducted by video or telephone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1075 Böckstiegel (2005) p. 125 
1076 Ibid 
1077 Khanna (2010) p. 237-240 
1078 See i.e. Laurent Levy establishing procedural rules together with parties in ICC Arbitration and 
submitting these procedural rules as part of the Terms of Reference. 
1079 (Interview) Hunter, Martin (2010) 
1080 Ibid 
1081 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 6 
  220 
conference.1082 It is unusual for a preliminary hearing to extend beyond a day, 
and it may well be completed within a shorter period.1083 It is a useful way for 
the tribunal to impose its authority on the parties, face to face in some cases, 
and for all issues to be discussed fully and ironed out, often more satisfactorily 
than by way of written communication alone.1084  
 
The following topics are usually discussed in the case management 
conference:1085 further written statements or submissions; disclosure issues 
between the parties; disclosure from third parties; expert evidence; witnesses 
of fact; fixing procedural dates; communications between the parties and 
between the parties and the tribunal; inter-lawyer correspondence; further 
procedural hearings; oral hearings; the venue for the hearing; documentation 
for the hearing; pre-hearing written material; directions for the main hearing; 
post-hearing briefs and closing submissions; a timetable; and ensuring 
compliance with fast-track procedures.1086 
 
However, not all of these issues will be discussed in every dispute; the 
specific matters that need to be determined at the case management 
conference depend partly on the law governing the arbitration and partly on 
whether the parties have already subjected the arbitration to a set of ad hoc or 
institutional rules.1087  If the arbitration is subject to the FTA rules of one of the 
major international arbitration institutions, it will not be necessary, for example, 
for the parties to deal directly with the arbitrators in determining the place and 
the language of the proceedings or the form, length, and time limits for the 
written submissions that will be presented before the main oral hearing.1088 
The case management will usually be the moment to raise objections against 
the fast-track procedures and timetable or to discuss challenges against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1082 Schultz (2006) 
1083 Böckstiegel (2005) 
1084 Chambers (2009) p.52 
1085 Khanna (2010) p. 237-240 
1086 Heilbron (2008) Chapter 10 
1087 Cheung (2008) p.91-104 
1088 Zykin (2010) 
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arbitrators or to determine whether to hold a hearing or conduct documents 
only FTA.1089 
 
Surprisingly, not many institutional FTA rules impose an obligation to hold a 
case management meeting. ACICA FTA Rules even prohibit the possibility of 
any hearing unless exceptional circumstance exists or the parties agree 
otherwise.1090 Article 23 of the SCC FTA Rules, for instance, direct the 
Arbitrator, after the referral of the case to him, to promptly establish a 
timetable for the conduct of the arbitration and to send a copy of the timetable 
to the parties and to the Secretariat.1091 This provision provides the possibility 
of holding a case-management conference in SCC FTA but it does not say it 
so clearly.  
 
By contrast, Article 10 of the KLRCA FTA Rules state that, where the 
arbitration is not a documents-only arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
convene a meeting to be attended by all parties  (Case Management Meeting) 
no later than eight (8) weeks from the date of commencement of the 
arbitration.1092 Similarly, in WIPO FTA, the Tribunal may, following the 
submission of the Statement of Defence, conduct a preparatory conference 
with the parties for the purpose of organizing and scheduling the subsequent 
proceedings.1093 
 
Case management conferences may be vital because by the time the dispute 
arises tactical considerations or parties’ deteriorating relationship may make it 
extremely difficult to agree on a swift and cost-effective procedure on the fast-
track procedural matters.1094  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1089 Megens/Cubitt (2010) 
1090 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 13(2) 
1091 SCC FTA Rules, Article 23 
1092 KLRCA Fast-track Rules, Article 10 
1093 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 41 
1094 Friedland (2011) 
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At the case-management conference, the arbitrator should, after consultation 
with the parties, draw up a realistic time-table for the steps leading up to the 
hearing and determine the date of the hearing and its likely duration. A party 
responsible for a postponement could incur a substantial liability for wasted 
costs.1095  
 
4.5.3.3 Issuance of Procedural Direction and Timetable 
The tribunal should, if there is no case management conference, as soon as 
practicable after the referral of the case to the Arbitrator, issue written 
directions on the matters with which the parties must comply, in order for the 
FTA to progress swiftly to an award.1096  
 
Where the parties have not been able to agree on certain procedural matters 
such as the length of time required for each procedural steps, the tribunal will 
have to take control and issue appropriate directions or orders.1097 Depending 
on the nature and subject matter of the dispute and its complexity, the 
directions are likely to include some or all of the matters referred to in the 
institutional FTA Rules.1098  
 
The degree of detail in which the directions are given varies from tribunal to 
tribunal.1099 Tribunals take account of costs and delay and issues of relevance 
and proportionality when making directions.1100 The tribunal and the parties 
will also want to consider the extent to which, if at all, the IBA Rules of 
Evidence or the CIArb Protocol should be incorporated in relation to:1101 
disclosure; party-appointed experts; tribunal-appointed experts; on-site 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1095 Needham (1989) pp. 71-72. 
1096 Chambers (2009) p. 54 
1097 Appel (2006) p.83 
1098 Ibid 
1099 Böckstiegel (2005) 
1100 ICC Techniques (2007) stating that 82% of the costs of an institution-managed arbitration was 
represented by lawyers’ fees. 
1101 Park (2006) p. 141-154 
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inspections; the taking of samples and analyses; evidentiary hearings; 
admissibility; and assessment of evidence.  
 
Decisions on these matters set the parameters for the entire fast-track 
procedure and therefore have to be resolved before entering into a discussion 
of the merits.1102 The tribunal has to decide whether it wants to dispose of 
preliminary directions through an order or an interim award.1103 This decision 
is important because in ICC arbitration any award will have to be confirmed by 
the ICC Court which can lead to additional delays, and because such an 
award might be attacked in the courts having jurisdiction over the 
arbitration.1104 
 
Another matter is the ruling on procedural constraints.1105 FTA rules give the 
tribunal the authority to determine procedural shortcuts or to order procedural 
limitations by selecting from one of the listed methods. For example, the 
tribunal may require that all communications be e-mailed rather than delivered 
by expedited postal service in order to accommodate an expedited arbitral 
schedule.1106  
 
The tribunal may also limit the admissible evidence to proofs relating to facts 
deemed relevant by the tribunal on the basis of a preliminary evaluation of the 
merits.1107  
 
Finally, an important issue for giving procedural directions are the requests by 
parties asking for the production of documents by the other side.1108 Again, 
depending on the background of the participants, the tribunal might establish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102 Rau/Sherman (1995) p. 104 
1103 Gabriel/Raymond (2005) p. 453 
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Lloyd's Rep. 348 
1105 Welser/Klausegger (2009) p. 260 
1106 KLRCA Fast-track Rules (2012), Article 6(5); ACICA FTA Rules, Article 13(1); SCC FTA Rules 
Articles 19(1) and 19(2) See also AAA/ICDR International Arbitration Rules of 2009, Article 18(1); LCIA 
Rules, Articles 4(5) and 4(7) 
1107 Vasani/Tallent (2006) p.255 
1108 Bedard (2009) 
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a schedule for the type of limited document disclosure frequently encountered 
in international commercial arbitration.1109 In a really complex dispute, 
however it may not be practical to take final decisions on matters like 
submission of evidence, documents disclosure, witness testimony and 
meetings between experts at the case management conference.1110 The 
arbitrator could therefore expressly reserve these matters for further 
consideration at a subsequent meeting.1111 
 
The time when a tribunal gives directions also varies.1112 Some tribunals 
prefer to wait until after the first round of written statements has been 
exchanged so that such directions can be made in the light of all the issues: 
others prefer to make directions at an earlier stage.1113 If the arbitration is 
under the ICC Rules then a provisional timetable will follow the Terms of 
Reference.1114 Some of these directions may be revisited and updated, or 
deferred altogether, until nearer the main hearing.  
 
Depending on the FTA, the tribunal will give directions only up to a certain 
point in time, such as after exchange of experts’ reports, or up to and 
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1114 Derains/Schwartz (2005); ICC Rules, Article 23 
1115 Bredow (2010) 
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4.5.4 Written Submissions 
Usually the first step that would be taken once the arbitral tribunal has been 
appointed and the fast-track procedure established would be an exchange 
between the parties of some informal written submissions.1116 The first of 
these, prepared by the attorneys, are summaries of the evidence (rather than 
witness statements), which can be supplemented by “witness panels,” if 
needed.1117 The second is to have each side’s experts submit their view of the 
case.1118 Under most FTA Rules, these types of informal submissions may 
proceed before the tribunal has been established, through the administrative 
support of the arbitral institution.1119 Of course, this is only practicable where 
both parties are fully aware of the issues in dispute and eager to present their 
case through institutional support and without the tribunal’s direction.1120 In 
such a case the arbitrator can evaluate their respective contentions later by 
inspecting the written submissions.1121  
 
Written submissions are normally exchanged sequentially, so that the 
claimant sets out its position first and the respondent then answers.1122 Almost 
all FTA Rules provide that after the parties have delivered their initial request 
for arbitration and answer, written pleadings consisting of a “Statement of 
Case”, “Statement of Defence”, and “Statement of Reply” and further 
equivalent written pleadings in the event of a counterclaim follow each other 
within certain time limits.1123 Thus, if there is a counterclaim, the respondent 
should submit his counterclaim at the same time as his answer to the 
claimant’s claim and his document is often known as an “answer and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1116 Macpherson/Smith/Mitchell (2008) p. 30 
1117 Schifferl (2011) 
1118 Ibid 
1119 Broichmann/Ernemann (2010) 
1120 Glaholt (2008) 
1121 Borris (2008) p. 294 
1122 Redfern/Hunter(2004) p.292 ¶6-55 
1123 KLRCA Fast-track Rules (2012), Articles 6-8; ACICA FTA Rules, Articles 17-22; SCC FTA Rules 
Articles 23-24; FCC FTA Rules, Article 16; SCAI Rules, Article 42; VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, 
Article 45 
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counterclaim”, or “defence and counterclaim”.1124 The claimant then submits 
his defence to the respondent’s counterclaim; he may also be allowed to 
submit a reply or rejoinder to the respondent’s answer. It appears from these 
FTA Rules that subject to any directions to the contrary from the arbitral 
tribunal the written statements are intended to be the only written submissions 
in the arbitration, and are to be accompanied by copies of all essential 
documents on which the party concerned relies.1125 Only in exceptional 
circumstances will the arbitral tribunal order parties to submit additional written 
pleadings and documents under FTA proceedings.1126 
 
Article 19 of the SCC FTA Rules, for instance, provides a framework for 
written submissions and a time-limit within which such documents shall be 
submitted.1127  Thus, the claimant can submit a statement of claim which 
should include:1128  
(i) the specific relief sought;  
(ii) the material circumstances on which the Claimant relies; and  
(iii) the documents on which the Claimant relies.  
 
and the respondent can submit a statement of defence which should 
include:1129 
(i) any objections concerning the existence, validity or applicability of the 
arbitration agreement;  
(ii) a statement of whether, and to what extent, the Respondent admits or 
denies the relief sought by the Claimant;  
(iii) the material circumstances on which the Respondent relies;  
(iv) any counterclaim or set-off and the grounds on which it is based; 
(v) the documents on which the Respondent relies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1124 VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, Article 45 
1125 SCAI Rules, Article 42 
1126 FCC FTA Rules, Article 16 
1127 SCC FTA Rules Articles 19 
1128 Ibid Article 24 (1) 
1129 Ibid Article  24 (2) 
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The tribunal sets a time period within which the parties must submit their 
written pleadings. The next stage, unless for special reasons the Arbitrator 
decides otherwise, is:1130 
(i) in addition to the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence, the 
parties each may only submit one written statement, including 
statements of evidence;  
(ii) the statements must be brief; and  
(iii) the time limits within which the documents shall be submitted may not 
exceed 10 working days. 
 
KLRCA Fast-track Rules provide only seven days to tender written 
submissions and to exchange documents.1131 Under the ACICA and FCC 
Expedited Arbitration Rules the periods of time fixed by the Arbitrator for the 
communication of further written statements must not exceed 14 days.1132 
While, under ACICA, further submissions depend on the Tribunal’s approval, 
under KLRCA the Claimant has seven days to reply to the statement of 
defence and the Respondent has seven days to Reply. The Respondent may 
also submit a counterclaim within seven days. 1133  
 
Parties under opt-out FTA Rules may do the same. Thus, all submissions 
under CIETAC Rules should be made within 20 days rather than the normal 
RA limit of 45 days.1134 Under most opt-out FTA rules, however, there are no 
time limits for the submission of briefs and the institutions are authorized to 
extend or shorten any time limits as they see fit.1135   
 
At the time a written submission is served by one party on the other, a copy is 
usually served to the tribunal.1136 This enables the arbitral tribunal to  study  
the  case  at the same time as the parties and avoids the need to read many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1130 Ibid Article 19 (3) 
1131 KLRCA FTA Rules, Articles 8 and 15 
1132 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 21(2); FCC FTA Rules, Article 16(3)(c) 
1133 KLRCA FTA Rules, Articles 8-9 
1134 CIETAC Rules, Articles 14 and 57 
1135 SCAI Rules, Articles 2(3) and 23  
1136 McIlwrath/Savage (2010) p. 284-307 
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volumes of documents in a short period of time after the written stage is 
completed.1137  It is also useful for the tribunal to have copies of a particular 
pleading in order to be able to evaluate quickly the merits of any application 
that may be made (for example for an extension of time for a reply, or for an 
application for document disclosure request).1138 
 
In all but the simplest dispute, it is desirable for the matters in dispute to be 
defined in writing.1139 Committing the issues in dispute to writing informs the 
arbitrator of the matters which he must decide in making his award. This is 
important because an award which decides upon more or less than the 
matters submitted to the arbitrator for decision is open to attack.1140 Moreover, 
unless the arbitrator was able to obtain an adequate idea of the issues in 
dispute at the case management conference, he will be largely dependent on 
the information obtained from the written submission for giving sensible 
directions as to how the fast-track proceedings should be conducted.1141  
Written submissions also enable each of the parties to know from the outset 
the case which he has to meet, enabling each party to restrict their 
preparations for the hearing to those issues.1142   
 
A number of FTA rules set out fairly detailed provisions concerning written 
submissions. These provisions usually cover some or all of the following: the 
contents of the written submissions, including counter‐claims and set‐off; the 
periods for filing submissions; and the possibility of amending or 
supplementing submissions.1143  
 
Other methods can be considered for defining the issues in a fast-track 
dispute, like requiring both parties to give a brief oral account of what they 
regard the matters in dispute at the case management conference. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1137 Davis (1992) p. 170 
1138 Paulsson (2001) p. 607-614 
1139 Hunt/Kincaid/Monichino (2007) pp. 81-100 
1140 Caprasse (2008) p. 721 
1141 Eveleigh (1987) p. 84 
1142 Mustill/Boyd (1989) pp. 317-318. 
1143 Ibid supra p. 224 fn. 1123 
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written submissions provide a more convenient record of matters compared to 
audio or video recordings.1144  
 
The arbitrator in consultation with parties and in the light of initial submissions 
will select what he considers to be the most important issues and will direct 
the parties to focus on these issues and suggest to them what writing style 
and level of complexity they should use when they prepare their statements of 
claim and defence.1145 
 
If parties use an inappropriate level of complexity the FTA may be delayed by 
written submissions which inadequately describe the situation or, conversely, 
time and money may be wasted in both producing and assessing 
unnecessarily voluminous and exhaustive submissions. It is advisable for the 
parties to sign summary minutes of the case management conference to 
avoid later disputes as to whether they agreed that these were in fact the 
issues which the arbitrator was required to decide.1146 ICC rules require the 
arbitrator to draw up a document, defining issues in his terms of reference, to 
be signed by the arbitrator and the parties, after the parties have identified the 
issues.1147 
 
Alternatively, parties may draw up a joint statement of the matters in dispute 
without the arbitrator's assistance. The statement should set out the disputed 
issues and the averments of each party in relation to those issues, the 
responses of each party to the averments of the other, the facts and 
contentions of law on which each party relies, and the award which each party 
desires the arbitrator to make.1148  
 
A further advantage of the written statement of case is that the arbitrator is 
able to read it in advance and approach the hearing with an open but not an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1144 Cairns (2010) 
1145 Thomson/Finn (2005) p. 74 
1146 Brand (2007) 
1147 ICC Rules, Article 23; Mustill/Boyd1989, p. 321 fn. 3 
1148 SCC Expedited Arbitration Rules of 2010; FCC FTA Rules 
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empty mind.1149 Not only will this save time at the hearing1150 but it will enable 
the arbitrator to play a more constructive role in interlocutory matters.1151 The 
requirement that a party's statement should be accompanied by the essential 
documents on which it relies can significantly reduce the delays and expense 
associated with document disclosure.1152  Thus, although it is during the main 
oral hearing that the tribunal actually assess the evidence, it is in the written 
submissions that the parties compile the evidence.1153 
 
In order to keep within shorter time limits, most FTA rules restrict the ordinary 
procedures available, for example by limiting the number of memorials and 
cross claims to be submitted, requiring pleadings to be brief and demanding a 
single exchange of written submissions.1154 
 
Articles 10 through 12 of the WIPO FTA Rules require that the Statement of 
Claim must accompany the Request for Arbitration. Similarly, Articles 35 and 
36 require that the Statement of Defence must accompany the Answer to the 
Request.1155 FTA Rules under the KLRCA, ACICA and SCC also compel 
parties to submit the statement of claim with the request for arbitration and the 
statement of defence with the answer to the request.1156  
 
Under this approach the Statement of Claim must include a comprehensive 
statement of the facts, legal arguments and all the available evidence must be 
attached, including all relevant exhibits and any witness statements which 
support the party’s position. The same applies to the Statement of Defence or 
any counterclaim or set-off alleged by the Respondent. A reply to any 
counterclaim and set-off will also have to be completed, but no other 
submissions will be allowed before the hearing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1149 Redfern/Hunter (2004) p.289 ¶6-49 
1150 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p.321 
1151 Eveleigh  (1987) p. 84 
1152 Butler (1994) p. 274 
1153 Macpherson/Smith/Mitchell (2008) p. 30 
1154 Bedard (2009) p. 79 
1155 WIPO FTA Rules, Articles 10-12 and 35-36 SCC FTA Rules Articles 2-6 and 24-26; ACICIA Fast-
track Rules of 2011, Articles 5 17 and 18 
1156 KLRCA FTA Rules, Articles 3(2)(g), 7 and 8; ACICA FTA Rules, Articles 17 and 18 
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START FINISH 
START   FINISH 
While simple, such structuring of the written submissions has a significant 
effect in increasing speed and economy.1157 Rather than being permitted to 
submit skeletal, notice-type pleadings at the outset of the arbitration to be 
followed by disclosure or document production and more fully developed pre-
hearing memorials later, the parties are required to marshal their evidence 
and legal arguments and present their entire cases at the outset, subject to 
supplementation in the post-hearing briefs or further written submissions.1158  
What this approach offers is the possibility of narrowing the focus of the 
proceedings from an early stage rather than allowing the issues to become 
more and more diffuse until focus is achieved at, or shortly before, the final 
hearing. The diagram above used by Newmark to represents this distinction in 
simple visual terms:1159  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1157 Smit, H. (1998) p.44 
1158 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 47(e) SCC FTA Rules, Articles 24-34 
1159 Newmark, C. (2008) p.84 
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Figure 19: Newmark’s Comparison of Fast-track Procedures and Regular 
Procedures in terms of re-structured written submissions  
Source: Newmark C. (2008) p.84 
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In the first example the parties have started the case without setting out the 
issues in any detail.1160 They have then explored various issues, arguments, 
documents and witness evidence without any control or constraint.1161  The 
scope of the arbitration has broadened as it moves towards a final hearing.1162  
There is then an effort to focus on what is important, no doubt fuelled by the 
need to convince the tribunal on the determinative issues. The case therefore 
narrows significantly at the end.1163 This approach may well produce sound 
results, but it is likely to be expensive and time consuming.  
 
In the second example, the parties explore and expand the issues in dispute 
more fully at the outset.  This enables the tribunal to work with them to identify 
what is important in the case.  The parties and the tribunal focus on those 
matters and as the case progresses. This leads to a narrower, quicker and 
hence cheaper process.1164 
 
Limiting the number and complexity of written submissions which can be 
submitted may increase speed but it also has significant strategic 
consequences.1165 It may constitute a great problem for a party wishing to 
argue extensively. The requirement that the Request for Arbitration contain 
the Statement of Claim may disadvantage the claimant who, at that early 
stage of the dispute, lacks sufficient information to substantiate its claim or 
seek the appropriate remedy.1166 A claimant may also prefer not to disclose all 
of its arguments and evidence prior to the respondent's defence but will not be 
able to make further written submissions apart from the response to the 
counter claim.1167 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1160 Ibid see supra p.230 figure 19 
1161 Davison/Nowak (2009) p.163 
1162 Draetta (2010) p. 351 
1163 Newmark (2008) p.85 
1164 Ibid  
1165 Park (1989) p. 662 
1166 Smit (1998) p.45 
1167 Ibid 
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Requiring that the Answer includes the Statement of Defence and shortening 
deadlines for the Answer may be even more disadvantageous for the 
respondent.1168 While the claimant can take as much time as it needs to 
compose its Statement of Claim, the respondent will have to formulate and 
present its case within the tight deadlines prescribed for the Answer.1169 This 
may be as few as 20 days under WIPO and CIETAC FTA Rules or 28 days 
under KLRCA and ACICA FTA rules.1170 By contrast in regular arbitration the 
limit is 30 days and the answer need not include the Statement of Defence.1171 
Also, as the party more likely to need document production to develop its 
case, the respondent may be particularly disadvantaged by having to submit 
its Statement of Defence prior to any document production in the arbitration. 
 
The SCAI Rules provide for one round of pleadings in principle, which means 
that further briefs may be submitted but only in appropriate circumstances. 1172 
The rules impose limits on the amount of written pleadings, but are silent on 
total number of such submissions. The SCC and FCC FTA Rules limit the 
parties' written submissions to one each, in addition to the single exchange of 
Statement of Claim and Defence.1173  
 
Notably, none of the FTA rules mentioned above contains any sanctions if 
parties do not limit their documentation, for example if the statement of claim 
is not made with the request of arbitration or if the respondent does not add 
the statement of defence to its answer. In practice it is unlikely that the 
arbitrator would reject a statement of defence if it was not added to the 
answer but submitted later. Similarly, the arbitrator will have a delicate task in 
determining what the result should be if either party submits more written 
pleadings than are allowed. While one party may argue that he has good 
cause for submitting more pleadings than allowed, the other party may hold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1168 Augenblick/Mean/Robine (1994) p.133 
1169 Hunt/Kincaid/Monichino (2007) 
1170 See p.193 Section 4.5.1.3 
1171 Carter (2011) 
1172 SCAI Rules, Article 42(1)(b) 
1173 SCC FTA Rules, Article19(3); FCC FTA Rules, Article 16(1)(a) 
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the arbitrator to the literal interpretation of the rules.1174  Should the arbitrator 
refuse to take into account written submissions there is again a chance that a 
party may challenge the arbitral award claiming a denial of due process as a 
result of the limitation on pleadings.1175 However, for an experienced 
arbitrator, it would be a challenge but not impossible to find the balance 
between the parties’ interests in this respect. Accordingly, this kind of 
procedural limitation should normally not cause insurmountable problems. 
 
4.5.4.1 Amendments to the claim or defence 
It is not uncommon that during the course of FTA a party may find new 
evidence, or locate a new witness, or find it necessary to add a new claim, or 
need to put its case in a different way.1176 In these circumstances, the party 
may want to amend or supplement its pleaded case. The arbitral tribunal will 
usually allow such amendments unless either the amended claim falls outside 
the scope of the FTA agreement (and hence, outside the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction), or the application to amend is made so late that, if it was allowed, 
it would cause such prejudice to the other party that an award of costs would 
not provide adequate compensation.1177 
 
Article 25 of the SCC Expedited Rules provides that: 
“At any time prior to the close of proceedings pursuant to Article 34, a party 
may amend or supplement its claim, counterclaim, defence or set-off provided 
its case, as amended or supplemented, is still comprised by the arbitration 
agreement, unless the Arbitrator considers it inappropriate to allow such 
amendment or supplement having regard to the delay in making it, the 
prejudice to the other party or any other circumstances.”1178 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1174 Aksen (2007) p. 255 
1175 Baker/Romman (2009) 
1176 Szpara/Laszczuk (2010) 
1177 Pryles (2007) p. 327 
1178 SCC FTA Rules, Article 25 KLRCA Fast-track Rules (2012), Articles 15; ACICA FTA Rules, 
Articles 19; FCC FTA Rules, Article 22; SCAI Rules, Article 30; VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, Article 
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4.5.4.2 Default of a Party 
It is not unusual for one party to default in complying with an order or direction 
by the arbitral tribunal to serve a pleading.1179 For example, this may happen 
where, the respondent does not wish to participate in fast-track arbitration.1180 
In this situation, the arbitral tribunal should still continue with the fast-track 
proceedings.1181 Most institutional rules require the tribunal to continue with 
the fast-track proceedings, but without treating the respondent’s failure as an 
admission of the claimant’s allegations.1182  Thus, the tribunal would not 
ordinarily have the power to issue a “default” award in favour of the claimant 
by reason of the respondent’s failure to comply with a procedural order.  
Rather, it must still make a determination on the claims presented in the 
arbitration hearing having regard to the submissions and evidence presented 
to it.1183 
 
On the other hand, if the claimant fails  to  submit  a  statement  of  claim  in 
accordance with the arbitral tribunal’s order or direction, the arbitral tribunal 
may be justified in terminating the proceedings.1184 
 
Article 30(3) of the SCC Expedited Rules provides that: 
 
“If a party without good cause fails to comply with any provision of, or 
requirement under, these Rules or any procedural order given by the 
Arbitrator, the Arbitrator may draw such inferences as it considers 
appropriate.”1185 
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4.5.5 Gathering of Evidence 
In fast-track arbitration, oral presentations such as witness and expert 
testimony are more often replaced by written documents. Physical inspection 
will also often be made by an expert and reported in writing. Thus, the bulk of 
the evidence is gathered during the written phase, before the hearing.1186  
 
4.5.5.1 Production of documents 
A fast-track procedure is only achievable if extensive document production is 
not required.1187 As a general proposition, therefore, requests for document 
production are not permitted under FTA, although parties are free to 
voluntarily provide documents which support their case.1188 
 
Usually, each party will present the documents that favour its cause and are 
unfavourable to the other side.1189 Sometimes, however, certain key 
documents will be under the exclusive control of the party for whom they are 
unfavourable, and the other side may request their production.  Where the 
parties have not agreed upon rules for document disclosure, the tribunal may 
be called upon to decide whether such a request will be satisfied.1190  
 
The SCC Expedited Rules provide for arbitrators to order parties to produce 
those documents in their possession or power.  Article 26(3) states: 
 
“At the request of a party, the Arbitrator may order a party to produce any 
documents or other evidence which may be relevant to the outcome of the 
case.”1191 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1186 Böckstiegel (2010) pp. 1-8 
1187 Habegger (2006) p. 21 
1188 Hunt/Kincaid/Monichino (2007) p. 81 
1189 Hanotiau (2006) p. 113 
1190 See i.e Alexander Jolles (Sole Arbitrator) in ICC Arbitration dismising respondent’s requests of 
document production dated 3 April 2009 and 30 June 2009 in the Procedural Order No. 1 on 31 July 
2009. 
1191 SCC FTA Rules, Article 26(3) 
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Unless compelled to do so by the terms of the arbitration agreement, an 
arbitrator should make an order for document production only in exceptional 
circumstances, and then only order limited document production on the 
specific issues necessary to ensure justice between the parties.1192 For the 
arbitrator to exercise his discretion intelligently when giving directions for 
limited document production, the issues in dispute must be clearly defined and 
the arbitrator must be sufficiently informed about those issues.1193 An 
arbitrator with insufficient information to give directions on document 
production at a preliminary meeting before written statements of case have 
been exchanged, should strongly consider directing that document production 
stand over for consideration at a special additional meeting immediately after 
the statements have been exchanged.1194 If, as the FTA rules of several 
institutions require, a party's written statement of case is accompanied by 
copies of all essential documents on which that party relies, the need for full 
document production should fall away1195  
 
The arbitrator's order for document production must be associated with an 
order for inspection, a time-table for both being set by the arbitrator in his 
order.1196 The key is to have a reasonable document production plan that 
corresponds with the case’s complexity.1197 Like everything else in arbitration, 
the parties can agree to change the terms at any time to make the process 
better suit their needs. To avoid disputes in this area, a thoughtful arbitrator 
might invite the parties to revisit their document production intentions, and 
amend them if necessary.1198  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1192 Needham (1989) p.83, who refers to the reluctance of solicitors to agree to limited document 
production because of their desire to gain access to possible indiscretions in manuscripts and marginal 
notes in the opposition's files. 
1193 Tackaberry (1987) p. 223 
1194 If the issue or document production is left to await further consideration at a prehearing review just 
before the hearing commences, the need for further document production could result in the hearing 
itself have be postponed 
1195 Needham (1989) p. 84; Jones (1987) p. 231; Redfern/Hunter( 2004) p. 298 ¶6-69 
1196 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p. 326. 
1197 Tackaberry (1987) p. 223; Mustill/Boyd (1989) p.325-326 
1198 Hierro (2012) p. 37-47 
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There is no obligation on an arbitral tribunal to order document production.1199 
Whether document production, in any form, is required will depend on what 
procedures are necessary to achieve fairness in the resolution of the 
dispute.1200 In Anangel Peace Compania Naviera SA v. Bacchus International 
Commerce Corporation,1201 Robert Goff J found that the arbitrators had not 
acted unfairly by not requiring the production of scrap logs. The fair logs had 
been produced during the arbitration, along with other evidence which 
supported the information in them. It had also been explained that the scrap 
logs had probably been destroyed. It was then a matter for the arbitrators to 
form a view on the evidence, after the request had been made informally and 
an explanation offered. The judge could not find that the failure to order 
document production constituted misconduct by the arbitrators, so the 
application to set aside the award or have it remitted was dismissed.1202  
 
If a party fails to comply with an arbitral tribunal’s order for production of 
documents and no reasonable excuse is given, the arbitral tribunal is entitled 
to draw an appropriate adverse inference from that party’s failure in relation to 
the particular issue in respect of which the production of documents was 
ordered.1203 
 
In institutional FTA, the production of documents is usually governed by the 
rules of that institution. All of the expedited rules provide some form of 
procedure for the exchange of evidence in advance of the hearing, either by 
rules specific to the expedited arbitration or by reference to the arbitral 
tribunal’s authority under the FTA rules. The detailed procedures provided in 
the opt-in FTA Rules explicitly grant the arbitrator the authority to order 
production of relevant documents or evidence.1204 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1199 Honatiau (2009) p. 357 
1200 Hanotiau (2006) p. 113 et seg 
1201 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 452 
1202 Ibid 
1203 Sharpe (2006) p. 549  
1204 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 25; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 42; SCC FTA Rules, Article 26. 
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The AAA Expedited Rules require that parties exchange copies of “all exhibits 
they intend to submit at the hearing” at least two business days before the 
hearing, but they are silent on whether the tribunal may compel document 
production by the parties.1205 The AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules, 
however, vest the arbitrator with the power to compel production of evidence 
on his or her own initiative or at the request of a party and to order the 
identification of all witnesses to be called.1206 
 
The CPR Expedited Rules require that each party provide “all the documents 
which it may use in the arbitration” and permit parties to request the arbitral 
tribunal to “order the production of additional specific documents that are 
essential to a matter of import in the proceeding for which a party can 
demonstrate a substantial need”.1207 This departs from the regular CPR 
procedures, under which parties are encouraged to agree on one of four 
“modes” of disclosure, ranging from disclosure of only those documents that 
parties will present at the hearing, to complete disclosure of all “documents 
regarding non-privileged matters that are relevant to any party’s claim or 
defence, subject to the limitations of reasonableness, duplication and undue 
burden.”1208 
 
Other arbitral organisations similarly provide for some form of compelled 
evidence and document production.1209  The ICC, the LCIA and the HKIAC 
articles for expedited arbitration are silent on document production and 
production of evidence but they permit the arbitral tribunal to compel 
document production under the regular rules.1210 In practice, documents are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1205 AAA Rules, Article E-5. 
1206AAA Rules, Article R-21. ICDR/AAA Arbitration Rules of 2009, Article 19 
1207 CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Articles 11(1) and 11(2) 
1208 International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, CPR Protocol on Disclosure of 
Documents and Presentation of Witnesses in Commercial Arbitration, Schedule 1 (2009) 
Abyei.cpradr.org/ClausesRules/CPRProtocolonDisclosure/tabid/393/Default.aspx). 
1209 Bedard (2009) p. 74 
1210 ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012, Article 20.1; LCIA Rules, Article 22; HKIAC Rules, Article 23.3. 
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invariably produced by the parties in the subsequent written pleadings or 
delivered pursuant  to  a  procedural order  made  by  the  arbitral tribunal.1211 
 
Even if document production is successfully controlled to limit the production 
of unnecessary documents, the arbitrator should ensure that documents 
produced at the hearing have been subjected to a proper process of selection 
and classification.1212 Otherwise the efficiency of the hearing can be 
compromised by the need to manhandle large quantities of copy documents, 
most of them quite useless, and to keep track of the much smaller number 
which are really relevant.1213 
 
The arbitral tribunal may issue directions as to precisely how documents are 
to be presented if they have not already been presented together with the 
statement of case or statement of defence.1214 The tribunal may direct the 
parties to collate the documentary evidence in the form of one or more 
volumes of documents, in chronological order with each page numbered for 
use at the hearing.1215  The arbitral tribunal and the parties should have 
identical sets of documents for ease of reference. If there are a huge number 
of documents, it may be a good practice to identify the most important 
documents and include them in a separate bundle, sometimes called a core 
bundle.1216  
 
After document production and inspection, the parties should assemble a core 
bundle comprising all the documents which either or both of them consider 
should be before the arbitrator at the hearing.1217 The compilation of a core 
bundle has two main advantages. First, it enables the arbitrator to read the 
relevant documents before the hearing or during adjournments, whichever is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1211 ICC Rules, Article 20(5).  UNCITRAL Rules, Article 18; LCIA Rules, Article 15.6. 
1212 Lord Hacking (1998) p. 237 
1213 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p.327; See also Tackaberry (1987) pp. 224-255 
1214 Appel (2006) p. 86 
1215 Ulmer (2010) p. 240 
1216 Honatiau (2009) p. 358-359 
1217 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p. 326 
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most practical.1218 This avoids time being wasted by counsel or witnesses 
reading out documents during the hearing itself.1219  Secondly, counsel for 
both parties can do their preparations for the hearing from identical bundles, 
making annotations and reference changes during the hearing unnecessary 
which will again improve the efficiency of the hearing.1220   
 
It is sometimes also helpful for the parties to agree that the documents are 
accurate copies of existing documents and their authenticity is not being 
challenged.1221  If one party disputes a document’s authenticity, then the party 
relying on that document will know this in advance so he can take appropriate 
steps to prove this fact.1222  
 
The most significant limitation on the exchange of documents and other 
evidence prior to a hearing lies not in the available powers to order limited 
document production, but in the shortened time frame prescribed for that 
process.1223 Under the AAA and WIPO Procedures, hearings must begin 
within 30 days of the arbitrator’s appointment. An award must be made within 
three months of the date on which the claim was referred to the arbitrator 
under the SCC Expedited Rules and within six months under HKIAC article 
38. Document production in regular arbitration can often last six months or 
more.1224 
 
Unfortunately what can happen in practice is that because the time is very 
limited, the bundle is assembled carelessly, with insufficient knowledge of the 
dispute.1225 Parties’ counsel may work on the principle that it is safer to copy 
and include rather than to omit, leaving the sifting process to be done at the 
hearing. This is a false economy in fast-track arbitrations.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1218 Hanotiau (2006) p. 116 
1219 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p.350 
1220 Tackaberry (1987) pp. 225-226. 
1221 Fletcher (2006) p.101-111 
1222 Hill (2008) pp. 89-106 
1223 Houtte (2010) p. 1047 
1224 Marriott (2000) p. 353 
1225 Rivkin (2010) 
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Having only a short time before the hearing can result in an outrageously 
intense period for the party required to find and produce relevant documents, 
with the risk of over or underproduction and also in extremely curtailed 
opportunities to obtain document production from the opposing party.1226 It is 
also uncertain whether the arbitrators will be persuaded to curtail document 
production in view of the shortened time frames, or expect the same 
document production to be crammed into less time.1227 While curtailed 
document production can often favour the interests of one party over the 
other, it is difficult to predict which side will benefit in any given future 
dispute.1228 
 
4.5.5.2 Testimony of witnesses 
The method by which the testimony of witnesses is presented depends on the 
preference of the parties and the arbitral tribunal and whether common law or 
civil law traditions predominate.1229 Frequently, a mixture of the two systems is 
adopted.1230 In FTA, it is not considered an essential practice that witnesses 
should be heard orally in all cases.1231  
 
In Dalmia Dairy Industries v National Bank of Pakistan1232 the Sole Arbitrator 
refused to hear several witnesses requested by the Respondent who argued 
in London before the Commercial Court and later in the Court of Appeal that 
the ICC award should be annulled on the ground of the "misconduct" of the 
Arbitrator when rejecting those procedural requests. The English courts took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1226 Slate (2010) p. 195 
1227 Ibid 
1228 Landau (2007) p. 282 
1229 Schlabrendorf (2010) pp.1161-1182 
1230 Bühler/Dorgan (2000) pp. 3-30 
1231 SCC FTA Rules, Article 28; KLRCA Fast-track Rules (2012), Articles 6(5)(k); ACICA FTA Rules, 
Articles 13(3); FCC FTA Rules, Article 21; SCAI Rules, Article 25(4); VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, 
Article 45(9)(2) 
1232 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep.223 (C.A. 1977) 
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the view that it was not an infringement of any rule of English public policy for 
an arbitrator to decline to hear oral testimony.1233 
The court, in its judgement stated that: 
 
“Article 20 of the ICC Rules merely provides that the arbitrator ‘shall have the 
power to hear witnesses’. It gives him a discretion but imposes no 
obligation… Indeed, the procedure followed by the arbitrator in this case is in 
my experience the usual procedure in ICC and other Continental arbitrations.  
There can, therefore, be no question of any infringement of any rule of English 
public policy.”1234 
 
Written witness statements may be submitted on oath (in the form of 
affidavits) or simply signed by the witnesses as witness statements.1235  Each 
party then indicates to the arbitral tribunal which of the other party’s witnesses 
should be required to attend the hearing for the purpose of being cross-
examined.1236 The arbitral tribunal may also indicate to the parties which, if 
any, of the witnesses it wishes to hear in person.1237  However, the arbitral 
tribunal would seldom require a witness to be present if neither party requires 
his attendance.  
 
Article 53(b) of the WIPO FTA Rules requires that parties "bring to the hearing 
such persons as necessary to adequately inform the Tribunal of the 
dispute."1238 This article is designed to avoid the need to schedule additional 
hearings to hear particular witnesses.1239 Disagreements may arise, however, 
as to which persons are necessary to adequately inform the Tribunal of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1233 Ibid p. 226 
1234 Ibid p. 270 
1235 Schneider (2011) 
1236 Ibid 
1237 Schlabrendorf (2010) p. 1170 
1238 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 53  
1239 Smit (1991) p.140. The requirement that each party "bring" such persons to the hearing does not 
mean that such persons must also actually be present during the hearing, as the Tribunal retains 
authority under Article 54 to direct that "any witness shall retire during any part of the proceedings, 
particularly during the testimony of other witnesses." 
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dispute. Clearly, each side should make available any witnesses on which it 
intends to rely in support of its case as well as any other witnesses the 
Tribunal directs be made available.1240 The identity of the party 
representatives and witnesses to be heard at the hearing should generally be 
agreed with the Tribunal in advance of the hearing. In most cases the Tribunal 
should ensure that all testimonial evidence is submitted in the form of witness 
statements in advance of the hearing to eliminate the need for direct 
testimony at the hearing.1241 
 
Most institutional FTA rules do not contain any specific or detailed provisions 
governing the procedure for witness evidence to be presented to the arbitral 
tribunal.1242 Accordingly the fast-track procedure to be followed under such 
FTA Rules is dealt with by agreement of the parties or, failing agreement, at 
the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.1243 Either party may request that a 
witness attend, subject to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. If a witness 
fails to attend it may affect the weight to be given to his evidence or result in 
the evidence being excluded.1244 
 
The weight to be given to witness evidence rests with the arbitral tribunal.  
The SCC Expedited Rules provide: 
 
“The admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence shall be for 
the Arbitrator to determine.”1245 
 
Arbitral tribunals generally give more weight to corroborated witness 
testimony.1246 Greater weight would also be given to the evidence of a witness 
who has been tested by cross-examination, or by an examination by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1240 A similar direction was issued by the Tribunal in the Fast-Track Arbitration, namely that all 
witnesses be made available at the hearing. See Smit (1991) p.140. 
1241 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 54(d) (authorizing the Tribunal to direct that the testimony of witnesses be 
submitted in written form by way of signed statements, sworn affidavits or otherwise). 
1242 SCC FTA Rules, Article 28 
1243 Sentner (2008) p. 77 
1244 Shore (2004) p. 76 
1245 SCC FTA Rules, Article 26(1) 
1246 Shore (2004) p. 77 
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arbitral tribunal.1247 The untested evidence of a witness who has a vested 
interest in the outcome of a case may be given less weight than the evidence 
of an independent witness.1248 
 
4.5.5.3 Expert Evidence 
Where an arbitral tribunal needs the assistance of an expert to determine an 
issue it may appoint its own expert.1249 More commonly, the parties will 
present expert evidence to the tribunal which it may cross examine. For 
reasons of expediency and cost, the arbitral tribunal may limit the number of 
experts each side may present.1250  
 
Any power of the tribunal to engage its own witness will be expressly set out 
in the arbitration agreement or incorporated into the agreement by reference 
to institutional FTA rules of arbitration, or permitted by the lex arbitri.1251 The 
tribunal may require the parties to provide its expert with any relevant 
information or to produce for inspection any relevant documents, goods or 
other property that may be required by the expert.1252  
 
Generally, the parties have some control over the tribunal's selection of its 
own expert.1253 Some FTA rules provide that the tribunal should involve the 
parties in the process of appointing any such expert and in defining the scope 
of the expert's retainer.1254 Both the SCC Expedited Rules and the WIPO 
Expedited Rules, for example, state that the tribunal may appoint experts and 
define their terms of reference after having consulted the parties.1255  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1247 Sharpe (2006) p. 261 
1248 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.36. (2003) p.44 
1249 ICC Case No. 11516/KGA AAA Claimant v. BBB Respondent, Terms of Reference for the Expert 
Appointed by the Arbitral Tribunal (2001) 
1250 Kent (2007) 
1251 Kreindler (2005) pp. 87-104 
1252 Ibid 
1253 Professor Karrer's Letters to parties asking their view on the tribunal appointed expert on the 
delays in the planning and erection of the Ammonia plant. ICC Case No XXXX (1993) 
1254 Fellas (2007) 
1255  SCC FTA Rules, Article 29; WIPO FTA Rules, Article 49 
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In the absence of any express power, a question may arise as to whether or 
not an arbitral tribunal has implied power to appoint an expert under the law 
governing the arbitration.1256 Most systems of law recognize the principle that, 
unless authorized to do so by the terms of his appointment, someone to whom 
a duty has been delegated must not delegate that duty to someone else.1257 
But, as long as the arbitral tribunal is merely taking advice from an expert and 
not attempting to delegate to him the task of determining or deciding the issue 
that the tribunal has to decide there should not be any objection to the 
appointment of an expert by an arbitral tribunal.1258 Accordingly, even in the 
absence of an empowering provision of the governing law, an international 
arbitral tribunal has the power to call upon expert assistance if needed.1259  
The arbitral tribunal should, however, give the parties an opportunity to 
comment on any such expertise upon which the arbitrators have relied.1260 
The parties may have the right to make objections to the tribunal if they have 
doubts as to the independence of its expert.1261 Finally, the parties must also 
be given the opportunity to question any tribunal‐appointed expert at a hearing 
and to present their own expert witnesses to testify on the relevant issues.1262 
 
Expert evidence is usually presented in the form of written reports which may 
be submitted at the same time as the written statements of witnesses of fact, 
but in any event well in advance of the hearing.1263 If the parties present 
conflicting expert evidence, the expert witnesses must be prepared to appear 
before the arbitral tribunal for examination.1264  
 
The end of Article 49(a) of the WIPO Expedited Rules states: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1256 Brown (2005) p. 77 
1257 Ibid 
1258 Breton (2009) p. 117 et seq 
1259 Ibid 
1260 Feutrill/Rubins (2009) p. 307 
1261 Harris (2010) p. 212 
1262 Sachs (2010) p. 216 
1263 Brown (2005) p. 83 
1264 Ibid 
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“The terms of reference shall include a requirement that the expert report to 
the Tribunal within 30 days of receipt of the terms of reference.” 1265 
 
That deadline is designed to expedite the proceedings, but could raise 
problems unless flexibly construed.1266 The thirty-day deadline, for instance, 
could be too short if, as frequently is the case in international commercial 
disputes, the issues submitted to the expert are of a complex technical 
nature.1267 In such “exceptional” cases, the Tribunal could extend the deadline 
pursuant to its general authority under Article 32(c)1268. On the other hand, the 
30-day time period may be too long in certain cases, particularly in light of the 
requirement in Article 35(b) that the hearing be convened within 30 days of 
receipt of the Answer.1269 Because the expert's terms of reference will not be 
established until well after the respondent's Answer is submitted, the expert's 
report will ordinarily not be due until after the hearing has been held.1270 That, 
of course, is an untenable result and inconsistent with the requirement in 
Article 49(c) that the parties be afforded the opportunity to question the expert, 
presumably on the basis of his report, at a hearing.1271 This enables the 
arbitral  tribunal  to  hear  the  opinions  of  the  experts  on  specific issues 
together and at the same time, so that any differences in opinion may be more 
immediately and readily identified and the experts can be asked to clarify 
issues on the spot. While the Tribunal is authorized to extend the 30-day time 
limit for the hearing until after the expert report is submitted, it is not expressly 
authorized by the Expedited Rules to shorten the 30-day time limit for the 
expert's report. Unless the Rules are construed to allow the Tribunal to 
shorten the 30-day time period for the expert's report, the timing of the report 
will therefore dictate the timing of the hearing.1272 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1265 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 49 (a) 
1266 Smit (1998) p. 40 
1267 Ibid 41 
1268 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 32 (c) 
1269 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 35 (b) 
1270 Brown (2005) p. 82 
1271 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 49 (c) 
1272 Herrmann (2001) p. 76 
  248 
4.5.5.4 Inspection of the subject matter of the dispute 
Another method of obtaining evidence is for the arbitral tribunal itself to 
inspect the subject matter of the case, for example a site inspection in a large 
construction, engineering or technical disputes.1273 
 
Depending on the circumstances, a site inspection may be very useful to 
better understand the background of the dispute and the parties’ contentions 
and evidence.1274  As an alternative, if the costs of arranging and conducting 
the inspection are not in proportion to the benefits that might be gained, the 
arbitral tribunal may ask for photographs, models or videotapes to be 
presented.1275 
 
As regards the procedure for a physical site inspection, the arbitral tribunal 
should be careful to ensure that the principle of equality of treatment is strictly 
observed.1276 In particular, the arbitral tribunal should normally make a site 
inspection in the presence of representatives of both parties.1277 It should also 
not put questions directly concerning the case to persons working on the site, 
unless the advocates for the parties are given the opportunity also to ask 
questions of those persons.1278  
 
The KLRCA FTA Rules confer express power on the arbitral tribunal to order 
the parties to make any property or thing available for inspection and to carry 
out physical inspection of any matter or item that is related to the subject 
matter of the arbitration.1279 Similarly, Article 44 of the WIPO Expedited Rules 
requires the parties to allow the tribunal to inspect the site and any relevant 
subject matter.1280 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1273 Lew (2009) p. 13 
1274 Cook/Garcia (2010) p. 210 
1275 Josiah (2008) 
1276 Ricci (2010) p.1027 
1277 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 24(2); LCIA Rules, Article 22(1)(e); AAA Commercial Arbitration 
Rules, Article 13(2) 
1278 Tawil/Montashami/Sheppard (2009) 
1279 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 6(5)(i) 
1280 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 44 
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The FCC Expedited Rules require the parties to make available any relevant 
information to any experts appointed by the arbitral tribunal.1281 However, 
some FTA Rules like the ACICA and SCC do not confer any express power 
on the arbitral tribunal to inspect the subject matter of the dispute.1282   
 
4.5.6 Pre-Hearing Conference 
A preliminary hearing may have been held early on, before the written 
submissions or pleadings were served but at that time the parties may not 
have decided on the number of witnesses, factual or expert, that they wished 
to call.1283 Thus at that time the arbitral tribunal may have had insufficient 
information to effectively plan the main hearing or estimate the length required 
for it.1284  
 
 A meeting or conference prior to the actual hearing may therefore be 
desirable to deal with any matters that have not have been dealt with earlier. If 
it is not practical to deal with such remaining matters through telephone 
conferences or correspondence, a meeting with the parties should be 
convened.1285 
 
Most institutional FTA rules do not mention a pre-hearing conference.  The 
WIPO FTA Rules however provide in Article 41: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1281 FCC FTA Rules, Article 23(2) 
1282 Article 13(1) of the ACICA Rules for Expedited Arbitration of 2011 and Article 19(1) of the SCC 
FTA Rules imply the power of site inspection, expressly allowing the tribunal to "conduct the arbitration 
in such manner as he or she considers appropriate". Site visits are arguably "other evidence" in the 
terms of Article 26(3) of the SCC Expedited Arbitration Rules of 2010. 
1283 Chambers (2009) p. 60 
1284 Ibid 
1285 See ICC Case No. 13583/FM/RCH Summary Minutes of the pre-hearing telephone conference of 
19 December 2005 regarding the evidentiary hearing 
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“The Tribunal may, in general following the submission of the Statement of 
Defence, conduct a preparatory conference with the parties for the purpose of 
organizing and scheduling the subsequent proceedings.”1286 
 
4.5.7 Conducting the Hearing  
FTA can be conducted without an oral hearing as a documents-only 
arbitration or with an oral hearing.1287 In the latter the representatives of the 
parties have an opportunity to make oral submissions to the arbitral tribunal, 
and the arbitral tribunal can ask for clarification of matters contained in the 
written submissions and hear the evidence of witnesses. However, in fast-
track arbitration if there is an oral hearing, it is often reduced in length to save 
time.1288 
 
Although CIETAC, CPR, SCC and SIAC rules do not limit the duration of the 
hearing, in each case the arbitral tribunal has discretion to determine the 
length and procedure of the hearing, if one is to be held.1289 
 
4.5.7.1 Documents-Only Hearing 
A documents-only hearing is, as the name suggests, conducted only by 
reference to documents presented by the parties.1290 The Expedited 
Procedures of many institutional rules allow for a decision to be made solely 
on written submissions and documentary evidence without any hearing on the 
merits of dispute, unless the parties request a hearing or the arbitrator deems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1286 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 41 
1287 SCC FTA Rules, Article 27(1); KLRCA Fast-track Rules (2012), Article 9; ACICA FTA Rules, 
Articles 13(2); FCC FTA Rules, Article 21; SCAI Rules, Article 42(1)(c); VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, 
Article 45(9)(3) 
1288 See i.e. ACICA FTA Rules, Articles 13(2) 
1289 CIETAC Rules, Article 58; CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 2009, 
Article 13(1) 
1290 Rutherford (1995)  
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one necessary.1291 An arbitral tribunal may also proceed to make its award 
without a hearing if the parties have expressly so agreed.1292  
 
Under some FTA rules, documents only arbitration is automatically applicable.  
Under KLRCA Fast-track Rules, where the aggregate amount of the claim and 
counter claim in dispute is less than, or unlikely to exceed, US $75,000, that 
arbitration must proceed as a documents-only arbitration unless an oral 
hearing is deemed necessary by the arbitrator in consultation with the 
parties.1293 Similarly, under the AAA Rules, by default hearings do not take 
place for claims under US$10,000 and in other cases the parties may, by 
written agreement, waive their right to a hearing and the claim will be resolved 
on the basis of submission of documents.1294 
 
Some rules, like CIETAC, give the tribunal great discretion to refuse an oral 
hearing.1295 Indeed, the arbitrator can direct that the procedure be conducted 
in documents only, even if a party requests an oral hearing. Under CPR and 
ACICA FTA rules, the arbitrator must deem it appropriate in order to have a 
hearing.1296  Under FCC, HKIAC and SCC rules the arbitrator must deem it 
necessary.1297 If a party in good faith requests an oral hearing it would, 
however, be difficult for the arbitrator to conclude that an oral hearing is not 
necessary. A party's application for an oral hearing would in most cases lead 
to the inference that such a hearing is necessary.  
 
Unlike other expedited arbitration rules, SIAC rules require a hearing unless 
parties agree otherwise.1298 Similarly, the WIPO Expedited Rules do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1291 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 9 
1292 Greenberg/Weeramantry (2010) p. 354 
1293 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 9(3) 
1294 AAA Rules, Article E6 
1295 CIETAC Rules, Article 58 
1296 ACICA FTA Rules, Article 13(2)(a); CPR Global Rules for Accelerated Commercial Arbitration of 
2009, Article 13(1) 
1297 FCC FTA Rules, Article 21; HKIAC Rules, Article 38.2(c); CPR Global Rules for Accelerated 
Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article 13(1); SCC Expedited Rules of 2010, Article 27; HKIAC Rules, 
Article 38.  
1298 SIAC Rules, Article 5 
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authorize the Tribunal to dispense with an evidentiary hearing if either of the 
parties requests such a hearing.1299  Instead, WIPO rules seek to expedite the 
proceedings by requiring that the hearing be convened within 30 days after 
the claimant's receipt of the Answer to the Request and Statement of 
Defence.1300 While Statements of Claim and Defence will already have been 
submitted, thirty days is precious little time to prepare for a hearing.1301  Some 
or all of the following may have to occur prior to the hearing under WIPO FTA: 
a preparatory conference held under Article 41 to formulate the issues and 
schedule the arbitral proceedings; document production completed under 
Article 42(b); applications for special confidential treatment made under Article 
46; expert reports submitted under Article 49; site visits performed under 
Article 44; notices of experiments submitted under Article 43; further written 
statements, including any pre-hearing memoranda, submitted under Article 
37; applications for interim relief made under Article 40; and witness 
statements submitted under Article 48(d). Indeed, it appears likely that, in 
many if not most cases, the Tribunal will be called upon to exercise its 
authority under Article 32(c) to extend the 30-day deadline for the hearing.1302 
 
4.5.7.2 Organization of the hearing  
Hearings are normally held on a date fixed by the arbitral tribunal, either at the 
request of one or both of the parties, or on its own initiative.1303   In practice, 
hearing dates are fixed after consultation with the parties on the dates 
convenient to the parties, their respective lawyers and the arbitral tribunal.1304  
 
Considering that the actual hearing provides a recalcitrant party with an 
opportunity to delay arbitral proceedings, most FTA rules impose limits on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1299 Compare SCC FTA Rules, Article 27 (“a hearing shall be held if requested by a party and if 
deemed necessary by the Arbitrator”). 
1300 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 47 
1301 Hoellering (1986) pp. 233-34; Silverman (1991) pp. 156-157; Downie (1991) pp. 484-85. 
1302 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p. 80 (suggesting that time limits imposed on specific stages of 
the arbitral proceedings may became a “straightjacket with many arms”). 
1303 Molitoris/Abt (2009) p. 179 
1304 Needham (1989)  p.51 
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duration or number of hearings available to parties.1305 Under AAA, ACICA 
and JCAA rules the hearing must be completed within one day; under WIPO 
FTA Rules it is three days; under KLRCA rules, six days.1306 
 
Limiting the duration of hearings forces the parties to prepare their cases in 
advance and focus their arguments and evidentiary presentations on the key 
issues.1307 While a time-limited hearing may suffice for most FTA disputes, it 
may not suffice for all, and the Tribunal retains authority to extend the hearing 
or call additional hearings in exceptional circumstances.1308 Under SCAI rules 
the arbitral tribunal shall hold only a single hearing, unless the parties have 
agreed otherwise.1309 A single hearing does not mean a single day of hearing. 
There is no particular restriction on its duration and it may last several 
consecutive days; but there cannot be a second hearing.1310 Furthermore, a 
single hearing does not rule out a prehearing conference. Prehearing 
conferences can be very useful for the organization of a hearing to determine 
the issues which have to be tried and decided, and to discuss any other 
procedural arrangements.1311 
 
Article 47(b) of the WIPO Expedited Rules states: 
 
“If a hearing is held, it shall be convened within 30 days after the receipt by 
the Claimant of the Answer to the Request and the Statement of Defense.  
The Tribunal shall give the parties adequate advance notice of the date, time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1305 Rhodes/Sloan (1984) p. 37; ICCA Congress Series 5 p. 197-331 (discussing delays encountered 
at the hearing stage of international arbitrations). 
1306 Similarly, Article 56 of the AAA Expedited Procedures imposes a one-day limit on hearings. In the 
Fast-Track Arbitration, a one-day hearing was held in which each side was allowed three hours for 
argument, examination or cross-examination of witnesses or for any other purpose. See Smit (1991) 
p.139 
1307 At the hearing in the Fast-Track Arbitration, although the parties were free to use their allotted time 
for examination of witnesses or any other purposes, they largely forewent that opportunity in favor of 
arguing the key issues in the case. See Smit, H. (1991) p.140; see also Poppleton, A. (1981) p. 7 
(noting that the parties will concentrate the presentations of their cases in accordance with the limited 
time afforded them); Nickles, P. J. (1991) pp.146-47. 
1308 Monichino (2009) 
1309 SCAI Rules, Article 42(1)(c) 
1310 See similarly VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, Article 45(9)(3) 
1311 Tiessen (2006) 
  254 
and place of the hearing. Except in exceptional circumstances, hearings may 
not exceed three days.  Each party shall be expected to bring to the hearing 
such persons as necessary to adequately inform the Tribunal of the 
dispute.”1312 
 
However, this article refers both to “the hearing” in the singular and to 
“hearings” in the plural and it is thus difficult to know how the thirty-day and 
three-day time periods are to be applied. If more than one hearing is held, 
must each hearing be convened within thirty days? Does the three-day limit 
apply to each hearing or is it an aggregate total limit for all of the hearings?1313 
In any event, the Tribunal should always endeavour to schedule hearings at 
the same time, a practice-tested means of expediting the hearing stage of 
international arbitrations.1314 Article 47(b)'s final requirement is that the parties 
“bring to the hearing such persons as necessary to adequately inform the 
Tribunal of the dispute.”1315 That requirement is designed to facilitate 
completion of the hearing as expeditiously as possible by avoiding the need to 
schedule additional hearings to hear particular witnesses. Disagreements may 
arise, however, as to which persons are necessary to adequately inform the 
Tribunal of the dispute.1316 Clearly, each side should make available any 
witnesses on which it intends to rely in support of its case as well as any other 
witnesses the Tribunal directs be made available. The identity of the party 
representatives and witnesses to be heard at the hearing should generally be 
agreed with the Tribunal in advance of the hearing. In most cases, the 
Tribunal should ensure that all testimonial evidence is submitted in the form of 
witness statements in advance of the hearing to eliminate the need for direct 
testimony at the hearing.1317 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1312 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 47(b) 
1313 Tschanz (1993) pp. 52-53. 
1314 Consecutive hearings not only minimize the difficulties associated with assembling parties and 
arbitrators of various nationalities at the hearing but also frequently result in the hearings being heard in 
fewer days than would be the case with multiple non-consecutive hearings. See Poppleton (1981) p. 9 
1315 Smit (1991) p.140.  
1316 Downie (1991) p. 486 
1317 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 54(d) (authorizing the Tribunal to direct that the testimony of witnesses be 
submitted in written form by way of signed statements, sworn affidavits or otherwise). 
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While the aim of having written witness statements rather than listening to 
witnesses at the hearing is to speed the arbitration process, practice has 
shown that written statements may lead to a lengthier procedure due to the 
need for reply statements and cross examination, rather than a brief oral 
questioning by the arbitral tribunal.1318 Therefore, it is usually left to the 
arbitrator to decide whether written witness statements will serve to accelerate 
or decelerate the procedure.1319 
 
If there is to be a hearing it is essential that adequate notice is given to the 
parties.1320 
 
Article 27(2) of the SCC Expedited Rules provides: 
“The Arbitrator shall, in consultation with the parties, determine the date, time 
and location of any hearing and shall provide the parties with reasonable 
notice thereof.”1321 
 
The administrative arrangements for the hearing may be made by one of the 
parties, normally the claimant, with the agreement of the other.  They may 
also be made by the arbitral tribunal or by the administrative secretary 
appointed by the arbitral tribunal if one is appointed.1322  In some administered 
arbitrations, for example under the LCIA, the institution may make the 
arrangements.1323 The administrative matters could include: 
• arrangements for interpreters and translators;  
• mechanical audio recordings;  
• transcription services;  
• booking of the hearing room (at a hotel or an arbitration centre with the 
requisite support, such as photocopying, telecommunications and 
video conferencing facilities). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1318 Casey/Parker (2008) p.167 
1319 Davis, M. (2004) 
1320 Mohtashami, R. (1999) pp. 124-143 
1321 SCC FTA Rules, Article 27(2) 
1322 Casey/Parker (2008) p. 167 
1323 Nesbitt, S. (2010) p. 401 
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4.5.7.3 Procedure at the hearing 
The objective in FTA is to keep the duration of the hearing to a minimum 
whilst maintaining equality of treatment of the parties and ensuring that the 
parties are given a proper opportunity to present their case, in accordance 
with any relevant applicable  laws  and  public  policy considerations.1324 
 
The general practice is to permit each party to present a brief opening 
statement, the assumption being that the arbitral tribunal has already read the 
documents that have been submitted.1325  The oral testimony of any witnesses 
for each party will then be heard, the claimant’s witnesses to be heard first.1326  
There is usually no examination-in-chief (“direct” examination) as the 
witnesses’ testimony would have been submitted in writing.1327  A witness may 
be given the opportunity to elaborate or clarify what is in his written statement, 
or add new points, so long as this does not take too much time or introduce 
new material that may substantially alter the issues already identified by the 
written pleadings.1328 
 
A lengthy oral opening by counsel is unnecessary when the arbitrator has 
been able to read the statements in advance, particularly if counsel furnished 
a written opening statement to facilitate understanding of the other documents 
made available before the hearing.1329 However, even where counsel has 
provided a written opening of his case, a short oral opening can prove 
helpful.1330 This should preferably take the form of a brief and uncontroversial 
summary of the basic events and issues and the evidence he will present, 
with reference only to the most important documents.1331 Claimant's counsel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1324 Mohtashami (1999) p. 125 
1325 Molitoris/Abt (2009) p. 180 
1326 Ibid 181 
1327 Chambers (2009) p. 55 
1328 Monichino (2009) 
1329 Needham (1989) p. 92 
1330 Eveleigh (1987) p.86 
1331 Lord Hacking (1998) 
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will have his opportunity to argue his client's case at the conclusion of the 
evidence.1332 
 
Although the fear has been expressed that by reading the evidence before the 
hearing the arbitrator could prejudge the issues, this should not be a problem 
if the arbitrator has been carefully chosen as a person of good standing in his 
own profession with sufficient training and experience as an arbitrator.1333 
Besides making it unnecessary for counsel or witnesses to read documents 
and enabling witnesses' statements to be taken as evidence-in-chief without 
substantial oral repetition, reading the evidence before the hearing will reduce 
the number of interventions by the arbitrator in order to clarify oral evidence or 
statements.1334 It can also reduce the need for copious note-taking, enabling 
the arbitrator to listen more carefully.1335 Pre-reading by the arbitrator can 
therefore significantly reduce the length of the hearing.1336 
 
For the arbitrator to adequately consider the documents before the hearing a 
key bundle must have been carefully selected and logically arranged by the 
parties' lawyers and delivered to the arbitrator in good time.1337 Moreover, in 
complex matters, reading documents before the hearing may not be possible 
without some prior oral explanation.1338 In these circumstances it is preferable 
for the hearing to be adjourned after a short oral explanation to enable the 
arbitrator to read the documents.1339  
 
The fact that the arbitrator has requested and been duly furnished with 
documents in advance of the hearing unfortunately does not mean that he will 
have read them.1340 An arbitrator may find it helpful to allay counsel's fears in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1332 Mathy (1985) p. 435 
1333 Needham, M. (1989) pp. 101-102 
1334 Harris (1987) p. 152 
1335 Eveleigh, E. (1987) p. 86-87 
1336 Harris, B. (1987) p.152 
1337 Ibid 
1338 Coe (2002) p. 53 
1339 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p. 350 
1340 Caulton (1988) p.95 
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this regard by giving a short and neutral summary of the relevant document(s) 
at an appropriate point in the hearing.1341 
 
In FTA proceedings, an opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses is 
almost always given if a party requests it.1342 Depending on the background of 
the arbitrators, the witnesses will be questioned either by the tribunal or by the 
advocates.1343 The arbitrator may examine a witness called by the parties, but 
it is for the parties to decide which witnesses they wish to call.1344 Frequently, 
arbitrators commence and then hand over the questioning to the lawyers for 
cross-examination.1345 How much cross-examination there will be a function of 
the legal background of arbitrators and counsel.1346 Here, the tribunal has to 
ensure that Civil Law advocates, who often lack familiarity and the skills 
needed for cross-examination and who are not accustomed to witness 
coaching, will not be placed at a disadvantage. In common-law style 
arbitration, testimony will be recorded in literal transcripts, whereas Civil Law 
style arbitration relies more on summaries usually prepared by the presiding 
arbitrator and presented to the witness for approval and signature.1347 
Although the tribunal would not embark on a long series of questions to 
challenge the credibility of a witness, there may be cases where specific 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1341 Mustill/Boyd (1989) p. 350 fn. 4. 
1342 Schneider (2011) 
1343 Ibid 
1344 Zykin (2010) 
1345 Cairns (2010) 
1346 (Interview) Hunter (2010) 
1347 Mohtashami (1999) p. 130 
1348 Holt (2003); See also Chambers, M. (2009) p. 55 
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4.5.7.4 Post Hearing Briefs 
It is becoming increasingly common for tribunals to allow parties to submit 
post‐hearing briefs, which allow parties to address any new material or 
submissions made by the other party, or answer any questions posed by the 
tribunal during the hearing to which they did not have the time to respond, or 
to produce new evidence which came to light after the hearing (but before the 
tribunal has issued its award).1349 
 
Article 47(e) of the WIPO Expedited Rules accords each party a right to 
submit a post-hearing brief within a period of time agreed by the parties or, in 
the absence of such agreement, determined by the Tribunal.1350 Unlike 
Articles 35 and 36, which dictate what the Statements of Claim and Defence 
must contain, Article 47(e) allows the parties and the Tribunal to tailor the 
contents of the post-hearing briefs to the needs of the case. If, for example, 
the hearing is devoted exclusively to examination of witnesses, post-hearing 
briefs may set forth the parties' arguments based on that evidence and 
applicable law.1351 In fact, whether post-hearing briefs are necessary at all will 
depend on the parties' prior opportunities to present their cases in writing, 
such as in their Statements of Claim and Defence and any further written 
submissions. The post-hearing briefs contemplated by Article 47(e) appear to 
have been conceived as an alternative to pre-hearing memorials of the type 
frequently submitted in international arbitration. If such pre-hearing memorials 
are submitted in WIPO expedited arbitrations, it may no longer also be 
necessary to submit post-hearing briefs.1352 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1349 Jarvis (1985) p. 19 
1350 WIPO FTA Rules, Article 47(e) 
1351 In that connection, it has been suggested that, at the hearing, “arguments of any kind should be cut 
off and the parties directed to argue the point in their post-hearing briefs.” Poppleton (1981) p.10 
1352 As noted above, it is generally preferable that all argument and evidence, including testimonial 
evidence, be submitted to the Tribunal in advance of the hearing rather than during or after the hearing. 
See Nickles (1991) p.146; Smit (1991) p.140. 
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Under the VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, there are no post-hearing briefs, as 
no written submissions shall be filed after the oral hearing.1353 This is similarly 
so under many institutional FTA Rules.1354 
 
4.5.8 Post-hearing Matters 
After the hearing and the submission of any post-hearing briefs the arbitral 
tribunal may declare the hearings closed.1355  The usefulness of declaring the 
hearing closed is to discourage the parties from submitting new material, 
which will then require further procedural orders to enable the other party to 
reply.1356 
 
4.5.8.1 Summary form of the award 
FTA provisions vary as regards the provision of a reasoned arbitral award.1357 
Under SCAI Rules, the arbitral tribunal is required to state the reasons upon 
which it relies in summary form, unless the parties have agreed that no 
reasons need to be given.1358 Similarly, section 7 of the DIS SREP regulates 
that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal need not state the 
facts of the case in the award.1359 Under the FCC FTA Rules the arbitral 
award shall not contain reasons, unless a party has no later than in his closing 
statement requested a statement of reasons.1360  
 
The purpose of these provisions is to accelerate the issuance of the award by 
reducing the time necessary for drafting the decision.1361 These rules only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1353 VIAC Arbitration Rules of 2013, Article 45(9)(4) 
1354 FCC FTA Rules, Article 16; HKIAC Rules, Article 38; CPR Global Rules for Accelerated 
Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article 13(5); SIAC Arbitration Rules of 2008, Article 5  
1355 SCC Expedited Rules of 2010, Article 34 
1356 Park (2009) p. 629 
1357 Scherer (2005) p. 231 
1358 SCAI Rules, Article 42(1) 
1359 DIS SREP, Article 7 
1360 FCC FTA Rules, Article 32 
1361 Jarvis, M. (1985) p. 19 
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address the time-consuming task of drafting and are not intended to limit the 
time needed to review the arbitration file, analyse the disputed issues, or 
make a decision on the parties' claims.1362  Arbitrators still need to have 
reasons for rendering the awards; they are only discharged from the task of 
drafting them.1363 
 
It should be stressed that any awards rendered in accordance with FTA is a 
real awards even if the proceedings are expedited.1364 It is not a 
recommendation or a summary judgement that can be reviewed by another 
instance.1365 The award is final from the moment it is communicated. For all 
purposes the decision rendered under FTA is an arbitral awards according to 
the Model Law Article 34 and the NYC Article 5. A court, which may have 
exclusive jurisdiction for any challenge, will hold awards rendered in expedited 
proceedings to the same standards as any other arbitral awards.1366 
 
4.5.8.2 Fees and Costs  
Many fast-track arbitration rules correspond to the Standard Rules with regard 
to fees and costs.1367 Some institutional rules calculate the arbitrators’ 
compensation on the basis of hours spent.1368 Others take into account not 
only the time spent, but also the rapidity of the proceedings and the 
complexity of the dispute.1369 
 
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the arbitrator's fees are decided by 
the arbitral tribunal i.e. the arbitrators decide their own fees, and ascertained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1362 Ibid 
1363 Scherer/Baizeau (2009) p.130 
1364 Casey/Parker (2008) p. 168 
1365 Baizeau (2009) 
1366 Ibid 
1367 See i.e. SCAI Rules, Articles 38-41 
1368 CCIG adopts the same position as that of the AAA—but with less flexibility —and the LCIA, and to 
some extent the ZCC International Arbitration Rules.  
1369 ACICA FTA Rules, Articles 34-36; FCC FTA Rules, Article 21; CPR Global Rules for Accelerated 
Commercial Arbitration of 2009, Article 17; SCC Expedited Rules of 2010, Articles 42-44 
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by reference to the time spent on the dispute.1370 Under institutional arbitration 
rules not the arbitrator alone but institutional board or court decides the 
arbitrator's fees in accordance with the scale-fee regulations appended to the 
institutional rules.1371 It is therefore possible to calculate the costs of the 
arbitration in advance. The losing party has, as a rule, to pay the arbitrator's 
fees and the SCC's administrative charges, although the extent to which a 
party has delayed the proceedings, or in other respects has carelessly 
increased their cost, is taken into account.1372 
 
WIPO Expedited Rules follow similar provisions like its regular arbitration rules 
with respect to fees and costs.1373 The fees payable to the arbitrator shall, 
unless the parties and the arbitrator agree otherwise, be determined within a 
range set out in a schedule of fees issued by WIPO Centre. Both the 
arbitrator's fee and the Centre's charges are calculated on the basis of the 
disputed amount. Subject to any agreement between the parties, the tribunal 
shall apportion the cost of the arbitration and the registration and 
administration fees between the parties in the light of all the circumstances. 
The tribunal may also, subject to any contrary agreement, order a party to pay 
the whole or part of reasonable expenses incurred by the other party in 
presenting its case, including costs for legal representatives and 
witnesses.1374 
 
Noticeably, under KLRCA Fast-Track Rules, the costs, which the parties may 
recover, are capped. In a documents-only arbitration, neither party is entitled 
to recover more than 30% of the total amount in dispute. In arbitration with an 
oral hearing, no more than 50% of the amount in dispute can be recovered in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1370 UNCITRAL Rules, Article 41 
1371 SCC FTA Rules, Articles 42-44 (Appendix III, Schedule of Costs) 
1372 SCC Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article 44 
1373 WIPO Rules, Articles 70-71 
1374 WIPO FTA Rules, Articles 64-65 
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costs1375 It should be noted that these percentages are maximum figures and 
a tribunal may, at its discretion, cap costs at a lower percentage.1376 
 
Some parties may be tempted by the flexibility offered by the SCC Rules 
which provide for a wide range of fees schedules and oblige the SCC Court to 
take into consideration several criteria for the determination of the arbitrators’ 
fees.1377 Some parties may prefer a simpler approach, based on the hours 
worked.1378 Some may prefer to reduce risk by seeking by capping the 
Tribunals fees and recoverable costs to a fixed scale.1379 In any event, it 
seems desirable that arbitration centres offer a plurality of solutions so that 
users can opt for the system which they believe will best meet their 
expectations.1380 
 
 Concluding Remarks 4.6
There has been increasing criticism that arbitration has become too much like 
the courtroom litigation to which it is supposed to offer an alternative.1381 It is 
unsurprising therefore that arbitral organisations have developed expedited 
procedures that reduce the length, cost and complexity of regular arbitration. 
But as we have seen there are substantial differences between the 
approaches they take to expediting arbitration and parties need to be aware of 
them. Nevertheless, with care, FTA procedures can minimise the potentially 
deleterious impact of long delays and excessive costs. FTA rules help parties 
to focus on speed and cost-efficiency from the moment they draft the 
arbitration clause to the final issue of the fast-track arbitral award.1382 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1375 KLRCA FTA Rules, Article 14(3) 
1376 Craig/Park/Paulsson (2000) p.394 
1377 SCC FTA Rules, Articles 42-44 (Appendix III, Schedule of Costs) 
1378 Goodrich/Hunt (2008) 
1379 Bühler (2004) p. 249 
1380 Aksen (2007) p. 258 
1381 Gernandt, J. (2010) p. 119 
1382 Overcash/Gerdes (2009) p.34 
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The procedural steps discussed in this section are designed to avoid 
confusion about some of the relatively mundane aspects of fast-track 
arbitration. They deal with the form and transition of notices, how the periods 
of time fixed in the FTA Rules are to be calculated, and the authority of parties 
and Arbitral Institutions to modify those time limits.1383  
 
When deciding whether or not FTA is suitable in ICA, the following five items, 
in particular, should be considered:1384 
 
• Do FTA time limits provide enough time to resolve the dispute?1385 
• Does the procedure for selecting arbitrators provide sufficient time and 
opportunity to select the arbitrator(s) which will best meet the parties’ 
needs.1386 
• Will procedural constraints jeopardize the chance of presenting a 
party’s case adequately.1387 
• Will provisions for document disclosure allow a party to present its case 
adequately, and to uncover sufficient evidence as may be needed from 
the opposing party?1388 
• Will the award (which may be unreasoned) provide a satisfying 
resolution to the dispute and one which is beyond attack?1389 
 
These considerations are affected not only by the fast-track rules of the 
arbitration institution chosen, but by the law of the place of the arbitration, as 
well as the background and biases of the arbitrators selected.1390 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1383 Kraft (2010) 
1384 Krause/East (2009); Oetiker (2008) 
1385 Arias (2010) p.30 
1386 Müller (1998) p.18 
1387 Sachs, K. (2010 
1388 Rubinstein, J. (2009) 
1389 Magnusson (2001) 
1390 King/Giaretta (2010) 
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Figure 20: Average Daily Duration of FTA and Regular Arbitration Proceedings
Source: Institutional FTA and Regular Arbitration Rules 
 
Time and costs can be saved by trying to expedite each procedural step 
separately. Figure 20 compares the duration of steps in fast-track proceedings 
with regular arbitration. It takes 15 procedural steps for parties to move from 
the request of arbitration to the notification of arbitral award. Under regular 
arbitration rules the whole process takes on average 600-700 days to 
complete; under FTA it takes on average 90-180 days – a reduction of around 
18 months. This is a considerable saving in time but the question that remain 
is whether the quality and the justice of the final result is sufficiently attractive 
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 IS THERE SCOPE FOR THE WIDER APPLICATION OF FTA 5
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION? 
In response to the criticism that arbitration proceedings take too long and cost 
too much, in the past 20 years many institutions have developed specific FTA 
Rules.1391 FTA procedures are now widely discussed by the arbitration 
community at arbitration conferences and success stories describing their use 
are published by arbitral institutions.1392 It is clear that FTA is popular with 
some sectors of the arbitration community and for some kinds of dispute.1393 
But is there scope for wider application of FTA in international commercial 
disputes? 
 
This chapter attempts to answer to this question with the help of institutional 
statistics, recent survey reports and examples from arbitration literature. By 
analysing these results we hope to identify areas where FTA is not currently 
widely used by the arbitration community and also to offer solutions to the 
practical difficulties which may otherwise discourage parties from adopting 
expedited procedure. 
 
 The current level of use of FTA 5.1
In 2012 the SIA/WC published the International Arbitration Survey: Current 
and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process.1394 In it, arbitration lawyers, 
arbitrators, senior in-house counsel, academics and expert witnesses were 
asked what they thought of FTA. The results showed that FTA is not the Holy 
Grail that was hoped for. Despite the warm-hearted support of the arbitration 
community only a small percentage are frequently involved with FTA. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1391 See Appendix 2 
1392 Conferences: Fast-track arbitration: an idea whose time has come? (2009) IBA Annual Meeting, 
Madrid, Spain, October 7, 2009; ASA Below 40 Conference (2008)  Fast-track Arbitration, Switzerland, 
Geneva, October 10, 2008. 
1393 Ibid 
1394 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p. 2 
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past five years only 5% of survey respondents were involved with more than 
five FTA cases while over 70% of survey respondents were involved with 
more than five regular arbitration cases.1395  
 
Furthermore, in the same period, the vast majority of respondents either had 
no experience of FTA or were involved in fewer than five FTA cases.1396 This 
finding alone suggests there may be scope for increased use of FTA – but 
whether it can be made more popular in practice depends on why the 
respondents did not use it. Did they feel it was not appropriate for their 
disputes? There is good evidence that respondents felt FTA was not 
appropriate for their disputes.1397 But they may also have simply not been 
aware of FTA’s potential advantages. And the 5%, who were frequent users 
may have relied on FTA because they were involved in disputes which 
occurred in areas where fast-track arbitration is the norm, e.g., commodities or 
sports.1398 
 
Figure 21: Over the past 5 years, how many fast-track arbitration cases have you been 
involved in? 
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey Report,  p.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1395 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.14 
1396 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.15 
1397 Ibid  
1398 Andreeva (2008) 
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According to Philippe, the greater use of regular arbitration compared to FTA 
is due in large part to the success of applying methods to expedite 
international arbitration.1399 She observed that expedited arbitral proceedings 
are gaining in popularity, but not necessarily under separate sets of FTA 
rules.1400 To her, whether there is a scope for the wider application of FTA 
depends on how you define fast-track procedures. Thus, over the past 5 
years, the number of applications made under Article 9 of the LCIA Arbitration 
Rules for the expedited formation of tribunals has risen from 10 in 2007, to 30 
in 2012.1401 But there has not been a similar trend for FTA cases within the 
LCIA.1402 If we allow that the expedited formation of a regular arbitral tribunal 
is FTA then there does appear to be scope for its wider application.1403  
 
The SIA/WC survey certainly reported that some methods for expediting 
international arbitration have become widely used. In Figure 22 we see that 
the method which respondents considered to be most effective at expediting 
proceedings was ‘identification by the tribunal of the issues to be determined 
as soon as possible after constitution’ followed by ‘appointment of a sole 
arbitrator’ and ‘limiting or excluding document production’. Thus, the idea that 
separate sets of FTA rules are the best way to achieve quick and economic 
arbitration appears to be unrealistic and out of step with the modern holistic 
approach to the international dispute resolution.1404 A variety of methods for 
expediting international arbitration will continue to play a prominent role in 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1399 Philippe (2002) p.283 
1400 Ibid 
1401 LCIA Statistical Reports between 2007 and 2012 
1402 Ibid 
1403 McIlwrath/Savage (2010) p.278 
1404 Schlabrendorff/Sheppard (2005) pp. 743-777 
1405 McIlwrath (2010) p. 532-537 
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Figure 22: Effectiveness of the following methods in expediting arbitral proceedings 
according to the experience of the 2012 SIA/WC Survey respondents over the past 5 
years.
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey Report, p 13 
 
However, not all FTA procedures gained the approval of the respondents. 
While, almost all of the respondents had experience of setting up ‘short time 
limits for the exchange of substantive written submissions’ over the past 5 
years, there was disagreement among them on the effectiveness of this 
method: 48% found it most or quite effective, while 42% said it was the least 
effective or less effective.  
 
Despite this worrying lack of consensus on the effectiveness of time limits, the 
vast majority of survey respondent who had FTA experience in the past 5 
years reported that shortened time limits were complied with most or some of 
the time.1406  However, 34% said that time limits were sometimes complied 
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with, which begs the question ‘What stopped the time limits being applied in 
every case?’ The same is, of course, true for the 7% that said time limits were 
never observed. This 7% demonstrates a significant failure of FTA to meet its 
intended shortened duration.  
 
Figure 23: Were the shortened time-limits generally complied with?
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey Report, p.15 
 
Furthermore, the majority of respondents had never experienced some of the 
most cited FTA procedures for expediting arbitral proceedings. For instance, 
as we see from figure 22, 64% of survey respondents had never experienced 
the provision for short arbitration award without extensive reasoning.1407 
Similarly, 56% of respondents had no experience of an arbitration with no 
hearing.1408  As we saw in Chapter 4, both of these methods are included in 
specific sets of FTA rules.1409 Perhaps including these methods discourages 
parties from agreeing to those packages of FTA rules and therefore to reject 
FTA.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1407 See supra p.268 figure 22 Green list (Never done) See also supra pp. 259-260, Section 4.5.8.1  
1408 See supra p.268 figure 22 Green list (Never done) See also supra pp. 250-251, Section 4.5.7.1 
1409 See supra pp. 191-261, Section 4.5 
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In strong contrast to the respondents’ modest experience with FTA, the survey 
suggests that almost two-thirds of participants are willing to consider FTA 
clauses for future contracts.1410 As shown in figure 24, 60% of respondents 
said that they would favour fast-track clauses (depending on the contract) and 
another 5% said they unequivocally favour fast-track clauses for future 
contracts.  The fact that only 21% do not favour FTA again indicates there 
may be great scope for increased use of FTA although how much will depend 
on why FTA was chosen or rejected.1411 Finally, 14% expressed no view 
about using FTA clauses in the future. This suggests that there may be scope 
for the wider application of FTA if arbitration practitioners can be made aware 
of its merits.1412 
 
Figure 24: Do you favour fast-track arbitration clauses for future contracts? 
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey Report, p. 15 
 
Interestingly, the limited application of FTA reported by the 2012 SIA/WC 
Survey is not consistent with the statistics recently released by arbitral 
institutions who use specific set of FTA Rules. Figure 25 shows that six 
hundred and sixty two arbitration cases were filed by the SCAI between 2004 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1410 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.15 
1411 Barrington (2009) p. 39 
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and 2012. Of those cases, 34% were conducted as FTA procedures. Peak 
years for FTA use were 2004 with 46% and 2010 with 45% of cases being 
fast track. In 2012 40% of SCAI Arbitrations were FTA conducted according to 
expedited arbitration procedures of the Article 42 of the SCAI Arbitration 
Rules. As we see in the previous chapter the SCAI was one of the first arbitral 
institutions to implement an opt-out approach to FTA procedures.1413  In 2004 
it created a monetary threshold of CHF 1,000,000 (one million Swiss francs) 
below which disputes would automatically be referred to FTA.1414 
 
Figure 25: Regular Arbitration vs. FTA Cases under the SCAI between 2004 and 2012
Source: SCAI (Swiss Chambers) Arbitration Statistics 
 
The SIAC is another arbitral institution which on 1 July 2010 introduced an 
opt-out FTA approach but with a higher monetary threshold.1415 However, the 
relative use of FTA is much less than the SCAI. Figure 26 shows that in the 
2.5 years following the introduction of opt-out, the SIAC reported 59 FTA 
procedures which constituted 13% of the 467 cases submitted. Of these 59 
cases, the SIAC accepted 54 under Rule 5(1)(a) (amount in dispute below 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1413 See supra pp.172-174, Section 4.4.6.3 
1414 SCAI Rules, Article 42 
1415 SIAC Rules, Article 5 
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SGD 5 million) and 5 under Rule 5(1)(b) (agreement of the parties). In other 
words, it appears that 54 FTA applications were opposed and 5 agreed by the 
parties.1416  
 
Figure 26: Regular Arbitration vs. FTA Cases under the SIAC between 2010 and 2012
Source: SIAC Arbitration Statistics 
 
The number of SIAC arbitrations parties submitted to it increased from 88 
cases in 2010 to 188 in 2011 and 191 in 2012. The sharp increase came after 
the introduction of expedited rules in 2010 which may indicate a desire for 
FTA.1417 Recourse to FTA procedure under an opt-out approach can be driven 
either by the amount in dispute or by the parties’ desire for FTA. Thirty-one 
FTA applications were submitted to SIAC in 2012. Twenty-six depended on 
the monetary threshold and only two applications were made in accordance 
with parties’ agreement.1418 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1416 See supra p. 178-179 for the role of the SIAC’s Chairman in deciding the suitability of FTA cases. 
1417 But perhaps only FTA as part of regular arbitration; not as a distinct set of FTA rules like those 
institutional rules for expedited arbitration of SCC, WIPO, ACICA and FCC. See supra pp.171-179 
Section 4.4.6.2 
1418 SIAC Annual Arbitration Statistics of 2012. See also supra p. 178, figure 15 












  274 
The small number of applications for FTA after the dispute is explained by the 
conflict of party interests once the dispute has arisen. This indicates that there 
is a scope for FTA if parties are encouraged to agree to pre-dispute FTA 
clauses. This would provide scope for the wider application of FTA if 
automatic application for fast-track procedures fails because the amount in 
dispute is too high. Accordingly, many institutions that offer an opt-out 
approach have recently introduced a model FTA clause which allows parties 
to agree that expedited procedure will apply to disputes with a value greater 
than the opt-out monetary threshold.  
 
Redfern suggested that addressing the problem of delay and expense in ICA 
is only possible if the parties are given the opportunity to choose an FTA 
procedure, and by making that fast-track procedures mandatory for cases 
below a certain monetary value, as is done in the SCAI and other institutions 
with opt-out approach.1419 However, the numbers of non-mandatory FTA 
applications under some arbitral institutions offers evidence against this 
view.1420 SCC, for instance, outlines the fast-track procedures to be followed 
and leaves it to parties to make that choice for the application of fast-track 
procedures.1421 Figure 27 shows that parties submitted 421 requests for FTA 
to the SCC between 2004 and 2012 which had been filed pursuant SCC’s 
specific sets of FTA Rules. This represented 28% of the 1499 cases 
submitted during this period.1422 Similarly, 33% of the 244 cases administered 
under WIPO Rules since 1994 were conducted in accordance with its 
expedited procedure.1423  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1419 Redfern (2008) p. 37 
1420 Bagner (1997) p. 228 
1421 Magnusson, A. (2001). 
1422 SCC Caseload 2004-2012, available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/hem-3/statistik-2.aspx 
1423 WIPO Caseload 1994-2012, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html 
  275 
Figure 27: Regular Arbitration vs. FTA Cases under the SCC between 2004 and 2012
Source: SCC Caseload 2004-2012 
 
Unfortunately, we don’t know whether the numbers of FTA cases recorded are 
related to domestic or international arbitration in the SCC and SCAI 
Arbitrations.1424 Without making a clear division between domestic and 
international FTA cases, these institutional statistics suggest that only around 
20-30% of arbitration cases are FTA and this echoes the low percentage of 
disputes selected for FTA in international commercial dispute resolution.1425 
 
Not all sets of institutional expedited rules have proved to be as popular as 
those where FTA represents around 25-30% of total cases. Some institutions 
have no experience with international commercial disputes and others are too 
recently established to gain the trust of international business users.1426 
Figure 28 shows that the FTA Rules of the FCC did not grab parties’ attention. 
In the first three years there were no FTA cases recorded despite more and 
more arbitration users becoming aware of this option. Only recently have the 
numbers of FTA administered by the FCC risen to 13% of the 66 cases filed in 
2011 and 12% of the 69 arbitrations in 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1424 Although these institutions publish the numbers of domestic and international arbitrations they do 
not so specifically for the numbers of domestic FTA and international FTA.  
1425 See SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.14 See also supra p. 266 figure 21 
1426 Gaillard (1998) p. 29 
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Figure 28: Regular Arbitration vs. FTA Cases under the FCC between 2004 and 2012
Source: FCC Arbitration Statistics 2004-2012 
 
The DIS in Germany published Supplementary Rules for Expedited 
Proceedings (SREP) in 2008 to encourage FTA procedures.1427 Figure 29 
reveals a very low initial uptake followed by a downward trend. This is 
because SREP Rules are neither a separate set of FTA Rules (like SCC rules) 
nor do they provide an opt-out approach to fast-track (like the SCIA and SIAC) 
for arbitrations below a certain monetary threshold.1428 In 2009, a year after 
the SREP Rules were introduced, three FTA cases out of 177 new arbitral 
proceedings was conducted by the DIS. This reduced to two FTA cases out of 
156 in 2010 and only one FTA submitted out of 179 new arbitrations in 2011.  
Similarly, the ACICA and KLRCA reported no more than two FTA cases 
respectively in 2010 and 2011.1429 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1427 Berger, K. P. (2008) p. 595-612 
1428 Bredow (2010); See also Redfern (2008) p. 37 explaining how to make fast-track procedures a real 
choice for parties. 
1429 See ACICA and KLRCA Caseloads of 2010 and 2011 in their secretariats annual arbitration report. 
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Figure 29: Regular Arbitration vs. FTA Cases under the DIS between 2009 and 2012
Source: DIS Arbitration Statistics 2009-2012 
 
Statistical data from various arbitral institutions with specific sets of FTA Rules 
suggest there is scope for the wider application of FTA if one institution learns 
from the others how it can also expand the use of FTA. Under SIAC, SCC and 
WIPO the use of FTA increased in both opt-in and opt-out systems. However, 
this is not replicated by the ACICA, KLRCA, FCC and DIS. 
 
Despite the infrequent use of FTA in international commercial dispute 
resolution, figure 30 shows that only 8% of the SIA/WC 2012 Survey 
respondents that used FTA over the past five years were negative about it 
compared to regular arbitration.1430 35% had a positive view and 40% had a 
positive view depending on the case. 17% either had no view or must have 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1430 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.15 Chart 15 
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  Number	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Figure 30: How was your experience with fast-track arbitration, when compared to a 
regular arbitration?
Source: SIA/WC Survey (2012) p.15 
 
The survey further reported that respondents with experience of FTA felt it 
was more suitable for simpler cases but that in complex cases it jeopardised 
the quality of the award.1431  
 
This is supported by the institutional statistics that, roughly, only 20-30% of 
arbitration cases are FTA – a similar percentage to the low value disputes 
selected for FTA via opt-out Rules.1432  
 
The types of disputes amenable to fast-track arbitration have been identified 
by many authors to include disputes arising out of financial transactions which 
normally involve issues of default that can be resolved relatively quickly, and 
price adjustment disputes in long-term contracts, such as the dispute involved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1431  Ibid p. 15 See also Hierro (2012) p. 42 
1432 See reports in relation to type of disputes conducted under institutional FTA rules. See for general 
analysis in Carter (2011); for SCC in Magnusson (2001); and for SCAI in Morton (2010) 
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in the first FTA cases of the ICC.1433  But does it mean that rules for FTA 
should continue to be confined to specific industries (sports, intellectual 
property, commodity pricing, maritime disputes, etc.) or to “very low 
amounts”? While the survey reported only 5% of respondents are regular FTA 
users, 60% are willing to try it.1434 This alone indicates there is scope for 
increased use of FTA. If the international arbitral community is seriously 
concerned to reduce the time and costs of international arbitration, as it 
purports to be then it is time to stop tinkering with the existing arbitration rules 
and give the parties the option of a quicker and more expedited model of 
international fast-track commercial arbitration. 
 
 Risks associated with FTA when compared with RA 5.2
Opponents to FTA are unwilling to try fast-track procedures for international 
cases. However many types of international disputes have been resolved by 
FTA. Notable successes are commodities, maritime and construction disputes 
in England, and sports and WIPO disputes in Switzerland. These positive 
results allowed FTA to gradually expand over the past 25 years into general 
international commercial disputes. However, international FTA does involve 
risk, and worries remain regarding whether due process will be respected, 
whether mandatory rules will adversely affect fast-track procedures, and 
whether FTA awards will be enforced globally. This section examines whether 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1433 See Ibid See also previous authors with similar observations in Tschanz (1993) p.56; 
Newman/Burrows (1994) p. 3, col. 1; Ballem (1991) p. 152-153; Silverman (1991) pp.154-158; 
Watkiss, D. K. (1991) pp. 150 
1434 SIA/WC Survey 2012, p.15 
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5.2.1 Fear of compromising due process 
While it is certain that FTA achieves speed and economy, a dispute that is 
resolved in, say, three days may cause parties to doubt whether due process 
has been respected and whether the award will be binding and enforceable 
globally. 1435  
 
The first point to make is that FTA is not intrinsically incompatible with due 
process. In Walkinshaw v Diniz the English High Court Judge rejected the 
allegations that three days is not enough to conduct a fast-track arbitral 
procedure because the respondent would not have sufficient opportunities to 
make its case.1436 The High Court stated that “if justice so required”, the 
procedure needed only to involve as many meetings “as required”, and in that 
case justice did not ask for more.1437 The English court confirmed that the 
acceptable speed of arbitration depends on what justice requires and that 
shortened time limits do not necessarily prevent a party’s right to be heard.  
 
However, according to Schwartz, by its own nature fast-track procedure 
compromises the equality of parties as it imposes short time-limits and 
procedural constraints on the respondent for the preparation of the 
defence.1438 In FTA the claimant has time to prepare and then to dump a 
claim on the respondent, who may not have sufficient time to prepare a proper 
defence.1439 Fast-track arbitration may therefore simply be an unfair 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes. It clearly favours the claimant and 
infringes the defence rights of the respondent.1440 Hence, it has the potential 
to spawn due process challenges to the arbitral award.1441 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1435 Baker/Romman (2009) 
1436 Walkinshaw v. Diniz (Stay of Proceedings). (1999, May 19). Queen's bench division (commercial 
court). [1999] WL 33105608 
1437 Walkinshaw v Diniz [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 237 
1438 Schwartz, E. A. (1998) p.144 
1439 Lamm (2009) 
1440 Ibid 
1441 Kurkela/Turunen (2010)  
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In order to reduce such concerns, arbitration institutions have introduced 
different types of FTA Rules which balance time limits and procedural 
constraints against due process protection.1442 While parties can select 
among these FTA rules or adopt their own time limits they cannot limit the 
authority of arbitrators or arbitral institutions to extend those time limits, or to 
introduce additional procedural steps if the circumstances of the case require 
it.1443 In this way speed can become an objective without reducing due 
process safeguards. 
  
Thus in Walkinshaw v Diniz it was held that, despite FTA Rules, the tribunal 
would extend time limits to allow the respondent to make submissions for the 
presentation of its case, and they would add further procedural steps where 
necessary: 
 
“As a matter of fairness to TWR/Arrows Respondent in Arbitration, given the 
sum of money apparently turning indirectly on the answer to this issue a 
reference to whether the contract had been terminated under clause 9.2(b) or 
clause 9.5 we think it is wrong to proceed in TWR/Arrows' absence without 
giving it another opportunity to attend a further CRB meeting arbitration 
hearing where it could present evidence and argument in support of its case, 
provided that no irreparable prejudice from such a delay is thereby inflicted 
upon the Driver or Sauber Claimants in Arbitration.”1444 
 
The acceptable speed limit here thus depends on “the matter of fairness”.1445 
However, in order to identify more precisely “what justice requires” or “what 
the circumstances require” we need to know how FTA may violate due 
process in international commercial dispute resolution.1446 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1442 Carter (2011) p.4 
1443 Note on Expedited ICC Arbitration Procedure of 2002 
1444 [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 23 
1445 Ibid 
1446 Hartwell/Geoffrey (1998) (achieving efficiency without sacrificing due process discussed at session 
of Working Group II at the 14th ICCA Congress on 5 May 1998 - Paris, France) 
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The problem for FTA is that there is no authority other than the tribunal’s 
discretion to ensure the compliance with fast-track procedures.1447 But this 
authority is exercised subject to various constraints. Chief among these is 
requirement of due process at the place of arbitration.1448 Indeed, due process 
is often explicitly required by the lex arbitri although specific standards may 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1449 
 
Although modern arbitration law almost always takes the view that it is up to 
the parties and the tribunal to ensure the propriety of the proceedings there 
are some exceptions to the principle of judicial non-interference.1450 
Furthermore, even if courts may not interfere during the conduct of FTA, any 
instances of procedural misconduct will reappear if the final award is 
challenged.1451 For this reason Paulsson says parties exchange legal security 
for speed in FTA.1452  
 
In order to increase the wider application of FTA, fast-track procedures must 
be made more resistant to claims of due process being violated.1453 Of 
course, FTA provisions could abandon the very notion of due process, and 
instead simply define precise time limits for giving evidence, claims, etc. with 
no recourse to extensions.1454 This could be legally binding with the right 
legislation (in sport disputes parties have exactly 24 hours to make their case) 
but international business users will not want to arbitrate in such an inflexible 
system.1455 As we observed in the first chapter, ICA traditionally addressed 
the drawbacks of litigation to business parties.1456 It offered alternatives such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1447 Karrer (1998) p. 136 
1448 Sentner (2008) p. 81 
1449 See supra p.123-124 Section 4.3 
1450See, e.g., Tuesday Indus. Ltd v. Condor Indus. Ltd, [1978] (4) SA 379 (South Africa); Windward 
Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co.,123 Fed. App'x 481 (3d Cir. 2005) See Born (2009) p.1341 
1451 Paulsson (2001) p. 611 (The most serious reservation one may entertain with respect to fast-track 
procedures flow from the observation that equality may be an elusive concept.)  See also Paulsson 
(1996) 
1452 Paulsson (1994) p. 715 
1453 Davis/Smit/Brown/Affaki/et al (1994) p. 454 
1454 Baker/Romman (2009) 
1455 Müller (1998) p.6 
1456 See supra p. 54 Section 1.5 
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as expert decision-making, procedural adaptability and flexibility, finality, 
confidentiality and, lastly, time and cost-savings. Emphasising the importance 
of speed and economy under fast-track procedures does not mean that 
parties do not want the other fundamental objectives of ICA.1457 
 
Due process is such a subjective and imprecise area that it can be interpreted 
in many ways.1458 This offers a recalcitrant party opportunities to employ 
various type of dilatory tactics which are contrary to the overriding objectives 
of FTA procedures.1459 
 
Some examples of due process violations will clarify how risky it is to conduct 
international commercial dispute resolution using fast-track procedures. In 
MORS v. Supermarket Sys1460 due process was violated when the tribunal 
relied on a submission which it had previously rejected as being out-of-time. In 
Groundshire Ltd v. VHF Constr. plc1461 the due process rights of the parties 
were breached when the arbitrator relied on his own knowledge, without 
hearing the parties, on damages issues. In Zermalt Holdings SA v. Nu-Life 
Upholstery Repairs Ltd1462 the arbitrators came to a decision based on factual 
materials which were not advanced by the parties. The court stated: 
  
“If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never been raised by either 
side then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an opportunity to 
comment. If he feels that the proper approach is one that has not been 
explored or advanced in evidence or submission, then again it is his duty to 
give the parties a chance to comment”1463 
 
FTA Rules sometimes require arbitrators to conduct private fact-finding, such 
as independently visiting construction sites, contacting one party regarding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1457 Hierro (2012) p. 38 
1458 Paulsson (2001) p. 612 See for a discussion of due process theories Rutherford (1992) 
1459 Conference (2009), Due Process in International Arbitration,12th IBA International Arbitration Day 
1460 Cour d'appel, Paris, Judgment of 18 April 1991, 1995 Rev Arb 448  
1461 [2001] B.L.R. 395 (Q.B.) 
1462 [1984] 2 EGLR 14 (Q.B.)  
1463 Ibid p. 15 
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substance of the case, or interviewing witnesses. However, the findings of 
arbitrators may cause problems if they are not communicated to the parties. 
The Paris Court of Appeal, for instance, annulled an award in Sporprom Sers. 
BV v. Polyfacne Immo1464 where the tribunal relied on an expert report not 
provided to the parties and also in Compagnie Aeroflot v. AGF1465 where the 
tribunal relied on personal knowledge without communicating it to the parties. 
 
In Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North American Towing, Inc.,1466 the 
arbitrator engaged in ex parte communications with one party's lawyers, 
without notifying the adverse party and the court annulled the award due to 
the arbitrators' ex parte contacts. The court stated that although arbitrators 
need not follow “all the niceties observed by the federal courts,” they must 
provide the parties with “a fundamentally fair hearing.”1467 
 
Similarly, in Vee Networks Ltd v. Econet Wireless Int'l Ltd1468 the court held 
that:  
 
“by advancing the point of construction not argued by either party the 
arbitrator was neither acting fairly nor giving each party a reasonable 
opportunity of putting its case”. 
 
A tribunal's refusal to conduct a hearing can be another reason for a party to 
claim it does not have the opportunity to be heard.1469 In Immoplan v. 
Mercure1470 one of the parties requested a hearing but the tribunal decided the 
issue without holding an oral hearing. The court decided that the due process 
rights of the parties were violated. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1464 Cour d'appel, Paris, Judgment of 18 January 1983, 1984 Rev Arb 87 
1465 Cour d'appel, Paris, Judgment of 10 June 1993,1995 Rev Arb 447 (award annulled where tribunal 
relied on personal knowledge); 
1466 Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North American Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) 
1467 Ibid See also United Food & Comm. Workers Int'l Union v. SIPCO, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21332 (D. Iowa 1992)  
1468 [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 192, 194 (Q.B.) 
1469 Mantilla-Serrano, (2004) p. 340 
1470  Cour d'appel, Paris, Judgment of 19 January 1990, 1991 Rev Arb 125 
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Similar concerns arise where a party is not provided with proper notice.1471 In 
PPX Enter Inc. v. Musicali,1472 failure to timely inform one of the parties of the 
hearing date violated its due process rights and led to the annulment of the 
award. Under the shortened time limits of FTA the risk of the arbitral tribunal 
making such mistakes is much higher than in regular arbitration.1473  
 
FTA procedures are also criticized on the grounds that scheduling decisions 
will impede the parties’ ability to present their cases, for example, by 
preventing the attendance of a witness, or by granting counsel less 
preparation and presentation time than requested.1474 FTA scheduling may 
also provide parties with some advantage, for example, making them focus on 
the real issues in dispute and avoiding unneccessary procedural steps 
otherwise applicable in the regular arbitral proceedings.1475 Certainly, if a 
tribunal grants one party a significant, unjustified procedural advantage or 
refuses without justification to postpone or reschedule a hearing so that 
essential witnesses or irreplaceable counsel can be available, due process 
rights will be violated.1476  
 
In Tube & Steel Corp. of Am. v. Chicago Carbon Steel Products 1477 the US 
Court decided due process violation had occurred when the tribunal 
scheduled a hearing on a date that one party could not make, despite the fact 
that the parties had mutually agreed on another date. Again, even though fast-
track procedures may not be a problem, the objectives of meeting shortened 
time limits increase the risks of the tribunal making an obvious error.1478 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1471 Dahlberg/Öhrström (2010) p. 539 
1472 384 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 397 N.Y.S.2d 987 (N.Y. 1977)  
1473 Baizeau (2009) 
1474 Japaridze (2008) p. 1430 
1475 Böckstiegel (1999) p. 52 
1476 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch (1993) p.81 
1477 319 F.Supp. 1302, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)  
1478 Lamm (2009) 
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Another ground for the denial of due process in FTA is the arbitrator’s 
improper exclusion or admission of evidence.1479 In Gervant v. New England 
Fire Ins. Co.,1480 the court held that: “In arbitration proceedings the rule is that 
‘If the arbitrators refuse to hear evidence pertinent and material to the matter 
in controversy, it is unquestionably such misconduct as will vitiate an award in 
a court of equity.’”1481  
 
In Chilton v. Saga Holidays plc,1482 the English Court of Appeal set aside an 
award where the arbitrator refused to allow the respondent's solicitor to cross-
examine the claimants on the grounds that the claimants were unrepresented. 
 
A number of courts have decided that unreasoned awards violate due process 
rights, where this has affected the parties' rights to be heard. In Judgment of 
22 March 2007, DFT 4P.172/2006 the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the 
tribunal's failure to address the party's lengthy legal submissions in its award, 
or to provide any indication that these submissions were considered, violated 
the party's right to be heard. 
 
Understandably, some parties reject FTA, considering that the risk is too great 
that due process rights will not be respected and that the award will not be 
final and enforceable.1483 However, if parties need some manner of protecting 
themselves against this risk, they can contract for a second round of 
arbitration as their mechanism for an appeal.1484 In England, for instance, 
adjudicators’ decisions on construction disputes can be reviewed by courts to 
reduce due process concerns.1485 A post-award process of appellate 
arbitrators can be suggested to review an FTA award before a final award is 
issued.1486 This would indeed increase arbitration’s expense and duration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1479 Habegger, P. (2009) 
1480 306 N.Y. 393 (N.Y. App. 1954) 
1481 Ibid See also Born (2009) p.2585  fn.182 
1482 [1986] 1 All E.R. 841 
1483 Kurkela/Turunen (2010) 
1484 Knull/Rubins (2000) p.531-607 
1485 Jenkins/Stebbings (2006) p. 105-126 
1486 Ginkel (2003) p. 192 
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contrary to the overriding objectives of FTA, but it would provide the review 
some parties’ desire without stepping back to regular arbitration proceedings. 
 
Even though fast-track procedures should respect fundamental due process 
rights and many court decisions support arbitrators who apply fast track,1487 
the many court decisions that go against FTA awards show that parties still 
face a compromise between the speed they want and the legal security they 
need. 
5.2.2 The impact of Mandatory Procedural Requirements on 
FTA 
The parties' freedom to agree upon FTA procedures and the tribunal's 
discretion to adopt such procedures are subject to the mandatory 
requirements of applicable national and international law.1488 Under most 
developed arbitration statutes, mandatory requirements are limited to due 
process rights and the procedural regularity of the FTA process.  However, it 
is often difficult to identify what precisely constitutes a mandatory procedural 
requirement of the arbitral seat (or elsewhere) even for a lawyer educated in 
the country in question. 1489  
 
Most national laws are silent on the question of parties’ freedom to fast-track 
procedures in ICA.1490 However, mandatory rules of some states interfere with 
parties’ autonomy to agree upon arbitral procedures1491 and instead, impose 
specific, mandatory procedural regimes for the FTA proceedings. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1487 See i.e. Swiss Supreme Court decision dealing with an FTA award rendered under Article 42 of the 
SCAI Rules in 4A_294/2008 of 28 October 2008, ASA Bull. 1/2009, pp. 144-152.   
1488 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 34(2)(iv); German Arbitration Act of 1998, Article1059 (2)(d); 
Austrian CCP of 2006, Article 611 (2)(iv); Australian IAA of 2011, Section16 
1489 Caron/ Pellonpää/Caplan (2006) p. 80 
1490 Lau/Horlach (2010)  p.121  
1491 Blessing (1997) pp. 23-40 discussing the legal effect of mandatory rules which in the wide sense 
include mandatory rules (i) of an internal or domestic mandatory nature, (ii) those of a foreign legal 
order, (iii) those of an international character, claiming application irrespective of, any law chosen or 
determined as applicable, and (iv) those pertaining to a truly supranational order 
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For example, until recently, arbitration statutes in some Latin American states 
imposed detailed procedural time tables that arbitral tribunals were obliged to 
follow.1492 Other states impose procedural requirements imported from local 
litigation.1493 For example, the Egyptian Evidence in Civil and Commercial 
Matters Act of 1968 requires witnesses to personally attend the hearings and 
to testify orally.1494 The new Egyptian Arbitration Act repealed the former 
arbitration chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure but left the Evidence Act 
untouched.1495 Furthermore, one can infer from the conjunction of Articles 25, 
33(4) and 37(1) of the of the Arbitration Act that personal presence of the 
witness and his oral testimony is still required, if no contrary agreement is 
expressly made.1496 Thus unwary parties might agree to a clause without 
knowing about Egypt’s law and subsequently find they cannot submit written 
witness statements without oral testimony. 
 
In some other national laws there are mandatory procedural deadlines which 
might restrict FTA provisions. For example, in the Republic of Armenia, Article 
20 of the Law on Arbitration provides that the arbitration tribunal must in a 
proper manner notify the parties about the place and time of the court's 
session.1497 What is meant by ‘in a proper manner’ is defined in Article 17 
which specifies that the respondent should be given thirty days to respond to 
the statement of claim presented to him by the plaintiff.1498 Further, Article 
40(3) of the Armenian Law on Arbitration advises that "the issuance of the writ 
of execution of an award may be refused if the party against whom the award 
was entered was not notified in a proper manner about the time and place of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1492 See, e.g., Guatemalan Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Articles 287 and 288; Organic 
Law of the Judiciary (Chile), Law 7421 of 15 June 1953, Article 223. The residual effects of this 
legislative approach remain even in France's current domestic arbitration legislation. French NCPC 
Articles 1456 (six month time limit), 1460 (judicial procedures mandatorily applicable in domestic 
arbitration). 
1493 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Promulgated by Law No. 93-42) Art. 7; McConnaughay/Ginsburg 
(2009) pp. 449-464 (Vietnam's Ordinance on Commercial Arbitration, 2003 guarantees party 
autonomy, abandoning out-dated procedural requirements). 
1494 Egyptian CCP of 1968 
1495 Law No. 27 For 1994 Promulgating The Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 
1496 Ibid  
1497 Armenian Arbitration Act of 2006, Article 20 
1498 Armenian Arbitration Act of 2006, Article 17 
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the proceedings".1499 Therefore, an FTA procedure cannot provide a time limit 
shorter than 30 days for the statement of defence if Armenian law is to be 
applied.  
 
Similarly, the Algerian mandatory fifteen-day time limit for the answer would 
void a shorter time limit set by the parties. Article 1022 of the new Algerian 
Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure requires each party to set out its 
defence and supply the relevant documents at least fifteen days before expiry 
of the arbitration time limit, whether fixed by agreement or by law.1500 Thus, 
any parties agreeing to a fast-track arbitration to be conducted under Algerian 
law should refrain from setting a time limit shorter than fifteen days for the 
rendering of the award, otherwise the award will face a real risk of being set 
aside.1501  
 
A related argument could be made at the enforcement stage under I(3) of the 
NYC, which indicates that state signatories can limit the application of the 
Convention to those proceedings that are ‘commercial’ in nature. Although the 
vast majority of signatories have not adopted that particular reservation, a 
significant number (45 of 149) currently have.1502 The term ‘commercial’ has 
typically been interpreted broadly so as to encourage enforceability of awards 
under the Convention.1503 Indeed, Gary Born has stated that the term should 
be given ‘a liberal, expansive definition that includes all manner of business, 
financial, consulting, investment, technical and other enterprise’.1504 However, 
a few national court decisions have adopted what appears to be a narrow 
definition of “commercial relationship” under the Convention.1505  For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1499 Armenian Arbitration Act of 2006, Article 40(3) 
1500 Algerian Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure, Article 1022. See also Article1018 (three 
months from date of submission to arbitration, unless otherwise agreed , the arbitral tribunal may, for 
good reasons, provide for an extension of the term by two months at the most.”) 
1501 Born (2011) p.733-734 
1502 See at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
1503 Born (2009) p. 260-264 (but noting problems could arise with regard to ‘public law’ statutory rights 
(such as those involving concession agreements or other contracts involving elements of national 
sovereignty) and consumer transactions or employment law). 
1504 Ibid 
1505 BV Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States of America, 1976 A.M.C. 2514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (claims for 
salvage of US military vessel not commercial). 
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an Indian court held that agreements concerning the transfer of technology 
were not “commercial” under Indian law or the Convention.1506  Likewise, the 
Tunisian Cour de Cassation held that a contract for the architectural design in 
a town-planning program was not commercial.1507 To the extent that states 
wish to exclude certain types of transactions, the legislature can adopt specific 
substantive rules regarding the non-arbitrability of those disputes.1508 The 
better approach to Article I(3) was adopted by France in 1989, which withdrew 
the commercial reservation that it made when originally ratifying the NYC.1509   
 
Problems do occasionally arise as a result of the relevant country not having 
acceded to the NYC1510 or (more difficult to identify) not properly incorporating 
the provisions of the NYC into its domestic law, even where it has 
acceded.1511  
 
Bearing in mind that parties have a reasonable expectation that national 
courts should expedite arbitration proceedings, it is important to discover how 
courts can be helped in fast-tracking international commercial disputes. This 
requires knowing the attitude of the courts toward the FTA process at the 
location of the forum. Are the courts there inclined to take a hands-off attitude 
to fast-track proceedings? Or will they actively intervene in the fast-track 
process to ensure that parties respect the mandatory rules of law? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1506 RM Inv. & Trading Co. Pvt Ltd (India) v. Boeing Co., XXII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 710 (Indian S.Ct. 1994) 
(1997); India Organic Chemicals, Ltd v. Chemtex Fibres Inc., (1978) All India Rep. 106 (Bombay High 
Court) 
1507 Judgment of 10 November 1993, Taieb Haddad and Hans Barett v. Societe d'Investissement Kal, 
XXIII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 770 (Tunisian Cour de cassation) (1998). 
1508 Greenawalt (2007) p.103 
1509 French Decree No. 90-170 of 16 February 1990, Official Journal of 23 February 1990 
1510 See, for instance, Texaco Pananma Inc. v Duke Petroleum Transport Corp., 3 September 1996 95 
Civ. 3761 (LMM); International Arbitration Report 11(9) (1996) pp. D1 – D2, ‘The New York Convention 
of 1958 relied on by the respondent does not apply, since sic respondent is a Liberian corporation and 
Liberia is not a signatory party to that Convention’. 
1511 For example, Pakistan was an early signatory to the New York Convention but did not amend its 
domestic law to reflect its terms until 14 July 2005. 
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In Petro­Canada v. Alberta Gas Ethylene Co.1512 a party received indications 
from the tribunal that the award would not be favourable to him. The award 
was to be rendered shortly after 08 March 1991, the contractually agreed 
date.  The party immediately applied to the court on 11 March 1991 seeking to 
enforce the party agreed time limit for the issuance of the award. The 
successful claim meant that as the award was rendered after the contractual 
deadline, it was beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the award was therefore 
unauthorized and invalid. The court found that “it is not for the courts or the 
Arbitral tribunal to question a party’s motivation for exercising a contractual 
right.”1513 
 
Finally, even if lex arbitri employs a hands-off approach to fast-track 
proceedings, whether the award will be enforced in another country will 
depend on how the enforcing courts look upon the fast-track process and its 
review by the courts at the original location.1514 There is thus considerable risk 
if the arbitral forum does not have substantial experience in supporting fast-
track procedures, or if the place of enforcement is located where the courts 











	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1512Petro-Canada v. Alberta Gas Ethylene Co. (1992, January 28). Alberta Court of Appeal, 
Harradence, Stratton and Fraser JJ., A.,1 Alta. L.R. (3d) 380, 127 A.R. 128, 20 V.A.C. 128. 
1513 Ibid 121 AR 199, 205 
1514 Daly/Scheller (2010) p. 67 
1515 Koch (2009) p. 273 See also Paulsson (1998) p. 19 
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5.2.3 International enforceability of FTA awards under the NYC 
FTA is most useful if it provides an award that is binding and easy to enforce 
internationally.1516 In 2007 Berg observed that only 70 arbitral awards were 
refused enforcement although 700 applications were made to refuse 
enforcement under the NYC.1517 A failure rate of only 10% can be considered 
a successful achievement for the interpretation of international arbitral 
proceedings under the NYC. But do the grounds of challenge to awards 
contained in Article V of the NYC limit or prohibit the application of FTA?1518  
 
5.2.3.1 A potential conflict between party autonomy and 
fast-track procedures 
The single most likely reason for FTA to produce an award that is not 
enforceable is an objection that arises under Article V (1)(d) of the NYC. This 
provision allows a national court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award 
upon proof that ‘the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place’.1519  
 
Issues can arise where an arbitral tribunal does not wish to accept a fast-track 
procedure agreed upon by the parties.1520 For example, the parties may wish 
to permit limited document discovery, followed by a one day evidentiary 
hearing, while the arbitral tribunal firmly believes that extensive discovery and 
a 1 week hearing is appropriate.1521 In these circumstances, may the tribunal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1516 Broichmann/Ernemann (2010) 
1517 Berg (2007) p. 35 
1518 Verbist (2008) p. 692 (The author states that no less than 136 reported court decisions were found 
worldwide during the last 35 years where due process was raised as a ground to oppose enforcement, 
but the due process ground caused State courts to refuse enforcement in 14 cases only.) 
1519 NYC Article V(1)(d) 
1520 Born, G. (2009) p. 260-264 
1521 Veeder (2008) 
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“reject” the parties' agreement, or is it bound to implement the parties' 
mutually-agreed fast-track procedures?1522  
 
Most courts have emphasized that an arbitral tribunal's interpretation and 
application of the parties' agreed arbitral procedures will not be subject to 
rigorous judicial second-guessing: Article V(1)(d) was not “intended … to 
permit reviewing courts to police every procedural ruling made by the 
arbitrator and to set aside the award if any violation of the party agreed 
procedures is found.”1523  
 
However, the US Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l 
Corp.1524 did not accept this approach. In this case the court vacated the 
arbitration award under § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) on the 
ground that the arbitrator exceeded his powers while interpreting and 
enforcing an arbitration agreement.  
 
Whether one views the reliance on state law as a means of determining party 
intent (as suggested in Stolt-Nielsen) or as a separate default mechanism 
under the second clause of Article V(1)(d) regarding ‘the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place’, the analysis is the same under the NYC.1525  
Neither Article V(1)(d) nor any other provision of Article V permits non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1522 Carter (1995) p.31; Littman (1997) p.269; Rokison (1998) p. 361 
1523 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc., [1992] WL 122712 (D.D.C. 1992). See 
also Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 315 (Q.B.) (rejecting 
defense to recognition based on failure of arbitrators to comply with CIETAC Rules, as parties' agreed 
procedures, under Article V(1)(d)); Judgment of 14 April 1998, SpA Ghezzi v. Jacob Boss Söhne, XV 
YBCA 450 (at 453-454) (Federal Supreme Court, Germany)(1990) (rejecting argument that failure to 
render award within ICC Rules' deadline of six months was grounds for non-recognition under Article 
V(1)(d), on grounds that ICC Rules provide for extensions, which were granted, and do not provide for 
termination of arbitrators' mandate after six months); Judgment of 20 October 1998, XXIX YBCA 673 
(Oberlandesgericht Dresden) (2004) (no violation of parties' agreed arbitral procedures where, in award 
debtor's default, arbitral institution applied its rules providing for institutional appointment of co-
arbitrator); Judgment of 30 May 2006, XXXII YBCA 406 (Italian Corte di Cassazione) (2007) (failure of 
arbitrator to declare proceedings closed, as required by institutional rules, “is only a defect in the arbitral 
proceedings which may be relied on, if at all, in the foreign legal system through the means of recourse 
available therein”); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(apparently holding that arbitrators' determination that arbitration agreement's procedures had been 
properly followed was binding). 
1524 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010). 
1525 Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas/Rogers (2011) See also Lew (2007) p. 455 
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recognition of an award merely because the arbitral tribunal gave effect to the 
parties' agreed arbitral procedures rather than the law of the arbitral seat.1526 
On the contrary, Article V(1)(d) grants priority to the parties' procedural 
agreement and provides for the non-recognition of awards where the arbitral 
tribunal gives effect to mandatory local law rather than the parties' agreed 
arbitral procedures.1527 As discussed above, both arbitral tribunals and 
national courts have sought to avoid conflicts between mandatory local laws 
and agreed FTA procedures, typically by interpreting each consistently with 
the other.1528 Nonetheless, where a conflict is unavoidable, it is the parties' 
agreed arbitral procedures that prevail over local mandatory law for purposes 
of Article V(1)(d).1529  
 
According to Born, provided that FTA proceedings are based on the parties’ 
consent either express or implied, Article V(1)(d) of the NYC would not be 
implicated and conducting a fast-track procedure should not provide grounds 
for denying recognition to an award'.1530  In one case, the Court of Appeal of 
Bremen dismissed the respondent's argument under Art. V (1)(d) NYC that 
the arbitral proceedings were not in accordance with the law of the country 
where arbitration took place, because the arbitral tribunal did not grant the 
respondent's request for an oral hearing and disregarded its offer of new 
evidence.1531 The court held that the arbitral tribunal acted in accordance with 
the Institutional Arbitration Rules, which applied as a consequence of the 
parties' agreement to refer their disputes to arbitration before that body and 
under which a documents only arbitration could be conducted.1532  
 
Parties may also argue that fast-track proceedings are improper in cases 
where the parties have agreed to proceed under a particular set of regular 
arbitral rules that do not specifically contemplate FTA provisions but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1526 Horvath (2011) p. 270 
1527 Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port (2010) p. 285 
1528 Haas (2009) para 65. 
1529 Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v. S.r.l. Termarea (ItalyNo.32),Cortedi Appello of Florence, 13 April 1978 
1530 Born (2009) p.2764 
1531 Judgement of 30 September 1999, XXXI YCBA 640 (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht) (2006) 
1532 Ibid pp. 640-651 
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institution has nevertheless applied FTA.1533 According to Kreindler it is 
doubtful whether an award arising out of implicit application of FTA 
proceedings (unless parties explicitly choose fast-track) would be enforceable 
under the NYC, even in cases where the relevant law or arbitral rules give the 
necessary authority to a court, arbitrator or appointing authority.1534 Julian D.M 
Lew’s view on FTA similarly appears to be based on a strict reading of party 
autonomy that institutions cannot fast-track regular arbitration without express 
party agreement.1535 Although criticised by other commentators,1536 this view 
is strongly embedded within the international arbitral community.1537  In 
practice, it is clear that the parties' procedural autonomy is paramount and 
that institutions and arbitrators under institutional arbitration rules will almost 
always seek agreement by the parties on fast-track procedural issues and will 
only in the rarest of cases accept implicit application of FTA proceedings.1538 
 
The split of opinion between Born and Kreindler regarding the international 
enforceability of FTA awards without express agreement for fast-track 
procedures suggests that FTA awards will receive a similarly divided reception 
at the enforcement stage.1539  
 
Another area of concern involves the parties' ability to choose their own 
arbitrators, which is often considered a fundamental right in arbitration.1540 
The sanctity of this principle is reflected in Article V(1)(d) of the NYC, which 
explicitly protects the parties' agreements concerning the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1533 See supra p. 171-178 Section 4.4.6.3 
1534 Kreindler (1998) pp. 180-187 
1535 Lew/ Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p.548 ¶ 21-85 
1536 Derains (2003) pp. 25, 27, 33  
1537 Lynch (2003) pp. 72-74. 
1538 Zuberbühler/Muller/Habegger (2005) p. 355 
1539 Born (2009) pp. 185-187; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) pp. 70-81 ¶ 5-2; Lynch (2003) pp. 72-74. 
1540 Born (2009) p.1378 
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Difficulties can arise, however, when an attempt to expedite the appointment 
of a tribunal breaks down.1541 Whenever an agreed fast-track procedure is not 
followed, the composition of the tribunal will be improper. Such improper 
composition may arise in the initial composition or result from the treatment of 
challenges by the parties subsequent to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
The following examples illustrate cases in which improper composition was 
raised as a defence to enforcement and recognition under Article V(1)(d). In 
Encyclopaedia Universalis SA v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.,1542 the 
parties' arbitration agreement was violated when the two co-arbitrators 
reached deadlock and the appointing authority was unable to appoint a 
presiding arbitrator. In Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v. Srl Termarea1543, the 
arbitral tribunal comprised two arbitrators and the Italian court refused to 
recognize its award because the arbitration agreement provided for a three-
person tribunal. In contrast, the US court in Al Haddad Bros. Enter. Inc. v. MS 
Agapi1544 recognized the award made by the sole arbitrator, pursuant to the 
English Arbitration Act, even though the parties' agreement provided for three 
arbitrators.   
 
Numerous solutions have been proposed to ensure expedited appointment of 
arbitrators.1545 The most popular has been to allow the appointing authority to 
name the sole arbitrator, either immediately or once it is clear that the parties 
cannot agree on the procedure to be used.1546 This method, which is 
considered to protect the equality of the parties, applies equally well to FTA. 
Therefore, enforcing courts will likely be able to rely on existing practice and 
authority when considering objections to a FTA award arising out of the 
appointment of arbitrators. In one case, where the agreement specified the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1541 See e.g., BKMI Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Dutco Construction Co. Ltd (1990) XV YBCA 124; 
Gaillard/Savage (1999) pp.  47-49 Sections 92-93 
1542 403 F.3d 85, 90-92 (2d Cir. 2005)  
1543 Judgment of 13 April 1978, Rederi Aktiebolaget Sally v. Srl Termarea, IV YBCA 294, 294-95. 
1544 635 F.Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1986); Judgment of 3 June 1982, X v. Naviera YSA, XI YBCA 527 
(Spanish Tribunal Supremo) (1986);  Judgment of 24 February 1994, Ministry of Public Works v. 
Société Bec Frères, XXII YBCA 682 (Paris Cour d'appel) (1997) 
1545 Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port (2010) p. 289 
1546 Frick (2001) p. 234;   
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appointing authority but the tribunal was appointed by a different authority, the 
court rejected the argument that the composition was out of line with the 
agreement because the arbitrator was appointed by the institutional 
appointing committee once the parties could not reach agreement on an 
arbitrator.1547 Similarly, if the agreement or the local law requires the 
nominated arbitrator to have certain qualifications and the arbitrator is missing 
those qualifications, the tribunal would be improper. The same principle 
applies to the number of arbitrators.1548 Some FTA Rules allow the institution 
to appoint the arbitrator without providing parties an opportunity to agree a 
choice. This may increase speed but makes FTA procedure less consensual 
and more open to challenge under the NYC.1549 
 
However, not every deviation from the originally agreed-upon fast-track 
procedure necessarily leads a court to find that refusal of enforcement or 
recognition is warranted under Article V(1)(d). Rather, the court must examine 
whether the parties have (perhaps tacitly) modified the rules of arbitration.1550  
Similarly, an irregularity in the composition process does not necessarily lead 
to a refusal of enforcement of the award under Article V(1)(d) if a party later 
(tacitly) consents to the composition of the arbitral tribunal.1551  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1547 Judgement of 31 May 2007, XXXIII  YBCA  524 (Celle Court of Appeal, Germany) (2008) 
1548 Judgement of 24 February 1999, XXVIII  YBCA 248 (Bavarian Supreme Court, Germany) (2003) 
1549 Judgement of 18 September 1978, Gaetano Butera v. Pietro e Romano Pagnan, IV YBCA 296, 
(Corte Di Cassazione, Italy) (1979)(“the conformity of the composition of the arbitral tribunal with the law 
of the country where the arbitration takes place … must be observed for the enforcement of the award 
only if the parties have not provided for a different composition of the arbitral tribunal.”). 
1550 Judgement of 20 February 2001, XXVIII YBCA 261 (Dresden Court of Appeal, Germany) (2003), 
where both parties deviated from the arbitration agreement by naming arbitrators without institutional 
membership although the arbitration agreement required such membership. The court deduced from 
the parties' failure to object to the lack of membership a tacit modification of the rules of arbitration.  
1551 See Int'l Arb. L. Rev. 2006, N-61 (Naumburg Court of Appeal, Germany), where the court 
considered the conclusion of the contract with the arbitrator as consent to the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal. 
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5.2.3.2 Lack of Proper Notice 
Notice of any procedure that affects a party's legal entitlements is another 
fundamental right in arbitration and the NYC explicitly reflects that principle in 
Article V(1)(b). It states: “recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused”1552 on proof that “the party against whom the award is invoked was 
not given proper notice of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings.”1553  
 
This increases concerns that the award may annulled if a party claims it was 
given inadequate notice of the commencement of arbitration, or written 
submissions, or the hearing, or any other important steps in the FTA 
process.1554 
 
In Holargos Shipping Corp. v. Hierros Ardes S.A the supreme court of Spain 
denied recognition of an award under Article V(1)(b), because there was 
insufficient proof that the defendant had been notified of the appointment of 
the arbitrator. Furthermore, the arbitrator failed in his first notice to identify the 
disputed issues and gave the defendant only one week to present his 
defence.1555 In contrast to the requirement of notice of the appointment of 
arbitrators, courts have found that parties need not be given notice regarding 
an extension of the arbitrator's mandate.1556 Also the Swiss Court of Appeal 
held that there is no lack of procedural fairness where a party received an 
“invitation to participate in arbitration in a ‘comprehensible’ language only 4 to 
5 days before the start of the proceedings”1557 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1552 NYC Article V (1) 
1553 NYC Article V(1)(b) 
1554 See, e.g., Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 1248, 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988); Kanoria v. Guiness 2006 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 413 (English Court of Appeal) (refusing recognition 
of award under Article V(1)(b): “a party to an arbitration is unable to present his case if he is never 
informed of the case that he is called upon to meet”);  
1555 Judgment of 3 March 1982, IX YBCA 435 (Spanish Tribunal Supremo) (1984) 
1556 Judgment of 14 April 1998, SpA Ghezzi v. Jacob Boss Söhne, XV YBCA 450 (at 453-454) 
(Federal Supreme Court, Germany)(1990)  
1557 Judgment of 27 February 1989, XVII YBCA 581, 583 (Basel-Stadt Court of Appeal) (1992)  
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Courts are reluctant to require formal compliance with notice provisions if 
there is evidence that a party had in fact received notice.1558 In two separate 
cases, Mexican courts have refused to require personal service - as required 
by Article 605 No. IV of the Mexican Code of Civil Procedure - where the 
applicable ICC and AAA rules allowed service by mail and the defendants had 
acknowledged service by such means.1559 The jurisprudence of the Chilean 
Supreme Court has evolved similarly to accept notice given in accordance 
with the relevant contractual provisions and arbitral institution rules, instead of 
requiring strict compliance with domestic service procedures.1560 Institutional 
FTA Rules are therefore relatively straightforward. Most of them pose few or 
no problems because arbitral institutions adopt various precautions in relation 
to managing notices in FTA so as to avoid problems at the recognition or 
enforcement stage.1561 
 
The drafters of Article 24.2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law have made clear that 
notice of any meeting of the tribunal must be both sufficient and provided in 
advance of the proceedings.1562 Courts have generally not imposed 
restrictions on parties’ autonomy to agree specific time limits.1563 but have 
rather focused on the parties' factual ability to have participated in the 
arbitration, even where time limits have caused the parties considerable 
inconvenience.1564 However, an Italian court held that it must always ascertain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1558 Bianchi (2007) (citing Union Européenne de Gymnastique v. Multipole Distribuidora de Filmes Ltd. 
(decided Apr. 19, 2006) (Superior Court of Justice, Brazil)). 
1559 Press Office S.A. v. Centro Editorial Hoy S.A., (decided 1977), IV YBCA  301 (18th Civil Court of 
First Instance for the Federal District of Mexico, Mexico)(1979); Malden Mills Inc. v. Hilaturas Lourdes 
S.A. decided 1977), IV YBCA 302 (Court of Appeals for the Federal District of Mexico, Mexico) 
(1979)(also refusing objections based on letters rogatory). 
1560 Quote Food Products B.V. v. Sociedad Agroindustrial Sacramento Ltd., Jul. 5, [1996] RDJ (1999), 
2-1 82 (Supreme Court, Chile). 
1561 Waincymer (2010) p. 23 
1562 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 24(2) 
1563 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 34(2)(1)(ii); German ZPO, Article 1059(2)(1)(b) (allowing 
award to be set aside where applicant shows “he was not given proper notice of the appointment of an 
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case”); Austrian ZPO, 
§611 (award may be annulled where “a party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an 
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was for other reasons unable to present his case”); Japanese 
Arbitration Law, Article 44(1)(iii) (award may be annulled where “party … was not given notice as 
required by the provisions of the laws of Japan”) 
1564 Judgment of 27 January 1986, XII YBCA 496 (Italian Corte di Cassazione) (1987) (“the Court of 
Appeal had rightly considered that the award-debtor had been informed by the award-creditor of the 
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“discretionally and according to prudent judgment,” whether the defendant has 
been notified of the proceedings against him in due time, so that he can be 
able to present his case, even if the period of notice complies with the 
conditions of the foreign law governing the arbitral proceedings.1565 
Interestingly, institutional FTA Rules have provided increased protection to 
ensure that parties receive timely notice of the FTA proceedings to reduce 
possible later intervention of national courts.1566 Furthermore, the parties are 
often consulted by the institution before making a decision on applying for 
FTA over regular arbitration, which provides yet another level of assurance 
that notice has been properly given to the parties.1567  
 
The party objecting to enforcement under Article V(1)(b) has the burden of 
proving this ground for refusal exists.1568 Accordingly, a party alleging lack of 
notice may be asked to prove a negative, that is, that it did not receive notice 
of the hearing.1569 In order to increase the scope for the wider application of 
FTA court approaches to notice need to be standardised both to improve the 
efficiency of fast-track procedures and to increase the enforceability of FTA 
awards. Without such harmonization it is wise to consider FTA only if all of the 
parties, the lex arbitri and the place of enforcement are from countries that 
permit expedited notices.  
 
Since national legislation regarding notice varies, the assistance of local 
counsel is always recommended. The situation would be helped by 
establishing an ‘approved’ list of countries and countries’ courts which are 
favourable to FTA so that parties’ trust for the effective conduct of FTA can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
arbitration in previous correspondence, that it had received the notice already on 24 October 1981, and 
that a period of 20 days for notifying a hearing was adequate considering the award-debtor's 
international experience and the modern means of communication.”); 
1565 Bauer & Grobmann OHG v. Fratelli Cerrone Alfredo e Raffaele, decided 1982), X YBCA 461 
(Naples Court of Appeal, Italy), (1985). 
1566 See supra p. 195-197 Section 4.5.1.5 
1567 Najar (2010) 
1568 DIST Corporation v. Cosmos Internacional S.A. (decided Oct. 30, 1998) (Lima Superior Court of 
Justice, Chamber of Abbreviated Procedures, Peru), 
1569 Bezirksgericht and Obergericht Zürich (decided 2003), XXIX YBCA 819,826 (Zurich Court of First 
Instance and Zurich Court of Appeals, Switzerland).(2004) 
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increased, and those countries who are not yet in the list can be encouraged 
to improve their arbitration legislation to favour expedited notices in 
arbitration.1570  
 
5.2.3.3 Inability to present one's case  
Another significant objection to the enforcement of FTA awards under Article 
V(1) of the NYC falls under that portion of subsection (b) which indicates 
‘recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused’ on proof that ‘the 
party against whom the award is invoked was … unable to present his case’. 
This language can be interpreted in two ways, either requiring a ‘full 
opportunity’ to present one's case or possibly only a ‘reasonable opportunity’ 
to do so.1571 Regardless of which definition is used, problems can arise in FTA 
where parties agree to fast-track procedures but conducting those procedures 
results in due process being prejudiced.1572  
 
A primary cause for objection is a pre-dispute FTA agreement that denies the 
right to be heard in oral proceedings.1573 A tribunal's denial of an oral hearing 
in order to respect the parties’ FTA agreement, when an oral hearing is 
requested by one of the parties after the dispute, would in principle be 
grounds for non-recognition of the resulting award.1574 In Generica Ltd v. 
Pharm. Basics, Inc.1575, the US Court observed that a hearing on the evidence 
is part of ‘the minimal requirements of fairness’.  
 
However, in FTA, documents only arbitrations are customary.1576 Many FTA 
rules explicitly provide that a decision may be rendered without an oral 
hearing. In these instances, most national courts have rejected arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1570 Dahlberg/Öhrström (2010) p. 543 
1571 Lew/ Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p.711 ¶26-87. 
1572 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (1975), II YBCA 241 (1977); Apex Tech Investment Ltd v Chuang's 
Development (China) Ltd 1996 2 HKLR 155.   
1573 Caron/ Pellonpää/Caplan (2006) p. 606 
1574 Born (2009) p.1832 
1575 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) 
1576 Hunter, M., & Redfern, A. (2004) ¶6-104 
  302 
that such procedures are necessarily improper or inadequate.1577 However, it 
is unclear whether an advance agreement to a documents only arbitration 
would be valid where it subsequently transpired that live testimony was critical 
to a reasoned evaluation of the parties' claims.1578 In Muyldermans v Belgium, 
App.1579 it was held that an oral hearing may be required where the case 
concerns “the personal behaviour of a party”.1580 
 
Other issues which can amount to a ground for challenge of an FTA award 
include the fact that a party has not been able to participate in the taking of 
evidence or in document disclosure proceedings,1581 that a party has been 
denied the right to introduce certain evidence,1582 or to comment on an 
expert's report submitted to the tribunal,1583 or that the standards of 
adversarial proceedings adopted by the tribunal deprived a party of its 
fundamental right to defence.1584  
 
In one case the Austrian Supreme Court held that in FTA proceedings a 
tribunal’s rejection of certain evidence brought by the defendant did not 
constitute a due process violation; nonetheless, if the arbitral tribunal had 
based its decision on facts and evidence that the defendant had no 
opportunity to contest, such omission would have been a due process 
violation.1585  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1577 See, e.g., Intercarbon Bermuda, Ltd v. Caltex Trading and Transp. Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64, 72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Judgment of 30 July 1998, XXV YBCA 714 (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg) (2000)  
1578 Born (2009) p.2746 
1579 12217/86 (EHR Comm. 1990)  
1580 Ibid  
1581 See, e.g., Polytek Engineering Co Ltd v Hebei Import and Export Corp, (1998) XXIII YBCA 666 
(High Court Hong Kong, 16 January 1998). 
1582 See, e.g., US, Iran Aircraft Industries v AVCO Corporation, 980 F 2d 141, (1993) XVIII YBCA 596 
(2d Cir, 1992); 
1583 See, e.g., Judgement of 15 January 1975, Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd, XIX 
YBCA 654 (Supreme Court of Hong Kong)(1994) 
1584 See, e.g., Judgement of 3 April 1975, US firm v German firm, II YBCA 241(Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg, Germany) (1977). 
1585 Judgement of 31 March 2005, XXXI YBCA, 583 (Supreme Court, Austria) (2006) 
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In G.W.L. Kersten & Co. BV v. Société Commerciale Raoul-Duval et Cie1586 a 
Dutch court refused enforcement in a fast-track case in which both the 
claimant and the arbitral tribunal had failed to forward documents submitted 
by the claimant to the defendant, even though the claimant had briefly 
informed the defendant of the allegations contained therein by telex and the 
defendant had presented its defence.1587  
 
In another Dutch case, documents were submitted after the hearing and not 
sent to the defendant. The Dutch court determined that, in order for an award 
to be enforced, the defendant must have explicitly agreed not to respond to 
any new, unknown documents submitted by the claimant to the tribunal after 
the hearing. The court found it to be insufficient that the award stated that 
documents submitted after the hearing had not been taken into 
consideration.1588 
 
The shortened period for appearing before the arbitrator can form an obstacle 
for the recognition and enforcement of an award under Art. V of the 
Convention if the aggrieved party can prove that the period has in fact 
precluded him from the exercise of his right of defence.1589 In one case, the 
Italian high court remanded to lower courts to determine whether an arbitral 
tribunal's decision to schedule the hearing in early September violated the 
respondent's right to be heard under Article V(1)(b).1590  In this case parties 
were summoned on 11 August 1981 to appear before the Vienna arbitral 
tribunal. The date scheduled for the hearing was 8 September 1981. The 
Court of Appeal held that this notice period was sufficient and reasoned inter 
alia that commercial activities cannot be unilaterally suspended because one 
of the two States involved habitually concentrates vacations in the month of 
August. The Supreme Court accepted the Court of Appeal's reasoning but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1586 Gerechthof Den Haag (Rice Trading (Guyana) Ltd. v. Nidera Handelscompagnie BV, decided 
1997), YCA XXIII (1998), 731 (at 733-734) (The Hague Court of Appeal, Netherlands). 
1587 XIX YBCA  708 (at 709) (decided 1992)(Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Netherlands), (1994), 
1588 Rice Trading (Guyana) Ltd. v. Nidera Handelscompagnie BV, (decided 1997), XXIII YBCA 731 (at 
733-734) (The Hague Court of Appeal, Netherlands),(1998) 
1589 Judgment of 28 January 1982, IX YBCA 423 (Italian Corte di Cassazione) (1984)  
1590 Judgment of 3 April 1987, XVII YBCA 529 (Italian Corte di Cassazione) (1992) 
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noted that there are legal provisions concerning this issue. Particularly, the 
Supreme Court noted that the Italian legal notice period is ninety days and 
that all time limits for proceedings before Italian courts are suspended 
between 1 August and 15 September, with certain exceptions (Law no. 742 of 
7 October 1969). The Supreme Court held that this provision leads to a 
“thinning out” of all judicial activities, so that the party’s opportunity of 
defending itself may have been affected. 
 
Although national courts have not used the due process exception to require 
parties to subject themselves to procedures different from those originally 
contemplated in the FTA agreement, the above case examples demonstrate 
that fast-track procedures can be risky.  
 
5.2.3.4 Problems Regarding Public Policy 
One of the most frequently invoked bases for refusing to recognize an 
international arbitral award is the “public policy” (or ordre public) exception.1591 
Under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, ‘recognition and enforcement of the award 
may … be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition 
and enforcement is sought finds that … the recognition or enforcement of the 
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country’.1592  
 
While not defined in the NYC,1593 it is clear that the only relevant public policy 
is that of the state where enforcement is to take place.1594 Although applicable 
under almost all leading international arbitration conventions and national 
arbitration legislation, the content of the public policy exception remains 
controversial as it gives rise to significant complexities. In the words of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1591 Born  (2009) p. 2827 
1592 NYC Article V(2)(b) 
1593 Kurkela/Snellman (2005) p. 11. The International Law Association (ILA) attempted to define the 
concept of international public policy in two reports issued in 2000 and 2002. See International Law 
Association, Conference Report 2000 and Conference Report 2002 (‘ILA Final Report’), available at 
www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19; Mistelis (2002) p. 249. 
1594 Lew/ Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p. 712 ¶26-82. 
  305 
leading practitioner, the exception has been interpreted erratically by the 
courts and is probably the most misused ground of all in Article V.1595  
 
Public policy concerns therefore have a significant impact on FTA, particularly 
when the country in which the arbitration takes place favours fast-track 
procedures but the public policy of the enforcing state discourages or even 
prohibits FTA proceedings.1596  
 
It is important to remember that domestic public policy concerns are not 
enough to justify non-enforcement of the FTA award.1597 ‘Only violations of the 
enforcement state's public policy with respect to … international public policy 
… is a valid defence.’1598 In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.1599 the US 
Court held that:  
 
“In equating ‘national’ policy with United States ‘public’ policy, the appellant 
quite plainly misses the mark. To read the public policy defence as a parochial 
device protective of national political interests would seriously undermine the 
Convention's utility. Article V was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of 
international politics under the rubric of ‘public policy.’ Rather, a circumscribed 
public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's framers and 
every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1595 Paulsson (1996) p. 113 
1596 Davis/Smit/Brown/Affaki/et al. (1994) p.449 
1597 ILA Final Report  paras. 10-11; 
1598 Lew, J. D. M., Mistelis, L., & Kröll, S. (2003) p. 720 ¶26-114. 
1599 508 F.2d 974  
1600 Ibid 
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As another court put it: 
 
“the public policy of the State where the arbitral award is invoked is thus not 
the internal public policy of that country, but its international public policy, 
which is defined as being all that affects the essential principles of the 
administration of justice or the performance of contractual obligations.”1601 
 
However, not all commentators agree, with many emphasizing that the 
relevant public policy is that of the enforcement forum.1602 Objections based 
on public policy may be procedural or substantive, though both are intended 
to be construed narrowly under the NYC.1603 In Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 
for instance, it was held that “the ‘public policy’ limitation on the Convention is 
to be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate 
the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice”1604.  
 
5.2.3.4.1 Procedural public policy 
 
When national courts have invoked public policy it has sometimes been on 
grounds of procedural irregularities (which could readily have been considered 
under Article V(1)(b) or (d)).1605 In Chrome Resources SA v. Léopold Lazarus 
Ltd, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that “case law, nowadays well 
established, has recognized that public policy applies not only to the contents 
of the award but also to the procedure and composition of the Arbitral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1601 Judgment of 24 November 1993, XXI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 617, 624 (Lux. Superior Court of Justice) 
(1996). 
1602 Merkin, R. M., Flannery, L., & Barlow, L. &. G. (2004) ¶19.58; Hunter, M., & Redfern, A. (2004) 
¶10.52; Sheppard, Public Policy and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should There Be A Global 
Standard?, 1(2) Oil Gas and Energy Law Intelligence (2003). 
1603 Born (2009) pp. 2845-2848. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“defenses to enforcement of foreign awards under the Convention are narrowly construed”)  
1604 517 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1975) 
1605 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, XXVIII YBCA 
752 (H.K. Court of First Instance, High Court 2003) (2003) (due process and public policy arguments 
can overlap); 
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Tribunal”1606 This is referred to by a few authorities as procedural public policy 
(to be distinguished from substantive public policy).1607  
 
Parties involved in FTA must therefore be aware of the extent to which due 
process objections based on fast-track procedures may overlap, since some 
courts have allowed parties to ‘elevate’ such Article V(1)(b) claims to the level 
of public policy under Article V(2)(b).1608 Such moves allow the enforcing court 
to look to its own law to decide on the recognition of fast-track procedures 
rather than to the law of the arbitral seat.1609  
 
Some people may find the overlap between the procedural protections of 
Article V(1)(b) and the public policy provisions of Article V(2)(b) 
unproblematic.1610 However, it seems inappropriate to allow a specific 
objection permitted under Article V(1)(b) to fall also under the more general 
provisions of Article V(2)(b). Limiting due process objections to Article V(1)(b) 
would appear to (1) better reflect the parties' presumed expectations 
regarding the standards that apply to the FTA proceedings; (2) help ensure 
creation of an enforceable award by avoiding any surprises regarding the 
public policy concerns applicable to the dispute;1611 and (3) limit the use of the 
public policy exception to truly exceptional cases, as appears to have been 
contemplated by the drafters of the NYC.1612 Although objections under Article 
V(2)(b) may be easily brought,1613 the enforcing court's scope of review is 
actually extremely limited.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1606 Judgment of 8 February 1978, Chrome Resources SA v. Léopold Lazarus Ltd, XI YBCA 538 
(Swiss Federal Tribunal) (1986) 
1607 See, e.g., Mantilla-Serrano (2004) p. 333; Redfern/Hunter (2004) p. 459 ¶ 10-54 
1608 See e.g., Jiangsu Changlong Chem. Co., Inc. v. Burlington Bio-Med. & Sci. Corp., 399 F. Supp. 2d 
165, 168 (EDNY 2005); Judgement of 17 July 2003, Italian Party v. Swiss Company XXIX YBCA 819 
(at p. 829) Obergericht [Court of Appeal], Zurich (2004); Judgement of 17 Febreuary 1998, Unión de 
Cooperativas Agrícolas Epis-Centre v. La Palentina SA (France v. Spain) XXVII YBCA. 533 (at pp. 
538- 539) Tribunal Supremo [Supreme Court] (2002) 
1609 See NYC, Article V(2)(b); Horvath (2001) p. 143. 
1610 Harris (2007) 17; ILA Final Report para. 29. 
1611 There has been a great deal of discussion about the extent to which an arbitral tribunal can or 
should consider foreign public policy when issuing an award. Born (2009) pp. 2180-2184; Platte (2003) 
p.312 
1612 Born (2009) at p. 2828. 
1613 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p. 721 ¶ 26-114; Böckstiegel (1987) pp. 177, 179. 
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Thus, courts have rejected claims of public policy exceptions based on 
procedures for selecting a sole arbitrator,1614 questioning a party's expert 
witness,1615 the failure of the tribunal to render a reasoned award,1616 and the 
submission of fraudulent testimony in arbitral proceedings.1617 Other 
objections based on procedural public policy may be based on ‘fraud in the 
composition of the tribunal; breach of natural justice; lack of impartiality; lack 
of reasons in the award; manifest disregard of the law; manifest disregard of 
the facts; and annulment at place of arbitration’.1618 As under Article V(1)(b), 
courts have given substantial weight to the parties' procedural autonomy and 
the arbitrators' procedural discretion in applying procedural public policies 
under Article V(2)(b).1619  
 
More fundamentally, it is unclear what legitimate purpose the notion of 
procedural public policy under Article V(2)(b) serves. As discussed above, 
Article V(1)(b) was drafted specifically to establish a uniform international 
standard for the procedural conduct of arbitrations,1620 while Article V(1)(d) 
permits non-recognition based on violations of the parties' agreed arbitral 
procedures or (absent agreement) violations of the procedural law of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1614 See, e.g., Judgment of 1 February 2001, XXIX YBCA 708 (German Bundesgerichtshof) (2004) 
(rejecting claim that party's nomination of sole arbitrator, pursuant to arbitration agreement in arbitration 
seated in England, violated German public policy). See also Judgment of 18 October 1999, XXIX 
YBCA 700 (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart) (2004); Judgment of 26 January 1989, XVII YBCA 491 
(Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg) (1992) (rejecting argument that party was denied 
opportunity to be heard, in violation of German public policy). 
1615 See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. MAN Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(no public policy violation where arbitral tribunal called award debtor's former expert to give testimony). 
1616 See, e.g., Judgment of 24 January 1997, Inter-Arab Inv. Guarantee Corp. v. Banque Arabe et 
Internationale d'Investissements, XXII YBCA 643, 652 (Brussels Cour d'appel) (1997); Food Serv. of 
Am., Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd, 32 B.C.L.R.3d 225 (B.C. S.Ct. 1997); Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., 
7 O.R.3d 608 (Ontario Court of Justice 1992) (unreasoned award recognized); Judgment of 27 July 
1978, IV YBCA 266 (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg) (1979); Judgment of 22 October 
1976, SA Tradax Export v. Spa Carapelli, III YBCA 279 (Florence Corte di Appello) (1978)  
1617 Judgment of 26 January 2005, XXX YBCA 421 (Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof) (2005) (fact that 
“the foreign arbitral award is therefore based on an intentionally false witness statement does not make 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award at odds with public policy”) 
1618 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) p.722 ¶ 26-117 
1619 Judgment of 18 January 1990, YBCA 503 (German Bundesgerichtshof) (1992) (relying on fact that 
“such type of procedure basically is in accordance with the practice of arbitral tribunals in the 
commodity trade in London” to reject argument based on procedural public policy); Judgment of 29 
June 1989, XVI YBCA 546 (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt) (1991) (respondent's choice not to be 
represented was deliberate and cannot be grounds for claiming violation of procedural public policy”). 
1620 Born (2009) pp. 2744-2746. 
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arbitral seat.1621 In these circumstances, the application of procedural public 
policies under Article V(2)(b) serves only to permit a limited imposition of local 
public policies on international arbitrations seated abroad which, by 
hypothesis (given Article V(1)(b)), satisfy international procedural standards. 
Given the Convention's objectives, it is difficult to see why such a basis for 
non-recognition would have been intended (or serve any desirable purpose); 
the better course would be not to expand the scope of Article V(2)(b) and 
instead to limit it to substantive public policies.1622 
 
5.2.3.4.2 Substantive Public Policy 
Public policy relating to procedural irregularities is not the only possible 
ground for non-enforcement of a FTA award under Article V(2)(b). There are a 
limited number of decisions from developed jurisdictions where substantive 
public policies have been relied upon to deny recognition to foreign 
awards.1623  
 
These objections typically include violations of the principle of good faith and 
pacta sunt servanda, the abuse of rights, activities that are contra bonos 
mores,1624 punitive damages and breaches of competition law.1625 For 
example, the national laws of certain countries do not allow the arbitrator 
hearing an arbitration in that country to award interest to a monetary claim. 
Any award that includes interest may not be enforceable in that country.1626  
One US court concluded that the imposition of 5% more interest than normal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1621 Born (2009) pp. 2764-2777. 
1622 Domenico/Martin (2001) 
1623 Victrix SS Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo AB, 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987) (default award against a 
bankrupt party not enforced because payment of the award from the debtor's estate would conflict with 
a US public policy of giving effect to a Swedish bankruptcy proceedings for the equitable distribution of 
the estate's assets); Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. AG, 480 F.Supp. 
352, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“public policy” exception would apply to awards pursuant to arbitration 
agreements obtained by duress); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, SA v. Southwire Co., 484 
F.Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
1624 ILA Final Report at para. 28. 
1625 Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) pp. 722 ¶ 26-118. 
1626 Soleimany v. Soleimany, 1999 Q.B. 785 (C.A. 1998); Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. 
Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964).  See also Rau (2007) p. 25 
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market rates violated applicable US public policy against contractual 
penalties.1627 
 
Similarly, punitive damages are frequently considered to violate public policy. 
An arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland rejected a claim for exemplary 
damages as being contrary to Swiss public policy even though the applicable 
substantive law may have permitted exemplary damages.1628 In Germany, 
punitive damages are also contentious and one view is that an award of 
punitive damages is unconstitutional.1629 In a leading judgment handed down 
by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof) in 1992, part 
of a United States court decision was refused enforcement because it 
provided for the recovery of punitive damages.1630 Although these examples 
relate to substantial matters and thus do not concern the enforcement of an 
FTA award directly, they demonstrate that the place of enforcement can take 
an unsympathetic view of a particular FTA provision and deny enforcement. 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention explicitly states that these 
objections are viewed from the perspective of the enforcing state, but 
questions often arise as to whether and to what extent the public policy of 
other potentially interested states can or should be taken into account during 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1627 Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, SA v. Southwire Co., 484 F.Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
By contrast in Arcata Graphics Buffalo Ltd v. Movie (Magazine) Corp.(Ontario 1993) (awarding rate of 
interest not permitted by enforcement forum not violation of public policy). 
1628 Final Award in ICC Case No 5946, XVI YBCA 97, 113 (1991).   
1629 Nils/Rademacher (2009) p. 76.   
1630 Ibid 76 citing from Bundesgerichtof (Neue Juristichie Wochenschrift, 1992) p. 3096 et seq.   
1631 ILA Final Report, paras. 20, 39. 
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5.2.3.4.3 National court decisions relying on expansive 
interpretations of public policy  
 
Some states have interpreted public policy very broadly to refuse recognition 
to foreign FTA awards on two specific grounds: reasoned awards and time 
limits.1632  
 
The arbitration laws of many countries prescribe that the award must contain 
the reasons on which the arbitration decision is based. In these countries, it is 
considered fundamental that the parties should be informed as to how justice 
has been done in their case.1633 On the other hand, in several common law 
countries, it has been customary not to give reasons in the award. Generally, 
the courts of the countries where the giving of reasons is mandatory enforce 
awards without reasons made in countries where such awards are valid.1634  
 
Apart from cases where an arbitration award contains no reasons at all, 
awards are frequently attacked under Article V(2)(b) for containing 
“contradictory” reasons. Reasons in an award which contradict one another 
may result in a court's determining that the award has no reasons at all. To 
prevent this ground from being used to review the merits of an award - which 
is not permitted by the NYC - extreme caution is required from the arbitrator 
that drafts the reasons. Similarly, there may be FTA awards where the 
summary reasoning is so confused that the award becomes bereft of any 
logic.1635 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1632 Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port (2010) p. 367 et seq. 
1633 Ibid 375 
1634 Oberlandesgericht of Hamburg, 27 July 1978 (F.R. Germany No. 18) and S.A. Tradax Export v. 
S.p.A. Carapelli (Italy No. 18), Corte di Appello of Florence, 22 October 1976, both concerning awards 
made in England. 
1635 Cour d'Appel de Paris (1997), Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corp. v. Banque Arabe et 
Internationale d'Investissements SA, 1998 Rev Arb 143; Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguros v. 
Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56197 (decided 2007)(US District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, US), where the court found that the award did include reasons so that 
the applicable arbitration rules (which required a reasoned award unless the parties agree otherwise) 
were not violated. 
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Failure to provide reasons is not universally regarded as a violation of public 
policy.1636 The domestic arbitration laws of some countries do not necessarily 
give reasons for an award unless a party requests it;1637 therefore, these 
countries tend to regard the absence of reasons as not being contrary to 
public policy. However, since not all courts enforce foreign awards if their own 
domestic public policy would not allow an unreasoned award, it is prudent to 
check the applicable arbitration laws before drafting FTA clauses.1638   
 
The other contested area is time limits. Parties to an FTA agreement often 
agree on fixed time limits within which the arbitrators must render an award, 
removing the arbitrators’ discretion in the matter as such time limits may not 
be extended by the arbitrators themselves. A violation of party-agreed time 
limits has been held to be a ground for refusal under the public policy 
clause,1639 as the arbitrators lose their mandate upon expiration of the time 
period. 1640  
 
Some countries impose onerous sanctions for failure to respect these time 
limits.  In Belgium, failure to observe time limits results in the award being null 
and unenforceable.1641 In Italy, it is a ground for setting aside the award.1642 
However, Art.821 (1) of the Italian CCP provides that the expiry of the time-
limit may not be relied upon as a ground for nullity of the award if the party 
has failed to notify the other parties and the arbitrators, before the 
deliberation, of its intention to rely on the termination of the arbitrators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1636 Areios Pagos (decided 2007), XXXIII YBCA 565 (Supreme Court, Greece) (2008). But see 
Komarov (2001) 411, who believes that lack of reasons would render a foreign award unenforceable in 
Russia. 
1637 See India's Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. 
1638 Vasani/Tallent (2006) p. 255; Shaleva (2003) pp. 83 
1639 Dubois & Vanderwalle v. Boots Frites BV, (decided 1995 & 1999) 1996 Rev. Arb 100 (Paris Court 
of Appeals, France). 
1640 Cairo Court of Appeal, unreported judgment of Feb. 29, 2008, case no. 16/124, summary in ITA 
Monthly Report, Apr. 2008 (Cairo Court of Appeal, Egypt). 
1641 Belgian Arbitration Act of 1998, Article 1698 
1642 Italian CCP of 2006, Article 829 (6) 
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authority owing to the expiry of time limits.1643 In Brazil, an arbitral award is 
clearly null and void if it is made after the time limit.1644  
 
In one case, a Turkish appeals court refused enforcement of a foreign award 
on the ground that the Swiss-based arbitration tribunal failed to conduct the 
arbitration within the time limits imposed by Turkish procedural laws. The 
arbitration agreement contained a clause that the arbitration tribunal “shall 
take as base the provisions of this contract and Turkish laws in force.” The 
court held that this clause amounted to a choice of Turkish procedural law.1645 
Article 10(a) of Turkey's International Arbitration Law no. 4686 provides that 
the arbitration tribunal must render its award within one year after 
commencing proceedings.1646 Thus, the court held that the tribunal's failure to 
meet this time limit and, consequently, to apply Turkish procedural law 
rendered the award unenforceable. The court based its decision on Article 
V(1)(d) and did not consider whether there had been a violation of public 
policy.1647 
 
The court's interpretation of the clause, however, was questionable. The 
prevailing view is that the procedural law governing the arbitration is the law at 
the place of arbitration (or lex arbitri); the choice of substantive law has no 
impact on the applicable lex arbitri. Furthermore, Article V(1)(d) is not 
triggered by a tribunal applying the “wrong” procedural law unless the error 
deprives a party of rights or unless the actual procedure is materially 
different.1648 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1643 Italian CCP of 2006, Article 821(1) 
1644 Brazil Arbitration Act of 1996, Article 32 (VII) 
1645 Osuuskunta METEX Andelslag V.S. v. Türkiye Electrik Kurumu Genel Müdürlügü General 
Directorate, Ankara (decided 1996), XXII YBCA 807 (at 810-811) (Court of Appeals, Turkey).(1997) 
1646 Tekinalp/Günançin (2001) p 730. 
1647 Ibid XXII YBCA 807 (at 813) (Court of Appeals, Turkey).(1997) 
1648 See also the dissenting opinion of Çiftçi, J., ibid., at 813, who stressed that the alleged irregularities 
were insufficient to warrant a denial of enforcement. 
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French domestic arbitration practice provides various examples for the setting 
aside of an award due to a lapse of the time-limit.1649 In Dubois & Vanderwalle 
v. Boots Frites BV1650, the Court of Appeals (Cour d'Appel) of Paris had to rule 
whether a foreign award could be recognised and enforced which had been 
rendered not within the three-months time limit stipulated in the arbitration 
clause, but about one month later.1651  It held: 
 
“The principle that the time limit set by the parties ... for the arbitrators to 
accomplish their task may not be extended by the arbitrators, reflects a need 
which pertains to public policy, both domestic and international, in that it is 
inherent to the contractual character of arbitration...”1652 
 
The Court found that Article 1502(5) of the New Code of Civil Procedure 
(NCCP)1653 provided the ground for refusal, since, “in taking a power which 
they did not have, the arbitrators violated international public policy.”1654 In this 
case the court considered that the arbitrator had decided on the basis of an 
agreement which had expired1655 and an award rendered without the 
arbitrators’ mandate violated international public policy.1656  
 
A similar approach is adopted by Articles 34(1)(2) and 36 of the Swedish 
Arbitration Act (1999)1657 and the Inter-cantonal Concordat which governs 
domestic arbitration in Switzerland.1658  However, the situation in Switzerland 
is quite different. There is no Swiss decision vacating an award on this ground 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1649 Sonidep v. Sigmoil (1994, June 15). Cass. 1e civ. France. 1995 Rev. Arb. 88, 1st Decision, and E. 
Gaillard's Note; Communauté urbaine de Casablanca v. Degrémont. (1994, June 15). Cass. 1e civ. 
France. 1995 Rev. Arb. 88-101, 2d Decision, and E. Gaillard's Note. 
1650 Judgement of 22 September 1995, Dubois & Vanderwalle v. Boots Frites BV.  XXIVa YBCA 640, 
(CA. Paris. France) (1999)  
1651 Ibid 641 
1652 Ibid 642 
1653 French NCPC Article 1502 is revised as French NCPC (2011) Article 1520 and 1525 in 2011 
without significant changes. 
1654 See supra  p. 311 fn. 1639, Dubois & Vanderwalle v. Boots Frites,  p. 642. 
1655 French NCPC of 1981, Article 1502(1). Notably  this was not included in French NCPC of 2011, 
Article 1520 and 1492 
1656 French NCPC of 1981, Article 1520. 
1657 Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Articles 34 and 36 
1658 Inter-cantonal Concordat 1969 Article 4 but New Swiss CCP (2011) superseded the Concordat in 
which  there are limited grounds for annulment . See New Swiss CCP of 2011, Article 393 
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under the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA).  In fact, a contrary 
decision was rendered in 1984 by the Court of Appeal of Basel City. It stated 
that the arbitrators' mission did not end merely because the deadline for the 
rendering of the award under the ICC Rules had expired before the award was 
issued.1659 According to this decision, rather than rely on the state court, the 
remedy in such cases resides in the power of the ICC Court to invalidate the 
mandate of arbitrators who do not discharge their duties properly and within 
prescribed time limits.1660 Although rendered under the International Treaty on 
Arbitration (CIA) rather than PILA and an earlier version of the ICC Rules, it is 
submitted by Poudret that the underlying principle of this decision remains 
valid today in Switzerland.1661  
 
Whether FTA provisions should be considered as procedural or substantive 
public policy1662 depends on whether FTA can be realistically obtained without 
some of its provisions. If the need to proceed within a specific time limit is 
considered substantive in nature, then the decision to allow time extension 
would seem to constitute an evaluation of the parties' rights.1663 Therefore, 
arbitrators cannot use their discretion to extend time limits. Alternatively, if the 
need to proceed within a specific time limit is considered merely procedural, 
then the arbitrators' decision to extend time limits would appear to be part of 
the dispute resolution process.1664 However, even if the decision is considered 
ripe for an enforcing court's review, that does not necessarily mean that FTA 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1659 Decision of the Court of Appeal of Basel-City of 2 January 1984, K. KG v. M. SA and M. G.. ASA 
Bulletin 1985, pp. 19 et serf., at pp. 24-25. 
1660 In that connection, it should be noted that SCAI Rules of 2012 Article12 also enables the 
Chambers to revoke arbitrators who fail to perform their functions despite a written warning. 
1661 Poudret/Basson/Berti/Ponti (2007) p. 380 para 454 
1662 Mantilla-Serrano, F. (2004) p. 333 
1663 Böckstiegel (1999) p. 52 
1664 Kerr (1997) p. 139 
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First, the increased availability of techniques to reduce time and cost in 
international arbitration laws and institutional rules suggests that FTA 
proceedings cannot be said to be contrary to public policy, even if some 
individual countries still view non-extendable time limits and unreasoned 
awards with suspicion.1665 Since the only public policy that can be considered 
at the recognition stage is international in scope, courts cannot hear 
objections to FTA proceedings based on domestic public policy concerns. 
Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the fact that a fast-track 
procedure is not available in the enforcing state's domestic legal system does 
not mean that allowing such a procedure in arbitration would violate that such 
countries’ public policy.1666  
 
Secondly, permitting a broad, general public policy argument to prevail over 
the detailed procedural provisions of Article V(1) seems to fly in the face of the 
purpose of the NYC, which was intended to increase, rather than decrease, 
the ease with which awards are enforced.1667 Furthermore, commentators 
have typically read the procedural objections outlined in Article V(1) as 
conclusively defining the corpus of international procedural public policy, or 
(even more generally) have defined international procedural public policy as 
simply constituting equal treatment, fair notice and the right to present one's 
case.1668  Those criteria will likely be met by any of the potential forms of FTA 
rules and procedures discussed in this thesis, though of course individual fast-
track procedures must be considered as they arise.1669  
 
Interestingly, Gary Born has noted that it is difficult to see what public policy 
objections could be raised against FTA.1670 The fact that some FTA provisions 
are not available in many national arbitration systems should not preclude the 
use of FTA. There may be requirements regarding procedural regularity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1665 Augenblick/Mean/ Robine (1994) p. 135 
1666 Kronke/Nacimiento/Otto/Port (2010) p. 297 
1667 Born, G. (2009) p. 2855 
1668 Schwebel/Lahne (1987) pp. 205 and 216 
1669 Mayer/ Sheppard (2004) p.339 
1670 Harris (2007) p. 18 
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an opportunity to be heard, imposed by national law, but these would involve 
the implementation of the FTA, not its basic enforceability.1671 
 
All of this suggests that enforcing courts should be particularly cautious about 
upholding an objection based on public policy in cases where the parties have 
chosen to have the dispute governed by the law of another state.1672 Indeed, 
rather than considering what the procedural law of the FTA is in the abstract, 
the tribunal (and national courts) would be better to consider what the parties’ 
agreement requires in each particular case.1673 
 
It may be difficult, as a political matter, for some courts to enforce an award 
arising out of a FTA when the enforcing state views its policy against FTA 
procedures as a non-violable fundamental right similar to a mandatory 
provision of law.1674  
 
Courts that are faced with conflicts between parties’ FTA agreements and 
public policy concerns must decide whether the enforcing state's own views 
on the policies underlying fast-track procedures have any role to play in the 
enforcement proceedings. In so doing, courts must consider (1) whether the 
interest affected is sufficiently fundamental to the enforcing state's legal 
system to justify non-enforcement;1675 (2) the international nature of the 
dispute and the connection of the dispute to the legal system of the forum;1676 
(3) the possible existence (or absence) of an international consensus 
regarding the principle in issue;1677 and (4) the extent of the connections 
between the parties and the subject matter of the dispute to the enforcing 
state.1678 Only if the enforcement of the FTA award would ‘manifestly disrupt 
the essential political, social or economic interests’ of the enforcing state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1671 Born (2009)  p. 1232, fn. 442 
1672 Ibid. pp. 1343-1347 
1673 Ibid. pp. 1344-1345. 
1674 Kurkela/Snellman (2005) p. 11; Böckstiegel (1987) p. 183. 
1675 Kawharu (2007) p. 491 
1676 Caprasse (2008) p. 735 
1677 Gibson (2009) p. 1247 
1678 ILA Final Report para. 40. 
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should the enforcing court consider giving effect to the enforcing court's 
national policy.1679 
 
 Developing wider scope for FTA – procedural issues 5.3
The support of the NYC, national law and national courts for FTA constitutes 
an important infrastructure, however, at the end of the day, it is the parties’ 
satisfaction with the FTA process which is essential for improving the scope 
for FTA. This section considers how FTA can be improved to make it more 
attractive to parties. 
5.3.1 Drafting Clear Clauses 
Drafting a clear and unequivocal arbitration clause avoids wasting time and 
money arguing over its interpretation later.1680 Drafting such a clause requires 
knowledge of fast-track procedures, their suitability for such disputes as may 
arise and, if the clause refers to an arbitral institution, how the FTA rules of a 
particular institution work in practice.1681  
 
For many parties, it is difficult to predict the nature of a future dispute before it 
arises.1682 For them, predetermined time limits like those in the AAA, WIPO, 
CPR and SCC Expedited Rules, or even the overall limit on the length of 
arbitration as set forth in the HKIAC Rules, may hinder the resolution of a 
dispute if it too complex to be resolved quickly.1683 In such cases, it may be 
better if the arbitral tribunal is established rapidly, but the parties are then 
given unlimited time to present and argue the underlying merits.1684 The swift 
appointment of the arbitral tribunal goes a long way to speeding the case and 
reaching an award. Limiting the tribunal to a sole arbitrator can have an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1679 Ibid para 40. See  also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll (2003) pp. 731-732 
1680 Coe (2002) p.61 
1681 Mustill (1998) p.17 
1682Trakman (2008) p.295 
1683 Blacker (2000) p.55 
1684 Eisemann (1974) p. 69-112 
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unpredictable but real impact on the outcome in a complex case so provision 
for later appointing a three-members arbitral tribunal should be guaranteed 
under FTA proceedings.1685  
 
On the other hand, for parties who anticipate only one kind of dispute arising 
under their arbitration clause, and who are familiar with the course of FTA, 
imposing shortened time limits and procedural constraints in the arbitration 
clause may be the most sensible option.1686 These parties should closely 
analyse the differences between institutional FTA Rules to determine which 
model suits their needs.1687 
 
To ensure the workability of any time limits and procedural constraints, it is 
important to draft these in non-mandatory terms, leaving an option for their 
extension on a case-by-case basis. However, parties rarely possess the 
required understanding.1688 They frequently try to invent their own FTA 
procedures in order to increase speed and economy but in doing so run the 
risk of binding themselves and the arbitrators to impossible time limits or 
creating FTA provisions which will be difficult to deal with in practice in a 
subsequent dispute.1689   
 
Although it seems obvious that parties should conduct the requisite due 
diligence before drafting an FTA clause, the arbitration literature is teeming 
with examples of omitted terms or ill-defined arbitration clauses resulting in 
the failure of FTA procedures and unenforceable awards.1690  
 
The case of Walkinshaw v. Diniz1691 is a good illustration of the complications 
that may arise out of an unclear FTA clause. In this case, Arrows, owners and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1685 Sachs (2010) p. 1055 
1686 Redfern (2008) p.38 
1687 Gelinas (1998) p. 46-66 
1688 Medalie (1990) pp.18-20. 
1689 Wagoner (1993) p. 82 
1690 Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) p. 158 § 9.01 
1691 Walkinshaw v Diniz (Stay of Proceedings),(1999, May 19), Queen's bench division (commercial 
court) [1999] WL 33105608; [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 237 
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operators of the Arrows Formula One racing team, entered into a contract with 
Diniz, a professional Formula One racing driver on 24 October 1997, under 
which Diniz would drive for them during the 1998 and 1999 Formula One 
World Motor Racing Car Championships (F1).1692 The agreement was in 
accordance with the 1997 F1 Concorde Agreement which set out the 
respective obligations of the parties and required the contract between the 
driver and his team to contain a provision for the resolution of conflicts by way 
of fast-track arbitration under the Contract Recognition Board (CRB) of the 
Federation Internationale de l’Automobile.1693 This provision was incorporated 
into the contract between Diniz and Arrows by the CRB’s ‘off the peg’ FTA 
clause in clause 11(1) which provided an expedited dispute resolution process 
for the resolutions of disputes between the racing driver and racing team.1694 
However, the parties added their own dispute resolution procedures in clause 
11(2) under which they agreed that the contract, otherwise provided in clause 
11(1), should be governed by English Law and subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of England.1695 
 
In December 1998, the parties were faced with a dispute that needed to be 
resolved within a very short time period, as the championship was about to 
begin.1696 The F1 driver Diniz submitted the dispute to the CRB on 15 
December 1998, which quickly convened an ad hoc arbitral tribunal sitting in 
Geneva that had jurisdiction over certain contract issues between F1 drivers 
and teams. However, before the CRB made a decision, the racing team 
Arrows, not wanting to submit to arbitration, filed a legal action on 16 
December 1998 against the driver in the English High Court.1697 For them the 
issues in dispute were not within the scope of arbitration clause 11.1 and had 
entered their claim by way of the general conditions governing all issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1692 Ibid p.237 
1693 Schultz (2006) p.8 
1694 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter (2001) p. 183 
1695 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 237  
1696 Ibid 
1697 Born (2011) pp. 92 
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between Formula One drivers and teams under the jurisdiction of English 
Courts.1698 
 
In response to legal action, Diniz sought a stay of the English court pursuant 
to the Arbitration Act 1996 section 9,1699 contending that, pursuant to clause 
11.1 of the agreement, the dispute was one which the parties had agreed 
should be determined by fast-track arbitration under the administration of the 
CRB.1700  
 
The CRB went on to render a very quick decision within 1 month of the 
establishment of the arbitral tribunal on 17 February 1999, in compliance with 
its fast-track rules, which provided that it must issue a decision within three 
days after the hearing with the parties.1701  
 
However, on 19 May 1999 the High Court judge Thomas J. dismissed Diniz’s 
application and held that whilst the proceedings before the CRB were FTA in 
character, by virtue of clause 7.9 of the contract, the CRB’s tribunal was 
limited to a decision upon which contract took preference and whether the 
contract between Arrow and Diniz had been terminated.1702 Thus, the court 
rejected the jurisdiction of the ad hoc arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute 
and consequently issued an injunction against the continuance of the CRB’s 
FTA tribunal. Notably, Thomas J delivered no separate reasons for his anti-
arbitration injunction consequent upon his refusal to stay the English litigation. 
The issues were finally resolved in accordance with two further judgments in 
the English Commercial Court dated on 4 May 2000 and 2 February 2001, 
following an eight-day trial.1703 Thus, the court decision on this matter finally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1698 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 237 
1699 English Arbitration Act of 1996 Article 9 follows Article II of the NYC and, likewise, is concerned 
only with the validity, operativeness and workability of the arbitration agreement, not the underlying 
contract as a whole. 
1700 [1999] WL 33105608 
1701 Davis/Smit/Brown/Affaki/et al. (1994) p.421 
1702 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter (2001) p.186 
1703 Walkinshaw v Diniz (2001, February 02), Tomlinson J., (2001), 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 632; Walkinshaw v 
Diniz (Court of Appeal) (2002, February 01), Waller J., (2002), 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 165 
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came almost 2 years later than the fast-track arbitral award made by the 
CRB’s tribunal on 17 February 1999. 
 
Another example shows how an ambiguous clause allowed a conflict to arise 
between the two competing procedures of fast track and regular track. In 1984 
the Court of Appeal of Paris took a decision relating to an ad hoc 
arbitration1704 where the arbitration clause contained two segments. For all 
disputes relating to the goods, arbitration was to take place within ten days 
from the designation of the arbitrators; for all other disputes, a general 
arbitration clause with no time limit was provided.1705 
 
A dispute arose between the parties on the quantity of the goods alleged to be 
not in compliance with the contractual requirements negotiated by the parties. 
The arbitrator rendered his decision more than ten days after having been 
appointed. In the absence of any extension, the Court of Appeal of Paris ruled 
that, as the dispute related to the goods and as the arbitrator rendered his 
award on the basis of an expired arbitration clause, the award had to be 
annulled.1706 If the time limit inserted in the segmented arbitration clause had 
been more realistic, the arbitrator might have been able to give an award 
within the time limit, thus avoiding the annulment of the award on that basis. 
 
In another arbitration in France1707 the arbitration clause provided that the 
award was to be rendered within two months from the closing of the written 
arguments. The Court of Appeal of Paris annulled the award, as the date of 
the closing of the arguments had been changed by the arbitrators who did not 
seek the parties’ agreement to extend the time limit for the award.1708 The 
difficulty in this case was that of the definition of the starting point of the time 
limit. The clause did not define closing of the written submissions.1709 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1704 Judgement of 14 Januray 1984, (C.A. Paris 1re Ch. Civ.) 1984 Rev. Arb. 498 and Fouchard’s Note 
1705 Scalbert/Marville (1988) p.117 
1706 Supra fn. 1704 Fouchard’s Note p.500 
1707 Judgement of 13 January 1993, (Cass. Civ. 2ieme),1993 J.C.P. II 22179 
1708 Boisséson (1990) p.769 
1709 Cass. Civ. 2ieme,(1993, January 13),  1993 J.C.P. II 22179 
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court held that this was to be understood as being the last filing of the parties’ 
submissions.1710  
 
These problems are mainly caused by the imposition of midnight FTA clauses 
which are introduced into commercial agreements after all other points are 
clear and no one wants to delay the contract by elaborating on detailed rules 
to govern a possible dispute.1711 The respective lawyers merely ask their 
litigation and arbitration colleagues for a good arbitration clause, with the 
result that the clause does not take into account the specifics of the case.1712 
Such careless clauses may allow the parties to submit their dispute to FTA but 
they are generally silent on how fast-track procedure should be conducted, 
which puts the burden on the arbitrators to decide what FTA procedures are 
most appropriate.1713  
 
Unclear FTA clauses give opportunities for reluctant parties to adopt time-
consuming litigation on whether the fast-track dispute qualifies for expedited 
treatment or whether the arbitration clause is pathological.1714 Given that any 
ambiguity of an FTA agreement has the potential to delay the fast-track 
process, the FTA clause should be clear on what will happen if the conditions 
for FTA proceedings are not met.1715 To achieve this, in their FTA agreement 
parties should authorize the tribunal to resolve any interpretation questions 
that may arise and to remand the remaining issues or disputes for FTA or 
regular arbitration as appropriate.1716 
 
A safer solution is for parties to adopt a model institutional FTA Clause which 
reflects the arbitral community's best thinking on fast-track procedures.1717 In 
practice, less is often more, and simpler, more general FTA clauses can avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1710 Judgement of 13 January 1993, (Cass. Civ. 2ieme),1993 J.C.P. II 22179 
1711 Broichmann (2010) 
1712 Welser/Klausegger (2009) p. 275 
1713 Sentner (2008) p. 77 
1714 Davis/Lagace/Volkovitsch(1993) p.85 
1715 Bond (1990) p. 14 
1716 Downie (1991) pp. 481-82 
1717 Rau/Sherman (1995) 
  324 
ancillary disputes over which of the rules have been followed and which 
not.1718 Of course, using institutional model FTA clauses also avoids the 
equally injurious fault of including too little specificity, especially as to the key 
components: the applicable law, the number and selection of arbitrators, the 
language and the seat.1719  
 
In order to increase the use of institutional FTA clauses the specific sets of 
FTA Rules offered should not only save time and cost but should also permit 
the tribunal and the parties to schedule a regular arbitration once the tribunal 
has been formed if it becomes necessary.1720 This approach permits parties to 
consider fast-track as the primary option but, if the case requires it, to conduct 
an extensive factual inquiry, including discovery, without the pressure of a fast 
approaching hearing.1721 
 
5.3.2 Increasing the number of competent and available FTA 
participants 
Another issue that stands in the way of FTA being used more widely is the 
difficulty of finding competent, experienced and acceptable counsel, 
arbitrators and institutions. 
 
5.3.2.1 Lack of available, competent counsel 
Counsel, by reason of their legal knowledge and their skill in presenting their 
clients' cases, can play a valuable role in FTA proceedings.1722 They can 
ensure that the issues in dispute are properly defined and that the evidence 
and legal arguments are efficiently and clearly presented to the arbitrator.1723 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1718 Hochbaum (1996) p. 20 
1719 Kreindler (2001) p. 111 
1720 Sussman/Underwood (2011) p. 22 
1721 Zykin (2010) 
1722 Wisner/Rowley/Neil (2011) p.237 
1723 Aksen (2007) p. 257 (giving an example from 6 weeks ICA where lawyers prepared everything 
expeditiously in 5 weeks time and gave the author, as a sole arbitrator, one week to render its award) 
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But often these benefits are not reaped in practice because counsel is 
insufficiently familiar with the FTA process.1724 
 
To increase the scope for FTA in-house counsel should be involved more in 
defining the issues to be contested, the search for expedited solutions, and 
the creation of FTA rules and procedures.1725 Arbitral Institutions should solicit 
counsel’s views on issues such as the amendment of arbitration rules, which 
have a direct impact on counsel’s activities in relation to international dispute 
resolution.1726 Counsel, and the parties they work for, is the real users of 
international arbitration, without which ICA would not exist. Ironically, such 
cooperation does exist for regular arbitration but not for FTA.1727  
 
Even though short time limits require parties’ submissions to demonstrate a 
high level of advocacy and focus, paradoxically, for inexperienced counsel this 
can be a time-consuming rather than a time-saving endeavour.1728 As one 
arbitration counsel put it: “I know I could have made my submission shorter, 
but I just did not have enough time for that.”1729 Inexperienced counsel are not 
the only ones to blame. Experienced counsel can also be too ready to put 
matters off to another day if the opponent proposes it. A change in the attitude 
of counsel towards how long arbitration should take is likely to go a long way. 
Counsel may be used to spending two to three-years on a case with 
resources spread thinly across a number of cases.1730 However, experience 
shows that, if circumstances require it, arbitration cases can be prepared for 
the final hearing within a matter of weeks. Counsel can often do more than 
they currently do to seize the initiative in bringing arbitration to a swift 
conclusion. 1731 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1724 McIlwrath, M. (2008) p.424 
1725 The AAA's Corporate Counsel Committee is an example of a ‘best practice’ in this area. Another 
example is the User's Councils of the LCIA, in North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, putting 
together private practitioners, arbitrators, judges, and in-house counsel.   
1726 Bowman (2009) p. 285 
1727 Woods (2011) 
1728 Burr/Karrer (2010) 
1729 Trakman (2007) p. 19 
1730 Sussman/Underwood (2011) p. 22 
1731 Yves/Orlandi/Lew (2010) 
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If FTA is to enjoy wider application counsel need to abandon the habit of 
relying on the techniques of regular arbitration.1732 
 
First of all, counsel should endeavour to play an active role in the selection of 
the right arbitral tribunal for FTA.1733 While institutional FTA rules generally 
make satisfactory and expedited appointments, counsel for the parties know 
their case better than any institution ever can. When experienced FTA 
counsel are involved in the expeditious selection of a sole arbitrator or the 
chairman, the chances are increased that the arbitral tribunal will have the 
requisite competence and experience to avoid unnecessary cost and delay 
and conduct the case in a fast-track manner.1734 
 
Secondly, cooperation between counsel is enormously useful in ensuring that 
an FTA moves forward expeditiously.1735 It is relatively rare for counsel to 
endeavour to drive a case along at a pace which prevents the opposing 
counsel from having adequate time to prepare the case. This reciprocal 
respect for a colleague’s legitimate needs is one of the delights of FTA in 
international commercial dispute resolution. What counsel can agree upon in 
terms of a procedural timetable, an arbitral tribunal will rarely refuse to follow, 
apart from the matters of observing overall time limits, fixing hearing dates 
and guiding procedural constraints.1736  
 
Thirdly, counsel’s conduct should be compatible with the objectives of fast-
track procedures.1737 They should not demand speed while burdening the 
arbitral tribunal with massive submissions, lengthy hearing requests and 
dilatory tactics. Arbitrators will best move an FTA along in a timely fashion if 
they see that counsel from each side put an effort to conduct fast-track 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1732 Park (2011) pp. 287-315 
1733 Alford (2010) 
1734 Bennett (2009) p.20 
1735 Davison/Nowak (2009) p. 163 
1736 Bleemer (2006) p. 184 
1737 Davis (2004) 
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procedures in a timely manner.1738 Too often though, counsel are in the mind-
set of wanting to see every conceivably relevant document, and therefore 
make wide-ranging rather than focused disclosure requests.1739 While there 
may be cases where it is appropriate to leave no stone unturned, extensive 
document disclosure is an obstacle for the effective conduct of FTA 
procedure.1740  
 
Finally, counsel should not hesitate to advise an arbitration institution if they 
believe that an arbitral tribunal is going too rapidly, or too slowly.1741 They 
should be able to have reasonable confidence that the institution will take 
action when and if appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of fast-track 
procedures.1742 
 
This thesis suggest that arbitral institutions should not only ensure that arbitral 
tribunals proceed at a pace appropriate to a particular case, but also accept 
responsibility for ensuring the success of FTA. Arbitral institutions should have 
more power to limit the appointment of a person who has never acted as 
counsel or arbitrator in an FTA; at the same time they should establish 
programmes to increase counsel’s and arbitrator’s experience of FTA in 
international commercial dispute resolution.1743  Sometimes a party may 
select counsel who is too busy to devote sufficient time to the FTA case. To 
avoid this, the arbitral institution may ask counsel to complete availability 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1738 Oetiker (2008) p.17 
1739 Davis (2004) 
1740 Oetiker (2008) p.17 
1741 Bond (1998) p. 118 
1742 Ibid 
1743 The AAA's Corporate Counsel Committee is an example of a ‘best practice’ in this area. Another 
example is the User's Councils of the LCIA, in North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, putting 
together private practitioners, arbitrators, judges, and in-house counsel.   
1744 Hauser-Morel, M. (2010) p.24 
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5.3.2.2 Lack of available, competent Arbitrators  
Again and again one hears that the case under consideration is too important 
to be decided by a newcomer to the arbitration profession.1745 Thus while 
everyone agrees that new talent must be developed, everyone wants to leave 
the pioneering to somebody else.  
 
But parties concerns for finding the right person are legitimate as the 
background and experience of the chosen arbitrator will have a significant 
contribution to the successful conduct of the FTA process.1746 The awards of 
newcomers can be mediocre or even downright dreadful under fast-track 
procedures.1747  
 
Unfortunately, while demand for the services of experienced FTA arbitrators is 
increasing, driven by new international commerce such as financial 
transactions, the electricity industry and M&A, the supply remains virtually 
static.1748  Arbitral institutions, which seek to administer fast-track procedures, 
have a concomitant responsibility to help ensure an increase in the pool of 
qualified FTA arbitrators.1749 
 
Increasing the pool of FTA arbitrators could be achieved by a voluntary move 
by experienced regular arbitrators taking on more FTA.1750 However, only a 
small percentage of regular arbitrators make such a move because, owing to 
the much larger volume of cases, the opportunities for employment are much 
greater in regular arbitration.1751  
 
Many of today’s best international arbitrators are continuously employed in 
hearing regular arbitral procedures as part of three-members tribunals. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1745 Oetiker (2008) p.17 
1746 Lord Hacking (2000) pp. 32-37 
1747 Rogers (2004) p. 972 
1748 Dezelay/Garth (1996) p. 47  
1749 Rovine (1992) p. 45 
1750 Sachs (2010) 
1751 Smit/Pechota/Carbonneau/Misteslis (2013) 
  329 
the appointment of these highly qualified arbitrators as chairmen is 
undoubtedly highly beneficial, their duties as a party appointed arbitrator could 
be equally well handled by less experienced arbitrators working as hearing 
officers under the chairman’s supervision. In this way the expert arbitrator 
could be released from his more mundane duties, allowing him to get involved 
with FTA.1752 
 
Unfortunately, the attractive remuneration that regular arbitration generates is 
an incentive for the arbitrator to accept more arbitration than he has time 
for.1753 Thus, given the choice between regular arbitration and FTA, he will 
almost certainly go for regular arbitration, as it is both more profitable and 
more flexible, allowing him to accept other appointments.1754  
 
Another lucrative activity for the expert arbitrator is writing lengthy reasoning 
on routine cases which do not require it. A possible solution to making FTA 
more financially attractive would be to link arbitrators’ fees with the delivery 
time of the award. The shorter the time for the award, the higher the 
arbitrator’s salary.1755 However, this can only be solution for exceptional cases 
where speed is of the essence.1756 Many FTA users will not accept the 
increase in cost in order to achieve speed.1757  
 
Many internationally known arbitrators are unavailable for FTA disputes, either 
because they are loaded up with existing arbitration cases or because they 
are employed full-time as permanent arbitration counsel in global law 
firms.1758 If counsel and the parties truly desire FTA, they should not select 
arbitrators who are over-burdened.1759 But there are many examples in ICA 
where an arbitral tribunal composed of three highly experienced arbitrators is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1752 Secomb/Krause/Nacimiento/Ray/Turrini/Goldberg (2011) 
1753 Born (2009) p. 1605-1615 
1754 Carter (1995) p. 23 
1755 Cutolo/Esposito (2007) p.60 
1756 Ibid 
1757 Park (2010) pp.25-53 
1758 Rogers (2004) p. 957 
1759 McArthur (2011) p. 57 
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unable to fix the dates for a hearing until some six to nine months after the 
date on which the procedural calendar is established.1760 If, for some reason, 
that hearing has to rescheduled, a similar waiting period can easily be 
required. 
 
The dearth of experienced FTA arbitrators would be made easier if training 
was available for individuals to make arbitration their full-time profession.1761 
Arbitrator-nominating bodies could help by introducing more educational 
schemes to ensure that their panel of arbitrators receives training on fast-track 
as well as regular arbitrations.1762 Institutions should also ensure that these 
newly trained arbitrators are used whenever possible, rather than appointing a 
small group of experienced arbitrators to a disproportionately large number of 
cases. In this way a growing number of full-time professional arbitrators could 
quickly gain the trust of arbitration users and reduce the desire of parties to 
seek only a very few well-known names.1763 
 
International arbitration practice has frequently seen the aversion of lawyers-
turned-arbitrators to case management.1764 Many arbitrators, when asked to 
expedite regular arbitration proceedings, are reluctant to rule against the party 
who requested a time extension or additional procedural steps for fear of 
recourse against themselves or their award for an alleged failure to observe 
due process. Regular arbitrators will often act with considerable caution, with 
the aim of providing the parties with a copper-bottomed process and 
award.1765 Yet many respected commentators urge arbitrators to show more 
courage in the pro-active management of arbitrations.1766 To remedy this 
requires institutions to set up educational programmes about FTA so that 
arbitrators’ willingness to respond quickly, to accurately deal with swift 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1760 Trakman (2007) p. 19 
1761 Okekeifere (1998) p. 81 
1762 Najar (2008) 
1763 Graving (1989) p. 319 
1764 Bernard (2010) p. 165 
1765 Lowenfeld (1999) p. 19-30 
1766 Sharp (1996) pp. 6-11 
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deadlines, and to ensure parties’ compliance with FTA proceedings can be 
increased.1767 
 
5.3.2.3 Choosing Correct Institutional Supervision 
Before adopting a model institutional FTA clause, parties should study the 
FTA rules of the institution being considered in order to choose those rules 
that are most suitable to their particular type of commercial relationship.1768 As 
Silverman, the defending counsel of one FTA case observed, the success of 
fast-track procedure to a large extent depends the administrative capacity of 
the arbitral institution.1769  
 
Unfortunately the major institutional rules, like those of the ICC, the ICDR and 
the LCIA, have not adopted specific sets of FTA rules.  The ICC and LCIA 
articles, for instance, only reduce time for the appointment of arbitrators but do 
not provide specific fast-track procedures.1770 There is a scope for the wider 
application of FTA if these institutions adopt fast-track procedures. 
 
While, in theory, some regional arbitral institutions provide rules and 
administrative support for international commercial arbitration, in practice they 
deal mainly with domestic arbitrations.1771 Parties rarely know what 
experience a particular institution has in assisting with international arbitration.  
That both parties and arbitrators are ready to conduct expedited procedures 
and available to do so but achieves less speed if the institution itself is not 
sufficiently experienced in administering international commercial arbitration to 
take the necessary procedural steps in a timely manner. For instance, in 2012 
the Finland Chamber of Commerce (FCC) dealt with 163 parties but only 22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1767 R. Graving, ‘The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good A Job Are They 
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1768 Nickles (1991) p. 143; See also Carter (1994) p. 785 
1769 Silverman (1993) p.113 
1770 See p. 157-159 Section 4.4.6.1 
1771 Najar (2010) 
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came from outside Finland.1772 By contrast, 133 out 256 parties who were 
involved with SCC Arbitrations were international.1773 Most of the institutions 
keep the record of their domestic and international arbitration cases but do not 
publish the number of FTA cases separately.  Nevertheless, providing the 
number of international arbitrations indicates the international character of 
particular institutions. It is obvious that SCC conduct more international cases 
than FCC. 
 
Some arbitral institutions simply may not be able to increase their involvement 
with international cases to gain the necessary experience in conducting 
international administration.1774 They may be unable to recruit sufficiently 
experienced arbitrators onto their lists or to hire administrative staff with the 
experience of international commercial arbitration.1775  For these institutions 
the only possible way to ensure better preparation and presentation for 
international FTA would be to appoint FTA arbitrators from a global list. These 
FTA arbitrators could then replace the inexperienced arbitrators on the young 
institution’s list and provide proper administrative support.1776 Currently, there 
is no such global list for experienced FTA arbitrators and each institution has 
to rely on its own list of arbitrators to conduct either regular domestic or 
international arbitrations. Having a global list of FTA arbitrators would be 
particularly useful in providing support in the preliminary stages of FTA.1777 An 
experienced arbitrator can encourage parties to agree on undisputed pertinent 
facts and thereby considerably reduce the testimony. He can also define the 
arbitrable issue precisely and thereby better focus the later tasks of preparing 
written submissions and prehearing statements. This preparation of a global 
list of FTA arbitrators could help if institutions educate individuals on how to 
manage fast-track procedures without reducing the legal certainty and trust of 
ICA. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1772 2012 Caseload of FCC available at http://arbitration.fi/en/statistics/ 
1773 2012 Caseload of SCC available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/hem-3/statistik-2.aspx 
1774 Mustill (1998) p. 17 
1775 Blessing (1989) p. 7 
1776 Sussman/Underwood (2011) p. 22 
1777 Mourre (2010) 
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There is no reason why a global list of FTA arbitrators cannot be created and 
education on FTA procedures cannot be given for this purpose. Each 
institution needs only to provide the names of the FTA arbitrators on their list 
that dealt with FTA cases in previous years.1778 The current lists of arbitrators 
that arbitral institutions hold could provide the necessary framework for the 
creation of global FTA arbitrators list.1779  
 
Arbitral bodies should be more expedition-minded when providing FTA 
services. If parties are, for their own reasons, reluctant to keep a strict check 
on the way the arbitrators manage time, it is the role of arbitral institutions to 
step in and exercise such checks. This interrogation is legitimate; after all, one 
of the advantages of administered FTA versus ad hoc FTA is the supervisory 
function of the institution, which should ensure reliability of FTA procedures. 
The institutions should (if not already) train their Secretariat for the satisfactory 
advancement of fast-track proceedings. Where possible, they should seek to 
provide the same training to arbitrators.1780 
 
Professor Hans Smit went so far as to suggest that the major arbitral 
institutions can no longer meet the needs he perceives for improvement, and 
that, for this and other reasons, there should be ‘a single global institution that 
would make uniformly improved processes and facilities available anywhere in 
the world’, with existing institutions becoming simply ‘branches’ of the global 
international arbitration system.1781  
 
However, the suggestions above for education programmes for FTA and the 
establishment of a global list of FTA arbitrators is not impractical and 
theoretical, it has a realistic potential to increase the wider scope of FTA.  
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5.3.2.4  Changing the Habits and Perceptions of the 
International Arbitration Community  
It is well within the power of the international arbitration community to break 
the habits and preconceptions of practitioners which make them reluctant to 
use FTA.1782 However, getting counsel, arbitrators and institutions to change 
their approach to FTA, and to modify their expectations as to how long is 
reasonable for each step to take, is unlikely to be achieved overnight. 1783 
 
Currently, FTA is approached on the basis that it is perfectly acceptable to 
provide additional procedural steps and extend time limits so that arbitration 
takes between 6 months to 1 year from commencement to delivery of the 
award.1784 This is still faster than the average duration of ICA which takes 
between 2 to 3 years to compete.1785 However, if counsel, the tribunal, the 
institution (if applicable) and the parties agree that it will be dealt with on time, 
and are prepared to observe time limits, the default approach to all arbitration 
could become what is currently regarded as fast-track. FTA would then be 
offered as the usual starting point and only with good reason would the parties 
be steered towards the back-up position of regular procedures.1786 
 
Although introducing specific sets of FTA rules is not a prerequisite for the 
conduct of fast-track procedures, arbitral institutions should investigate 
methods of expediting arbitral proceedings whenever possible.1787 For 
instance, there is a need to accelerate nomination procedures for arbitrators 
under all regular arbitration rules as the LCIA does in Article 5(4) in which the 
institution is mandated to appoint the entire arbitral tribunal "as soon as 
practicable" after receipt of the response.1788 More particularly Article 9 of the 
LCIA Rules provides specific provision for shortening the time for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1782 Mistelis (2004) p.525 
1783 Scherer, M., & Baizeau, D. (2009) pp.130-151 
1784 Magnusson (2001) p. 13 
1785 CIArb Cost Survey 2011 
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1788 LCIA Rules, Article 5(4) 
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formation of the arbitral tribunal “in exceptional urgency, on or after the 
commencement of the arbitration” which otherwise follows the standard 
formation procedures under the LCIA Arbitration Rules.1789 It authorises the 
LCIA Court, in its complete discretion, to ‘abridge or curtail’ any time limit 
contained in the rules concerning the formation of the tribunal.1790 
 
Each party should be ready to nominate its arbitrator within a few days, and 
challenges should be required within 24 hours or a similar limited time 
frame.1791 An arbitration clause that urges the arbitral tribunal to issue the 
award “within three months after appointment of the chairman” or “within six 
months from the constitution of the arbitral tribunal” certainly does not have its 
full intended effect if, due to various challenging procedures, the appointment 
of the chairman or the constitution of the arbitral tribunal takes months to 
conclude.1792 Indeed, after the expeditious appointment of the arbitral tribunal, 
counsel and the arbitrators should not slip into the default mode of regular 
arbitration and adopt a leisurely timetable.1793 There is scope for increasing 
the use of FTA if more regular arbitration rules are convertible to full-blown 
fast-track procedures. Converting to FTA in this way could see the process 
completed in three to six months, rather than two to three years, as is the 
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5.3.1 Reducing the time and cost of producing the 
award 
Another common criticism of ICA is that tribunals take too long to render 
awards.1795 This is despite the fact that courts have consistently held that 
arbitrators have no obligation to provide written explanations of their 
decisions, and although arbitration awards have no precedential value.1796 
According to respondents of the 2012 SIA/WC survey, tribunals took 
unjustifiably long to render awards in 28% of arbitrations. Unsurprisingly, 
arbitrators believed this happened in only 12% of their arbitrations, whereas 
private practitioners and in-house counsel think this happened in 32% and 
33% of their arbitrations, respectively.1797 
 
Awards may be longer than necessary because arbitrators are writing lengthy 
opinions and this has become a standard practice after international arbitral 
proceedings.1798  Unless parties specifically agree to unreasoned awards this 
also true after FTA proceedings. There are four main reasons for lengthy 
reasoning: 
 
First, arbitrators are trying to demonstrate that due process has been 
observed during the conduct of FTA procedures, even though this may be 
unnecessary.1799 The Arbitrator’s personal concern to reduce the possibility of 
annulment of his FTA award has led to the writing of both pre- and post-
hearing briefs, modelled after regular arbitration proceedings.1800 Many 
arbitrators are simply not ready to accept the undertakings given by court 
judges, inside and outside the courtroom, that even drastic action by 
arbitrators to speed up a case will not be treated as want of due process.1801  
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1798 House/Corgan (1991) 
1799 Rogers (2001) p. 348 
1800 Davis/Smit/Brown/Affaki/et al. (1994) p. 358 
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Second, writing a long opinion or a dissent in a three-member arbitral tribunal 
entitles the arbitrator to ask for a larger fee for his services.1802 Third, it is 
through writing up their opinions, that arbitrators build up the vital track record 
on which parties rely when choosing their arbitrator.1803 Fourth, institutional 
control mechanisms such as secretaries of Courts of Arbitration (like the ICC’s 
award scrutiny process) encourage lengthy reasoning by demanding strict 
compliance with formalities.1804 They should instead try to support the fast 
track nature of the proceedings.  
 
The 2012 SIA/WC survey reports two thirds (64%) of respondents have never 
used the issuance of an unreasoned award as a method of expediting arbitral 
proceedings. This shows that there is great scope for improvement.1805  
 
Figure 31: What is an appropriate length of time for rendering an award?
Source: 2012 SIA/WC Survey p.39 charts 41  
 
Different expectations about the appropriate length of time for rendering an 
award need to be encouraged. Two-thirds (67%) of respondents’ believed it 
was acceptable for a sole arbitrator to render an award within three months 
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after the closure of proceedings. This acceptable period might well be reduced 
given that most FTA rules provide overall time-limits of three months for the 
issuance of the award from the establishment of the arbitral tribunal. Similarly, 
for three-members tribunals, one-third (37%) of respondents believed that the 
award should be rendered within three months. Again, this view needs to be 
shifted if FTA is to be used more widely. Interestingly, about 13% respondents 
stated that it depends on the case.1806  
 
In order to improve the scope for the wider application of FTA there also 
needs to be research on the global enforceability of summary awards.1807 In 
the meantime, arbitrators should be trained to keep cost and time at a 
minimum when rendering reasoned awards.1808 For example, prior to the 
hearing some arbitrators prepare for themselves sections of the draft award 
on the basis of the written submissions of the parties. The arbitrator may be 
able to proceed a long way in such a draft, subject to what is learned at the 
hearing.1809 After the hearing, the arbitrator who immediately drafts the award 
with the issues still fresh in his mind may save substantial amounts of 
time.1810 Of course, this requires prior preparation of schedules to set aside 
the necessary time. Even where it appears necessary that partial or interim 
awards are to be made, the same process of thorough preparation, focus, and 
immediate response is needed in FTA. The end result of all this effort is a 
well-reasoned award rendered with appropriate speed which boosts parties’ 
confidence in entering into an FTA agreement.1811 
 
However, some issues about the award are beyond the arbitrator’s control. 
The ICC may send an award back and forth many times until it is convinced of 
its quality.1812 In addition to the combined efforts of parties, counsel, and 
arbitrators, successful FTA also requires an appropriate environment like an 
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institution that will act quickly to reconcile different points of view occurring 
during the case.1813   
 
5.3.2 Cases resistant to the application of FTA  
Although FTA is trying to prove itself to be an effective means of resolving 
international commercial disputes, it is by no means a panacea.1814 Like all 
forms of dispute resolution, it has its drawbacks which render it less suitable 
than other forms of dispute resolution in certain contexts.1815  Because FTA 
involves a very tight timetable, with limited flexibility to extend time limits, this 
can give rise to difficulties in substantial, complex or document heavy 
cases.1816 For these types of disputes, increasing the scope for FTA is a much 
more difficult task. At the end of the day, it is crucial for reasons of 
enforceability, that the award be rendered at the appropriate pace for the 
specific circumstances.1817  
 
Large and complicated disputes  
These may take many months or even years to reach the stage of an award in 
the case of arbitration. They are not usually suited to being resolved in the 
shorter time limits contemplated by FTA Rules. This may be the case where 
the dispute concerns a project requiring an in-depth post-mortem.1818  
 
Disputes involving a government  
Allegations against governmental bodies usually need to be supported by 
bureaucratic steps whose slowness and need for extensive documentation 
prohibits the short time frame required for FTA.1819  Thus for example, fast-
track procedures are inappropriate to resolve investment treaty disputes 
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1816 Gaillard, E. (1998) p. 31 
1817 Stipanowich (2008) p. 383 
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where government agencies, ministries and ministerial officers are 
involved.1820  
 
Multi-tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses  
These clauses, which try to encourage the parties to resolve their disputes 
amicably, are now common in international commercial contracts.1821 In 
particular, mediation, in all its various permutations, is becoming an 
increasingly popular non-adversarial means of attempting to resolve 
commercial dispute before they blow up into full-scale warfare between the 
parties.1822 Where, however, ADR Rules apply before FTA, the process of 
FTA is often impeded after the dispute has arisen. By requiring a party to “cool 
off”, or explore whether there is room for compromise or agreement, the 
potential speed of FTA may be lost.1823 
 
Interim Measures 
In a similar vein, there is usually no need for interim measures under an FTA 
procedure.1824 Because the arbitration must be quick and interim awards tend 
to be challenged, the decision for “fast-track” arbitration is a decision against 
interim measures.1825 In any case, duplication should be avoided as it may 
seriously impede the positive effects of fast track procedures. Interim awards 
are likely to propel an attack in court and therefore completely undermine the 
fast track scheme.1826 
 
In certain circumstances forgoing FTA and expediting regular arbitration may 
be the quickest way to get things done.1827 The clearest examples are 
disputes which need to be supported by copious expert evidence or extensive 
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discovery or that require the testimony of many witnesses.1828 If serious 
allegations are made, supported by expert evidence, the responding party 
may well be put at a disadvantage if it is not given the opportunity to explore 
whether another expert is able to counter the evidence of the referring party’s 
expert.1829 For this reason, unless the timetable and procedural steps for the 
fast-track procedure are substantially relaxed, FTA is often considered an 
unsuitable forum for large complex disputes.1830  Similarly, where large 
amounts of money are at stake, protracted and refined arbitral procedures are 
not superfluous.1831 However, there is no reason why less complex disputes 
with high value claims arising from an international contracts may not be 
brought to FTA and dealt with satisfactorily.1832 
 
5.3.3 Dispute ideally suited to FTA 
 
Arbitration literature contains many observations on the suitability of FTA to 
particular types of dispute. Gaillard, for instance, concedes that fast-track 
arbitration may not be suitable in all cases and should perhaps be used only 
when time is of the essence for the parties.1833 
 
The type of contracts where time is of the essence and FTA is a natural 
choice have been identified by Yves to include disputes arising out of financial 
transactions such as loans, securities, derivatives, banking and broker 
transactions. These normally involve issues of default that can be resolved 
relatively quickly.1834  According to Lew, disputes over price and quality 
determination are good examples of issues which both warrant and are 
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capable of fast-track arbitration.1835  Sports disputes can also be resolved 
within a few days for Paulsson1836 who also commented on the suitability of 
ICANN disputes for fast-track arbitration.1837 For Arias1838, ‘Cinderella 
arbitrations' involving small claims are ideally disposed of on a fast-track 
basis.  
 
Broichmann1839 suggests pre­closing mergers and acquisitions disputes are 
suitable for fast-track procedure.1840  Rosso & Dorgan1841 illustrated the 
suitability of fast-track arbitration in the electricity industry where the parties 
cannot wait one or two years for an award to settle their dispute. All of these 
disputes are time sensitive and demand the expedition that fast-track 
procedure can provide.  
 
Large, high value disputes should be considered carefully before FTA is 
embarked upon, but otherwise there is a scope for wider FTA application. 
Indeed, the majority of international commercial disputes should be capable of 
satisfactory determination by way of FTA. 
 
 Concluding Remarks 5.4
Despite the increasing complexity of international commercial disputes, FTA 
can be made more suitable for their resolution once practitioners have 
become accustomed to fast-track procedures.1842 In most cases, less time to 
decide a case does not result in a lower quality arbitral award. This is mainly 
because in FTA procedures all participants are compelled to focus on the key 
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issues to be determined by the tribunal, rather than allowed to turn over every 
stone.1843 
 
The NYC, national arbitration legislation and the interpretation fast-track 
procedures by national courts generally support FTA awards, so what is 
required is not setting up specific sets of FTA rules, but educating the 
international arbitration community.1844 Judging by the level of complaints from 
clients, FTA without institutional supervision does not seem to work in the 
resolution of international commercial disputes.1845  
 
There are certainly scenarios that do not encourage a belief in the wider 
scope for FTA. For example, if a party goes through lengthy and costly 
proceedings only to find the FTA award is not enforced.1846 As we saw in the 
second part of this chapter, FTA proceedings involve many risks such as 
damaging applications of mandatory rules, public policy or narrow 
interpretation of the NYC in the lex arbitri or at the place of enforcement. The 
laws regulating the enforcement of arbitral awards becomes less and less 
predictable and as a result FTA awards are not consistently enforced across 
the globe.1847 
 
The NYC made enforcement of foreign arbitral awards generally considerably 
easier, but still there is an obvious lack of uniformity.1848 Being unable to 
determine if FTA will be enforced by different countries is obviously 
detrimental for the wider application of FTA. Dissatisfied parties enjoy various 
options to resist the enforcement of an FTA award. Therefore, FTA 
proceedings are suspected of reducing guarantees offered by international 
arbitral awards: a final and binding award.1849 
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This is not a big problem in arbitration friendly countries like England, 
Switzerland and France, where courts have been very supportive of the 
expedited arbitration process, unless it clearly violates the rules of due 
process.1850 In these countries the success rate of the enforceability of FTA 
awards is very high.1851 This gives parties and arbitrators the confidence to 
conduct expeditious arbitrations in these countries.1852  There is a scope for 
the wider application of FTA in other countries that are less FTA friendly if 
they can be encouraged to improve their legislation and reduce the risk of 
FTA awards not being enforced. 
 
In this respect, it is important to emphasise that articles V of the NYC and 
Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provide that a national court 
may, refuse enforcement; it is not obliged to.  Thus, even if the resisting party 
proves there are grounds that justify refusal of the FTA award under the 
NYC/UNCITRAL system, the court retains the discretion to enforce the award. 
This creates a clear presumption in favour of enforcing FTA awards and many 
NYC/UNCITRAL member countries have endorsed this.1853  
 
However, in less arbitration friendly countries procedural elements of FTA 
may be seen contrary to their public policy according to Article V(2) 
exceptions to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; in these 
cases each country reserves the right for its courts to exercise ultimate control 
over the FTA process and awards.1854  
 
The potential of the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) to frustrate 
the goals of fast-track procedures and the recognition and enforcement of 
FTA awards has long troubled parties, lawyers, and arbitrators. Public policy 
is often compared to an "unruly horse", which may lead us from sound law. 
Some recent developments, especially in India, but also in other economically 
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upcoming countries, may even indicate more trouble since these countries 
seem to expand the definition of public policy far beyond general international 
practice.1855  
 
Successful challenges to enforcement of the award under both Article V(1)(b)  
and Article V(2)(b) have established that equality of treatment and the right to 
be heard are fundamental values whose breach results in an unenforceable 
award; the speed of FTA procedures increases such risks.1856  
 
In certain countries a time limit for rendering awards defines the arbitrators’ 
mandate and an award rendered after this mandate has expired may be 
refused enforcement.1857 Thus it is necessary to consider those countries 
which may have mandatory time limits or sanctions in their national laws for 
parties who do not respect the time-limits for FTA.1858  
 
Concerns over the enforceability of FTA awards are a serious limitation to 
increasing the scope of application of FTA in international commercial 
arbitration.1859  In order to facilitate the use of FTA, improvements should be 
made to existing arbitration laws, institutional FTA rules and procedures. In 
the meantime parties should be aware of the pitfalls that they might encounter 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1855 ICCA's Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention : A Handbook for Judges. 
(2011) p. 107 
1856 Park (2007) p. 77 
1857 Poudret/Basson (2004) pp. 309-403. 
1858 Kaufmann-Kohler/Peter (2001) p. 210 
1859 Craig/Park/Paulsson (1990) § 9.01 at 158. 
1860 Kreindler  (1998) p. 181 
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 Recommendations to increase scope of FTA 5.5
 
There is no single recommendation which can increase the scope for the 
wider application of FTA in the resolution of international commercial disputes.  
Rather, a collective effort from different stakeholders involved in each step of 
the fast-track arbitral process is required.1861 This thesis makes the following 
suggestions in order to increase the scope of FTA in international dispute 
resolution. 
 
1) The national law governing FTA and the applicable arbitration 
rules should regulate the court’s involvement in FTA 
proceedings. The English Arbitration Act of 1996 is a good 
example, which correctly stipulates as an underlying principle 
that the court should not intervene with arbitration proceedings 
unless otherwise expressly provided by the law. This approach 
can be implemented in less arbitration friendly legislation so that 
court intervention is minimised in order to avoid parallel 
proceedings that may hinder the fast-tracking of international 
arbitral proceedings. 1862  
 
2) There should be a proper allocation of powers related to FTA 
between the arbitral institutions, the arbitration tribunal and the 
national courts. In general the national courts enjoy wide-
ranging powers in supervising or assisting in ad hoc FTA. 
However, with the increasing use of institutional FTA, it is 
desirable to shift some of those court functions to the arbitration 
institutions. For instance, national law may delegate the power 
to decide on jurisdictional issues to the arbitration institutions, 
under whose auspice the arbitration proceedings are to be 
monitored. Under the Chinese Arbitration Law of 1995, either of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1861 Freyer (1998) pp. 104 
1862 Park (2011) pp. 314 
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the parties may, instead of going to the court, raise a 
jurisdictional plea concerning arbitration before the arbitration 
body, which is believed to be quicker and more capable of 
dealing with these issues than the national court. 1863   
 
Another area is the allocation of powers between arbitration 
institutions and the courts in appointing and replacing 
arbitrators. For the same reason it would be better to empower 
permanent arbitration institutions to appoint arbitrators, to 
decide on challenges, and to replace arbitrators. In line with this 
understanding the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance 1996 
provides that the HKIAC may serve as an appointing authority in 
lieu of the court.1864 
 
3) It is vital to standardise shortened time limits to be applied to the 
various stages of FTA proceedings and auxiliary judicial 
proceedings. The national law, the arbitration rules and the 
parties’ agreement may serve to this end. Time limits may 
occasionally make international arbitration proceedings 
inflexible but they provide consistency for parties. In practice 
parties commonly approach the court to apply for assistance or 
intervention only to discover that the court delays the procedure 
intolerably because the court is not subject to any time limits.1865  
 
4) The time has come for arbitrators and arbitral institutions to take 
on a more enhanced active role in FTA proceedings. This would 
replicate the role of judges in many jurisdictions who in recent 
years have had to accept more responsibilities in pre-trial, 
discovery and document production, and become more involved 
in dealing with expert witnesses. The over-riding goals of FTA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1863 Chang (1998) p.178 
1864 Ibid 
1865 Scherer/Baizeau (2009) pp.130-151 
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demand that arbitrators and arbitral institutions adapt to the 
complex challenges that are now present in ICA. To increase 
the scope of FTA the roles of arbitrators and arbitral institutions 
have to become more pro-active in nature.1866 
 
At the very least provider institutions should begin to conduct 
training in managing FTA fairly but expeditiously with particular 
emphasis on ways of reducing cost and promoting speed. 
Arbitrators should be required to complete training in expedited 
arbitration management before being included on a given 
providers list, and to update their knowledge and skills annually. 
 
Arbitrators should endeavour to improve their conduct of FTA 
proceedings. A party aggrieved by malpractice or mishandling 
of fast-track procedure by arbitrators may turn to the court for 
help, either in the course of FTA or after the completion of 
proceedings. This will inevitably delay or disrupt fast-track 
proceedings.1867 
 
5) An economic and speedy FTA is one without dilatory tactics. 
But in numerous cases dilatory tactics can be employed in 
almost every stage of FTA proceedings. This can be reduced if 
arbitrators and arbitral institutions are empowered to tackle 
delay in commencement of the FTA proceedings by the 
arbitration institutions or the appointing authorities, delay in the 
submission of arbitration documents by the parties or their 
counsels, delay in organizing the necessary arbitration hearings 
or deliberations among the arbitrators, and delay in making 
procedural constraints, observing time-limits and rendering FTA 
arbitral awards. Arbitration institutions and arbitrators should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1866 Slate (2010) p. 195 
1867 Okekeifere (1998) p. 143 
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accept these responsibilities in fast-tracking international 
arbitration proceedings.1868 
 
6) This thesis appreciates the specific sets of FTA Rules created 
by arbitration institutions which expressly lay down fast-track 
procedures. The institutional court or board plays an important 
role in expeditiously reviewing challenges to arbitrators and a 
monitoring of arbitrator’s performance without affecting their 
ultimate independence and decision making power. Institutional 
supervision has eliminated many procedural defects in FTA and 
increased the likelihood of enforceable FTA awards. 
 
7) Last but not least, publishing FTA awards as well as the 
outcome of judicial proceedings that review the FTA awards, 
can help to increase mutual understanding of participants on the 
practical implementation of FTA. So that others could avoid 
making same mistakes and spending unnecessary cost and 
time. With so many lessons that can be studied, it becomes 
more and more apparent that making FTA awards available 
may help the national courts to increase the awareness of the 
importance of respecting fast-track procedures and to become 
familiar with FTA practice, which in turn will inspire the judicial 
personnel to consider FTA favourably for international 
commercial dispute resolution. Conversely, a lack of familiarity 
with FTA may hinder judicial personnel to perform their duties 
promptly in assisting FTA. Publishing judicial proceedings that 
review FTA awards is bound to help the courts, the arbitrators 
and parties to make practical assessments on the potential 
pitfalls of FTA proceedings, encouraging inefficient proceedings 
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to be changed and to promote more widely those proceedings 
which are most efficient.1869 
 
Initiatives which arbitral institutions may offer to increase the scope for wider 
application of FTA include:1870  
1) publish and promote the use of institutional FTA rules 
2) offer rules that set presumptive deadlines for each phase of the 
arbitration and  fast-track procedural steps; train arbitrators in 
the importance of enforcing  stipulated deadlines and observing 
fast-track procedural steps. 
3) use the allocation of costs to encourage efficient conduct of  the 
FTA proceedings  
4) keep developing fast-track procedures that promote procedural 
shortcuts, expedited motion practice  
5) develop and publish rules that provide effective ways of  limiting 
document production to essential information  
6) provide for expedited appointment of arbitrators and require 
arbitrators to confirm their availability  
7) keep parties and their counsel informed about FTA procedures 
and ask their opinion about how to increase the use of FTA. 
 
Finally, we offer a list of initiatives for arbitrators considering or involved in 
FTA proceedings:1871 
1) If a party inquires whether an arbitrator is prepared to act under 
FTA Rules the arbitrator should confirm the general nature of the 
dispute and the expected volume of the file before accepting.  
2) The arbitrator should only accept if time wise he is available 
within the specified shortened time limits and able to render an 
award expeditiously. The tribunal must be candid about its 
availability.  
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1870 Slate (2010) p. 196 
1871 Scherer (2005) p. 237 
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3) Once the arbitrator accepts the appointment he should not step 
down. 
4) The tribunal should draw up a realistic procedural timetable as 
soon as possible, abide by it themselves, and monitor and 
enforce compliance by the parties. 
5) The tribunal should be aware of the extreme pressure on parties 
and their counsel. They cannot have the same expectations 
regarding substantiation and evidence as in normal proceedings. 
They should bear in mind that the Claimant usually has had 
much more time to prepare its case than the Respondent.  
6) The tribunal should quickly get a good grasp of the file and the 
relevant issues. It is recommended to give directions on what 
issues they wish the parties to deal with in their briefs and at the 
hearing (if any).  
7)  If the circumstances require, the tribunal should apply for an 
extension to the Chambers (for instance in the case of 
indispensable evidence and in order to preserve the parties' 
right to be heard). 
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 CONCLUSION 6
 Chapter Conclusions 6.1
 
In order to answer the questions raised at the start of this thesis, a string of 
issues was explored relating to the wider application of FTA in the resolution 
of international commercial disputes.  
 
In the first chapter we began by examining the importance of speed and 
economy in the development of ICA. We contended that speed and economy 
had always been the core value of international dispute resolution but this 
changed after the codification and harmonization of ICA arbitration rules and 
laws. New fundamental values, such as adaptability, flexibility, finality and 
enforceability, promoted through the influence of the NYC and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, became more important than saving cost and time in international 
dispute resolution.  
 
In the second chapter we examined problematic areas of ICA in relation to 
cost and delay. We showed that concerns for slowness and expense were at 
a peak between the late 1980s and early 1990s. We then analysed criticisms 
that ICA had become too costly and too slow to adequately resolve 
international commercial disputes. The chapter also considered that 
minimising cost and speed is not paramount for complicated and large scale 
disputes. For those kinds of disputes, finality and enforceability is more 
important. We established the real problem is for parties involved in mid-size 
and small size arbitrations who desperately need time and cost saving and 
awards which are final binding and enforceable.  
 
To determine when the duration and cost of ICA is excessive we looked at the 
reasons for cost and delay. These included dilatory tactics, different cultural 
and legal backgrounds, Americanisation of ICA and, most important of all, the 
behaviour of international participants.  
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In the third chapter we considered the variety of methods available for 
expediting international arbitration. These included parties’ and arbitrators’ 
autonomy to create streamlined arbitration; revisions of institutional rules and 
arbitration legislation; and the influence of an increasing number of arbitration 
laws, rules and reports.  These methods were identified to disprove the view 
that long delays and excessive costs are inevitable in international commercial 
arbitration. 
 
However, resolving some types of cross-border disputes requires more speed 
and economy than can be achieved within the framework of regular arbitral 
proceedings. While regular procedures have strengths and weaknesses in 
dealing with cost and delay they will not provide truly fast-track procedures 
unless parties specifically agree to them. 
 
In the fourth chapter, we turned specifically to FTA, showing how FTA 
proceedings are used in many different ways to increase speed and economy. 
We analysed a great number of fast-track procedures, including shortened 
time limits, procedural constraints, and abbreviated proceedings. We 
considered several types of FTA models including ad hoc FTA rules, specific 
sets of FTA rules, and FTA under regular arbitration rules, and discerned the 
common element of FTA provisions in these various settings. We then 
identified the strengths and weaknesses of the various FTA proceedings.  
 
Having discussed the elements of FTA, we investigated how the international 
arbitration community has sought to balance the core principles of due 
process against the parties’ freedom of contract. We identified that such a 
balance may be upset by parties when bargaining for speedy and economic 
conduct of arbitration, by arbitral institutions when providing rules for the 
expedited conduct of arbitral proceedings, by the arbitrator when conducting 
expedited procedures, and ultimately by the public court when charged with 
deciding on challenges to the enforcement of an award.  We also gave many 
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examples of how FTA procedures may be accelerated without reducing due 
process rights. 
 
We identified that specific sets of FTA Rules seem to provide a good 
compromise between speed and due process. Institutional provisions ensure 
speed and cost-efficiency but the rules also make a clear allowance for the 
parties’ right to be heard: First, almost all FTA Rules provide procedural 
shortcuts “in principle”, which means that further procedures may be 
submitted in appropriate  circumstances, and there are no time limits set in 
advance by the rules for the submission of briefs.  Second the default rule 
under most FTA provisions is a single or a limited hearing for the examination 
of witnesses and for oral argument, unless both parties agree that the Tribunal 
should decide on the basis of documentary evidence alone. Third, FTA rules 
apply automatically to all cases where the amount in dispute is below a certain 
monetary threshold, “unless the Chambers decide otherwise, taking  into  
account  all  relevant  circumstances”. Fourth, under most FTA Rules, the 
case must be heard by a sole arbitrator unless the parties initially agreed and 
continue to insist on a three members tribunal. Finally, the overall time limit to 
render the award may be extended in exceptional circumstances, a condition 
agreed among practitioners to be strictly but not unreasonably applied by the 
Chambers. 
 
Chapter 5 contrasted the arguments in favour of using FTA more widely in 
international commercial cases with reasons to be sceptical about its utility.   
 
In the first part, we observed that parties are eager to use FTA in principle but 
fearful to use it in practice. We saw that fast-track arbitration is not an 
improvement if it results in awards which cannot be enforced or decisions 
which are not conductible in practice. In order to increase the scope for wider 
application of FTA parties need to trust in the effectiveness of FTA 
proceedings. 
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In the second part we tried to clarify whether one of the common criticisms of 
fast-track procedures is justified, namely, whether FTA compromises due 
process. We concluded that there is indeed a risk that FTA fails to guarantee 
due process, in particular for respondents, and that awards are therefore more 
likely to be annulled. Contributing factors to this risk include: arbitrators 
selected for FTA who may be passive towards fast-track procedures; the 
applicable arbitration law of the country in question which may apply 
mandatory timescales and prescribe what procedures may or may not be fast-
tracked; international conventions on arbitration that aim to ensure that arbitral 
proceedings are conducted fairly but which may give unpredictable results if 
narrowly interpreted.  
 
We gave many examples of court decisions that have set aside awards on the 
basis of FTA provisions that violate due process but also many that support 
FTA awards. In ICA each legal environment brings with it a panoply of 
advantages and disadvantages. These should be carefully measured to 
determine if one should adopt a FTA clause, with whom to apply for 
arbitration, where to situate an FTA, the likelihood of the award being 
enforceable and what law is to be applied to the fast-track procedure. 
 
Most nations recognise the importance of FTA for international trade and have 
enacted arbitration friendly laws whereby an FTA award is only required to 
meet with minimum standards of due process. Once the dispute has arisen 
the central concern is the will of the parties to proceed expeditiously. A 
carefully defined FTA clause in the appropriate legal environment may assist 
the parties in focusing on the dispute that is of key importance to both of them. 
Where difficulties arise, state court assistance can be found in certain 
settings, but this may lead to untoward state court intervention. The arbitral 
institutions play an important role in assisting FTA by their responsiveness 
and also by aiding the integrity of the fast-track process under their rules. At 
the heart is the arbitral tribunal, fashioning the fast-track procedure that 
reduces parties due process concerns and leads to an enforceable award. 
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We also considered how the effectiveness of FTA is affected by the nature of 
the dispute to be decided, the extent to which the issues involve complex 
questions of law and fact, and the objectives of the parties concerned.1872  
We showed that without a detailed study of the matters likely to affect fast-
track procedure, one could easily be misled into believing that simply setting 
out FTA rules and procedures will provide speed and economy in practice and 
therefore conclude the scope of FTA may be increased.  
 
In the final part of the Chapter five we gave suggestions on how to improve 
the scope for the wider application of FTA. If FTA is conducted in a 
professional manner there is no reason why fast track arbitration should not 
be regarded as an efficient and fair dispute settlement procedure and the 
traditional objections to such accelerated arbitration can be dispelled. 
Furthermore, due process rights can be upheld equally, if not in some aspects 
more in fast track arbitration than in regular arbitration. Provided the arbitrator 
safeguards the minimal requirements of due process, thereby ensuring that 
the benefits of FTA proceedings are not perverted (e.g., by exposing the 
ensuing award to rescission or non-enforceability on the basis of grave 
procedural shortcomings), he may well disprove those who might be tempted 
to claim that, with respect to fast track arbitration nobody running at full speed 
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 Analytical Conclusion  6.2
 
Although there is no perfect solution to increasing the effectiveness of FTA 
procedures, there is certainly scope for the wider application of FTA. Each 
dispute constitutes a distinct case with its own character and there will always 
be those disputes which are not suitable for fast-track procedures. But this is 
not a limit, rather it is an opportunity to increase the scope for the wider 
application of FTA. The modern business community demands more dynamic 
means of dispute resolutions and requires from arbitral institutions more 
differentiated services for speed and economy. In the 1990s FTA proved that 
ICA need not always be costly and lengthy. In the 2000s the proliferation of 
specific sets of FTA Rules proved an effective way increasing the scope for 
the wider application of FTA proceedings and in the 2010s the institutions 
have begun to offer new developments to their rules. Some have increased 
the monetary limit for the automatic application of FTA and others have given 
more authority to the arbitral institution to determine the applicability of FTA 
procedures. If arbitral institutions worldwide continue to revise their existing 
arbitration rules, adopting specific sets of FTA rules and introducing new 
provisions where necessary, there is scope of the wider application of FTA.  
 
We offered that creating a global list of FTA arbitrators, educating practitioners 
on FTA procedures, and engaging business users more in the creation of FTA 
rules would help to increase trust in the use of fast-track procedures. 
However, these suggestions are mostly theoretical. The arbitral society cannot 
continue to respond to the requests of fast-track procedures without 
increasing the practical application of FTA. It has to keep listening to the 
voices demanding changes and increased efficiency. At the end of the day, 
business people will choose the solution they find most suitable — it is the 
task of the arbitral society to provide such a solution for them. 
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Increasing the scope of FTA in international commercial arbitration is possible 
but it will not be achieved by improvements only in arbitration friendly 
countries. The initiative lies in the hands of international arbitrators and 
practitioners. Despite its practitioners' legal and cultural differences, the 
practice of international arbitration is increasingly subject to harmonization. It 
is becoming supra-national and the suggestions to improve the scope of FTA 
must also be supra-national. 
 
Obviously, FTA will not be suitable for every contract or for every field of 
international trade. However, international commercial arbitration bodies must 
remain attuned to the regularly voiced desire for speedy and economic 
dispute resolution methods. By continuously developing their institutional FTA 
rules and by educating practitioners to successfully conduct FTA, the 
international arbitration community can easily contribute to the wider 
application of FTA 
 
These are modest suggestions and others will wish to add their own 
suggestions derived from their own experience of fast-tracking international 
commercial arbitration. Once collated by the international arbitration 
community, they could make a difference to improving the scope for the wider 
application of FTA. But bad practices in FTA do tend to drive out good. If 
deficient FTA procedures are not addressed, cynicism will breed contempt for 
fast-track arbitral procedure. None of this is a cry of despair. On the contrary, 
it is a measure of the ever-increasing success of ICA that it must meet new 
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